UNDERSTANDING URBAN RESILIENCE

MIGRATION, DISPLACEMENT & VIOLENCE IN KARACHI
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We are living today in exceptional times. Recent days have witnessed the global COVID–19 pandemic unfold amidst the crises of planetary, ecological, and social health. This combined with the unendurable impacts of austerity measures, suggests that life under precarious conditions and permanent crisis has become the norm. Indeed, very few of the transformations that we have witnessed in Pakistan over the past decade, now seem progressive. With so much hope that was pinned at the global and national levels now dissipating, can we turn to the city as a potential locus for progressive action? For those of us who study cities, to speak of progressive politics is not only to speak of power but also of the exercise of conflicts, protests and challenges at the subnational level. The ‘force-field’ of the city is represented in the everyday social, political and economic struggles in which countless households and individuals are entrenched, as they occupy marginalized and precarious spaces excluded from the protection of the state, thus leaving them vulnerable to exploitative practices.

In a region that is now well over 20 million people, it is nigh impossible to make clear-cut generalizations about the myriad forces that are shaping the lives of ordinary citizens in Pakistan’s largest metropolis, Karachi. This report is a constructive contribution for understanding some of the key dynamics that are shaping people’s decisions to move or migrate to cities like Karachi, and the extraordinary difficulties they are facing not only in making such decisions, but what is happening to them as they find themselves ensconced in the city’s spaces where the temporariness of work and housing, disconnected infrastructures and exposure to institutional and political violence, make their lives increasingly precarious. This report does make one thing clear: hundreds if not thousands of people are on the move across Pakistan’s southern region of Sindh. Notably, the migrations to Karachi are happening from environments that have become politically and ecologically hostile. For many populations, migration has become a question of survival; a measure of last resort that is a reaction to a specific short or long–term event, for instance water scarcity or insufficient water supplies; insufficient income for agriculture; and even displacement due to war.

This report brings forward fresh and insightful information concerning Karachi’s newfangled phase of migration, especially in the context of its expanding peripheral geography where new, income–poor settlements have emerged in the past decade, and where people’s lives intersect with violent histories, unending conditions of exclusion, displacement and ecological degradation; processes in which the state itself is complicit. In doing so, this report also lays bare the meaning of citizenship as migrants and displaced communities are forced to bear the brunt of new forms of deprivation in a rapidly changing urban space.

Akin to many cities across the Global South, Karachi’s ordinary residents constantly endure difficulties in order to make their lives better and more resilient to risks and daily battles. As this report emphasizes, for a progressive city to emerge, policymakers will need to engage with the harsh realities of these new urban spaces, and the unfairness, exploitation and plain criminality that inheres. A crucial point this report makes is, if the state does not acknowledge and engage positively with the new processes that are shaping ordinary lives and spaces in the city, then solutions to poverty and inequality will remain elusive. This is all the more urgent in the context of climate breakdowns and pandemic crises that are intensifying existing forms of racial, gender and class injustices. Hence, for happier and healthier communities to emerge, the state, non-state actors and residents will have to find common ground, and constructive ways to co–produce a resilient future for Karachi; a future that is also tied with an interconnected, extended urban landscape. We have no choice left given the complex times we are plunged in, and the uncertainties of what might emerge from the afterlife of the COVID–19 crisis that is unapparelled and will have deep effects on the governance of cities across the world.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FOREWORD</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVERVIEW</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METHODOLOGY AND CONTEXT</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Site Selection</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Descriptions of each site</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Data Collection</td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISPLACEMENT</td>
<td>09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Resilience in Displacement and Structural Inequities</td>
<td>09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Citizenship and Documentation</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Religion</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Labor</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Rural Geography</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 1: Focus Group Discussions</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 2: Meetings with Government Departments, NGOS and others</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This report is a study of various migrant communities settled in Karachi and how deep-seated inequalities in the distribution of economic, political, and social resources influence their capacity for resilience in the face of forcible displacement. Karachi’s original inhabitants were Sindhi and Baloch people who migrated and settled in the city in the 1700s, followed by Kutchis nearly two centuries later. Both migrated in search of better economic opportunities (Adeem and Lutfi 2016). In the decade after partition in 1947, migrants from Northern, Central, and Western India settled in the city, and its population rose from 450,000 to 1.37 million (Hasan 2002). The Hindu population fell from 61 percent to 8.6 percent and the number of Urdu speaking people grew to 50 percent. According to local historian and trade unionist, Usman Baloch, this exchange of populations was far from peaceful. Karachi’s first bout of urban disturbances was in 1948 when Muslim mobs torched Hindus shops in the city. Ansari (2013) describes the 1948 and 1951 migrations to Karachi and the advent of cooperative housing societies that maintained a sub-cultural identity and created areas in which a migrant group that were a minority lived as a majority. She documents the negative impact on native communities and describes how Sindhi and Makrani natives who grazed on the banks of the Lyari River were overwhelmed with the influx of people and sought legal remedy in 1954 to stop the state dividing up native village land among refugee claimants.

Researcher Shahana Rajani described how General Ayub Khan (1958–1969) used data collection as a means to police and manage informal settlements. The media portrayed jhuggis as unhygienic and an “eye-sore” and therefore necessitating evacuation. Studying reports from Dawn newspapers of the time, Rajani says the first major dislocation of an informal settlement of migrants from India was from the area designated for Jinnah’s tomb in 1958. Many of these people were re-settled in Korangi and while the state proclaimed these satellite settlements were ideal, Rajani found that these people were simply unceremoniously moved there without any housing or infrastructural support. Many opted to sell their plots and return to more central parts of the city where they enjoyed social networks. One of the persistent themes in the state’s narrative about land and housing has been to present land to be occupied or acquired for development as barren and uninhabited, thereby erasing a distinct history of its local inhabitants, whether it was Lalukhet, Golimar, and Korangi in the years after Partition or Gadap villages today. Maps too are political and those that show empty barren land around Karachi’s growing boundaries promote this narrative and sanitize and legitimize the violence of development. Rezoning in 2002 has also been used to include rural areas into urban ones thereby opening them up to development at the expense of the rights of its inhabitants (Anwar 2015).

A second major wave of migration to cities occurred from 1960 to 1980, and it was predominantly from rural to urban areas. It was precipitated by a policy of industrialization and a decline in rural opportunities (UN Habitat 2018). The rapid increase in population in these two decades was due to the resettlement of people from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab in Karachi during Ayub’s era, and the migration of Biharis to Karachi after the formation of Bangladesh (Kalmati 2014, 423). In 1961, the population of Karachi was 1,912,598 and within two decades in the 1981 census, Karachi’s population was counted, with a rapid increase of 184 percent, to be 5,437,984. Karachi was administratively divided into four districts and the census of 1981 also segregates Karachi’s urban (5,208,132) and rural populations (229,852). According to Usman Baloch, this migratory pattern contributed to the exclusion and marginalization of local Baloch in Karachi. Incoming migrants from KPK and Punjab were preferred and inducted into newly formed industries and were consequently politicized in trade unions, while Baloch were restricted to menial jobs at the city’s markets and port. After the 1971 India–Pakistan war and the independence of Bangladesh, Biharis who had moved to East Pakistan after 1947 moved to Karachi. The 1980s witnessed an influx of international migrants including Bangladeshis, Muslim Burmese fleeing persecution, and Afghans forcibly displaced due to Soviet invasion (Gazdar 2003). Although Pakistani citizenship laws recognize someone born on its soil as a citizen, the state has categorically refused to grant second and third generations of these migrants born here this status. Only those Bangladeshis who migrated

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1. Usman Baloch, trade unionist and historian, interview by authors, Karachi, September 17, 2018.
around the events of 1971 are recognized as citizens. Afghan refugees too were accommodated in the 1980s as Pakistan played a key role in supporting the US’s proxy war against the Soviets, but now that policy of accommodation has shifted to one demanding their exit.

Since 2004, militancy and military operations in FATA have resulted in displacements. The operation Rah-e-Nijaat in Malakand displaced over 1 million and Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan displaced another one million people. The two previous military operations in South Waziristan and Swat Valley displaced around three million people (Sayeed 2017). About 500,000 people sought refuge in Karachi after the Swat operation (OCHA). As of September 2014, UN OCHA states there are 961,000 individuals or 89,954 families displaced from North Waziristan (Hameed 2015).

This report attempts to interrogate how certain structural inequalities and injustices faced by the displaced and forcibly migrant communities we studied are produced and reinforced through the use of political and institutional violence. These inequalities and injustices are constructed along the lines of gender, minority status, citizenship, informality of labor, and rural geography, and are solidified through the use of both overt and tacit political violence in which the state itself is complicit. Overt violence is police high-handedness – unlawful stops, unreasonable use of force and extortion – and tacit forms of institutional violence may include the state’s collusion with private interests, inaccessibility of justice systems, erasure from maps and records, and state abdication in service delivery. Our main findings are that political or institutional violence exacerbate vulnerability and impacts a migrant group’s capacity for resilience.
A. SITE SELECTION

Migration and displacement are complex and cannot be reduced to patterns or waves. These do not always follow a rural-to-urban trajectory. In order to limit the scope of our research, we focused on these particular kinds of migrants to Karachi:

1) Rural-Urban Migration:
Poor infrastructure, weak governance, inequitable land ownership, and no control over natural resources are some of the main drivers of this kind of migration. These factors exacerbate the effects upon people who find it increasingly challenging to sustain livelihoods in farming, fishing, and livestock. Many enter into oppressive labor relationships with powerful landlords and others - bonded labor in farming and exploitative wage labor in contract-based fishing. The most vulnerable people in the Indus Delta of Sindh are dealing with multiple crises linked with climatic changes and loss of livelihoods and freshwater. We interviewed inland fishing and farming communities from Thatta, Badin, and Sujawal Districts who are now settled in Ibrahim Hyderi, Rehri Goth, Lath Basti, and in Taiser Town, Karachi.

2) Displacement due to International Conflict:
Millions of Afghan refugees arrived in Pakistan as a result of the Soviet war in Afghanistan. Some of these refugees have settled in different parts of Karachi. We held focus group discussions (FGDs) with an Afghan community residing in Afghan Basti. In addition to this, we met with migrants of Bangladeshi descent, who migrated after the 1971 war. Many of these migrants live in Machar Colony and Ibrahim Hyderi, where they find work in the fishing industry. Since the 1980s, Rohingya Muslims from Burma have also come to Karachi, fleeing communal and religious violence. Although these communities are not recent migrants, and in fact comprise third-generation children born on Pakistani soil, they continue to face obstacles in claiming basic citizenship rights and associated benefits. Discriminatory state policies toward them, including the rolling back of grants of identity cards to those with Bangladeshi heritage or a policy of deportation as opposed to accommodation for Afghans, deepen their economic insecurity and marginalization.

3) Urban Violence and Law Enforcement Operations:
A number of people have been forced to move from their homes because of violence stemming from militancy, sectarianism and gang war. This also includes those who have moved within Karachi after coming in harm’s way and also those fleeing military operations and other violence in FATA. These migrants are harder to trace and dispersed within the city; we were able to locate a few because they are connected to non-governmental organizations or have worked with local government (LG). We held interviews with people who have been displaced because of such violence and reside in various areas including Manghopir, Lyari, and Korangi.

