Land, Governance & the Gendered Politics of Displacement in Urban Pakistan

April 2021

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ABSTRACT

In millennial Karachi, holding on to land and homes and accessing public space for labor, has become a vital struggle. Land displacement is an increasing, and sometimes constant, source of anxiety for urban dwellers, especially for urban poor, working class, marginalized communities, but some of the lower-to-middle income communities too. This report documents how land is governed and acquired for infrastructure and urban development projects; how land displacements impact people’s lives and their communities; and how people resist displacement in Pakistan’s largest metropolis. The findings emerge from a 24-month project covering 16 study sites in Karachi, called Land, Governance & the Gendered Politics of Displacement in Urban Pakistan, and funded by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). The research covered three case studies of displacement: people living in fear of displacement as in the case of the Karachi Circular Railway informal settlements; those who were resettled after displacement but face new vulnerabilities as in the case of Lyari Basti, Taiser Town; and those who are displaced and relegated to an endless period of waiting as in the case of Salai Para, in Hasan Auliya Village, Lyari. We used an embedded, triangulated research method, including 670 household surveys, 30 in-depth interviews, numerous focus group discussions, community workshops, Geographic Information Systems (GIS) mapping, analysis of media and secondary data, and court cases.

Much of the urban land in Karachi exists in the interstices of ‘illegal’ and ‘informal’ practices whereby the urban poor and marginalized groups’ tenure status remains in perpetual limbo. Informality is entangled with colonial genealogies of bureaucratic-legal land governance, with documents serving as a crucial means of establishing legibility of land ownership. It works as a strategic narrative for the state to justify land displacement for the betterment of the ‘public good’. This dovetails with a contemporary discourse on ‘encroachment’ deployed by the media, bureaucrats, politicians, and judges, that has silenced the voice of the urban poor, leading to a disavowal of their rights and struggles. This discourse is aligned with a new infrastructural and urban development/planning regime that represents an emerging pro-growth coalition of provincial, local, and federal governments, as well real estate developers and multilateral international organizations, that are reshaping Karachi. As demonstrated through an examination of laws, legal practices, and discourses around land acquisition, we show that ‘justice’, in the procedural sense, is not always in the best interests of the urban poor and marginalized citizens’ rights to property, to land tenure and to livelihood.

Fundamentally, land displacements have severe consequences: loss of home, livelihoods, community, and social networks; engendering a permanent state of anxiety and uncertainty; increasing physical, social, and environmental vulnerabilities; compounding gender inequalities; and inflicting severe psychological violence, irrevocably damaging social and economic mobility. These effects are especially pernicious because displacement is not a one-time event. For many of the households, individuals, and communities we
worked with in this project, displacement has shattered their past, scattered their present, and made their future uncertain. For many people, the spatial-temporal disruption has resulted in the loss of a sense of entitlement as urban citizens, with specific gendered impacts. Therefore, this report also discusses the issue of resettlement by examining the 'afterlives' of displacement where people are relocated to the rural-urban margins. Forced displacement is an intensely traumatic and violent experience with differentiated impacts on men and women, and the wellbeing related consequences for those who have experienced displacement or are at risk of losing their land.

The report also charts the complex, evolving and rich terrain of solidarities, protests, and grassroots activism that is gradually shaping resistance against land displacements in Karachi. The emotional and material dislocations that ensue from the loss of land, home and livelihoods do not always end in defeat; these moments also generate various forms of resistance and contestations. We place this complex process of resistance in shifting atmospheres of hope, and expectation that can quickly dissolve into despair and waiting. These atmospheric shifts also epitomize the extensive labors of ordinary women and men who come together in given moments, to forge connections in their common struggles to achieve the same goal. The contestations and conflicts over displacement demonstrate how the right to land as a right to citizenship, remains differentiated and unacknowledged by the Pakistani state. With future displacements anticipated in the context of new urban planning, infrastructure development, and disaster risk management interventions in Karachi, we offer recommendations for addressing the exclusions that arise from land displacement and resettlement.

Lastly, the findings and recommendations of this report have the potential of being used as a predictive proxy to understand the ongoing and possibly future crises related to displacement in Karachi. The relevance and implications of this report are likely to take a central stage as the discourse of development and resulting dispossessions intensify. This study is the largest of its kind, based on triangulation, and uses representative sampling of the affected communities. These characteristics leverage for not only estimating the impacts of ongoing crises in Karachi, but they are also representative of displacement related crises in contexts that are parallel or similar to our 16 sites. This report also offers a comparison point and replication database for future large-scale studies on urban displacements in Pakistan and across the Global South.

About Karachi Urban Lab (KUL)

KUL was established in 2018 at the Institute of Business Administration (IBA), Karachi. KUL's mission is to nurture and support ideas that enable explorations and connections between research, teaching, public policy dialogue and advocacy. KUL provides an interactive platform of research that focuses on infrastructures, land transformations, climate change, violence, and gender. The KUL is housed within the Department of Social Sciences & Liberal Arts (SSLA), IBA.

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Acknowledgements:
The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) for funding.

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The comments and opinions in this report are of the authors and the Karachi Urban Lab and not of the Institute of Business Administration (IBA) and the International Development Research Centre (IDRC).
Acknowledgements

Thanks to the International Development and Research Centre (IDRC) for their generous funding of this project, and a special thanks to Dr. Navsharan Singh of IDRC for her support. We thank our project consultants, Dr Sarwat Viquar and Dr Amiera Sawas for the ex-post project evaluation and recommendations.

We acknowledge KUL short-term Research Assistants Abdul Rehman, Kevin Shi, Azka Khan, Sania Sohail and Atufa Shahid for their contributions in analyzing media reports and visual data; and for their assistance in data entry, generating coding systems, and helping in the analysis of qualitative and quantitative data. We also thank KUL Interns Ali Ahmed, Javeria Khanum, Abeera Haseen, Fiza Zehra and Aiesha Qureshi in helping analyze archival data and transcribe interviews.

A special thanks to community activists Shamsuddin Sahib, Sagheer Ahmed, community lawyer Muhammad Ali Shah, Muhammad Rizwan, Zahid Burki and Haji Jan Muhammad for their invaluable on-ground support in facilitating our research efforts.

We thank the officials from KMC, DMC - Central, Estate Department and PWD, Pakistan Railways and Anis Haroon from NCHR for their valuable time and assistance during the project.

A very special thanks to the Urban Resource Center (URC), Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) and the Rasheed Rizvi Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (RCCHR) in Karachi for supporting us in various aspects of the research. We are especially grateful to Ms. Seema Liaqat of the URC for helping organize legal and well-being workshops with residents of the KCR informal settlements.

We especially acknowledge our Research Associate Aqdas Fatima for her valuable contributions in helping typeset and organize this report.

We also owe a huge debt of gratitude to the many residents of Karachi who so selflessly gave of their experiences and their aspirations. This report is dedicated to them and their struggles to secure better futures.
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<td>AWP</td>
<td>Awami Workers Party</td>
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<td>ANP</td>
<td>Awami National Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>AH</td>
<td>Aurat Haq</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGS</td>
<td>Advocate General Sindh</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABAD</td>
<td>Association of Builders and Developers</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACHR</td>
<td>Asian Coalition of Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>BoR</td>
<td>Board of Revenue</td>
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<td>CDGK</td>
<td>City District Government Karachi</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPEC</td>
<td>China-Pakistan Economic Corridor</td>
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<tr>
<td>CM</td>
<td>Chief Minister</td>
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<td>Employees' Old-Age Benefits Institution</td>
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<td>ECP</td>
<td>Election Commission of Pakistan</td>
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<td>EIA</td>
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<td>EvIA</td>
<td>Eviction Impact Assessment Tool</td>
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<td>Focus Group Discussions</td>
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<td>Government of Sindh</td>
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<td>GPS</td>
<td>Global Positioning System</td>
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<td>Human Right Commission of Pakistan</td>
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<td>Housing and land right Network</td>
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<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>KAIRP</td>
<td>Katchi Abadi Improvement and Regularization Program</td>
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<td>Karachi Bachao Tehreek</td>
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<td>Lines Area Redevelopment Plan</td>
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<td>LAA 1894</td>
<td>Land Acquisition Act 1894</td>
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<td>LDA</td>
<td>Lyari Development Authority</td>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td>MQM</td>
<td>Muttahida Qaumi Movement</td>
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<td>MQM-P</td>
<td>Muttahida Qaumi Movement Pakistan</td>
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<td>ML1</td>
<td>Main Line 1</td>
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<td>MNA</td>
<td>Member of National Assembly</td>
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<td>MPA</td>
<td>Member of Provincial Assembly</td>
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<td>MDA</td>
<td>Malir Development Authority</td>
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<td>NA</td>
<td>National Assembly</td>
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<td>NDMA</td>
<td>National Disaster Management Authority</td>
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<td>National Highway Authority</td>
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<td>National Commission of Human Rights</td>
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<td>OPP</td>
<td>Orangi Pilot Project</td>
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<td>OBOR</td>
<td>One Belt One Road</td>
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<td>PBS</td>
<td>Pakistan Bureau Statistics</td>
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<td>PILER</td>
<td>Pakistan Institute of labor Education and Research</td>
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<td>PTI</td>
<td>Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf</td>
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<td>PML-N</td>
<td>Pakistan Muslim League (Noon)</td>
</tr>
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<td>PML-SB</td>
<td>Pakistan Muslim League (Sher-e-Bangal)</td>
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<td>PS</td>
<td>Province of Sindh</td>
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<td>PR</td>
<td>Pakistan Railways</td>
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<td>PPP</td>
<td>Pakistan People’s Party</td>
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<td>PCO</td>
<td>Post Call Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTCL</td>
<td>Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited</td>
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<td>PWD</td>
<td>Public Work Department</td>
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<td>P&amp;DD</td>
<td>Planning and Development Department</td>
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<td>PIL</td>
<td>Public Interest Litigation</td>
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<td>PAP</td>
<td>Project Affected Person</td>
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<td>QMC</td>
<td>Quarters Mutasireen Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCC</td>
<td>Reinforced Cement Concrete</td>
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<td>RAs</td>
<td>Research Associates</td>
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<td>RCCHR</td>
<td>Rasheed Razvi Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>RoW</td>
<td>Right of Way</td>
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<tr>
<td>SKAA</td>
<td>Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority</td>
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<td>SMPA</td>
<td>Sindh Master Planning Authority</td>
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<td>Sindh High Court</td>
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<td>Sui Southern Gas Company</td>
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<td>Sindh Industrial Trading Estate</td>
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<td>SMPA</td>
<td>Sindh Master Plan Authority</td>
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<td>SLGA</td>
<td>Sindh Local Government Act</td>
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<td>Slum Dwellers Internationals</td>
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<td>Sindh Building Control Authority</td>
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<td>SHO</td>
<td>Station House Officer</td>
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<td>SMTC</td>
<td>Sindh Mass Transit Cell</td>
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<td>TCS</td>
<td>Tranzum Courier Service</td>
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<td>URC</td>
<td>Urban Resource Center</td>
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<td>UC</td>
<td>Union Committee</td>
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“Our grandfathers and great-grandfathers built this country together with Quaid-e-Azam. They are the reason this country was made and is capable of functioning. Now they are calling their children encroachers! We have a right over this land, over this country.”