4) Urban infrastructure:
People are continually displaced within the city as a result of the construction of infrastructure or development schemes such as flyovers, roads, and housing projects. We interviewed a community that was displaced due to the construction of Lyari Expressway in 2004 that now lives in Taiser Town. The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR) recognizes that alternative homes provided to those displaced must be habitable and the location of the home should not lead to marginalization in employment opportunities, healthcare services, and education. Those displaced to Taiser Town, however, faced multiple new socioeconomic challenges as they were re-settled far away from their places of work and networks.

B. DESCRIPTIONS OF EACH SITE

A total of ten neighborhoods were studied as field sites around these towns.

1) Ibrahim Hyderi:
Ibrahim Hyderi is a fishing village in Karachi located on coastal belt and adjacent to the Korangi Creek Cantonment. In pursuance of Supreme Court Orders for the new delimitation in Karachi, Ibrahim Hyderi received the status of a new administrative unit (Tehsil) of District Malir Karachi whereas before it was part of
Bin Qasim Town. With one Union Council, this goth, Ibrahim Hyderi, is spread over 111 square kilometers and includes Umer Colony, Rahber Colony, Ali Akbar Shah Goth, Kohli Para, and Baloch Abad; the names of these localities reflect their kinship identity. There are around 9,000 registered voters in Ibrahim Hyderi. This UC comprises four wards (Moro 2019). Before, this Union Council was much larger and included Rehri Goth and Lath Basti. In 2019, this Union Council was divided into three to four new UCs (Moro 2019). According to 2017 census, the population of Ibrahim Hyderi has increased from 438,921 in 1998 to 1,045,815 people in 2017 (Statistics 2018). People from different ethnicities - Sindhi, Baloch, Pashtuns, Punjabi, Saraiki, Afghan and Bangladeshis - live here. During the 1980s, a large number of families of Bangladeshi heritage settled in this area and its surroundings (Kalmati 2014, 707). People migrating from the Indus Delta due to water scarcity and sea water intrusion, settled in Ibrahim Hyderi because of family and kin connections they have with people who arrived earlier. We interviewed migrants from Keti Bundar and Kharo Chan in Thatta. Pakistan People's Party (PPP) is the main political stakeholder, specifically in the area of recently settled migrants from Keti Bundar. In addition, their elected representatives are from the PPP, including all members of Union Councils as well as district council chairman (Moro 2019).

2) Rehri Goth and Lath Basti:
Rehri Goth, located on coastal line, is marked by its extreme vulnerability to cyclones. It is close to the Korangi Fish Harbor. It is a union council (UC) in District Malir Karachi. The estimated population of the settlement is 45,000 (Arif Hasan 2017). The land on which this settlement is located is owned by the Karachi Port Trust (KPT). Most residents here are Sindhi and Baloch and work in the fishing industry, some of whom have lived there for generations; others have moved here in recent years, coming from villages in and around the Indus Delta (Arif Hasan 2017). Lath Basti is a small village within UC Rehri Goth associated with the Jat tribe. It is near Cattle Colony and Jumma Goth. It is one of the neighborhoods of Bin Qasim Town in Karachi, Sindh, Pakistan. It has 900 households and 2200 registered voters. Due to the neighborhood's proximity to Lucky Coal and Electric Fire Power Plant and the Pakistan International Bulk Terminal Limited (PIBT) Coal terminal, residents here complain of skin and respiration related health problems. We interviewed families recently settled from Shafi Muhammad Shah Goth in Kharo Chan area of District Sujawal.

3) Ali Muhammad Brohi Goth:
Ali Muhammad Brohi Goth is located on coastal belt and hilly area of UC-30 Chashma Goth, District Malir Karachi. It is one of the localities of Bin Qasim Town. The goth hosts a mixed population of Bengalis, Baloch, Pashtuns, Punjabi and Sindhi. People work in the fishing industry and factories located in Korangi SITE area. The area is under the political control of the PPP and the UC Chairman, MNA and MPA are all members of this party. This is home to diverse communities mainly Bengalis, Baloch and Pashtuns. In interviews, they gave different reasons for migration including better livelihood opportunities, available and cheaper land as compared to other parts of Karachi; those of Bangladeshi origin reported inter-ethnic (Pashtun-Mohajir), violence in Orangi Town.

4) Goths of Gadap Town:
There are more than fifteen goths or villages of Gadap Town in UC Kathore surrounded by Bahria Town Karachi Limited (BTKL) commercial and housing complex. These villages have survived so far. However in March 2019, the Implementation Bench of the Supreme Court (SC), ruled that BTKL can pay 460 billion rupees over a seven-year period in exchange for 16,896 acres of land. Our visits were to five separate villages - Arbab Gabol Goth, Ali Muhammad Gabol Goth, Depar Gondar Goth, Usman Allah Rakhiyo and Kirthar Goth. These goth residents have lived here for three to four generations. Each goth comprises thirty-five to a hundred households. These villages have come under the increasing threat of forced eviction after the March 2019 SC decision. BTKL and other such elite housing projects start from Motorway M-9 (Super Highway) and has steadily advanced into the jurisdiction of District Jamshoro (Kohistan belt) and Kirthar National Park.

5) Machar Colony:
Machar (aka Machaira) colony (union council 5) is located at Maripur Road, Harbour Tehsil of District West Karachi. It is one of the localities of Keamari Town. It covers an area of approximately 4.5 square kilometers, with a density four to seven times higher than the average for Karachi. Machar Colony is a home to different ethnicities with a population of between 700,000 and one million plus, a majority of whom are Bengalis and Burmese (Arif Hasan 2017). Karachi Port Trust is the land-owning authority and the neighborhood has not been regularized. According to the Pakistani Bengali Action Committee, there are 85,000 people settled here of
Bangladeshi, Burmese and Afghan origin (Herald 2017). Possibly due to this diversity, elected representatives of the union council belong to the PML-N, whereas the MPA (PS-113) is from Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI).

6) Sultanabad, Manghopir:
Sultanabad Cooperative Housing Society is on the way to Manghopir road, New Karachi. Manghopir is also a new administrative unit as Tehsil Manghopir in District West, Karachi. Formerly, this area was counted in one of the neighborhoods of Gadap Town of District Malir Karachi. According to the 2017 census, Manghopir with UC-8 is home to 713,753 people (Statistics 2018). The estimated population of Sultanabad with UC-5 is 35,000, comprising sectors and Meer Muhammad Goth. Sultanabad has witnessed an expansion in the recent decade. Up to 80 percent of the total population of this area comprises Pashtuns and the remaining are Hazara and Baloch. The chairman for UC-8 is from PPP while the MPA and MNA of this area are from MQM and PTI respectively. Currently, whole area is under the hold of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) and UC chairman and Vice chairman both belong to JUI. Here, we interviewed internally displaced persons (IDPs) from South Waziristan who left after the launch of the military operation, Rah-e-Nijat. Many of them moved to Karachi. Most of the people settled here in Sultanabad said they migrated from Tehsil Sargodha and said they were reluctant to go back because of violence, poor economic conditions, lack of basic facilities, damaged infrastructure and onerous requirements of identification.

7) Afghan Basti:
Afghan Basti is located near the Karachi Northern Bypass and houses a community of Hazara and Afghan refugees. On its outskirts, there are a number of Baloch and Sindhi Villages. A number of migrants of the Mehsud tribe from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) are also settled in this locality. The total population currently is over 10,000. Most of the families shifted to this area in 2007 from Sohrab Goth and other areas in the vicinity of the Super Highway due to conflict between Darri and Pashto language speakers; but some returned to Sohrab Goth. Some of the families who returned eventually resettled in Afghan Basti. According to UNHCR, there are 130,746 documented Afghan refugees in Jadeed Camp and Afghan Basti of Gadap Town (Zaman 2017). Afghan Basti comes under the administrative control of District West Karachi whereas earlier, it was part of Gadap Town. We interviewed Afghan refugees who had migrated from Afghanistan to Pakistan due to the 1979 Soviet invasion. Although in recent years, many Afghans have been coerced to return to their country, there is also an ongoing movement of Afghans arriving in the country (UNHCR 2018).

8) Lyari Basti:
Lyari Basti is a governmental housing scheme located in Taiser Town, Karachi close to the Northern Bypass. It is one of the neighborhoods of UC-38 (Yousuf Goth) Gadap Town, District West Karachi. The affectees of Lyari Expressway project were given residential plots in Lyari Basti. There is mixed population in Lyari Basti comprising Sindhi, Punjabi, Saraiki, Pashtun, Baloch, and Urdu speaking people. A large number of Hindu and Christian families are also settled in this area – about 1000 Christian and more than thirty Hindu households. This Union Council, comprising twenty-five to thirty goths, hosts a significant number of Christian and Hindu families. Evictees of Lyari Expressway were given plots of eighty yards here and 50,000 rupees as compensation as part of a resettlement plan. Both the MPA (PS-122) and MNA (NA-252) belong to the PTI while the local government representatives are from the MQM.

9) Khuda Ki Basti:
Khuda Ki Basti (KKB) is a low-income housing scheme in Karachi and is one of the localities of Taiser Town and adjacent to Lyari Basti which is located in the northern end of Karachi at a distance of about 2 kilometers from the city center, 14 kilometers from Hyderi Commercial area (North Nazimabad) and 10 kilometers from Nagan Chowrangi, a prominent junction. Khuda Ki Basti is also a part of Union Council-38 Yousof Goth, Gadap Town, District West Karachi. The area has many ethnic and religious communities including Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashtun and Urdu speaking people. This housing project covers 100 acres and was conceived by former Director General of Sindh Kachi Abadis Authority (SKAA), Tasneem Siddiqui and is a joint venture of Malir Development Authority (MDA) and the NGO Saiban. In 1987, Siddiqui’s incremental housing project aimed to provide affordable homes. Acumen Fund (2004) claims that this scheme has created 6,000 housing units and reached 35,000 low-income urban residents with affordable, legally entitled real estate assets (Azfar and Rahman 2004). Residents of KKB stated that there are about a thousand Hindu and Christian families here. We interviewed Hindu families located in KKB who migrated from Tando Muhammad Khan and Badin and are part
of an ongoing pattern of migration instigated by political and environmental factors.

10) Holy Mary Colony:
Holy Mary Colony is an irregular settlement on Karachi’s Northern Bypass road. It is one of the neighborhoods of Gadap Town, District West Karachi. Dozens of minority households who have migrated from Badin and Punjabi speaking Christians live here. This locality is close to Lyari Basti and comes under the administrative control of UC-38, Yousuf Goth of District West Karachi. Malir Development Authority (MDA) is the land-owning authority of this area. We interviewed people who have migrated from Tando Muhammad Khan, Badin District, Sindh most of whom migrated because of economic reasons. Residents of this area predominantly work as daily wage laborers; women are mostly engaged in home-based industrial work.

C. DATA COLLECTION

This research project employed four kinds of data collection methods, namely: (1) focus group discussions (FGDs), (2) detailed open-ended interviews, (3) media analysis, and (4) literature review. In addition to these methods, the team held weekly or bi-weekly meetings in order to discuss findings from field visits, relevant literature, and ways to strengthen future field visits. In total, we conducted eighteen FGDs in localities, twenty-two interviews with NGOs, researchers, historians, and journalists, and fourteen meetings with government departments. See Appendix 1 and 2.

In the initial stages of field-work, we interviewed academics, NGO personnel, reporters, and researchers in order to gain an understanding of recent findings by others studying the communities we focused on. For instance, we spoke to journalist Khizar Qazi and urban planner Mohammad Toheed because of their extensive experience working in Karachi, and these interviews helped us identify localities where relevant communities reside. Our interview with Safina Gill, a human rights activist who has worked on minority issues in particular, was useful in understanding the experiences of religious minorities and refugees. Tasneem Siddiqui’s practical knowledge about housing projects stemming from his own work in this area was also helpful. Mohammad Ali who runs an NGO called Roshni Helpline and has decades of experience working with law enforcement and social networks to recover missing children provided insight to the city’s dynamics.

Following this, we conducted field visits to the settlements that these communities reside in. These visits were limited by the contacts we had who could link us up with them. We held FGDs based on a questionnaire designed to gather information to build community profiles. The questionnaire focused on data pertaining to biographical information and life before and after migration. In particular, questions were centered around reasons for migration, challenges faced following migration, and access to services provided by the state and NGOs. Additionally, we attempted to understand gendered differences in experiences of migration and displacement. In particular, we assessed the different factors that lead to migration – for example, women’s migration is usually dependent on the decisions of the men of their households – and they have a different experience accessing jobs, services, and public space after migration or displacement.

The focus group discussions were fruitful because they allowed for corroboration of information by multiple members of the community, and also created an environment that was likely more comfortable for interviewees to express themselves as compared to one-on-one interviews. However, a limitation in of the focus group discussion method that we experienced was that women were not always equal participants in these discussions, either due to outright exclusion or silencing. In a focus group discussion at Machar Colony, for example, women sat at the fringes of the gathering while the male union councilor dominated the discussion. An interviewee in Afghan Basti shared the story of a researcher who forced their way into speaking to the women and how this resulted in repercussions for the women. We were ultimately able to speak to some women from this community who were visiting their local social service provider. Hence, constraints related to gaining access to the women of some communities exist, though they are sometimes navigable when, for instance, social service providers are willing to provide a connection.

Even though the communities are on the brink of survival, they often generously shared stories about their lives with a mix of cynicism and hope, in the context of their encounters with researchers and NGOs. There were also differences in terms of willingness to share information – Bengali and Bihari migrants, for instance, understandably felt threatened answering questions related to citizenship, while Afghan refugees were more
open about their exclusion from citizenship. This difference may have been due to the latter having a more distinct identity as refugees and many have proof of residence cards that give them some official status.

Alongside the FGDs with the aforementioned groups, we also interviewed members of local government. We chose to speak to them because local government has been an important forum to demand change at the community level. Interviewing union councilors, many of whom are themselves residents of the communities we have studied, was helpful in illuminating the struggles faced by elected officials who know their constituencies well in obtaining the services they require.

Throughout the course of our research, we interviewed various stakeholders, including NGOs and Community based Organizations working on urban issues, as well as various government departments. These interviews focused on obtaining information about the kinds of services these stakeholders provide, as well as their perspectives on the issues faced by the people we have studied. The purpose of these conversations was to understand the approaches being taken by state and non-state service providers respectively, illuminate the ways in which these entities collaborate, and also to compare the situation on the ground to what stakeholders described in terms of their work.

We chose to interview NGOs such as HANDS Pakistan, Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum (PFF), the Marie Adelaide Leprosy Center (MALC), and the Citizen’s Foundation (TCF) because their interventions within the communities we studied, provided us with data about their needs and difficulties and were also a useful entry point into the communities themselves. The government departments we chose to interview were based on their relevance to our communities. The Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority (SKAA) helped us understand how regularization of informal settlements is proceeding, the Malir Development Authority (MDA) was useful in obtaining data on land use for housing, and departments handling anti-encroachment were relevant due to the ongoing crisis for people in so-called illegal or encroached areas. It was important to interview these stakeholders because assistance provided by the state as opposed to abdication toward equitable distribution of resources is linked to communities' ability to move forward or be resilient. This contributed towards our understanding of the experiences of migrant and displaced people.
Historical injustices and structural inequalities shape a person’s capacity for resilience in the face of displacement. All our research communities had either experienced displacement or were at risk of imminent displacement. Forced displacement or involuntary migration involve movements of people who are coerced or compelled to move. Although many migrations appear voluntary, there are usually coercive factors driving them – loss of livelihood systems, urban infrastructural developments, and conflict. Migration itself is a display of personal or group resilience. In this section, we examine the concept of resilience and how it is shaped and determined by socio-economic and political power. Ordinary people are better able to adapt and be resilient when underlying political relationships are transformed and when they are included in justice mechanisms and enabled to access basic services. We contextualize the experience of religious minorities, “non-citizens”, informal daily wage earners, rural migrants, and women within the historical injustices and political exclusions they have been subjected to. Disentitlements constructed around non-citizenship, minority status, gender, and informality of labor obstruct peoples’ ability to be resilient in situations of displacement. This section explores how excessive policing of communities and inadequate social welfare policies accentuate these inequities and prevent rehabilitation and integration of displaced communities.

A. RESILIENCE IN DISPLACEMENT AND STRUCTURAL INEQUITIES

The coerced movement of people takes place in various forms around the world. Displacement, forced migration, and forced evictions are examples of such forced movement recognized in international conventions. These concepts share strong correlations. At the heart of these similarities is the detrimental effect on people’s resilience and the structural inequalities that underlie these forced movements. Displacement has been defined as the “forced movement of people from their locality or environment and occupational activities” caused by numerous factors such as armed conflict, natural disasters, economic fluctuations, and development (unesco.org 2019). Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are defined as “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human–made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border” (unesco.org 2019). The International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines forced migration as the ‘migratory movement’ of people, which may be caused due to a number of reasons, but involves an element of compulsion, force or duress (IOM Migration 2019). Forced eviction is “the permanent or temporary removal of individuals, families and/or communities against their will from the homes and/or land which they occupy, without the provision of, and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other protection” (IOM 2019).

These definitions illustrate the involuntariness, coercion, and violence of the forced movement of people and are reflected in the experiences of the various people we met. The inhabitants of Rehri Goth, Lath Basti and Ibrahim Hyderi have been forcibly displaced over the last three decades due to ecological changes, environmental degradation, and climate injustice. These dynamics have severely compromised the communities’ livelihood systems. Village residents in Gadap, Kathore have been forcefully evicted or remain under the imminent threat of eviction due to mega real estate development projects (Syed and Zaman 2019). Families from the erstwhile FATA flee conflict and violence and inadequately repaired infrastructure and conflict related insecurity, prevents their resettlement in their homes. This section will focus on the adaptive capacities of those forced to move to their new place of origin in the context of literature on resilience and the factors that inhibit this adaptation.

Since the 1990s, the concept of social–ecological resilience emerged in literature and built on older definitions so that these were no longer about the resistance to change and conservation of existing structures, or the ability to persist in the face of disturbances, but as adaptive and transformative capacity (Bene et al 2018). In other words, if we are looking at disaster situations, resilience does not mean a return to pre-disaster equilibriums, with their instabilities and vulnerabilities, but that actors are enabled to be more flexible and have more options to cope with future adversity (Frerks, Warner, and Weijs 2011). A critique that emerges in recent articles is that resilience literature does not focus enough on social justice, the needs and interests of the most marginalized, how resilience is experienced differently by different individuals and social groups in various spatial locations, and how inequality drives vulnerabilities and limits adaptive capacity (Bene et al 2018; Vale 2014).
The concept of resilience has also been framed within the norms of neo-liberalism that places the onus of responsibility on the individual as opposed to the state. That once enabled and capacitated, individuals, by working on themselves, can somehow resolve problems without transforming social relations. This approach can reinforce inequality and structural oppression when social resilience is seen as active or responsible citizenship and self-regulating conduct (Frerks, Warner, and Weijs 2011). Resilience planning may also be used to justify increased securitization at the expense of civil liberties and participatory decision-making (Meerow, Pajouhesh, and Miller 2019). This is particularly important in the case of Karachi where any conversation related to resilience has to be grounded in the experience of communities. Rather than enabling a positive resilience through a recognition of their rights, displaced communities are policed and surveilled. Whether it is through routine checks of the CNIC, periodic extortion of daily wage earners, monitoring access to essential natural resources such as firewood or the open sea for fishing, or active criminalization, this social management is a form of urban violence that fractures communities and disrupts resilience.

Meerow, Pajouhesh, and Miller (2019) suggest that in order to make systemic transformations, one has to pay attention to uneven power relationships and structural inequities, as these dynamics shape resilience. They evaluate three forms of justice that are entwined with the capacity to be resilient – distributional, recognitional, and procedural. Recognitional justice is “equal acknowledgement and respect of different identities and associated social status” (Meerow, Pajouhesh, and Miller 2019, 797), including intersecting identities of race, gender, class, and age. The authors posit “that these identities are shaped by historical injustices and can determine individual vulnerability to shocks and stresses, ability to access resources, and capacity to participate in decision-making” (797). Distributional justice is defined as “equitable access to goods and infrastructure, environmental amenities, services, and economic opportunities” (Meerow, Pajouhesh, and Miller 2019, 797), and procedural justice is “equitable participation in decision-making processes and city governance” (798).

Chu and Michael’s (2018) research on migrants to Bengaluru and Surat reveals how climate injustice migrants “embody intersecting forms of environmental marginality” (140) attributable to socio-economic domination and non-recognition. They argue that migrants are invisible to state apparatus or erased from cities though discriminatory policies. In the context of climate change, they posit that “one has to go beyond fair distribution of rights and responsibilities and inclusion in procedural requirements of participation in policy and decision making” and recognize “existing forms of inequality and how actions exacerbate and entrench underlying structural disadvantages” (141).

Vale (2014) points out that it is important to see how “dominant storylines get constructed, which powerful symbols are used to gauge progress, and how political power sets priorities for investment” (197). It is common for politicians to use natural disasters as opportunities. Councilors of UC-38 in Taiser Town reported that a minister visited this area when it was engulfed in water after heavy rains in 2019 but not before even though infrastructural problems are known to them. Mohammad Ali, of the NGO Roshni, talked about how politicians, eager to garner support from their vote banks, will jump in on an ad hoc basis to assist those displaced by natural disasters as their plight is highlighted by the media and people are stirred by their predicament. He spoke of how people displaced from rural Sindh after the floods were settled in Razzakabad, Steel Town, Hawks bay, and Musharraf Colony in Karachi. As compared to natural disasters, internal displacement due to bridge or a railway track is not presented by media to evoke an empathetic public response. Ali further posited that even with “worthier” natural disaster evictees, empathy wanes and there is an expectation that people will move back once the situation is stable. However, those on the socioeconomic fringes in rural areas find slightly improved conditions in the city and understandably opt to stay.

In order to participate in decision-making processes and governance (procedural justice) an important factor is the environment and whether it enables people to organize and seek legal or other redress. The negative impacts of displacement experienced by those evicted for Lyari Expressway are particularly distressing given that there was a sustained campaign for the housing rights of those evicted. Many original allottees named in the surveys were never able to construct homes. One such allottee has been fighting for his plot for years and said:

Shots are fired (golian chalti hain) when people ask about their plot. Where is the original survey list? It had all the measurements of the plot I was assigned yet it’s been through three files.3

3. Local government representatives, interview by authors, Yousuf Goth UC 38, Karachi, October 15, 2019.
Arif Hasan (2005) writes about how civil society organized to seek redress. Their actions represent the resistance civil society can put up if the environment enables them to. Community based Organizations, capacitated by the Urban Resource Center (URC), mobilized funds for legal actions, participated in public hearings, and secured international support and visits. In 2001, when Musharraf wanted to push ahead with a plan, they objected and highlighted impact on environment, losses to homes and business, and flaws in the resettlement plan. Data collected from the grassroots was used to show resettlement plans had not distinguished between categories of ownership and land use contained procedural defects, and that it would take as long as twenty years for relocation sites to develop accommodative social and physical infrastructure. However, despite this robust community mobilization, matters came to a head and the current experiences of those displaced, albeit a small group, are not inspiring.