ناہالے پھپڑ ایہن انہیں چاؤیا لہم کے ساتھ کی نگا کی اس ملب کی لیکس کی - آج ایہ کے بچوں اور قبائل کے وہاں دکھ کر جا رہے ہیں! نہیں اس مرضی والوں نے اس ملب کے کہنے کی کہتی ہے!
This report is the final output of a 24-months IDRC-funded project titled *Land, Governance & the Gendered Politics of Displacement in Urban Pakistan*. The project has focused on 16 study sites in Pakistan’s largest metropolis - Karachi - to understand how land is governed and acquired for infrastructure and urban development, how people respond to their marginalization and resist land displacements; and are prone to psychological harm and loss of community wellbeing. The particularities of the different study sites are incorporated as representing diverse temporalities, spatialities, heterogeneity of experiences, and different intensities and durations of land displacement. These diverse geographies have been portrayed as particular sites that are both intimate and local, but are also shaped by historical trajectories, and economic and political forces. Given that land displacement is an intensely traumatic experience, this project has been particularly attentive to its emotional and differentiated impacts on poor and marginalized men and women, and the wellbeing related consequences for those who have experienced displacement or are at risk of losing their land. Being attentive to differentiated impacts has brought into view the fact that land displacement is not a gender-neutral process. Women expressed higher levels of distress due to loss of social safety, community disruption, loss of homes, and loss of livelihoods. In the case of ongoing displacements, these negative impacts on wellbeing caused immense anxiety and fear of loss. At the psycho-social level, since women’s lives are largely centered around the domestic realm and the family, they may have fewer outlets than men to cope with vulnerability and insecurity.

Whereas, in the case of those who were living the afterlives of displacement and resettlement, women disproportionately suffered the stress of lost connections and intimacy, and issues related to mobility. These gendered impacts were further pronounced when they intersected with the socio-economic status. In fact, state policies and laws regarding land displacement and resettlement are blind to gender and the gendered experiences of those involved. Hence, a core focus of the investigation was on the impact of displacement on poor, working class, low-income communities in general and women in particular: how land displacement affects women’s land rights and access to accountability and redress. In Pakistan, women are typically excluded from decision-making processes regarding land ownership and suffer displacement with little or no compensation. This is relevant to their place, autonomy, and power in household relations and within the community, as well as to their understanding of rights-bearing citizenship as non-owners of property.

In addressing the question of women’s roles in resisting and challenging displacement, we found that the experiences are uniquely gendered and dictated by traditional gender roles and moral codes. These moral codes are rooted in a specific kind of institutionalized cultural construction of women that sees them as repositories of male honor, property and as inherently sexual(ized) beings (Toor, 2014; Fulk, 2013). The displaced, house-bound, and the dispossessed state’s relationship with women is characterized by paternalism due to a history of policy decisions that strip women of their agency. This is further reinforced at the level of the community where women are excluded from information sharing networks, decision-making processes, and advocacy groups. Notably, power dynamics and existing social networks often perpetuate community-based gender biases. Women’s voices are excluded from processes of visible resistance. This includes public modes of community mobilization, public protests, legal proceedings, and bureaucratic negotiations, because all these activities take place outside the *chaar-deewari* (four-walls), which is a culturally constituted concept used in Pakistan to signify the domestic sphere. However, as our research shows, women have continued to resist in innovative ways against oppressive economic and social structures, both within and outside their homes.

The project has also investigated how diverse communities threatened by land displacement are using different mechanisms, including the law, activism, and community-based interventions, to contest displacements. The law has become a critical ground in Pakistan for marginalized actors to demand recognition and entitlements, for instance through Public Interest Litigations (PIL) and petitions that endeavor to make the system of land and urban governance in Karachi ‘accountable’. Yet this system is partial, at best, in terms of the concerns of the urban poor reaching the courts. Moreover, the bulk of evictions taking place in Karachi, today, are being implemented for upholding the rule of law. Thus, the rule of law itself has become a terrain of violence for ordinary residents in conditions that are ripe for land displacement. The brutality of Supreme Court orders to remove ‘encroachments’ and ‘unauthorized structures’ from public land especially where poor men and women reside and work, has contributed to reinforcing the perception of informal settlement dwellers and informal vendors and hawkers, as culprits of the state’s actions and objects of their punishment, and the political force of them as victims of failure in housing policy, urban planning, and development. Hence, informal livelihoods and informal dwellings have fallen victim to the bulldozer. Moreover, the definition or range of what constitutes legality is increasingly being narrowed through the Supreme Court’s suo moto actions. In this process, the ordinary citizens’ rights rather than their duties, or inhuman life of them to move around and stay put anywhere in the city, is being reinvented and supplanted by a singular version of legality to uphold ‘law and order’.

This report’s findings are based on 670 household questionnaire surveys, 30 open-ended, in-depth interviews and multiple focus group discussions with people who have already experienced land displacement and are presently confronting the threat of displacement. The findings are also based on semi-structured interviews with government officials and civil society representatives to validate findings; as well as data on land displacements over the past two decades, collected through media monitoring, secondary literature review, community workshops, and tracking key court cases. The research benefited from our partnership with the NGO Urban Resource Center (URC) and its well-supported linkages with CBOS in several study sites. The findings of this report capture multidimensional impacts: household and individual level; community level implications; physical infrastructure (housing, density, materiality, mapping), state and institutional level mechanisms. Further, our results problematize and explain the complexity underlying the process of land displacement or fear of displacement among the most vulnerable populations of informal settlements in Karachi.

For the purposes of this research project, we have used the terms land displacement and evictions interchangeably to understand a process that involves the forced or coercive removal of people from land and homes by state authorities. This takes place with physical force, verbal threats, legal or extralegal processes, with bulldozers, police and paramilitary forces deployed as a proxy for state violence. NGOs and international organizations have already provided some guidance for the meaning of this term. For instance, Amnesty International defines ‘forced eviction’ as the forcible removal of people from their homes and against their will, with the threat or use of violence. The UN-HABITAT sees them as ‘temporary or permanent removal against their will of individuals, families and/or communities from the homes and land which they occupy, without the provision of, and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other protection’. These definitions situate eviction in a clear-cut relationship with land and highlight a legitimizing relationship between law and force. However, there is no legal definition of ‘forced’. Nevertheless, we remain mindful of the fact that on ground, land displacement is a complicated category (Baker, 2020) and there is no facile definition that captures all its permutations (Hartman and Robinson, 2003). Certain authors have emphasized a broader framework of ‘expulsion’ (Sassen, 2014), while others imply an ‘expanded meaning’ of dispossession occurring through intersections of class and race (Roy, 2017). In this report, we have retained the concept of land displacement/evictions as the forced removal of people from their land and homes. But we also understand it as a process that cannot be understood as a one-time event. Land displacement or evictions take place through different temporal contexts and generate complex, multiple effects of expectations, waiting, anxiety, and defeat. Thus, even though we have examined the causes of evictions in Karachi, we have also considered the durations or times of land displacement - an extended set of processes in which lives are made more precarious. The issue of time - *waqt* - is of particular importance in people’s lives as it not only moves but also runs out, for instance in matters of waiting for the state’s promise of compensation and resettlement.

Many people in Karachi live in fear and with the threat of eviction for years before an actual eviction occurs, as in the case of the Karachi Circular Railway (KCR) informal settlements, and for the residents of the Federal Quarters. For others, life after displacement is usually caught up in a state of ‘permanent temporariness’ (Yiftachel, 2009) as they are relegated to an endless period of waiting for state-provided compensation, as in the case of Salai Para, in Hasan Auliya Village, Lyari. Still others
who are formally resettled after land displacement, find that the process creates new vulnerabilities and uncertainties, as in the case of Lyari Basti, Taiser Town. Moreover, rumors about impending evictions often put social bonds under stress as deals are struck quietly between developers, bureaucrats, politicians and certain groups of residents, and mistrust becomes a vivid community life. Residents struggle to strategize against evictions. Turning to courts, submitting petitions, protesting, and conducting meetings with political representatives, activists, and municipal officials, is an exhausting process translating into harsh daily life experiences. When it comes to interacting with the forces that displace them, people’s agencies vary based on their positionalities and identities, for example, being a woman/Bengali/able-bodied/informal worker. In Karachi, land displacements also intersect with specific contexts where other kinds of dynamics are evident, such as gentrification, infrastructural developments, risk mitigation for urban flooding, and government operations for clearance of so-called illegal activities or encroachments.

In public discourse, ‘encroachment’ has become a unified label that disparages the urban poor who are targeted by the state. Their homes, land and neighborhoods are ripe for speculation, urban renewal, and infrastructure projects. Crucially, we understand land displacement in terms of a housing and livelihoods crisis in which poor, working class, low-income and even low-to-middle income residents suffer from impoverishment in every aspect of life. There is a growing consensus in the literature that land displacement and subsequent resettlement processes lead to a decline in the standard of living of displaced people and heighten impoverishment (Cernea 1997, 1998, 2000; McDowell 1997; Mathur and Marsden 1998). Certain authors (Ramanathan, 1996:1490) posit that “Mass displacement (…) is a prescription for impoverishment”, and public decision-making makes the impoverishment of other kinds of dynamics are evident, such as gentrification, infrastructural developments, risk mitigation for urban flooding, and government operations for clearance of so-called illegal activities or encroachments.

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(Chapter 1 - Introduction)

Juridical orders to clear encroachments have criminalized the informally placed, placing them in a permanent place of spatial illegality. Consequently, the psychological vulnerability of living under fear and facing stress in everyday life has become pervasive. Women, especially, have raised concerns regarding their safety, lack of autonomy, stress, and traumatic distress. For these communities, the process of negotiating with state officials for the right to stay has become an endless wait with people caught up in protracted legal battles and political appeals. Moreover, the exigencies of juridical power combined with a fragmented terrain of land governance in Karachi, have engendered pervasive state violence. Such prevailing power dynamics have narrowed people’s choices about when, how and where to move, and the repercussions of this are tremendous not only for those experiencing displacement but for the next generation and their security. In presenting our findings, we underscore that the experience of being displaced is not a side effect of development but is development: it defines the essence of current urban processes in Karachi, and more broadly across urban Pakistan (Tassadiq, forthcoming; Abeyasekara, et al., 2020; Bhurgri, 2019; Turi, 2015). Notably, despite the deleterious impacts of the continuing Covid-19 situation, forcible displacement of poor people and their livelihoods, has continued across urban Pakistan, for instance in the Federal Capital Islamabad, in Bahawalpur, Karachi, and Quetta (Toheed, 2020).

To understand how urban land is governed and acquired, we have been attentive to the historical complexities that buttress land acquisition and tenure arrangements in Karachi. There are ‘informal’ and ‘illegal’ tenure arrangements that poor, working class and low-income residents’ must navigate, which ultimately affects their access to affordable land and housing. These dynamics intersect with colonial genealogies of bureaucratic-legal practices, such as document-centric requirements of land acquisition that put a very heavy burden on people, due to exclusionary dynamics in institutions to provide documentary proof of land/property ownership. Colonial legacies also include primary legislation such as the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (LAA) that deals with land acquisition in Pakistan and allows the government to seize land/property for public use by eminent domain. A worrying new trend in this regard has been an increasingly proactive Supreme Court which, following a constitutional petition filed by Naimatullah Khan, former Mayor (Najmus) of Karachi, in 2010 to clear encroachments, has steadily increased its discursive and constitutional remit to substantially scale-up interventions in Karachi’s landscape. We take-up an in-depth exploration of this phenomenon’s history and repercussions in Chapter 4, Land, Law and Governance.

In Karachi’s context, the state’s accommodation of ‘illegal’ land acquisition practices, for instance in the regularization of informal settlements, over time and across generations, has not only shaped people’s perceptions of the legality of land ownership, but also provided a means for them to contest the state’s categorization of their land as ‘illegal’ or ‘encroached’. Even Federal Government employees, who were provided formal housing by the state after 1947, are now included within this bracket of ‘illegal’, and they confront the threat of eviction. Still, in Karachi many affected people who are unable to fulfill the burden of providing documented proof of land ownership, are either left out of compensation schemes or are provided with no form of compensation, a process that produces profound material and emotional dislocations. However, in instances where the state has resettled displaced communities, for example in Lyari Basti due to the construction of the mega-project Lyari Expressway (LEW) in the early 2000s, resettlement has been a coercive process with limited or no participation, especially for those on whom the state imposed the burden of providing official documents of land ownership. For these people, a flattened policy of compensation has been applied with no attention to differentiated land claims. There have been significant gaps between those declared ‘affected’ or ‘eligible’ and the actual process of counting people impacted by displacement. Today, people relocated to resettlement colonies such as Lyari Basti on the city’s rural-urban margins, find they were not fully compensated for previous homes or the money received has not led to improved living conditions given the inferior quality or delayed provision of infrastructure facilities. Under these conditions, religious minorities - such as Hindus - find themselves stuck in places where they are threatened, treated as outsiders, or excluded from the provision of basic infrastructure services. In Lyari Basti, conversations with Hindu respondents revealed that several incidents of discrimination directed at their children in the neighborhood schools, forced them to give up on their children’s schooling. Post-resettlement, the burdens of women’s domestic roles are exacerbated in conditions of precarity. This is particularly pertinent in a context where the state is even more absent in providing security and infrastructure in both public and domestic realms. Hence, the processes of displacement and resettlement also intensify the imbalance of patriarchal power relations. Thus, we show that resettlement exposes poor, working class, low-income women to new forms of violence and insecurities, which, due to blatant gender discrimination and patriarchal biases, never get addressed by planners and policymakers.

In informal settlements that are currently threatened by eviction in the city’s central locations, people have raised serious concerns about their personal and communal well-being. This is particularly evident in the context of the Supreme Court’s 2018 order for the clearance of ‘illegal encroachments’, whereby people residing for decades in settlements built on public land and with de facto tenure or no official documents, now find themselves labelled ‘illegal’. But the people targeted with eviction firmly believe in the legality of their land ownership and have positioned themselves as rights-bearing citizens demanding compensation in exchange for their land. In the words of a 30-year-old male respondent from Clayton Quarters:

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token compensation, for instance as a ‘charitable’ gesture that is evident in the Lyari Expressway (LEW) case. Under such circumstances, even the minimum criteria for compensation as laid out in the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (LAA), is bypassed by the state.

1.1 Brief History of Land Displacements in Karachi

Land displacements or evictions are themselves nothing new to Karachi and the associated violence can be located within a broader historical narrative. Certain scholars (Elden, 2013) remind us that “conflict over land, at a variety of scales is a major factor in human affairs and […] its effects have been almost entirely negative.” The effects are intertwined with struggles over property and ownership within given historical moments in which land has been allocated and distributed – from histories of settler colonialism to land grabbing, and the general ‘creative destruction’ of urban landscapes that cast cities as engines of dispossession for poor and marginalized populations. The historical dimension of land displacement in Karachi is connected to such histories but is also rooted in the history of urban planning and development after Pakistan’s independence in 1947, when the provision of affordable housing fell far short of on-ground realities (Daechsel, 2015; Ansari, 2011). Interestingly, the quest to restore order through the state’s present policies of land displacement, can be traced as far back as the early 1950s, when Karachi was the nation’s capital. After the upheavals of Partition, the challenges of accommodation loomed large as thousands of refugee-migrants squatted on land and built temporary shelters with virtually non-existent infrastructures. When state authorities finally intervened to ‘rehabilitate’ refugee colonies, their actions frequently resulted in demolishing houses and removing people from their land (Ansari, 2011). Thus, land displacements in Karachi cannot be separated from the post-Partition context of repeated crises of affordable housing, and tenure and infrastructure security.

In Pakistan, land displacement is recognized as a violation of the human right to adequate housing, and the Government of Pakistan is party to international conventions that oblige the state to protect citizens against forced displacements and to provide reparations. However, the challenge lies in both, the enforcement of such obligations and the recognition that forced displacements are not a side effect that ordinary people must put up with. In Figure 1.1, we highlight key historical moments since 1947 that have led to the reshaping of Karachi’s socio-spatial geography, a process in which millions of urban dwellers have been evicted, relocated, or left to fend for themselves for housing and livelihoods. Much of the displacement has taken place for urban development projects such as the LARP, in its truest projects such as the LEW and the KCR; for the ‘clearance’ of public land through anti-encroachment drives; and more recently in the city’s rural-urban margins, for the development of large-scale, private housing schemes that cater to the upper-middle class and have led to the displacement of longstanding Sindhi and Baloch communities (Ashfaq, 2020; Anwar, 2018).

In addition to the above historical moments, there have been myriad other lesser-known events such as the burning of other forms of informal shelter or jhuggies, by the government authorities to remove ‘encroachments’ on public land. State authorities - local, provincial, federal - have not carried out systematic surveys of land displacements. Even though there is a specific public agency - Karachi Development Authority (KDA) - that has been responsible since 1957 for resettlement, it has not kept records of how many families are displaced through recurring anti-encroachment drives. The reasons for this are multi-faceted and complex: the existence of multiple - at least 19 - land owning communities in Karachi which claims of authority over land are contested (Hasan et al., 2015); a lack of Standard Operating Procedures (SoPs) for removal of informal settlements; a complete disregard of existing protections granted to people in precarious housing situations under the law; and, perhaps the most salient reason, a discursive construction of people residing in informal settlements as katchi abadis and jhuggies as ‘illegals’ or ‘encroachers’.

This ‘encroachment’ and ‘illegality’ narrative, often used implicitly by policymakers and government officials, renders decades-long occupation of land and mixed-land usage of these kinds of areas invisible, and justifies the forced removal of people so the land can be ‘restored’ to its original state. As such, for state officials, simply documenting the number of people evicted or structures demolished, confers a degree of legitimacy to their tenure, which they are not supposed to deserve. This tactic also pays dividends for the government officials on-ground since a lack of documentation severely impedes resistance and social mobilization against eviction drives by displaced residents, whose first order of business necessarily becomes self-documenting as a scope of displacement. This includes preparing lists of affected people, estimating the value of lost assets, and devising fail-safes to root out false entries, all of which are time-consuming activities fraught with the possibility of aggravating existing communal fractures. Even then, whatever data is produced after a protracted process of negotiation, often has little legitimacy in official spaces where it is treated as terminally biased. This abject lack of data makes compensation or restitution schemes fundamentally infeasible because if the number of people affected and losses incurred is not conclusively settled on, then the scope of such schemes cannot be determined, and they perpetually remain in the planning stages.

There is some data available on resettlements in certain periods when major infrastructural projects were initiated between 2006 and 2009 in Karachi: the LEW project for which a separate body was set up - the Lyari Expressway Resettlement Project (LERP) - to retain some records of families evicted and resettled due to the construction; the Khasa Hill Project in 2007; the Korangi-Shah Faisal Flyover in 2008; and the Preedy Street project in 2009. For these major projects, surveys were conducted, and records are available with the relevant agencies, but none of these have been made public. Pertinently, these are the exception, not the rule. Since its formation in 1984, the Sindh Katchi Abadis Authority (SKAA) has been the only authority responsible for the
upgradation of informal settlements. But it too has no data on evictions or resettlements, and it does not cover other forms of informal shelter, such as jhuggies. For the most part, public sources such as the media, have reported forced displacements as ‘anti-encroachment drives’ to facilitate the recovery of public land. Hence, over the years, the unquestioned truthfulness of the data has become the very basis of a fractured and violent land governance and urban planning regime, which continues to exacerbate the longstanding crisis of affordable land and adequate housing for most urban poor, working class, lower-middle-class and marginalized residents in Karachi.

Even though Pakistan’s annual urbanization rate of 3 percent is lower when compared to other countries in Asia, e.g., Indonesian cities are growing faster at a rate of 4.1 percent per annum (World Bank, 2016), Karachi – by far the largest urban agglomeration in the country - has witnessed persistent population growth (see Figures 1.2 & 1.3) since Partition in 1947, alongside a housing crisis and growing inequality that successive major urban development plans have failed to address. Even various iterations of Karachi’s past master plans have sidestepped the affordable housing issue, and instead focused on regularizing large tracts of land through the Board of Revenue (BoR) for real estate development projects. In fact, the last three master plans of Karachi - the Greater Karachi Resettlement Plan, the Karachi Development Plan, and the Karachi Strategic Development Plan 2020 - only addressed the city’s perpetual housing precarity as a one-point issue, and even then, the plans’ piecemeal recommendations were never adopted in full.

Figure 1.2. Karachi’s Urban & Rural Population as % of Total Population, 1951 - 2017

Figure 1.3. Karachi’s Population 1998 - 2017

According to the 1998 Census, Karachi’s current housing demand is estimated at 80,000 new units per year, out of which the formal sector supplies about 32,000 housing units, while informal settlements are responsible for an additional 32,000 units (Hasan, 2015). Hence, in the absence of affordable land and housing, large numbers of informal settlements have developed over several decades through squatting on public lands and through the informal development of agricultural lands. Even though informal settlements are the defining feature of southern cities like Karachi, the belief that informal means unplanned or spontaneous is a myth (Anwar, 2014). State officials, politicians and the media often perpetuate entrenched and derogatory stereotypes about the dwellers of informal settlements. These stereotypes often go unchallenged. Moreover, through the state’s ability to exercise its legitimacy in removing ‘unauthorized’ settlements, residents of informal settlements are kept perpetually waiting for tenure security or for state-led relocation. The state’s arbitrary differentiation between what it considers ‘unauthorized’ or ‘illegal’ in terms of large-scale commercial developments that it sanctions, is indicative of its power over space and time. Thus, waiting is a condition created by the state through urban planning and state structures that generate uncertainty, as is evident in Karachi in the arbitrary cut-off dates used by the state to legalize some but never all informal settlements: notably the government agency Sindh Katchi Abadis Authority (SKAA) which has announced to formalize only those informal settlements that existed before 1997.

Approximately 62 percent of the city’s population currently estimated at 16 million (Census 2017) reside in informal settlements or katchi abadis. Although this figure is contested and may be considerably higher. For instance, the city’s main energy utility, Karachi Electric, (KE) and water utility, Karachi Water & Swareage Board (KWSB), both estimate that Karachi’s population is 25 million.2 Many residents within these settlements have no official documents of land ownership and fall in the category of de facto tenure (Hasan and Arif, 2018). Today, many katchi abadis represent startlingly high densities in the city’s center: one study site Mujahid Colony (District Central), has a density of 228,590 persons per sq. km as calculated from fieldwork and the Census 2017. This figure is considerably higher than the city-wide average of 24,000 per sq. km, and is comparable to high density slums like Dharavi in Mumbai, which has a density of 277,136 persons per sq. km. The proliferation of informal settlements and their subsequent densification, especially in the city’s center, has been crucial in fulfilling the shelter and livelihood needs of poor, working class, low-income residents, whose labor is indispensable to Karachi’s making and functioning. Major new commercial and infrastructural developments typically impinge upon several of these informal settlements, such as the 28 informal settlements built on public land alongside the Karachi Circular Railway (KCR). This situation is further complicated by people’s historical attachment and moral claims to these settlements, especially those located in the city center where people claim ownership of land based on their contributions to building the nation at the time of its creation in 1947, for instance in the Federal Quarters. Displacement then becomes an act of erasing histories, adding greater trauma and stress for people in the resettlement process.

1.2 Land Displacements in Millennial Karachi: Setting the Context

Karachi’s socio-spatial geography has changed rapidly since the 1990s. Based on data gathered by the Urban Resource Center (URC), and sources such as the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (KMC), the Dawn, and the Daily Express Newspaper archive, we estimate 67,562 housing units were demolished across Karachi from 1997 to 2020 due to land acquisition for urban development and mega-infrastructure projects, and for anti-encroachment drives to ‘clean’ the city and recover public land. In Table 1.1, we provide a breakdown of this figure. Notably, the below table does not include the 21,499 commercial structures that were demolished as part of small-scale anti-encroachment drives in the same period.

2 This information is based on the lead authors’ informal conversations with senior representatives of the KE and the KWSB.
The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) is another important political party in Pakistan's socio-political landscape. The party's influence has remained largely confined to the limits of cities like Karachi and Hyderabad in the province of Sindh. This is an ethnicity-based political party, though it calls itself "socially secular", established around the identity of Urdu-speaking migrants, the relevance of which will become clear in Chapter 5.