Presently, the space for civil society to contest forced evictions has shrunk considerably. Recent eviction drives, such as those related to the Karachi Circular Railway (KCR) and KMC markets (Lunda Bazar and Empress Market) have been conducted in a high-handed, duplicitous manner with non-meaningful notices provided to those affected. NGOs have witnessed their space being dramatically reduced, with laws and policies expelling international human rights and aid organizations from the country (Dawn 2018).

Villages evicted and facing eviction in Gadap find the justice system accommodating and failing them. BTKL did not get any ‘no objection certificates’ to commence construction in around 2013 and 2014, and simply rounded up communities with police helping them and bulldozed their houses. Those who attempted to resist were met with false terrorism charges and FIRs (Zaman and Ali 2019). Goths where we held FGDs reported having filed “stay orders” to halt construction on their land. The Supreme Court issued an order against them in 2018 and annulled the irregular agreements that allowed the MDA to exchange lands with BTKL. Justice Ejaz Afzal Khan found that laws such as the Colonization of Government Land Act, 1912 (COGLA 1912) and the Malir Development Authority Act, 1993 were flouted and that the Board of Revenue had no legal authority to allow MDA control over forty-three dehs; they noted that MDA could not provide any coherent scheme for housing or master plan for the notified dehs. Despite this commendable decision, a later ruling of the implementation bench in March 2019 (discussed earlier on site selection on page 5 i.e. Goths of Gadap) allowed BTKL to construct over 16,896 acres; but without clear demarcation of the acreage, this has allowed the builder to proceed with encroachment and building with impunity.

Residents told us about how their livelihood systems of farming and livestock have been impaired by this construction. Women who manage livestock find that they can no longer access grazing lands shut off by BTKL’s walls. BTKL intentionally cut off water supply and farmers here are no longer able to rely on traditional methods of collecting and using monsoon rain water to grow crops. Their construction has also drastically reduced green space, diminished water supplies due to excessive extraction, and interfered with the natural flow of rivers and tributaries.

Most of our research communities did not have access to basic infrastructure and amenities and thus deprived of distributional justice. These amenities include clean water, sanitation, electricity and gas. They were also not part of an equitable decision-making process or positioned to make demands from the state. Entire communities are beleaguered by load shedding, gas shortage, untreated sewage, uncollected garbage, improper roads, inadequate transport, and lack of adequate, nearby health facilities. While households in the neighborhoods demonstrated human endeavor and creativity, most were far from the standard of habitability envisioned in human rights doctrines. Regularized localities have official legal status and can get gas and electricity, but provision is irregular and causes hardship; in unregularized locations such as Afghan Basti, people rely on purchased or foraged firewood for cooking. Collection is not straightforward, and even getting one’s hands on natural resources is monitored and circumscribed through policing. Lath Basti residents said that they are often stopped from foraging for firewood due to the construction of a bridge to facilitate the nearby Lucky Coal power plant that blocks their access to the forest. Their homes, made of wood, were on the coastline and vulnerable to climatic events. Local government officials we met before FGDS in Lath Basti and Rehri Goth, said these areas were inundated with water during heavy rains in 2019 but there was no state assistance.

People in Holy Mary Colony in Taiser Town relied on self-made sewerage tanks, but as an unregularized

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community, these did not have connections to main lines. Women of Bhutta Village, a regularized neighborhood, reported living in dilapidated and substandard homes where families of six were confined to one-room houses. Garbage collection is a problem and most neighborhoods displayed unhygienic conditions. In UC-38 of Taiser Town, local government officials said a model community school at Allah Wali Eid Gah Ground, has been closed for four months because garbage and drainage water have blocked the entrance.

According to the Managing Director of Sindh Solid Waste Management Board (SSWMB), there was no authority to provide garbage disposal for numerous marginalized neighborhoods in Karachi. More worrisome was SSWMB’s location of Garbage Transfer Sites (GTSs) where garbage accumulated from various neighborhoods is collected before its final disposal. Many of these GTSs are located in heavily populated areas such as Sharafi Goth, Dhobi Gath, and Sohrab Goth and have a detrimental impact on the health and safety of the populations here.5

Karachi went through a series of administrative changes in recent decades. During General Musharraf’s rule (1999–2008), the city was governed by the City District Government Karachi (CDGK). After a nine year stint, the CDGK was disbanded in 2010 and its multiple functions went back to the provincial government. The government enacted a new local government (LG) law in 2013 and LG elections were held in December 2015. Since that time, Karachi’s municipal functions have been managed by the Karachi Municipal Corporation (KMC) and six District Municipal Corporations (DMCs), but service delivery is far from ideal (Ellis, Friaa, and Kaw 2018). Most people are not getting services because of multiple problems, including the lack of coordination between the DMCs and KMC. Many municipal functions are run through the Government of Sindh (GoS) and city governments lack the authority and financial autonomy needed to deliver on their municipal service mandates. The Karachi Water and Sewerage Board (KWSB), Sindh Solid Waste Management Board (SSWMB), Sindh Building Control Authority (SBCA), Karachi Development Authority (KDA), Lyari and Malir Development Authorities (LDA and MDA) are fully controlled by the Government of Sindh. These flaws manifest themselves as suffering for the people of Karachi as far as water supply, sanitation, and solid waste management is concerned. Only 55 percent of Karachi’s daily water needs are met. More than 6 million residents have no access to public sewerage service. Sewerage network coverage is estimated at 60 percent and faces complex challenges of inadequate sewer trunk mains, malfunctioning pumping facilities, and insufficient wastewater treatment capacity (Ellis, Friaa, and Kaw 2018).

Local councilors in Union Council 38 complained their tenure comes to an end in July 2020; but beside attesting documents and issuing birth and marriage certificates which remind them of their official status, a lack of devolved funding has incapacitated them. They said funds are not rationalized on local needs and actual population size and are given as a uniform lump-sum to each Union Council; most are used for salaries and not to resolve UC level local concerns. Yet, the UC Chairman here said, they are the face of government and have to placate angry residents when there is no water. Shifting jurisdictions further block access to services. One of the councilors opined:

> When we contact the UC office for routine garbage collection, they tell us due to new delimitation your area is not in District West and when we approach District Council of Malir, they tell us we are part of the West.6

The GoS has transferred sanitation services to the SSWMB, but they have eliminated the job of the “kundiman” who maintains sewage lines. They complained that the state has spent millions on the new K-IV water scheme but the dividends for the community are still not apparent. Most councilors thought the system was better in 2005 as they had sweepers, kundi management, a functional water board and sewerage board.7

Poor protection of housing rights by the state is another form of distributional injustice that has led to unmet needs being catered to by the informal sector of middle–men or brokers. Tasneem Siddiqui, formerly with the Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority (SKAA), explained that these middlemen settle migrants and displaced people on the city’s outskirts, without any proper documentation of possession, and then engage other brokers to provide bricks, asbestos, and water through water-tanker mafias. This provides an irregular but affordable alternative

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5. SSWMB officials, interview by authors, Karachi, March 18, 2019.
6. UC Chairman Jahangir Akbar, Vice Chairman Shaukat Sardar and other local government representatives, interview by authors, Yousuf Goth UC 38, Karachi, October 15, 2019.
7. Ibid.
to long-drawn, complicated government schemes. Middlemen engage various socio-political agents; they invite politicians to the area and name the settlement after them, collude with media personnel, and pay bribes in the form of cash and plots of land (Hasan 1996). This informal housing service promulgated by middle-men has become institutionalized, especially in sprawling cities such as Karachi where the informal sector provides approximately half of the city’s housing unit needs (Hasan 1996). These informal settlements are often located on city peripheries with poor sanitation and unhygienic conditions.

Moreover, this leads to an unplanned and “self-organizing urbanity in which the land broker or dalaal is a vital figure” (Anwar 2013, 76). These dalaals are social workers and astute businessmen who have an understanding of the housing market and the workings of the relevant government and private stakeholders. One such person whom we interviewed plays a critical role in encouraging people from his own village to migrate to plots in Taiser Town. He had migrated from Badin two decades ago and had done well for himself and his extended family. He was moved to help others whose situation he understood and empathized with given changes in the political economy of Lower Sindh. Of course, his empathy was also driven by the fact that this was a business opportunity. His father was also a social worker, leader, and a middle-man of sorts, and told us that he had arranged 312 marriages in his community and moved to Khuda Ki Basti in 2003 from his village. His grown children had paid a deposit (biyana) and were not ready to move, so he did, in order to avoid losing the plot. This entrepreneur has worked closely with another who described his work as “helping people find a place”. But he had no qualms about accommodating two families with the same file.

We assess how structural inequities are perpetuated and exacerbated as people experience displacement or forced migration. The state’s reneging of its social contract is experienced as a form of structural violence. It leads to extreme forms of deprivation and destitution. If survival is made precarious because of the daily struggles around water, gas, and living wages, in addition to being excluded from participatory decision-making and all forms of justice discussed above, then a community’s capacity for resilience is constrained. The state constitutes hierarchies along citizenship and domicile, religion, informalization of labor, geography, and gender and these determine who gets to claim their rights and own the city, and who is invisible or demonized in state doctrine and media discourse. Notably, since 2016, there has been a concerted law enforcement operation against criminal and militant groups. Ellis, Friaa, and Kaw (2018) posit that this has contained political and religious violence and criminal activity. However, it has also led to many human rights violations adding to the climate of impunity.

B. CITIZENSHIP AND DOCUMENTATION

The state uses the Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC) and domicile to police people and exclude them from services along arbitrary lines of citizenship and non-citizenship. This policing and exclusion, a form of political or institutional violence, is most acutely experienced by people of “foreign” origin who cannot legally apply for a CNIC. Yet across the board, even those who meet the criteria for citizenship can be subjected to repressive police action and denied services if they do not have a valid card. A resident of Haji Mureed Bikak Goth stated:

Partition migrants received CNICs but some of the natives of Haji Mureed Bikak Goth still suffer from an identity issue.  

Policemen routinely stop wage-earners in the city and demand that they produce their CNIC on the spot. This becomes a pretext for extortion and arrest, a form of public violence men experience (Anwar et al 2016). Hindu men from Lyari Basti report that this is a daily occurrence. These men have found it difficult to find employment nearby and so travel long distances in order to run fruit and vegetable stalls in Karimabad. They return home in groups in rickshaws late at night and are stopped by police near their area, who demand to see their CNICs. If they do not have CNICs, they are at risk of overnight lockup. The policemen demand a share of the men’s meagre earnings from the day, taking at least half if not all. If the men resist, the policemen may harass and beat them. Bribes demanded for their release are usually “financially crippling” (Anwar et al 2016, 151). The lawful right against such extortionist searches and seizures is simply not realized. In Khuda ki Basti, a woman recalled that in 2006, a Hindu boy, did try to argue with the police when they accosted and they later framed him in a false
drugs case that led to his detention for four days.

The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) has noted that during the 2017 census, armed forces accompanying the census enumerator, checked the CNIC of each household member, and sent a text message to NADRA to check its validity instead of standard practice of noting one CNIC number per household for verification (Karim 2018). The Sustainable Development Policy Institute (Karim 2018) states that this could have discouraged undocumented people from participating and getting counted. The 1998 census counted 11.1 million people in Karachi but declared its population to be 9.34 million as it deemed 1.8 million to be “illegal” (Karim 2018). If the state has defined and delineated entire communities as illegal or undocumented, they appear justified in their categorical denial of basic amenities associated with citizenship such as municipal services, housing, and education.

Nausheen Anwar (2013) traces the policy shifts towards Bengali and Burmese migrants through the 1990s and post 9/11. After the publication of the Shigri report in 1996 (during Benazir’s second tenure) the state portrayed “illegal migrants” as a threat to Pakistan’s internal security, and thus paved the way for the state to regulate and criminalize them through changes in citizenship laws, new detention schemes, the introduction of a new biometric identification system managed by the National Database Registration Authority (NADRA), as well as the establishment of the National Alien Registration Authority (NARA). After 2002, it became increasingly difficult for Bangladeshi migrants who came to Pakistan in the 1980s and 1990s (as opposed to prior to 1971) to acquire citizenship documents. It was no longer possible to bribe state officials or using connections to secure national identification cards (Anwar 2011). The state experimented with deportation in the mid–90s. That policy has been largely replaced by blocking and cancelling CNIC cards. In April 2017, the then Federal Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, said that the government had cancelled 174,184 and blocked over 350,000 CNICs (Herald 2017).

FGDs with Bengali and Bihari migrants who live in Machar Colony, revealed the social impact of these legal exclusions and non-recognition that renders them invisible to the state’s paltry social welfare schemes, excludes them from governance, and makes them easy targets of the state’s repressive apparatus. Those associated with fishing find water bodies increasingly circumscribed by law enforcement officials. Majeed Motani, a local historian and leader in the fishing village of Ibrahim Hyderi, informed us of the onerous registration process for fishing and the vigilant checking of CNICs of those at sea:

Boat owners before going on a fishing expedition first give Maritime and customs officials a list of people who will be on the boat with a photocopy of their CNICs. Both agencies check original CNICs as well and ensure that they examine each and every person leaving the “pickup point” for the open sea. The same scrutiny is applied on return from fishing. During my time (around 1960s and 1970s), there were no such restrictions and there was one customs office that charged a fee of five rupees to register a boat.10

This heightened scrutiny and surveillance forces Bengali and Bihari fishers to the fringes of the informal labor economy with its lack of legal protections and makes them clients to the informal services economy. Families report that one CNIC is used to access services for the entire household. Participants in the FGD reported that because they do not have identity cards, their children are precluded from attending government schools. Private schools partially fill the gap but are expensive and unaffordable. Cost-effective and good quality ones like those run by The Citizens’ Foundation (TCF) have a limited number of seats. There is a shortage of running water in Machar Colony and families purchase 150–200 liter drums of water at a cost of 600 rupees each. Depending on the size of the family, one water drum lasts two to three days and is reserved for cooking and drinking while brackish water is used for washing dishes, clothes, and bathing. Karachi Electric (KE), a privatized electricity company, claims Machar Colony was a high loss area for them and that they were recovering only twenty percent of the bills. After working against the illegal kunda system of accessing electricity, they bragged of higher bill recovery rates of 60 percent and near-zero power cuts or load-shedding.11

Erasure of citizenship and unmet needs thus make space for NGOs to wheel in their apparatus and provide services. While NGOs do make useful interventions, serve as safety valves for people, and raise awareness

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around disentitlements, their services are usually piece-meal, temporary, often donor-driven and not fully accountable to communities. Tasneem Siddiqui’s NGO, Saiban, is a good example of such intervention (Siddiqui 2014). Saiban employs a model of incremental housing for the poor. It allots 80 square yards plots to very-low income groups at an affordable rate of 40,000 rupees and places the condition that these homes be occupied. Services and infrastructure for water, roads, electricity, and gas are established gradually as allottees pay their monthly installments.12

At the provincial level, the state’s ameliorative mechanism to tackle the housing crisis has been the regularization of informal settlements (katchi abadis and irregular goths). This has by and large been undertaken by the SKAA which was established by the Provincial legislature in 1987. SKAA’s main functions include the mapping of informal settlements, their improvement, and the provision of leases or legal titles to inhabitants. There must be a minimum of forty households in the vicinity and dwellers must prove they have been settled in the locality since before 1987. Dwellers must also provide documents such as CNICs, old utility bills, and demonstrate that their name is on the voters list. Followed by this, SKAA writes to the Board of Revenue and the relevant District Commissioner to inquire about the status of the land. If the land belongs to the Board of Revenue, for instance, SKAA asks if the abadi can be regularized and the Board can decide whether to issue a “no objection certificate” (NOC) to that effect. The SKAA then conducts a survey of the area, notifies the measurement of the land, collects the payment, and issues a lease indenture. This process can take anywhere from one month to ten years.13

However, the state in their recent eviction drives reflect ambivalence about this apparatus. The Director of the Board of Revenue’s Anti-Encroachment Cell perceived this regularization as a means of “unorganized invasion of government land” used by political parties as a vote bank. He claimed that such informal settlements are a “joint venture” between government officials and land grabbers to informally occupy government land and convert it into plots, which are then sold at affordable prices to the homeless residents of the city.14

According to the UNHCR, there are currently about 1.4 million registered Afghan refugees in Pakistan comprising about 210,465 households (UNHCR 2019). In 2014, there were 67,000 Afghans in Karachi alone (Siddiqui 2019). Since 2002, geo-politics have evolved with Pakistan’s support for America’s war on terror. The state encouraged a “voluntary” repatriation policy and a number of Afghans left the country. The state actively sought to deport Afghans in the aftermath of the horrific Army Public School incident in December 2014. This was one of the multiple other draconian measures outlined in the federal government’s National Action Plan. In mid–2016, as the relations between the countries deteriorated, the police launched threats of deportation accompanied by intimidation and extortion against people of Afghan origin. In 2018, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported 365,000 of the country’s 1.5 million registered Afghan refugees and 200,000 of the estimated 1 million undocumented Afghans left in these coercive conditions (HRW 2017). The state has been able to scapegoat ordinary Afghans as responsible for crimes, a fact refuted by statistics from KP prosecution officials published in Dawn newspaper. Mohammad Ali of Roshi Helpline reports a compassion deficit for people because of strained resources and competition – they are unlikely to think of coerced departure of Afghans seen as “outsiders” as an injustice.15

Although Proof of Registration (PoR) cards grant second and third generation Afghans born in Pakistan the right to live and travel in the country, they are not eligible for more entitlements. They are barred from purchasing property and attending public schools and universities. Government hospitals do not provide them with non-emergency medical treatment (Siddiqui 2019). One participant in the FGD in Afghan Basti said that public hospitals demand bribes or names of contacts before agreeing to treatment. There are four small schools in the area, one of which was set up by Dr. Ruth Pfau’s Marie Adelaide Leprosy Center (MALC), while another, the Ghazi Amanullah Khan School, was set up by a German doctor. To secure high school diplomas, they study under the Afghanistan Board and their results are sent through the consulate in Peshawar to Kabul for verification and certification. They maintain ties within the community to avail basic services – water, gas, electricity. There are no gas lines and people reported that they spend 400 rupees a month on firewood. Electricity became available only after MALC pushed for it in the early 1990s but there are power shutdowns for most of the day. Moreover,

13. Abdul Ghani Jhokio, Director HR and Amanullah Shaikh, Director Finance, Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority, interview by authors, Karachi, October 18, 2019.
Afghan neighborhoods cannot be regularized as locals do not have CNICs and most regulatory bodies do not believe such settlements should get this status, thus leading to insecure tenure. SKAA officials claim that not much can be done for communities such as those of Afghan refugees in Afghan Basti because they are not Pakistani citizens. Since their identity renders them ineligible for the regularization of their settlement, they also do not receive services from other local government departments, such as the Sindh Sewerage and Waste Management Board (SSWMB). The conversation with SKAA officials hinted toward a general sense of resignation and apathy toward Afghans.

Refugees ought to remain near the border, not move towards the city. What else do they expect if they come here?

Clearly, the state needs to ease the process of regularization as people need basic amenities whether or not their presence is legally acknowledged.

Since 2001, militancy in what were the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) led to mass displacements. In Manghopir, we interviewed a displaced person from South Waziristan who like thousands of others fled the military operation Rah-e-Nijat in 2009 and settled in Sultanabad, Manghopir. Many of those displaced from South Waziristan come to Karachi because of long-standing kinship ties to the city. These displaced persons normally first stay with relatives and then move to a rented house. Although the government has tried to gradually repatriate the displaced of South Waziristan, some families complain of poor infrastructure and lack of basic facilities on return. Our interviewee informed us that 80 percent of the infrastructure (homes, schools, mosques) of their district was demolished during the operation and only 20 percent houses were in original condition. In addition, in order to visit or to return to live in Waziristan and a few other former tribal agencies, they need more than just a CNIC. They must first undergo a rigorous process of biometric verification, registration and cross-referencing of their records against state data on initial displacement to go back to their homes. The displaced people also complain of restrictions on their movement and our interviewee stated that they need permission from the authorities to even take a sick person to the settled areas. Lack of civil society support and aid delivery makes repatriation more difficult. Such families are often subjected to policing and surveillance in Karachi. In the state’s exuberance to apprehend militants, ordinary Pashtuns from FATA are routinely asked for identification. Another interviewee who is a displaced person from South Waziristan and a school principal, said that between 2012 and 2016, law enforcement agencies carried out operations in Sultanabad and these specifically targeted Pashtuns.

Dichotomies of documented citizen versus an undocumented non-citizen create whole segments of people who are born and raised in Pakistan and have various socio-economic entanglements in the city but are considered ‘outsiders’. This forced fiction is disabling to an authentic recognition of their intersectional identity as migrants and non-citizens and their rights to procedural and distributional justice.

C. RELIGION

Belonging to a religious minority group in the context of displacement brings with a heightened sense of vulnerability. Historically, the state has systematically attempted to depoliticize, and hence weaken, religious minorities through various policy measures. These include separate electorates until 2002 and then reserved seats in subsequent elections, which inhibit local, district level campaigning and deter effective articulation of local level issues that could mobilize minorities. In local government as well, council members of UC-38 in Taiser Town told us that after local elections, labor, minority, women, youth and peasant representatives are selected to fill in reserved seats. This further stifles campaigns around manifestoes at the city and street level.

The discriminatory use of the blasphemy law commenced after General Zia (1977–1988) amended the blasphemy law in the eighties. Research indicates that in most cases, the motive behind blasphemy charges is not to vindicate actual offended religious sentiments but is typically a personal or property dispute (Julius 2016).

17. Abdul Ghani Jhokio, Director HR and Amanullah Shahid, Director Finance, Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority, interview by authors, Karachi, October 18, 2019.
19. Ibid.
Karachi had a sizeable Hindu population until partition. Between 1941 and 1951, Hindus fell in numbers from 47.6 percent to less than 1 percent, changing the demographics of the city (Rahman 2012). Presently, there are roughly 2.5 million Hindus in Sindh (Kumar and Kothari 2016).