Since 1997, the intensity and frequency of land displacement represent the local and provincial governments’ rising interest in road widening, signal-free corridors, highways, and city beautification projects. Karachi gradually joins Karachi’s poor, low-income, and working-class populations to the rural-urban margins. This new phase of mega-infrastructure development and city beautification can be traced to General Pervaiz Musharraf’s (2000 - 2008) military regime, when the Sindh provincial and local governments launched the PKR 29 Billion (179.6 million $ USD) City Package Program or Tameer-e-Karachi (Dawn, 2004), to upgrade the city’s infrastructures. Popularly known as the brainchild of the Jamaat-e-Islami-backed Mayor Naimatullah Khan, the Tameer-e-Karachi’s combined federal and local government budgets were earmarked for the construction of roads, flyovers, bridges, underpasses, sewerage lines, and water supply. Approximately 135 infrastructural projects were launched under the City Package, with special attention given to the removal of ‘bottlenecks’ for the LEW’s construction. In 2005, a new local government with the MQM’s Mustafa Kamal at helm, continued the infrastructural works. For certain political and bureaucratic stakeholders, this decade of ‘infrastructural boom’ was particularly fortuitous given that the Sindh Local Government Act 2001 (SLGA 2001) had enabled the consolidation of local government powers and departments under one institutional entity: the City District Government Karachi (CDGK).

Table 1.1. Land Displacements in Karachi from 1997 to 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Infrastructure/Urban Development Projects &amp; Anti-encroachment</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Residential Households Demolished</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small-scale anti-encroachment drives</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>26,027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujar Nala clearance</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyari Expressway Project</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khosa Hill Project</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shah Faisal &amp; Korangi Linked Bridge Project</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Preedy Street Project</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1,385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revival of Karachi Circular Railway</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>67,562</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: KMC, CDGK, Dawn, KUL field surveys.

The infrastructure projects and anti-encroachment drives have resulted in the displacement of at least 400,000 people across Karachi; this figure is based on a conservative estimate of average 6 persons per household as reported in the Census 2017. However, we surmise a more realistic figure of 600,000 people displaced, given that most of the displacements were in the city’s high-density areas, where households often comprise between 8 to 10 persons. Moreover, the conservative estimate further excludes the displacement of people living in jhuggis, either as part of displacement due to infrastructure projects, or those displaced due to the burning of jhuggies for ‘unknown’ reasons. The URC has estimated that over 17,846 people were displaced from jhuggies between 1997 - 2010 (Saleem et al., 2020). Even though data for the following decade was not compiled, we speculate it is higher given the increased contestations over public land. It is imperative to add that during this period, less than 33 percent of the forcibly displaced households have received any alternative form of resettlement site and/or cash compensation. As discussed in Section 1.1, even though there is no systemic data on evictions in Karachi, there is some reliable data on resettlements. But this implies undercounting, and we cannot make definitive conclusions about the total number of evictions since the late 1990s. While, however, show trends based on a minimum set of evictions that are also acknowledged by state officials.

Since 1997, the increased contestation over public land represent the local and provincial governments’ rising interest in road widening, signal-free corridors, highways, and city beautification projects. Karachi gradually joins Karachi’s poor, low-income, and working-class populations to the rural-urban margins. This new phase of mega-infrastructure development and city beautification can be traced to General Pervaiz Musharraf’s (2000 - 2008) military regime, when the Sindh provincial and local governments launched the PKR 29 Billion (179.6 million $ USD) City Package Program or Tameer-e-Karachi (Dawn, 2004), to upgrade the city’s infrastructures. Popularly known as the brainchild of the Jamaat-e-Islami-backed Mayor Naimatullah Khan, the Tameer-e-Karachi’s combined federal and local government budgets were earmarked for the construction of roads, flyovers, bridges, underpasses, sewerage lines, and water supply. Approximately 135 infrastructural projects were launched under the City Package, with special attention given to the removal of ‘bottlenecks’ for the LEW’s construction. In 2005, a new local government with the MQM’s Mustafa Kamal at helm, continued the infrastructural works. For certain political and bureaucratic stakeholders, this decade of ‘infrastructural boom’ was particularly fortuitous given that the Sindh Local Government Act 2001 (SLGA 2001) had enabled the consolidation of local government powers and departments under one institutional entity: the City District Government Karachi (CDGK).

Even though Karachi’s local government system has been in abeyance since 2008, and municipal powers and budgets have atrophied considerably due to the centralization of power at the provincial level (Maher, 2019), the infrastructural developments and city beautification plans continue unabated. Today, with the Supreme Court’s involvement in Karachi’s urban planning, the city’s space is under constant alteration. A recent mega-infrastructure project is the Karachi Circular Railway (KCR), which has been in the pipeline since 2003. The KCR is a city-wide train transit system whose 42 km track passes through 28 informal settlements spread across the city’s four districts. Since 2018, eviction notices have been served to the settlements, with 4,653 households under threat of displacement (JICA, 2011). In 2019, as an outcome of Supreme Court backed orders, approximately 1,047 households were displaced without compensation or resettlement. Table 1.2 provides a breakdown of the demolished settlements based on field work, media reports and the URC. These include both concrete structures as well as jhuggis, located in Districts West, East and Central. The demolitions took place within a short period of six months from January to May 2019. This intensity of demolitions and evictions is unprecedented, with devastating and irreversible consequences on residents’ lives.

Writing on the brutal wave of Supreme Court backed anti-encroachment drives in the city’s center, urban planners (Toheed, 2020; Anwar, 2019; Hasan, 2018) and NGOs (Urban Resource Center, 2018) have described a veritable ‘massacre’ of informal livelihoods and housing. In 2018, the demolition of informal markets in the Empress Market and Lighthouse in the city’s center, led to the loss of 200,000 jobs (Hasan, 2018). These are devastating consequences for a majority of Karachi’s low-income residents who rely on the informal economy for survival. Moreover, due to the COVID 19 outbreak and containment measures adopted by the government to curtail people's movements

Table 1.2. Total Residential Structures demolished in 2019 for KCR’s Revival

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Demolitions</th>
<th>Residential Structures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24 Jan 19</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>Urdu College KCR</td>
<td>180 concrete structures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 May 19</td>
<td>East</td>
<td>Gilani KCR Railway Station, Gulshan e Iqbal Block -13B</td>
<td>10 jhuggis and 10 concrete structures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 May 19</td>
<td>East</td>
<td>Gulshan e Iqbal Block -13C</td>
<td>100 jhuggis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 May 19</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Hussain Hazara Goth, Gulshan e Iqbal Block 11</td>
<td>20 concrete structures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 May 19</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Juma Goth, Gulshan e Iqbal Block 11</td>
<td>22 jhuggis and 45 concrete structures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 May 19</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Gilani KCR Railway Station, Gulshan Block -13B</td>
<td>10 jhuggis and 10 concrete structures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 May 19</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Baloch Goth, Gulshan-e-Iqbal Block -13E</td>
<td>50 jhuggis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 May 19</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Gharibabad</td>
<td>72 concrete structures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 May 19</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Quaid e Azam Colony</td>
<td>78 concrete structures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 May 19</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Musa Colony</td>
<td>11 concrete structures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 May 19</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Mujahid Colony</td>
<td>55 concrete structures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 May 19</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Punjab Colony</td>
<td>9 concrete structures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 May 19</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Wahid Colony</td>
<td>15 concrete structures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 May 19</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Moosa Goth</td>
<td>20 concrete structures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1,047 residential structures</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: KUL field surveys, various media reports and URC
in urban spaces, the impact on ordinary people whose livelihoods are dependent on the informal economy, has been particularly precarious. Nearly 72.6 percent of jobs in Karachi are generated by the informal economy, with street vendors and hawkers as its backbone (ILO, 2015). Accessing urban space for labor is vital for poor men and women who struggle to find a place in the city. However, unlike the right to housing, discussions about the right to work are hardly ever associated with space, and there are no laws or policies that cover labor rights in the informal economy. The lack of legal status means that street vendors and hawkers are particularly vulnerable to evictions. Even though the right to work and the right to housing are enshrined in the Pakistan Constitution, there are still different degrees of legitimacy afforded to both in practice. This is a crucially important point given that for poor men and women, place-making hinges on the close relationship between land, housing, and work.

Even though land displacements in Karachi stretch back to the 1950s and 1960s (Daechsel, 2015; Ansari, 2005), in the present phase, the involvement of the Supreme Court marks a new moment in the city’s socio-spatial restructuring. The Supreme Court, in addition to issuing the order for clearing encroachments, has singled out the KCR and the LEW as projects of ‘public interest.’ The court has also tried to cut through bureaucratic red tape by passing unilateral directives. This is happening to the detriment of vulnerable populations, such as residents of informal settlements, already engaged in protracted negotiations with multiple state and non-state agencies in resisting evictions. Within this transformation, there are other multiple changes that have unfolded over the past two decades: liberal market reforms initiated in 2000 that have led to urban Pakistan’s political-economic restructuring alongside a media explosion; the popular notion of ‘slum-free’ and ‘world class’ cities increasingly evident in urban planning agendas (KSDP, 2007); urban development that has differentiated spaces and populations based on lines of caste, class, and lifestyle, for instance in the religio-cultural practices of an emergent urban middle-class (Maqsood 2017; Ahmad 2009), who increasingly reside in housing societies located on the urban peripheries, and demand improved service delivery either by the state or private arrangements; and the revival of mega-infrastructure projects under the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), that is an appendage to China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR).

The CPEC-backed transport projects have triggered the displacement of myriad working class, low-income households in Pakistan’s urban centers (Abeyasekara et al. 2020). In Karachi, the KCR’s revival is associated with the Federal Government plan to link it with the CPEC, specifically the extension and construction of the existing 1872 km ML1 railway track that will connect Karachi, Lahore, and Peshawar. These mega-projects are routinely represented through a discursive frame that casts them as a ‘matter of national interest’ or a ‘game changer’ (Dawn News, 2020). These mega-infrastructural aspirations for facilitating the ‘public good’, hardly consider the tacit implications for Karachi’s poor residents in terms of land displacements. Development plans for railways and highways disregard the needs of the marginalized and urban poor by considering the uses and benefits of the projects for select interest groups. We posit that with the inclusion of projects such as the KCR in the CPEC, there is an increasing dissolution of dissent within major political parties, bureaucratic institutions and the judiciary regarding the necessity or desirability of this mode of development. In fact, every project under the CPEC then becomes not only a project of ‘national importance’ but also dovetails with what is presented as in the ‘public’s interest’. While these forms of development continue to lead to exclusions and displacement, there is also the emergence of new risks due to shifting weather patterns, climate change and degraded ecologies. These pose new threats to urban lives in Karachi, as evidenced in the impact of the 2020 floods that had devastating consequences for the urban poor (Hashim & Imtiaz, 2020). During the past two decades of this intensified phase of infrastructural developments, hardly any low-income housing projects were developed in Karachi by the state. Although resettlement colonies such as Lyari Basti were built on the rural-urban margins of the city to accommodate the LEW-displaces - largely those who had no official documents of land ownership - housing ownership remains a matter of political patronage rather than rights. In the KSDP 2020 that the CDGK unveiled in 2007, social housing was never prioritized. The only proposal for housing the urban poor was in terms of strengthening the ‘Katchi Abadi Improvement and Regularization Programme’ (KAIRP), according to which single-story unit houses were to be converted into apartment complexes. But this project never materialized. Thus, housing by the government through state parastatals such as the Malir Development Authority (MDA), the Lyari Development Authority (LDA) and the military’s Defence Housing Authority (DHA), has continued to cater to middle class and high-income groups. Both public and private land development projects have encouraged speculation and investment in land (Anwar, 2018), and national housing policies show that the role of government has shifted from housing provider to a regulator (Abeyasekara et al, 2020). These developments signal the changing role of the Pakistan Constitution, there are still different degrees of legitimacy afforded to both in practice.

Nevertheless, this changing landscape of speedy infrastructures and city beautification schemes is not unfolding in a linear and unhindered fashion. Certain infrastructure projects, such as the KCR’s revival, remain stuck due to conflicts about land ownership and delayed by stay orders and public interest litigation; still others, such as the impending reconfiguration of the Empress Market, signal landscapes in transition. The temporal dimension of these uneven landscapes can be read as displacement, relocation, and transience, in which ordinary urban dwellers are caught up with varying degrees of hopes, expectations, aspirations and inertia. The current phase of Karachi’s land displacements should also be understood in the broader context of new urban planning and infrastructural developments that dovetail with a back-breaking austerity regime and Covid-19 shocks that are likely to double poverty in Pakistan; the Covid-19 impacts have already forced daily wage earners, migrants, and informal sector workers into greater precarity.