Lower caste Hindus suffer an intersectionality of oppression. Although the Pakistan Hindu Council (PHC) and the Pakistan Hindu Panchayat (PHP) provide Hindus a platform to articulate their grievances, one’s ability to mobilize support through these platforms is inevitably dependent on multiple caste and social status, education, gender and geographical differentiations within the community. In his research on Hindus in Umerkot, Rahman (2012) reports how one interviewee compared upper caste Thakurs and Brahmins to Muslim feudal lords when it comes to oppressing lower caste Bheels and Kohlis. For Christians, the most important representation comes from the Church. Ajay Raina (2014) calls it a “cradle-to-grave support system that provides identity, security, leadership, social cohesion, education, health care, employment and ritual support” (694). In addition, a strong network of NGOs such as National Commission for Justice and Peace (NCJP) and the Centre for Legal Aid, Assistance and Settlement (CLAAS) provide legal support and inject Christian voices in the rights discourse, but there is no political party for minorities with structural equality as their central tenet. In 2002, there was a deadly attack on a Karachi based Christian organization, Idara-e-Amn-o-Insaf. (BBC News 2002). This organization worked to unite people regardless of religion round a working class identity in order to address structural issues.

These social injustices constitute the backdrop of minority experiences of displacement and exacerbate or perpetuate existing marginality. The experiences of two distinct Hindu communities – Marwari Hindus and Bheel Hindus – we interviewed in two locations in Taiser Town are described below.

A community of Marwari Hindus were forcibly displaced in 2004 from Azizabad to Taiser Town because of the construction of the Lyari Expressway. They reported a loss of social status and fractures and fissures in their community ties post displacement. One participant in the FGD, a woman, 46, said that this was not her only experience of displacement – during Benazir’s first government, many Hindu families were given incentives and moved to Jamshoro and Tando Mohammad Khan in rural Sindh, but were unhappy and moved back to Karachi after a year or two. Their entire neighborhood, comprising 90 to 110 households, was displaced in 2004 from Azizabad. They received eighty yards of land and a lump sum of 50,000 rupees as official compensation, which was barely enough to build a house. Not everyone was given this amount – those living in jhuggis were considered ineligible for compensation, while others fell through the cracks during the registration process. The community worked in the informal sector before 2004, but since their displacement they have been stripped of easy access to the localities with bustling business activity where they previously sold their wares. Decades ago, they were engaged in making clay crafts, but there is no longer any demand for this except for use in Hindu rituals. Government schools provide less than adequate education and are certainly not oriented to help Hindu children adjust in school or overcome prejudice. Mothers complained that their children experienced discrimination directed against them by staff and other students and consequently got discouraged from attending school. Women and girls complained of sexual harassment and that members of other ethnic groups, taunted them for being minority. One woman reported that a man once threw a rock at her.

We met members of the Hindu Bheel community who had migrated from Badin to Karachi and now live in Holy Mary Colony in Taiser Town. Since the early 1990s, landless farm labor, lower caste Hindus and Muslims, burdened by debt and exploitative working relations with landowners, have migrated to Karachi in the hope of economic and social reprieve. Through social networks and kinship ties, they were able to connect with middle-men who have provided plots to build homes. These inter-city migrant community experienced a modest improvement in their lives compared to the intra-city afectees of the Lyari Expressway, although they are far from living ideal lives in make-shift homes in an unregularized community with no municipal services. There were rows of small houses in Holy Mary Colony – the more recent migrants had houses made of wooden materials that are flooded in the monsoon. Our FGD was held in a concrete house; its owner moved in 1993 and had gradually improved on it. There was no gas available in Holy Mary and firewood is used for cooking. There are no hospitals in proximity and the city’s more developed areas are virtually inaccessible because the nearest

Lyari Basti, Taiser Town, FGD by authors, Karachi, September 15, 2019.
bus stop is 2 kilometers away and the bus fare is expensive. There was no sanitation or water services and the community had made their own temporary septic tanks. Due to lack of municipal water supply, the residents were captive clients of the private water tanker businesses. Nevertheless, they still seemed better off and more content than the Marwari Hindus in Lyari Basti.  

In Taiser Town, residents pointed out a mosque, imambargah and church cater to the needs of different communities, but there was no temple for Hindus. In Lyari Basti, Hindu residents had made a temporary temple in an open space; but each time they attempt to build it into a formal structure, the Muslim residents of the area create impediments. They complained that one man has made it his personal project to intimidate and harass them when they try to construct temple walls. Efforts made in 2008 to petition the District and Union councils have failed.  

In 2014, the Supreme Court following the Peshawar Church bombing tried to institutionalize social protections for minorities. However, actual protection necessitates social connections; the minority councilor suggested that the community is not organized and persistent, and if they had pushed harder, the temple walls would have been constructed by now. Yet capacity for resilience is undermined by displacement, prejudice, precarity in employment, vulnerability to political violence and municipal abdication.

D. LABOR

Most migrant workers go from one set of exploitative labor relations to another. Both before and after displacement, their work is tied to the informal economy. According to the Labor Force Survey, 67 percent of overall employment in Karachi in 2011 was in the informal sector, even though the city has a larger share in formal employment in comparison to other cities across Pakistan (Ellis, Friaa, and Kaw 2018). Informal workers include hawkers, fishers, farm labor, home based workers, and those hired through labor contractors. These are workers engaged in economic production, but their work is largely unregulated, and they are not protected by formal labor laws on minimum wage, social security provision, health and safety, and collective bargaining. In his study of informal construction workers in Islamabad and Rawalpindi, Akhtar (2011) found that “the dynamics of informal employment are often inimical to conscious class struggle” (182). Rather than mobilizing along class lines, workers strategize in ways that guarantee employment and favorable treatment by their patrons or labor subcontractors who secure employment for them. Usually people find employment in the informal sector through people they know. Akhtar argues that the modern middleman in the informal economy instrumentalizes cultural norms of kinship and reciprocity — but that these norms are “far from unchanging and instead are articulated in very distinct ways with the impersonal ethics of the market” (182). Ultimately, labor–capital relations, despite having roots in reciprocal culture, are not fixed and serve the needs of business. In most of our FGDs, a majority of the workers exist on the legal and physical peripheries — both spatially removed from markets and city centers, the traditional/formal factory floor, which is a space conducive for trade unions to mobilize workers, and outside the ambit of legal protection. Their jobs are seasonal and contingent, and do not provide a sense of financial security. As discussed above, Marwari Hindus from Azizabad were resettled in UC-38 (Lyari Basti) in Taiser Town and lament their broken access to the thriving city center economy. They complain of costly and time-consuming travel needed to reach areas for hawking purposes and police extortion when they return from work.

Women do unpaid household work, but in addition to this, more and more women take on low paid piece-rate work in the informal sector to meet household income needs. This informal, or “home-based”, work is largely unregulated and despite the passage of a protective labor law in Sindh, women in these jobs do not have any real protection from unfair labor practices. Moreover, there is no guarantee of continuity; the work is unpredictable, seasonal, and procured through middle-men as opposed to investors and capital owners. Most men are also engaged in the informal economy, but informality of labor is largely feminized and only 8.5 percent of women in Sindh’s cities are part of the formal labor force (Ellis, Friaa, and Kaw 2018). Rates for piece-rate work are so low that many labor organizers refer to it as “negative counting” or ulti gilti given that the social costs of this work far outweigh the meager remuneration. Some rates are - 20 rupees to peel a kilogram of shrimp in Machar Colony and Rehri Goth; 30 rupees to peel a kilogram of garlic in Taiser Town — and women accompanied by their children, spend virtually the whole day for earnings that are well below the minimum daily wage for unskilled
workers. For instance, women would have to peel fifteen kilograms of shrimp to earn 300 rupees per day. Peeling garlic is laborious and a drawn out process. It requires concentration because damaging the garlic cloves could result in deductions in wages. Women workers use the spaces of their homes, utilities and neighborhoods to carry out this type of work. In the process, women workers subsidize the owners in terms of providing a space in their homes to carry out the work. Thus owners, can rely on the women to solicit family members for free to complete the tasks.

Women in Holy Mary Colony generate household earnings by making quilts or rillis. Given the women are disconnected from the city’s main markets, a month of labor for producing one rilli, fetches a measly 600 rupees. A rilli is typically sold in upmarket shopping malls, for at least 10,000 rupees, but the women workers rarely receive a share of the profits that retailers earn. Informal workers do not have social security benefits such as pension and once unable to work, they become dependent on the mercy of others. An elderly Hindu woman from Lyari Basti used to sell vegetables in the market but lately, has not been able to make ends meet because she along with her husband, are no longer able to work. Despite these low rates, we heard stories of precarious survival and how women financially piece together wages to support families. A woman in Holy Mary Colony, claimed that her savings enabled her daughter to attend a small private school.

Women who were relocated to Lyari Basti, claimed they preferred their old neighborhoods in Azizabad, where it was easier to find domestic work, especially in middle class homes. Domestic work gave them a semblance of continual employment. Moreover, employers gave other forms of assistance, such as food, used clothing, and household items. Women in Ibrahim Hyderi who were able to find domestic work, explained they earned approximately 800 to 9000 rupees a month and those whose earnings were on the higher end of this bracket were working in multiple homes. Their house rent alone was 5000 rupees but that they preferred unregulated domestic work, is indicative of economic marginality. Given that most women workers we interviewed, have no secure employment, the case of a female Christian resident in Khuda Ki Basti, was an outlier. She had a fulltime job in a private, elite school in Clifton, where she earns 15,000 rupees per month. But her commuting expenses are high at 140 rupees per day, and she said has to take three different buses to get to work. Still, she explained that her family prefers this arrangement over being a landless farmer.

For informal workers who are second or third generation Bengali-Pakistanis, the state’s increasing surveillance and demands for documentation, makes earning livelihoods harder. In Rehri Goth, some Bengali and Bihari workers collect and sell the residual animal fat that accumulates in drains outside bone factories. Sindhi residents of Ibrahim Hyderi employed at bone factories earn less than minimum wage (300 rupees for women and 500 rupees for men respectively) for cleaning carcasses to sift bones that are crushed to manufacture kitchen utensils. Their employment is also informal and they are not given social security benefits that are usually associated with an official employment card. Landless haris in Holy Mary Colony who had left exploitative farm work in Badin District, accept tenuous “under the table” informal employment at factories nearby. Our contact in Taiser Town informed us that most of them, earn a daily wage (400 to 500 rupees a day) in these factories and do not receive any social security cards or employment related benefits.

In Pakistan, NGOs and workers’ organizations have pushed for laws to protect home-based workers with modest changes in the law to include agricultural workers. In 2018, the Sindh assembly enacted the Sindh Home Based Workers Act that still awaits proper implementation. The Act commendably mandates the setting up of a fund with donations from employers, government, donors, or loans for projects designed for the welfare of such workers. However, vulnerable populations are not in a position to demand rights from the state if their citizenship is contested or limited to lawful presence. Their ability to push for benefits under new laws is compromised by economic and legal-political marginalization. Those of Afghan or Bangladeshi descent have limited space to negotiate rights and they rely on informal mechanisms to find employment and get services. This inevitably means that workers have to consolidate kinship and patronage ties to secure and maintain employment. Working the patronage system comes with its own challenges. These are ultimately subject to changes with the market. Moreover, not everyone has an equal opportunity to negotiate with patrons, benefactors and middle-men – whether for employment or other services. A woman from Afghan Basti mentioned one such middleman:

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25. Lyari Basti and Holy Mary Colony, Taiser Town, FGD by authors, Karachi, September 15, 2019.
Agha Jan is supposed to take care of the community and he receives funds on behalf of Afghans and runs schools and clinic, but he never helps us when we ask.26

She reported that Saylani Foundation, a welfare NGO, turned her away and told her to approach this man. Although most displaced workers are employed in precarious, informal, and seasonal work, women and non-citizens are impacted the most. Since most house–hold tasks like cooking and washing are done by women, state abdication in water, gas, and electricity provision adds to household stress and women, in particular, are burdened. Women in Afghan Basti rely on firewood to cook; where there are gas lines in regularized neighborhoods, women complained of gas cuts and low gas pressure. Women in Bhutta Colony complained that when there is no gas, they have resorted to burning used furniture to cook food.