The public discourse around Karachi’s future pivots on development that prioritizes the speeding up of transport projects, tourism, real estate interests, public-private partnerships, and world class aesthetics, as well as the reconfigurations of land and densities in the city’s center (Figure 1.4). This discourse underscores an emergent powerful worldview of different stakeholders ranging from planners, bureaucrats, local, provincial, and federal governments, political parties to the judiciary as well multilateral organizations such as the World Bank.² A key aspect of this discourse is how ‘encroachments’ have been constructed: as a hurdle to achieve development for the greater public good and new aspirational futures for Karachi.

²World Bank (2018) Transforming Karachi into a Livable and Competitive MegaCity. The World Bank has become a major stakeholder in supporting various kinds of projects in Karachi: from water supply, sanitation, transport to neighborhood improvement, institutional reform, and urban management. A considerable sum of money in the form of loans is being channeled into the projects. The capacity of cities like Karachi to repay these loans and the impact of such loans on equitable development remains to be seen.

Figure 1.4. Public Discourse on Land Development in Karachi.

The act of encroachment is seen as a reason for congestion, disorder, traffic jams and a hindrance to restoring the city; it is also seen as a risk that requires the necessary removal of people from ‘danger zones’, for instance the removal of ‘encroachers’ from the banks of the Lyari River to protect them from floods – a narrative that has justified not only the need to be displaced for the residents’ own sake, but ultimately for the construction of the LEW. In the present moment, we witness a similar drive initiated after the 2020 floods to justify the removal of ‘dangerous’ settlements located along the banks of the city’s three main nullahs - an important point that we revisit in Chapter 8. This position consistently emerges in the narratives of experts, in the rhetoric of political parties, in public interest litigations, and newspaper reports that we have analyzed. In media discourse, the ‘illegal constructions’ are labelled as...
country where the state has continuously violated the rights of the poor and marginalized people to favor developers and powerful real estate interests as well as the Pakistan military’s land-acquisition agendas (Siddiqua, 2017; Anwar, 2018). Additionally, in urban Pakistan, formal participatory planning has never been institutionalized - even though the words of NGOs and organizations such as the Urban Resource Centre (OPP) provide a model for community participation (Hasan, 2011). Nor are there channels, such as those in Brazil (Roy et al., 2020) where communities develop Planos Populares (audits, countervisions, moratoriums) to challenge official urban planning or development agendas. Often, in Karachi the urban poor’s pathways to and limits of resistance to land displacements, have the Orange Pilot project of patronage (Anwar, 2014; Virag 2014) - a process akin to other parts of urban South Asia (Weinstein, 2014). These legacies can easily reverse decades of precariously accumulated rights and resources of urban dwellers, as we show in the ensuing chapters about the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (LAA), that continues to have relevance for how the state appropriates land for infrastructure and urban development projects.

In urban Pakistan, struggles against land displacements are increasingly being waged through the ballot box or vote bank politics, in the courtroom or through public interest litigation, and on the streets in the form of protests and sit-ins. These complex engagements also represent a living history of struggles against land displacements in Karachi, is often a straightforward demand to not be moved or for regularization and stay orders, as opposed to long-term security and improved housing quality. On the other hand, this can be understood as residents’ and activists’ way of prioritizing the urgent material interests of keeping land and housing intact and using wider movements instrumentally to gather support (Bayat, 2015). Thus, residents’ collaborations with a network of organizations both neighborhood- and city-based, can be understood as an anti-eviction strategy in millennial Karachi.
Chapter 1 - Introduction

displacement in which this project has unfolded. Even though land displacement is hardly new to South Asia—the colonial period was characterized by the encroachment of land and forest by the Raj for railways, mines, and plantations, and in postcolonial South Asia by large scale infrastructure developments, mining, and industrial projects. Today, land displacement and the shift in the value of land from its productive use to its commodification, is notable. In South Asia, scholars have charted the land transformations, focusing upon increasing inequality and impoverishment (Corbridge & Shah 2013; Münster & Strümppell 2014) as well the crisis of agriculture, impoverishment of farmers and exploitation of labor in the informal sector (Harriss-White et al. 2009; Reddy & Mishra 2009; Breman, 2010). When turning to urban contexts, much of the literature on land displacements/evictions (Zhang, 2012; Sadana, 2010; Bhan, 2009; Weinstein and Xuefei 2009; Dupont, 2008) has examined how under neoliberal regimes, governments take aggressive measures to attract new capital investments that often entail the conversion of specific types of urban land for mega-infrastructure projects, and ‘world class’ urban development schemes. This literature has emphasized the significant and complex entanglements between foreign investment and cities, and the resulting anti-poor policies and curtailments on the ‘right to the city’ (Harvey, 2008). David Harvey's (2004) work has been particularly influential in seeing land displacements/evictions as a necessary feature of capitalist economies, notably his powerful concept ‘accumulation by dispossession’, even though it has drawn critique (Leitner and Sheppard, 2018) as inadequate for understanding the variegated orders of displacement. A key feature of these debates on displacement is how it manifests through gentrification where higher-income groups replace lower-income residents in neighborhoods that are undergoing land and housing transformations (Lees et al. 2016; Slater 2006; Smith, 1996). Gentrification and its connected gentrification have generated extensive debates, with certain authors pointing to the predominance of gentrification narratives as subsuming other reasons for land displacement (Ghetner, 2014).

Even though we acknowledge the importance of these literatures for understanding land displacements in millennial Karachi’s changing landscape of infrastructural developments, and ‘world class’ aspirations, for instance through the arrival of Chinese capital, we also underscore that the city’s present historical conjuncture of land displacement cannot be understood as solely emblematic of neoliberal urban governance. It is our contention that what makes this present moment of land displacement and dispossession particularly complex, is the interlocking of emergent neoliberal policies with colonial genealogies of managing and appropriating land, as well post-Partition legacies of housing crisis and land informalization that dovetail today with the violence of law, and by this we mean the emergence of the courts as key sites of urban planning and governance that aim to restore law and order in the city. Thus, we take a cue from recent anthropological work (Bjorkmann, 2015) on South Asian cities, that sees neoliberal policies as incomplete projects inflected with historically shaped practices of land governance and appropriation in local contexts. This is particularly pertinent in the Karachi context where the land ownership rights of the urban poor are generally indeterminate or incomplete. In Karachi, the local realities of land use, differential forms of access and property rights are often far more nuanced.

The continuity of the relevance of colonial laws and practices of land governance in Pakistan, are notable in two significant ways: in the deployment of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (LAA), and in the areas of civil administration. In South Asia, colonial rule established a elaborate system of governance constituted through the production of paper and land records (Bull, 2012). This system was central not only to land revenue administration, but also for land acquisition and establishing property ownership. The LAA was introduced by the British colonial rulers to enable the construction of infrastructure (Beverly, 1888), and it continues to function in Pakistan as an important law governing land acquisition. The LAA allows the state to seize property for public purposes by eminent domain; although the instrument that land/property is the ‘hegemonic’ form of disempowered groups’ multiple social practices of claiming space. This is evident, for instance, in certain authors’ (Safransky, 2016; Hart, 2006; Holston, 2008; Roy, 2003) work where displacement is understood as part of the enactment of racial difference or as a process of racial banishment, contested through a politics of emplacement in the context of anti-eviction struggles in cities like Chicago and Cape Town. Further, Sapna Doshi’s (2013) research on displacement in Mumbai, has shown how evictions facilitate “accumulation by differentiated displacement”, a process in which race and class interlock to produce different categorizations of urban citizens, resulting in different outcomes of rights and entitlements to land and housing. The state’s resistance to land displacements and movements by ‘informal people’ (Bayat, 2000) to formalize property regimes, as struggles to assert rights (Holston, 2009).

Further, we cannot ignore the gendered dimensions of property regimes where women’s lack of effective rights in land, explains their socio-economic and political subordination (Moser & Fenton, 2010; Rakodi, 2010; Agarwal, 1994). Against the backdrop of forced displacement, it is difficult to achieve gender justice in the allocation and distribution of resources given the cultural and political biases that work against women in urban Pakistan (Cheema et al 2021). Gender also intersects with other forms of social difference such as class, caste, ethnicity, as well national political-economies, and localized understandings of safety in public space, to shape men’s and women’s experiences and contestations of land displacement (Vaz-Jones, 2018). In Karachi, where public space is rife with contestations along gendered and class-based lines, women’s access remains highly limited. Even though this is in part due to social factors such as traditional gender roles and moral codes, women’s access to public space has also historically been influenced by the state’s role in the ‘construction of women’s gendered citizenship’ (Viqar, 2018). The chador and chandewari discourse, which was specifically popularized during General Zia’s military regime (1979-1988) and was institutionalized with the introduction of restrictive laws within the Hudood Ordinance, facilitated a particular kind of cultural construction of women that has made them akin to repositories of male honor (Afshan, 2005; Jalal, 1991), and reduced them to appendages. In this way, the far-reaching impacts of General Zia’s Islamization can still be felt within Pakistan’s social fabric today where women’s mere presence in public space itself is often seen as a transgression (Anwar et al.,2018; Toor, 2014). Thus, the fluidity of the home/private and the street/public space also conditions gendered experiences of land displacement, whereby for women what is at stake is not only the loss of homes/
land and livelihoods, but also the perceived safety of their neighborhoods and the support of their female kinship and neighborhood networks.

Finally, with the acceleration of urbanization in Pakistan, there are significantly increased social and environmental pressures on urban dwellers, leading to lower security and to higher vulnerability (Wang et al., 2019). These pressures and resultant vulnerability are further exacerbated for residents of low-income settlements due to lower socioeconomic status and power, and limited access to decent infrastructures (Anwar et al., 2016). We conceptualize vulnerability as a complex and multidimensional concept that includes socio-psychological vulnerability, and infrastructural vulnerability. The socio-psychological vulnerability may include but is not limited to lack of control over circumstances, perception of insecurity, stress and anxiety, and fear or the loss of social and community relations. Whereas lack of control over circumstances significantly changes the individual’s perceptions and behaviors causing negative impacts on their wellbeing (Whitson and Galinsky, 2008); the sense of security is significantly related to social relationships and perceived community support (see Edmondson, 2014; Inoue et al. 2016). Moreover, this socio-psychological dimension includes the disproportional vulnerabilities for groups with lower socio-economic status, i.e., poor and women. Meaning that their wellbeing and perceived security is further compromised in the context of land displacements based on their lower control over circumstances, higher fear, and stress levels. Women in particular face higher stress levels if they fear disruption of communities because many have greater reliance on social support of other women in their community (Anjum et al., 2019).

Displacement makes people highly vulnerable to psychological violence by negatively impacting their health and wellbeing. Human wellbeing heavily depends upon people’s perceived control over their environment, and their relatedness with their environment and community (Deci et al., 2000); under the fear and stress of displacement, people’s lives become uncertain, and they fear loss of connectedness. These circumstances negatively impact health and wellbeing (Marcinko, 2015; Sheldon, 2012), negative perceptions and experiences, particularly hostile behaviors and violence become more frequent (Hodgins, et al., 2006). These negative impacts on the wellbeing of displaced communities are more visible among those who are disproportionately vulnerable and at a higher risk for mental illnesses (Hossain et al., 2020). Besides, lack of awareness, critically low resources for health and wellbeing, results in delayed and ineffective support for those who are forcibly displaced (Hossain et al., 2020). Thus, forced displacement is also a security experience at the local scale. This is important because in the dominant discourse on security and development, policy debates often ignore the (in)security realities of urban dwellers (Anwar et al., 2020; Lemanski, 2012).

1.4 Objectives

This report aims to show how people grapple with land displacement as an impending disaster, and how they live their afterlives in its devastating aftermath in urban Pakistan. It discusses how communities in Pakistan’s largest metropolis - Karachi - organize and demand redress, how they are prone to psychological harm and loss of community wellbeing. It also provides recommendations for addressing the current bureaucratic-legal impediments that frame land governance in Karachi. In Chapter 2, we detail the 16 study sites in terms of their locations, neighborhood profiles, densities, and histories.

In Chapter 3, we present details about the data collection methods, sources, and tools. This was a multi-method research project and each of the methods was selected to address specific types of data relevant to specific research questions.

In Chapter 4, we examine the laws, legal practices and discourses around land acquisition, displacement, and compensation as they take recourse in documents, legality, and violence. We refer not only to law’s inevitably violent imposition of state power, but also the constitutional provisions that seek to enforce fundamental rights of individuals and hold state governance accountable. We trace Public Interest Litigations (PILs) filed against encroachments in the context of Karachi, and identify the hitherto unexamined, expanding, relationship between the judiciary in the current urban planning and development discourse.

In Chapter 5, we build on the qualitative and quantitative empirical findings to discuss the relationship between varied forms of tenure (in) security that shape people’s relationships with the state, and are embedded in different historical trajectories, bureaucratic-legal structures, and politics alongside colonial documentation processes, which ultimately lead to different outcomes in terms of people’s futures or right to stay. We also explore the forms of violence wrought by displacement and the ensuing disruption of people’s livelihoods and mobility, focusing specifically on its affective dimensions and detrimental effects particularly on women, which is a key category connecting the spatial, temporal, and social, and the varied forms of resistance. The chapter focuses on showing land displacement as a non-discrete phenomenon, which directly and indirectly leads to entrenching vulnerabilities.

Chapter 6 takes up the issue of resettlement by examining the ‘afterlives’ of displacement in the context of the 80,000 LEW ‘affectees’ who were relocated to a resettlement colony on the city’s rural-urban margins. Government efforts in the resettlement, failed to consider that their policies create new vulnerabilities among resettled populations. The chapter asks: what are the socio-psychological and political experiences of resettlement, especially in relation to gender? In addressing this question, we highlight the limits of tenure security and new kinds of vulnerabilities created since the LEW ‘affectees’ resettlement almost two decades ago.

In Chapter 7, we discuss the case of displaced people who never received any form of compensation due the LEW’s construction. We examine the case of the displaced residents of Hasan Auliya Village (HAV) Block C, or Salai Para as it is colloquially known, as they enter their fifth year in a protracted state of ‘lives in limbo’. We consider how people describe, experience, and challenge the spatial and temporal disruptions to which they have been subjected. We draw attention to the experiences of the affectees for compensation; for stability in livelihoods and in homes; for a sense of social safety and security in placemaking, while they remain in a state of uncertainty and ‘permanent temporariness’.

In the final Chapter 8, we look at the future landscape of evictions, given the new infrastructure and urban development projects, as well as land clearance and a centralized urban planning regime, that are on the horizon. We take up this question in relation to density as it pertains to land and housing affordability, and real estate speculation in Karachi. Finally, in this chapter, we make policy recommendations to minimize the negative impacts of future land displacement on people considering the new development projects, locating these recommendations in the broader context of the United Nations Sustainable Goals (SDGs).
“A house is like a garment. If a house is demolished, the garment is snatched from the body.”
2.1 Introduction

This chapter briefly lays out the histories, demographics, and neighborhood profiles of the 16 study sites where we worked. This provides the necessary context for the reader to understand the importance of these sites within the broader context of land displacements in Karachi, while also detailing each site’s own history and circumstances. We will return to the issue of ‘density’ in Chapters 5 and 8, to further discuss its relationship with land displacement, affordable housing, well-being, and communal living. It is important to note that we have sourced much of our demographic data from the 2017 census, yet this census itself remains ungazetted or unpublished through official government channels. Hence, the figures remain provisional. We acknowledge some of the figures we have worked with might be updated by the Federal Government in the future.

2.2 Site Selection & Neighborhood Profiles

We selected a total of 16 neighborhoods as study sites based upon the city’s geographies that are mired in new and old phases of land displacements since 2000. This enabled a comparative context for understanding the shifting dynamics of displacement and resettlement experiences, and the associated politics and governance. We focused first on 12 neighborhoods—primarily informal settlements—located along the Karachi Circular Railway (KCR) track that runs across the city’s four districts as shown in Map 2.1. Approximately 20 percent of the area along the KCR tracks comprises informal settlements or katchi abadis; the remaining 72 percent is taken up by commercial structures such as banks, factories (Coca Cola, Toyota), as well as a military arms supply depot (Hasan, 2009). There is also some middle-income housing present. In the 2018-2019 anti-encroachment drives, it was primarily the informal settlements that were targeted with devastating consequences.

These 12 informal settlements are home to primarily working-class poor, and lower-income as well as lower-middle income residents who have lived there for well over four decades, and now claim the land as their own. Furthermore, out of these 12 settlements, 7 are listed as katchi abadis under the Sindh Katchi Abadi Act 1987, promulgated by the Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority (SKAA), that functions under the Ministry of Human Settlement and Social Development. This means that the land in these 7 settlements has either been regularized and/or residents have acquired leases for their properties. However, this is vigorously contested by the Pakistan Railway Authority (PRA), which claims a significant part of these settlements lies too close to the KCR tracks. Hence, ‘encroaching’ on the PRA’s Right of Way (RoW). In the case of one informal settlement—Machar Colony—the SKAA lease is in fact contested by the PRA and the Karachi Port Trust (KPT); both government agencies claim the land belongs to them. Hence, different land-owning agencies with competing claims to the land on which the informal settlements have been built further complicate the dynamics of land displacement and residents’ struggles to stay put.

We focus on two components of the KCR track: the main line that is part of the national railway track and connects Karachi to the rest of Pakistan, and the loop line that was laid in 1964, constructed specifically for the circular train. The loop line is currently inoperative but the KCR revival scheme, initiated by the Federal and Provincial governments, aims to restore it. Along the KCR main line between the City Station and the Drigh Road Station, 4 settlements are currently under threat of eviction: Gharibabad-PIDC, Kashmir Mujahid Colony, New Sindh Muslim Colony and Umar Colony 1. Along the KCR loop line, 7 settlements were partially demolished, and people were evicted from their homes between 2018 and 2019: Machar Colony (Muhammadi Colony & Bengali-Burmi Colony) between the Lyari Station and Wazir Mansion Station; as well as Gharibabad-Liaquatabad, Moosa Colony, Wahid Colony, Punjab Colony, Mujahid Colony and Musa Goth between the Liaquatabad Station and Orangi Station. Finally, Quaid-e-Azam Colony that is also situated along the KCR loop line, suffered the most demolitions. A total of 565 concrete structures were demolished comprising 1,000 households, and an estimated 6,500 people were directly impacted. We did not include Quaid-e-Azam Colony and Gharibabad-Liaquatabad in our household survey but engaged extensively with the displaced residents through open-ended, in-depth interviews and focus groups discussions to gain a better understanding of the experiences and politics of displacement.

In addition to the KCR neighborhoods, we selected two neighborhoods in the city’s Federal Quarters (Map 2.2): Martin Quarters and Clayton Quarters, where residents are also under threat of eviction. The Federal Quarters is primarily home to federal government employees and is one of the oldest settlements in the city, formed shortly after Partition in 1947. We selected this site not only because of...
the imminent threat of eviction it was facing, but also because of its complicated history with several different government institutions, such as the Ministry of Housing and Estate Department, that has, in the past, issued land ownership eligibility certificates, but these are no longer considered legally valid under the Supreme Court’s 2018 anti-encroachment orders. Furthermore, by including this site, we underscore that in millennial Karachi, the threat of evictions is not restricted to just poor or working-class neighborhoods but increasingly targets lower-middle class or white-collar residents. To gain a better understanding of land displacement and the workings of state-led compensation and resettlement schemes, we selected Lyari Basti (LB) or Taiser Town Scheme 45 (Map 2.3). LB is a resettlement colony on Karachi’s rural-urban margins, where an estimated 19,300 families, who had no official documents of land ownership, were relocated after being displaced in 2003 due to the construction of the megaproject Lyari Expressway (LEW). This site is important to our study because it allows us to understand the afterlives of displacement in the form of emerging vulnerabilities, loss of mobility, and degradation of infrastructures.

Our final site was Salai Para, Hasan Aulia Village (HAV), a neighborhood along the LEW and comprising three blocks - A, B and C. Residents in Block C of HAV—or Salai Para—experienced two phases of demolition: an initial phase from 2006 through 2013, and a second phase lasting from 2016 to 2017 to accommodate the construction of the LEW Garden Interchange (Map 2.4). Residents in Block A and B were not displaced in the eviction phases due to the community’s organized resistance, a process that forced government officials to bypass these blocks during the final construction of the expressway. Even though HAV is presented as a success story of organized resistance, our fieldwork in Salai Para complicates this narrative and underscores a more spatially and socially fractured landscape of displacement and resistance. By including HAV, our objective was not only to complicate the narrative of resistance, but also...
to gain an understanding of what happens when people are relegated to an irreconcilable situation of waiting for compensation and resettlement.

Another major event that took place during our project, was a series of anti-eviction drives against informal markets across Karachi. These commercial evictions unfolded in an intense phase, from October 2018 to February 2019, and led to the demolition of over 11,000 structures, including 20 major markets such as the Empress Market, Soldier Bazaar, Jamu Cloth Market, Bolton Market, Jodia Bazaar and Lighthouse Lunda Bazaar (Map 2.5). In Empress Market alone, more than 1700 shops and stalls were demolished within 14 small markets. We spent a month in the Lighthouse Lunda Bazaar market, drafting a new survey to capture the scope of these demolitions and the losses incurred. The outcome was 300 surveys gathered in collaboration with the URC.

Taken together, these ethnically and socio-economically diverse study sites represent Karachi’s intensifying crisis of affordable housing, informal livelihoods, and land tenure security. The sites also underscore the complex, layered material, and socio-spatial geographies through which forced displacements in the name of ‘progress’, are supported by new economic, legal, and political mechanisms. In what follows, we provide brief neighborhood profiles of the 16 study sites.

### 2.2.1 Karachi Circular Railway

#### Informal Settlements

Spread across 4 districts (District South, District Central, District West, District East), the 28 informal settlements along the KCR main line and loop line, comprise an estimated 4,653 families (JICA, 2011) who are facing the threat of eviction or have been evicted. The neighborhoods are a mixture of ethnically heterogeneous, poor, working class, lower-income to middle-income households. In Table 2.1, we present some basic data on location, population estimates, land governance agencies, and infrastructures. The main line and loop line neighborhood profiles are presented in the ensuing separate sections to highlight key differences in morphologies, land tenure arrangements, demographics, livelihoods, and infrastructures.