Most communities did not report receiving benefits from state led social security programs. The Benazir Income Support Program (BISP) makes unconditional monthly cash transfers originally set at 1,000 rupees and subsequently raised to 1,500 rupees in 2014. Eligibility for BISP is based on key indicators such as household size, education, child status, agricultural landholding, housing and toilet facilities, and livestock ownership (Mumtaz and Whiteford 2017). Women in our research communities were largely uninformed about the workings of BISP or the application process and the attendant benefits. In Bhutta Village, a woman claimed that she had received BISP cash transfer; in Rehri Goth, a few women said they had received BISP in the past. But women’s limited knowledge about the BISP’s application process, can put them in a vulnerable situation. In Bhutta Village, we learned that nearly 250 women were defrauded by a fallacious income support organization that promised BISP cards. A group of men and women came to their neighborhood claiming they were there to register women for social security. Women paid a small fee to register and if they did not have a CNIC, they were asked for their husband’s card number.

Afghan and Bengali workers are susceptible to the state’s coercive power on the basis of non–citizenship and are formally excluded from citizenship rights and all forms of justice. They are not recognized as workers, and thus cannot seek remedies under labor laws and are barred from municipal services. Moreover, new mechanisms that seek to marginalize and penalize on the basis of citizenship make it harder to legitimately press the state for more rights or inclusion in governance and decision making processes. Informality of labor is a further cause of economic instability and dilutes people’s capacity for resilience. Migrants who don’t have documentation find it hard to improve their circumstances while other inter or intra city with some documentation are economically too disempowered to go beyond insecure contracts.

E. RURAL GEOGRAPHY

The Indus Delta is a coastal area comprising Kharo Chan and Keti Bunder in Thatta District of Sindh. Changes in the rural ecology and political economy of the Indus Delta region have curtailed livelihoods and led to waves of migration. For poor and landless farmers and fishermen of the Indus Delta region of Sindh, control of inland water bodies by influential people, indebtedness to and dependence on landowners, sea–water intrusion and lack of fresh water, and susceptibility to climatic events have pushed people outward over the last three decades. They have mostly settled in fishing villages along the coast of Karachi – Ibrahim Hyderi, Rehri Goth, and Lath Basti. We met migrants who had settled in this part of Karachi, over three decades ago as well those who are recent settlers, arriving in the last five years. We also met eleven families in Lath Basti who had migrated in March of 2019. When these migrants arrive in Karachi, there are other disentitlements that impinge upon their desire for a better life – policing of access points to fishing, control of regulatory bodies and harbors by influential people, competition, and destructive fishing practices such as harmful equipment and deep sea foreign trawlers. Older migrants from Thatta, Badin, and Sujawal were frustrated with failing municipal services and low earnings.

Poor rural and social spending by the government and its adherence to colonial bureaucratic structure of water resources management intensify the vulnerability of small and landless farmers (Mustafa 1998). Mustafa, in his study of vulnerability to floods in two districts of Punjab, found that small farmers have a harder time stabilizing post–floods and in order to bounce back, they sell livestock, incur debt, and accept favors from family and influential people. Moreover, they are located in spatially more exposed areas than larger landlords who are

better protected and can rely on savings to offset their losses in floods.

The deterioration of the Indus Delta has been researched and documented by organizations including Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum (PFF), World Wide Fund (WWF), and the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN). Water infrastructure upstream and lack of water flowing downstream of Kotri Barrage in contravention of the Indus Water Accord of 1991 (possibly based on contested water allocation formulas) (Mustafa 2007) between Sindh and Punjab, has led to sea water intrusion in about thirteen creeks of the Indus River. This has led to devastating loss in mangroves, nesting grounds for sea-life, and freshwater in Kharo Chan and Keti Bunder in Thatta District. Local historian Majeed Motani witnessed the damage inflicted upon fishing, farming, and livestock livelihoods in the deltaic and riverine region:

When there was no construction on the Indus, water went directly to the delta. There was freshwater through the years except for two months in winter. There was a vibrant trade of ghee, red rice, bajra, and jute and in the mid-sixties. Twenty boats would arrive at the Ibrahim Hyderi Harbor in Karachi daily and then these goods would be transported on camel cart for sale at Lee Market and Soldier Bazar. People living in Keti Bunder and Kharo Chan were prosperous. When these problems first emerged, many people moved to other parts of Sindh, like Thatta, Sujawal, Badin, Jati, and Gulshan-e-Hadeed to continue fishing as that was the skill they had.

Gradually, fishing and farming in neighbouring Sujawal and Badin Districts also became challenging. Motani mentioned that one of his acquaintances, Yousaf from Kharani Acho Goth, lived at the border of Badin and Thatta, and found it increasingly untenable to grow crops in his village. He had incurred debt to buy seeds and fertilizer but was unable to recover costs due to water shortages.

In addition to ecological changes and environmental factors, in the Indus Delta, the political economy is also evolving. In the sixties and after the India-Pakistan war of 1971, a number of people from the erstwhile East Pakistan (mostly fishermen) migrated and settled in Ibrahim Hyderi. Many of them, unable to settle in Karachi, returned to the newly formed Bangladesh. Rohingya Muslims from Burma, fleeing communal violence, used land routes until 1980s to enter Pakistan and settled in Ibrahim Hyderi. Motani mentioned both communities now face problems in the issuance of CNICs, and thus encounter problems getting basic utilities and education. PFF facilitated them for CNICs, school enrolment, skills training and health services. In the 1980s and 1990s, Pashtun entrepreneurs, some according to Motani, desirous to “whiten” drug trade money, purchased boats and hired members of the native fishing community as laborers. The invasive practice of tying small eyed nets (bhoro) to mangrove roots depleted sea-life.

In the 1970s, influential landlords and politicians assumed control of the 1200 mostly inland water bodies in Sindh and imposed a contract system on fishing whereby poor fishermen became beholden to those with capital, who were able to purchase fishing rights over any one of them. Despite being legally abolished and replaced with a licensing system in 2011, achieved through an amendment of the Sindh Fisheries Ordinance 1980, this practice persists in inland and coastal fishing regions. Legislative changes are important, but without concerted efforts to address power and injustice at the grassroots, these laws prove toothless.

Contract fishing and lack of capital to invest in boats have turned fishermen into wage laborers living on the brink of bondage. In those months when fishing is suspended due to the monsoon, the fishermen take loans from the boats’ owners. The loans bind the fishermen to the owners’ boats until the debt is paid off. A fisherman’s entire catch is handed over to the owner and sold in fisheries. In return, the fishermen receive around 500 rupees per day or what the owner claims is left after costs for fuel and machinery are paid off. In the past, they would get a share from the catch but they reported that practice is over.

A few years ago, when khalasi (boat fishermen) returned home, they brought fish for their household kitchen. Now boat owners don’t give away the fish because the rates are high. There is a fish known as All that was disliked in the fish market, but even that is selling for 700 rupees a kilogram.

In the 1980s, there was a rise in surveillance at the unmarked and, hence, elusive sea border at Sir Creek between

28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
India and Pakistan. The Maritime Agency, formed in 1987, imposed strict surveillance of local fishermen and required checking of CNICs. Many fishermen were arrested and detained in jails in India (and a number of Indian fishermen in Pakistani jails). They languished in detention for months or years, awaiting a thawing of relations between the countries; the possibility such a moment would arrive and lead to their release as a benevolent state gesture. Motani too was arrested; his boat and wares confiscated in 1988. In those days, he recalled, detained fishermen were released at the Rann of Kutch frontier and they would return home by foot. 30

We met eleven families who had migrated in early 2019 from Shafi Muhammad Shah Goth, Deh Rapar, Kharo Chan Talluqa, to Lath Basti in Karachi. They dismantled their homes, borrowed 600,000 rupees for moving expenses, rented trucks, and moved to an extremely vulnerable coastal area in Lath Basti. The move to a new location in Karachi, was arranged by extended kin, who had moved twenty-five years ago. The new migrants refilled the land with sand and are hoping they could be connected with someone who can bring a tractor to level it. They have built a mud dam (band) to secure their homes from sea-water. They used construction materials (wood and bamboo) brought from their villages which permitted savings of 100,000 rupees. 31

According to these families, people from Thatta, Badin, and Sujawal, are migrating for the following reasons: acute shortage of water for drinking and irrigation and consumption of brackish water, sea-water intrusion causing unemployment and poverty, inadequate education, and lack of health facilities. In an FGD at Ibrahim Hyderi, a participant said:

> The water supplied at Keti Bandar is utterly unfit for human consumption. It contains dirt and is stored in an open tank and is also used by cattle and dogs alike. One has to travel far in boats to avail government health facilities at least 60 km away from our homes. There were limited opportunities in our village but in Karachi, women and children can earn to support their families. Children collect scrap from streets and earn 50 to 60 rupees daily. 32

If they manage to access hospitals, doctors and medical staff would not be available. As the community lived on an island, there were challenges in transporting patients to hospital. Sometimes, a delay in getting patients to the hospital resulted in death. A few of the participants in our Ibrahim Hyderi FGD said, they were part of twenty to twenty-five families that migrated in the last ten to twelve years from Thatta; their extended kin encouraged them to move and helped them settle here.

As victims of past political and economic injustices – failed infrastructure, unfair labor practices in fishing and farming, control of water and natural resources by influential people, and landlessness – these rural migrants enter an urban ecosystem where they face and get accustomed to a new form of routine violence. This includes policing and ongoing economic deprivation stemming from state neglect to municipal services or any (let alone effective) assistance in the adaptive process of migration.

30. Ibid
32. Ibid
CONCLUSION

The state has normalized and institutionalized various forms of violence on migrant and displaced communities. These forms of violence are multi-faceted and intersect with other forms of social and economic violence and involve a range of state and non-state actors. Instituted over marginalized communities, increasingly driven to the periphery of the city, it involves routine use of criminal complaints and prosecution to silence people defending their land rights, unlawful stops and seizures and use of illegal and unreasonable force that interrupt daily movement of daily wage earners, and legislative, judicial, and policy failures that foster an environment of impunity. These ensue in a backdrop of state abdication to municipal services and social welfare whereby people struggle for basic necessities and cannot rely on a private employer for any social benefits besides nominal wages. These negatively impact an individual’s capacity to be resilient or organize for positive change in the community post displacement.

The police and other law enforcement personnel employ the CNIC as a policing tool. The carceral power of the state keeps people in a constant state of social distress and deepens socio-economic marginalities. This overt political violence may be either a continuation or transformation of past violence (Winton 2017, 168–169). Criminalization and illegal searches are normalized when there is no public outcry, and communities do not have realistic options to contest their illegality. As Winton (2017) states: “Normalization of violence requires a system of norms, values or attitudes which allow, or even stimulate, the use of violence to resolve any conflict or relation with another person.”