#### Table 2.1. Basic Information on 12 KCR Informal Settlements - 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlement</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Estimated Population</th>
<th>UC</th>
<th>UC Chairman &amp; Political Affiliation</th>
<th>Land Owning Agency</th>
<th>Electricity, Gas, Sewerage, Water</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>KCR Main Line Informal Settlements: Umar Colony 1, New Sindh Muslim Colony, Ghareebabad-PIDC, and Kashmir Mujahid Colony</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Karachi's intensifying crisis of affordable housing, informal livelihoods, and land tenure security. The Settlements comprise ethnically heterogeneous (Hindko, Pakhtun, Punjabi, Saraiki, Balochi, Sindhi, Hazara and Kashmiri) populations that have migrated to Karachi over the past several decades, from different parts of Pakistan. The settlements have been built on public (railway) land and are largely an outcome of informal tenure arrangements that have been historically facilitated by national parties such as the PPP and the PML-N. These were also the dominant parties in previous elections, particularly the PPP that won immense support from the constituencies in which these settlements are embedded. However, in the 2018 elections, PTI won an overwhelming majority of votes from these areas. For instance, in Ghareebabad-PIDC and Kashmir Mujahid Colony, 75 percent of residents voted historically for the PPP. But in 2018, the PPP’s share shrunk to 25 percent with the rest of the votes going to PTI. We ascertained this shift based on in-depth discussions with key respondents and reviewed the election data available on the Election Commission of Pakistan website. Akin to many informal settlements in Karachi, the majority of KCR main line residents are daily wage laborers, drivers, and domestic helpers. Many are also street hawkers or have set-up their own small shops in their neighborhoods. A small number of residents have white collar jobs as clerks or other low-level employees. Notably, in Umar Colony 1 and New Sindh Muslim, women work as domestic helpers in nearby upscale neighborhoods. In Ghareebabad-PIDC, residents are also employed as security personnel and room service staff in neighboring upscale hotels and restaurants. The built morphological morphology of these settlements is dominated by houses constructed from semi-permanent materials, such as concrete blocks for walls and cement or tin or metal sheets for roofs, while a small number of homes are temporary shacks made of fabric or bamboo or wood. Plot sizes are mostly within or below 80 sq. yds, and houses are generally built up to the first floor with makeshift stairs constructed from metal or wood. Umar Colony 1 and New Sindh Muslim Colony are located near the Balochar Colony flyover in District East and run parallel to the main Sharab-e-Faisal Road (Map 2.6). According to the URC (URC 2009), Umar Colony 1 has 1,146 housing units with a population of 13,470. Even though most residents in both neighborhoods have de facto tenure, approximately 30 percent of the residential housing in Umar Colony 1, has been regularized.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
under the SKAA. Before the delimitation process began in 2018, these two informal settlements fell under the Provincial Assembly Constituency PS-114 with a PPP representative - Saeed Ghani - as the MPA. In the 2018 elections, the PTI won an overwhelming majority in Umar Colony 1 and New Sindh Muslim. The current MNA of the area is the PTI’s Ali H. Zaidi and the MPA also belongs to the same party. During open-ended conversations, many respondents from these neighborhoods cited hope for Naya Pakistan (New Pakistan) and government’s promises of eliminating corruption, providing affordable housing, and ending poverty in Pakistan.

Umar Colony is named after Umar Kamal, the son of Kamal Azfar - former Governor of Sindh and a senior member of the PPP - who visited the colony and sewerage lines. Anecdotal evidence suggests in the 1950s and 1960s, migrants purchased unleased 60 sq. yds plots for PKR 100 each (USD 0.62). Today, these same plots are valued at an estimated PKR 1 million (USD 6208) each. Taken together, New Sindh Muslim Colony and Umar Colony contain the largest number of households currently under threat of displacement: 1626 households representing the largest cluster across all KCR settlements. It is also for this reason that the leader - Haji Khan Badshah - of the influential Karachi Circular Railway Mutasireen Committee (KCRMC), resides in Umar Colony 1, and represents KCRMC across different community-based and advocacy settings. The KCRMC was originally established in 2006 when the KCR revival project was announced; and several mutasireen (affected persons) from the different settlements organized to resist impending displacements.

Umar Colony 1 received electricity in 1976 - first through kunda (illegal) connections - and respondents have documented proof of receiving electricity bills as early as 1984. New Sindh Muslim received electricity somewhat later in 1990. Gas connections were established in 1985 in Umar Colony 1 and then extended to New Sindh Muslim in 1991. In both neighborhoods, water was initially accessed through communal taps, until public water lines were laid in the 1990s by a joint group of community activists and political leaders from the PPP. However, not every household has access to public water supply, and many residents have opted to bore underground wells. Sewage disposal has mostly been done in a nearby drain, even though different levels of sewage lines were installed by the SKAA and Union Councils between 1997 and 2006. Residents often complain that the KMC sweepers, who clean the streets in the nearby Shahrah-e-Faisal Road, ignore their neighborhoods even though they are supposed to provide service for the entire area. Thus, residents pay sweepers separately for trash and other solid waste removal from their houses, and from the areas between the tracks and the houses. Other types of amenities, such as health centers, stitching centers for women, and madrassas have been established by community members. There is only one government run public school in the area. There are also many mosques, at the very least a dozen or so, and four are adjacent to the KCR tracks. This might have been a deliberate strategy to occupy space because it is generally difficult to demolish a mosque.

Moving on to Ghareebabad-PIDC and Kashmir Mujahid Colony, these informal settlements are located near the PIDC flyover along Pakistan Railways’ main line in District South, and run parallel to the Dr. Ziauddin Ahmed Road in Civil Lines (Map 2.7).

Both informal settlements are situated near the

as part of his political campaign on the same day that his son was born in 1971. Documents presented by residents suggest the earliest records of Umar Colony date to 1956. Respondents’ accounts indicate that Umar Colony 1 initially comprised jhuggis or temporary shacks of 100 to 200 homes. Over decades, residents invested an estimated PKR 342 million (USD 2.1 million) upgrading houses onto the tracks in Umar Colony 1. This makes the experience of walking through the space, between the track and the houses in Umar Colony 1, markedly different because the impact of the main line moving train is intense. However, this distance between the residential structures and the tracks gradually widens as one moves toward New Sindh Muslim. The issue of ‘distance from tracks’ is important for two reasons: first, it connects with the Pakistan Railways’ RoW claim for justifying the demolitions of residential and commercial structures; and second, the residents routinely point out the demolitions are unnecessary because the main line track remains operative despite its proximity to the structures under threat.

Umar Colony 1’s location along the KCR tracks is unique when compared to the other main line settlements. Whereas in most main line settlements the distance between the KCR track and residential structures is a minimum 40 feet, in Umar Colony 1, it is considerably narrower at 15 feet. Thus, the residential and commercial structures literally spill over the tracks in Umar Colony 1. This makes the experience of walking through the space, between the track and the houses in Umar Colony 1, markedly different because the impact of the main line moving train is intense. However, this distance between the residential structures and the tracks gradually widens as one moves toward New Sindh Muslim. The issue of ‘distance from tracks’ is important for two reasons: first, it connects with the Pakistan Railways’ RoW claim for justifying the demolitions of residential and commercial structures; and second, the residents routinely point out the demolitions are unnecessary because the main line track remains operative despite its proximity to the structures under threat.

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Both informal settlements are situated near the
city’s financial district and surrounded by 5-star hotels (Marriott, Pearl Continental, Movenpick), government buildings (Rangers Headquarters, Chief Minister House), markets (Saddar, Zainab Market, Burns Road), and banks (Habib Metro building, Dawood Centre). The settlements emerged after Partition in 1947, when refugee-migrants from India first arrived in the area and built houses on public land with state support: Ghareebabad-PIDC was reportedly ‘settled’ in 1952. In subsequent years, migrants from different parts of Pakistan, looking for work in Karachi made their homes in these neighborhoods given the central location. Today, Ghareebabad-PIDC comprises approximately 250 to 300 households, with a diverse ethnic profile of Sindhis, Punjabis, Pakhtuns and Urdu-speaking communities, many of whom are employed as low-level staff, domestic helpers and daily-wage laborers in nearby offices and residential areas. Due to its proximity to other parts of the city, residents spend approximately 5 to 30 minutes commuting to work. The section of Ghareebabad-PIDC currently under threat of eviction, is represented by a small group of community leaders and elders, with strong PPP linkages. Three figures stand out: Yusuf Himayati, Ali Shah, and Haji Saleem. All three reside in houses alongside the tracks.

Most houses in these settlements are single or double storied, built and upgraded over time by the residents and their parents and grandparents. The houses are constructed with concrete blocks with tin roofs or flat slabs resting on support beams. Wherever there is sufficient distance between houses and the main line tracks, the space in between is transformed into an active social and commercial space (Image 2.1); children play and ride bicycles in the open areas; residents sit on charpais and socialize in the evenings. During the day, women wash and dry clothes in the open spaces. Residents such as rickshaw drivers, often park their Rickshaws along the track. When residents return from work in the early evening, the open space is buzzing with commercial activity. Vendors push carts selling popcorn, gola ganda, nuts, rice, french fries, and other food items.

Ghareebabad-PIDC and Kashmir Mujahid Colony received water, electricity, and gas connections at different moments over the past thirty years. Electricity and water were provided in 1979 by Abdullah Hussain Haroon, a Councillor of the KMC; he was also affiliated with the PPP. Water connections were subsequently extended in 1998 by Irfan Ullah Khan Marwat (a senior Sindh Government official and PPP stalwart); and finally, in 1995 by Benazir Bhutto herself. Gas connectivity arrived in 1994 through Benazir Bhutto’s patronage. Hence, there is a strong linkage between the PPP’s patronage and the history of infrastructure provision in these neighborhoods. Ghareebabad-PIDC located within the current NA-247, has voted consistently for the PPP. However, in 2018, many residents in this settlement voted for the PTI. Arif Alvi (PTI) won the Member of National Assembly (MNA) seat in NA-247 and after he became the President, Aftab Siddiqui (PTI) was elected in the by-elections as MNA. The Member of Provincial Assembly (MPA) seat was won by Khurram Sher Zaman (PTI), whose patronage in Ghareebabad-PIDC and Kashmir Mujahid Colony, is perceived as somewhat unreliable in terms of supporting the residents’ anti-eviction campaign.

KCR Loop Line Informal Settlements: Moosa Colony, Wahid Colony, Punjab Colony, Mujahid Colony, Musa Goth, Machar Colony, Quaid-e-Azam Colony, Ghareebabad-Liaquatabad and Machar Colony.

The KCR loop line informal settlements span across District West with a population of 3,914,757; and District Central with a population of 2,971,626, which together represent a total of 97 UCs. The loop line includes 8 informal settlements: Moosa Colony, Wahid Colony, Punjab Colony, Mujahid Colony, Musa Goth, Quaid-e-Azam Colony, Ghareebabad-Liaquatabad and Machar Colony. The settlements located along the loop line in District Central are heterogeneous in their ethnicities; with residents in Wahid Colony, Mujahid Colony, Moosa Colony comprising Punjabi, Pakhtun, Hindko, Sindhi, and Urdu speaking communities. Musa Goth has a predominantly Sindhi population while residents of Punjab colony are mostly Punjabi-speaking Christians. In Quaid-e-Azam Colony and Ghareebabad-Liaquatabad, most of the residents are Urdu-speaking, and this has played a part in how the political capital in the area was shaped. These informal settlements have also experienced the brunt of the eviction drives. Even though the reasons for this are complex, as we discuss in Chapter 5, a key dynamic that has contributed to the devastation, is Karachi’s changing political landscape of the past decade.

Historically, these communities have been facilitated by the MQM, and have long represented its vote bank. Since the MQM has lost much of its stronghold in Karachi over the past four years, these informal settlements have experienced the weakening of neighborhood level and district level political networks. With reduced capacity to mobilize people and a shrinking base of reliable political patronage, resisting large-scale evictions has become a much harder task. This shift is visible in the election results; whence for the last three decades these areas were the constituencies of the MQM, in the 2018 election, the dynamics changed and PTI won the National Assembly seat from Ghareebabad-Liaquatabad, Quaid-e-Azam Colony with MNA Muhammad Aslam Khan, and from Machar Colony with MNA Muhammad Aftab Iqbal Haroon. However, this scattered political patronage is further highlighted by the success of the MQM-P, which has continued to win in the constituency comprising Mujahid Colony, Moosa Colony and Punjab Colony.

Residents are employed as daily wage laborers, drivers, government workers, factory workers and low-level employees in private companies. Compared to the main line settlements, there is a smaller percentage of women employed as domestic helpers. In Machar Colony, a low-income neighborhood that has a predominantly Bengali and Burmese-Rohingya population, most residents are solely dependent on the nearby fisheries for their livelihoods. Located next to the coastline, the residents have built their houses over the years by reclaiming the land and filling it with garbage, amongst other landfill materials. What began as temporary shacks that were prone to flooding, the settlement today comprises concrete houses and double storey construction. Across other loop line settlements, residents have extended the space in front of their houses to accommodate small shops to supplement incomes. The built morphology of the neighborhoods is dominated by temporary extensions made from bamboo, fabric and tin sheets attached to semi-permanent structures made of concrete block walls and cement-concrete roofs. In comparison to the main line settlements, nearly all neighborhoods in the loop line areas lack tenure security.