The state actively maintains a discourse around who is worthy and not worthy of rights and whose rights the state is willing to uphold. These characterizations are rooted in historical institutional injustices. These include legal regimes that fail to provide housing tenure and sacrifice housing rights over property rights and render entire communities subject to eviction. This in turn allows for entire communities who have been living in and building their neighborhoods to be labelled illegal occupants because they do not possess perfect formal title. Political and economic injustices in the rural landscape, compounded by environmental and climatic changes, manifest as irreparable damage to livelihood systems and lead to migration. Migration is initially a break from immediate local stresses but in the medium and long-term, if the state does not recognize and accommodate these migrants, they find themselves stuck in new deprivations.

Winton (2017) discusses how “cultural constructions of violence as normal have been maintained and transformed in a range of contemporary urban contexts, with the result that an increasingly complex web of institutions, groups and individuals are involved in the perpetration of everyday violence” (169). Whether it is KMC personnel mobilizing police to “shock and awe” communities in forced evictions drives, or private developers aided by departments in a subversion of process, or unofficial housing and labor entrepreneurs who may facilitate social services and getting informal jobs, but also wield power and act in exclusionary ways, this violence is routinized in people’s lives. This impacts one’s ability to be resilient. Being erased from procedural justice and being deprived of distributitional justice jeopardizes adaptive and transformative resilience. The invisibilization in policy and dialogue of a person’s intersectional identity of being displaced and disabilities of class, gender, religion or geography that have been constituted over historical injustices, negatively impacts resilience. These erasures, deprivations and invalidations need to be etched back into discourse and doctrines. The State must be compelled to address existing marginalities. Entrenched inequality in the distribution of economic, political, and social resources drives urban violence and requires systemic and holistic solutions. The State may make progress in addressing grievances of the displaced if it is able to provide basic services such as municipal, health, education and formalization of labor contracts. Additionally, those without valid citizenship status must be fast tracked for the same so they can also access the State machinery for services and secure tenancy.
## APPENDIX 1: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S. NO.</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>PLACE</th>
<th>APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF PEOPLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>23-Jun-2019</td>
<td>Taiser Town (Khuda Ki Basti and Holy Mary Colony)</td>
<td>3 women, more than 6 to 7 men mostly from Hindu Community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>04-July-2019</td>
<td>Usman Allah Rakhiyo, Gadap</td>
<td>3 to 5 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>09-July-2019</td>
<td>FGD at Kathore City with Akhtar Kalmati and others for Bahria Town evictions</td>
<td>5 to 6 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>14-July-2019</td>
<td>FGD Ibrahim Hyderi &amp; Rehri Goth facilitated by Fatima Majeed</td>
<td>Held two FGDs. More than 10–15 families (15 women, 20 plus men and 10 children) were present during first FGD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>14-July-2019</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>2nd FGD: 5 to 6 women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>21-July-2019</td>
<td>FGD with Hindu Community residing in KKB, Taiser Town</td>
<td>4 to 5 families (5 women, 2 children and 4 men)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>24-July-2019</td>
<td>FGD with Bengali Community, Machar Colony, facilitated by Mr. Raza of K-Electric Corporate Social Responsibility.</td>
<td>8 to 10 women, UC Vice-Chairman (Dr. Aziz) and woman councilor Ms. Momila.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>28-July-2019</td>
<td>FGD with Hindu Community, Taiser Town facilitated by local resident, Mr. PM.</td>
<td>6 to 8 women, mostly from Hindu Community and one Christian.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>02-August-2019</td>
<td>Field in Gadap Town (Haji Mureed Goth, Usman Allah Rakhio and Arbab Gabol Goth)</td>
<td>8 to 10 women and more than 15 men mostly from Arbab Gabol Goth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>03 August-2019</td>
<td>FGD at Lath Basti facilitated by Fatima Majeed</td>
<td>11 to 12 families (about 15 women, 4 to 5 girls and 20 to 25 men) (meeting with LG representative, Mr. Hanif earlier)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>31-August-2019</td>
<td>FGD at Muhammad Ali Brohi Goth, Ibrahim Hyderi</td>
<td>10 to 15 men. A separate discussion held with 2 women of the area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>04-September-2019</td>
<td>Manghopir</td>
<td>A principal of neighborhood school, Mr. Abdullah and a teacher of the same school, Mr. Abu Zahid. They were the IDPs of South Waziristan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
13 06-September-2019  FGD at Afghan Basti, MALC Center  5 to 6 men from Afghan community, principal of Ghazi Amanullah Khan School and a teacher in the same school. FGD preceded by discussion at MALC with their staff and a visit to the MALC school

14 12-September-2019  FGD conducted with women at Afghan Basti, MALC Center  7 to 8 women from the Afghan Community. A separate interview conducted with teachers of the neighborhood school run by MALC

15 15-September-2019  FGD at Lyari Basti, Taiser Town  6 to 7 women, 8 to 10 men from Hindu Community and minority Union Councilor, Mr. Imran

16 15-September-2019  FGD at Holy Mary Colony, Taiser Town  3 to 4 women, 4 men and a Union Councilor

17 12-October-2019  Visit to Gadap Villages  20 to 30 men

18 23-October-2019  FGD in Bhutta Village- Women  More than 15 women

APPENDIX 2: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S. NO.</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>NAME OF DEPARTMENT</th>
<th>PERSONS INTERVIEWED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3-August-2019</td>
<td>Local Government, Lath Basti</td>
<td>Mr. Hanif Sagar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>15-October-2019</td>
<td>Union Council (UC 38) – Yosuf Goth Office, District West</td>
<td>UC Chairman Mr. Jahangir Akbar, Vice Chairman Mr. Shaukat Sardar and other local government representatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>16-October-2019</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>District Education Officer (DEO) Primary Office, District Malir Karachi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>17-October-2019</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Mr. Naveed Shaikh and Mr. Shahzad Malik, Community Mobilization Project (CMP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>18-October-2019</td>
<td>Department of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), K-Electric</td>
<td>Ms. Zehra Mehdi, K-Electric, Deputy Director, Corporate Social Responsibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>18-October-2019</td>
<td>Sindh Solid Waste Management Board (SSWMB)</td>
<td>Mr. Muhammad Asif Ikram, Managing Director Sindh Solid Waste Management Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. NO.</td>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>NAME OF DEPARTMENT</td>
<td>PERSONS INTERVIEWED</td>
</tr>
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<td>-------</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>21-October-2019</td>
<td>Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority (SKAA)</td>
<td>Mr. Abdul Ghani Jhokio (Director HR) and Mr. Amanullah Shaikh (Director Finance), Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority (SKAA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>24-October-2019</td>
<td>Malir Development Authority</td>
<td>MDA Secretary and other staff members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>28-October-2019</td>
<td>UC Moro, Ibrahim Hyderi</td>
<td>Local Government representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>30-October-2019</td>
<td>Sindh Bureau of Statistics (SBS)</td>
<td>Mr. Kazim Jaffri, Deputy Director Sindh Bureau of Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>31-October-2019</td>
<td>Anti-Encroachment Cell, Board of Revenue</td>
<td>Mr. Tariq Dharejo, Director Anti-Encroachment Cell, Board of Revenue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>31-October-2019</td>
<td>Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (KMC), Anti-Encroachment</td>
<td>Mr. Bashir Siddiqui, Director Anti-Encroachment Cell.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>17-November-2019</td>
<td>Planning and Development, Sindh</td>
<td>Mr. Rafiq Chandio, Director General, Research &amp; Training Wing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NGOS, LOCAL LEADERS, JOURNALISTS, HISTORIANS AND ACADEMICS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S. NO.</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>NAME OF DEPARTMENT</th>
<th>PERSONS INTERVIEWED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>12-April-2019</td>
<td>Urban Resource Centre</td>
<td>Mr. Zahid Farooq (Joint Director Urban Resource Center), Yonus Baloch (Director Urban Resource Center)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>16-April-2019</td>
<td>NED University of Engineering and Technology</td>
<td>Mr. Mansoor Raza (Visiting Faculty) and Saeed-ud-Din Ahmed (Associate Professor, Department of Architecture and Planning)</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>18-April-2019</td>
<td>Karachi Urban Lab, IBA</td>
<td>Mr. Mohammad Toheed</td>
</tr>
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<td>4</td>
<td>02-May-2019</td>
<td>Orangi Pilot Project (OPP)</td>
<td>Mr. Salim Aleemuddin, Joint Director OPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location/Institution</td>
<td>Contact/Role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>5</td>
<td>03-May-2019</td>
<td>Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP)</td>
<td>Mr. Khizar Qazi, Journalist and Abdul Haq, HRCP</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>08-May-2019</td>
<td>Indus Valley School of Art &amp; Architecture</td>
<td>Ms. Shahana Rajani, Professor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>10-May-2019</td>
<td>Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum</td>
<td>Mr. Ayub Shan and Mr. Abdul Majeed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>23-May-2019</td>
<td>Saeedabad Karachi Youth Centre</td>
<td>Ms. Safina Gill, Minority Rights leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>23-May-2019</td>
<td>Roshni Helpline</td>
<td>Mr. Muhammad Ali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>27-May-2019</td>
<td>Saiban</td>
<td>Ms. Tasneen Siddiqui, Khuda Ki Basti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>17-June-2019</td>
<td>BBC, Urdu</td>
<td>Mr. Riaz Sohail</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>08-July-2019</td>
<td>Office of District Council</td>
<td>Mr. Gul Hassan Kalmat, Historian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>17-July-2019</td>
<td>Nasir Jump, Korangi</td>
<td>Local leader Mr. Samson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>20-July-2019</td>
<td>Mangophir</td>
<td>Mr. Gahex for FATA contacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>22-July-2019</td>
<td>KMC Sports Complex</td>
<td>Mr. Illahi Baksh Bakak, Local Resident Haji Mureed Goth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>24-July-2019</td>
<td>K-Electric Corporate Social Responsibility.</td>
<td>Mr. Ahmed Raza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>03-August-2019</td>
<td>Pakistan Fisher Folk Forum</td>
<td>Mr. Majeed Motani, local historian and founding member of Pakistan Fisher folk Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>05-September-2019</td>
<td>Marie Adelaide Leprosy Centre</td>
<td>Dr. Mutaheer Zia</td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>19-September-2019</td>
<td>The Citizens Foundation (TCF) School, Machar Colony and Ibrahim Hyderia</td>
<td>Primary and Secondary School Principals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>24-September-2019</td>
<td>MALC, Lalu Khet</td>
<td>Local Residents of area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>24-September-2019</td>
<td>The Citizen Foundation, Machar Colony (Visit 2)</td>
<td>Primary school teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>03-October-2019</td>
<td>Health and Nutrition Development Society (HANDS)</td>
<td>Ms. Sabina Ashfaq, Senior Manager Education, HANDS and other staff members</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Ellis, Peter D., Jaafar Sadok Friaa, and Jon Kher Kaw 2018. Transforming Karachi into a livable and competitive megacity: a city diagnostic and transformation strategy. World Bank Group.


Khan, Faraz. 2015. First stage of Karachi security operation complete: Rangers. August 10. Accessed December 2019. https://tribune.com.pk/story/935314/fist-stage-of-karachi-security-operation-complete-rangers/?__cf_chl_jschl_token=837d2fo0a6fe435957ef550c12e5f3bb8d9d7c-1576253408-0-AVP3QtUUCyCNUNR0Fh-hFve7vk4g0mobIq7GU_JIXpqt-1e03gwzPdkYxNzgaxgKzLFzdMyoFeEiEmSOUF.