Notably, there is greater commercial activity in the loop line settlements, and particularly in Ghareebabad-Liaquatabad. This is due to the area’s

Image 2.1. Soha Macktoom’s Sketches Depicting Railway Line Adjacent Land as a Social Space
proximity to a well-known informal, secondhand furniture market: the Gharibabad Furniture Market. The market exists mostly in the form of makeshift arrangements and is situated next to the loop line tracks. The lack of storage space has made settlements like Gharibabad-Liaquatabad an attractive option for the warehousing of furniture. But this is not the only commercial activity in the area: there are a plethora of small-scale, informal businesses that include book printing, manufacturing homemade ice cream, welding bird cages, craftwork, and other activities. Similarly, in Moosa Colony, Musa Goth and Mujahid Colony, informal businesses abound in the form of shoe, metal and plastic recycling units that proliferate in the spaces between the tracks and the houses; along with grain warehousing, embroidery and craftwork shops located on the ground floor of houses. Below we provide further details of the research sites located along the KCR loop line.

Wahid Colony, Mujahid Colony, Moosa Colony, Punjab Colony and Musa Goth are located near the Ziauddin Hospital North Nazimabad, along the now defunct loop line railway tracks in District Central (Map 2.8). Of these neighborhoods, Wahid Colony, to be formally declared as katchi abadis. Residents of the area have presented documents such as identity cards that date to 1973, and other documentary evidence showing approval for electricity connection in the 1980s.

As highlighted earlier, for the KCR loop line settlements, the circular railway tracks have been inoperative since 1999, and much of what remains, is buried under dust and garbage. Consequently, residents have created extensions to the houses, and the space above the track is used as a lane for both vehicular and pedestrian traffic. This makes the space where the tracks previously ran, an active social space and commuting lane, with informal commercial activity such as garbage, metal, and shoe recycling, spilling onto the space. Residents describe the changing character of the space when the shops shut at night and traffic flow is minimal, with people bringing charpais out of their houses to enjoy the evening breeze.

Water service delivery in these settlements started first as a single water line in 1988, and later in 1996, the Karachi Water & Sewerage Board (KWSB) provided piped connections directly to individual households. However, most households still complain of their limited access to piped water, and many have opted for boring wells. Sewerage lines were laid in 1996 and gas connections obtained earlier in 1988. Although attempts to acquire electricity connections date back to the 1980s, the residents claim to have initially obtained electricity by K-Electric through connections to the grid. Recently, electricity meters were upgraded by the K-Electric, and residents claim this has resulted in exorbitant bills. There are no government or private schools within these settlements, and parents send children to schools that are located at a considerable distance. Although a private hospital, Ziauddin Hospital, is located at walking distance, the residents are unable to afford its services, and rely mainly on the government hospital - Abbasi Shaheed Hospital - located at some distance from the area.

Community mobilization against evictions in this cluster of settlements has not been as robust as in other parts of the KCR informal settlements. This is largely because community activists have not been able to establish strong ties with residents in their areas. For the past three decades, these neighborhoods were a solid constituency of the MQM. In the 2018 elections, there was a major change in the local political landscape. Even though these neighborhoods - Wahid Colony, Mujahid Colony, Moosa Colony, Punjab Colony and Musa Goth - lie next to each other, they are in different political constituencies that represent the national and provincial assemblies. For instance, Moosa Colony, Punjab Colony and Mujahid Colony are located in NA-255 with an MNA from MQM-P; Dr. Khalid Maqbool Siddique. Muhammad Najeeb Haroon from the PTI won the National Assembly seat from NA-256 for Wahid Colony and Musa Goth. The Provincial Assembly seat from Moosa Colony and Punjab Colony- PS-127 - was won by Kanwar Naveed Jameel from MQM-P, with Muhammad Abbas Jaffery from the same party winning the PS-128 seat, in which Mujhaid Colony is located. Further, Syed Imran Ali Shah from the PTI won the PS-129 seat from Musa Goth. These kinds of political shifts pose a problem at the ground level for people to mobilize support from politicians to resist evictions. When multiple neighborhoods facing evictions are in close spatial proximity but belong to different political constituencies (Table 2.2), it becomes harder for people across these neighborhoods to build a broad political coalition to resist the onslaught of bulldozers. Additionally, with the PTI’s entry into the local political landscape of the KCR settlements, people’s socio-political networks have become decidedly more volatile and prone to fracturing.

Moving on to Gharibabad-Liaquatabad and Quid-e-Azam Colony in District Central, (Map 2.9) these informal settlements are located near Shah Mohammad Suleman Road and the Gharibabad underpass, where the famous Lalukhet Furniture Market and Gharibabad Furniture Market are located.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NA/PS Constituency</th>
<th>Settlements Name</th>
<th>MLA/MPA</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NA-255</td>
<td>Moosa Colony, Punjab Colony and Mujahid Colony</td>
<td>Dr. Khalid Maqbool Siddique</td>
<td>MQM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA-256</td>
<td>Wahid Colony and Musa Goth.</td>
<td>Najeed Haroon</td>
<td>PTI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS-127</td>
<td>Moosa Colony and Punjab Colony</td>
<td>Kanwar Naveed Jameel</td>
<td>MQM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS-128</td>
<td>Mujahid Colony and Wahid Colony</td>
<td>Abbas Jaffery</td>
<td>MQM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS-129</td>
<td>Musa Goth</td>
<td>Syed Imran Ali Shah</td>
<td>PTI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Election Commission of Pakistan.
Chapter 2 - Site Selection, Neighborhood Profiles, Densities

provision was initially limited to houses located next to the main road, and the rest of the residents accessed electricity through kunda. Residents paid minimal bills due to the kundas, some as little as PKR 10 per house (US 6 cents) for operating a fan and two light bulbs. In the 1980s, formal electricity connections were extended to both these settlements. Gas supply connections remain uneven; Ghareebabad-Liaqatabad has uninterrupted gas supply but Quaid-e-Azam colony continues to rely on firewood and gas cylinders for cooking and other activities.

During the local body elections in 2001, the MQM’s withdrawal from the elections led to a JI representative winning as councilor from both these settlements, even though the MQM has maintained a stronghold in successive years. The strong influence of the MQM in Ghareebabad-Liaqatatabad and Quaid-e-Azam Colony can also be explained due to these settlements’ proximity to the MQM’s headquarters, popularly known as ‘nine-zero’. The residents in these neighborhoods talked extensively about attending MQM events and ceremonies. Over the past 30 years, the neighborhoods remained a strong constituency of the MQM with Kanwar Naveed Jamil (MNA) winning in previous elections. The 2018 elections have seen a shift in the local political landscape whereby for the first time, both the national and provincial seats were won by PTI candidates - Omar Omari MPA from PS-126 and Mohammad Aslam Khan MNA for NA-254.

Finally, Machar Colony, in District West, is the largest informal settlement in our research sites along the loop line, with an estimated population of 118,000 persons. It is spread over 352 acres of land, with the KCR railway track bordering its North-Eastern side and the Arabian Sea to its West. Machar Colony has been built on reclaimed land in an area that was previously also a mangrove forest, although the land itself is claimed by the Karachi Port Trust (KPT) (Map 2.10).

Machar colony lies in NA-248, Union Committee No-42 of District West. The dominant political parties are PPP, PML-N and PTI. In the 2018 election, the PPP’s Abdul Qadir Patel won the NA seat while the PTI’s Sardar Aziz was the runner-up. The chairman of Union Committee No.42 Machar Colony belongs to the PML-N. Interestingly, the Pakistan Muslim League - Sher-e-Bengal (PML-SB), is active in Machar Colony due their popularity in the migrant Bengali and Burmese Rohingya community. Union Committee No-42 Machar Colony comprises four General wards in which two

located.

Ghareebabad-Liaqatatabad is a large settlement and already listed as a katchi abadi under the Sindh Katchi Abadi Act 1987. According to a senior community activist - Sagheer Ahmed - in the early 1990s, the MQM and the JI facilitated the leasing of over 1600 houses in this area. Even though the leasing process was initiated in the early 1980s by the JI-backed mayor Abdul Sattar Afghani, the actual distribution of the leases took place in the late 1980s, and was led by the MQM-backed mayor, Farooq Sattar. The MQM and the JI are also the two political parties that have historically had the greatest stronghold in Ghareebabad-Liaqatatabad and Quaid-e-Azam Colony. The exception to the leasing process is some houses located next to the loop line track, and on land that the Pakistan Railway has claimed. In the case of Quaid-e-Azam Colony, the entire neighborhood comprises 83 houses that have no leases and are built on railway land. These kinds of uneven land tenure arrangements are reflected in the land prices of the two settlements: an 80 sq. yds plot next to the railway tracks in Ghareebabad-Liaqatatabad was valued at PKR 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 (USD 9,010-12,013) before the evictions. The same valued between PKR 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 (USD 9,010-12,013) before the evictions. The same

Anecdotal accounts suggest that migrants settled in Ghareebabad-Liaqatatabad as early as 1960, whereas the first houses in Quaid-e-Azam colony were constructed in the 1970s. During these decades, a large part of Quaid-e-Azam colony and its surroundings consisted of agricultural land, where residents were engaged in farming as their main source of livelihood. Over time, the land use dynamics changed as agricultural land was usurped for residential purposes. Initially, the settlements consisted of houses made of temporary materials, mostly shacks with no permanent construction. Residents constructed mud walls reinforced with mats, straw, or thatches for stability. However, during heavy rains, most of these walls tended to collapse, which led residents to start using cement-concrete blocks as construction material. This also enabled the residents to add more floors to the houses.

Residents claim some infrastructure was already present before these settlements came into existence. For instance, water was available through a communal tap located inside a park on the other side of the tracks from Ghareebabad-Liaqatatabad; today the park is enclosed by a high boundary wall. The installation of the first water line and the carpeting of the area’s lanes, was done in 1979 under the JI mayor Abdul Sattar Afghani. Formal electricity
General members (Councilors) are from the PML-SB.

Machar Colony was established in the 1960s by Bengali and Burmese Rohingya migrants, most of whom were fishermen. This area is also located near the city’s fisheries and port. Newer migrant groups such as Swatis, Mianwalis, Punjabis and Sindhis who have been coming to the city for jobs, also settled in Machar Colony, though the ethnic majority is still the Bengali fisherman by far. Residents describe accounts of setting up the first mosque in the area by filling the land entirely with garbage to create a strong foundation. This was followed by a process of land reclamation whereby residents collectively filled the land with either sand, garbage or residual construction material purchased from nearby construction sites. Subsequently, residents built their homes by constructing temporary shacks over the water. Frequent flooding from the sea forced residents to use concrete blocks to build semi-permanent houses, in many cases building over the water. Frequent flooding from the sea eventually all led to the sea. A distinct characteristic of the area is the presence of large warehouse spaces called waada where women gather to peel shrimps after the daily catch is unloaded at the fisheries.

Most of the infrastructural upgradation in the area was carried out in the 1990s. K-Electric allotted a formal connection in 1997-98; before that residents used candles or kerosene lanterns. In 1990, Pakistan Telecom connections were fast-tracked, and some shops were set up as a Public Call Office (PCO). The demand for this came from the three major ethnic communities of the area: the Bengalis and Burmese Rohingya migrants, most of whom were fishermen. This area is also located near the city’s fisheries and port. Newer migrant groups such as Swatis, Mianwalis, Punjabis and Sindhis who have been coming to the city for jobs, also settled in Machar Colony, though the ethnic majority is still the Bengali fisherman by far. Residents describe accounts of setting up the first mosque in the area by filling the land entirely with garbage to create a strong foundation. This was followed by a process of land reclamation whereby residents collectively filled the land with either sand, garbage or residual construction material purchased from nearby construction sites. Subsequently, residents built their homes by constructing temporary shacks over the water. Frequent flooding from the sea forced residents to use concrete blocks to build semi-permanent houses, in many cases building over the water. Frequent flooding from the sea eventually all led to the sea. A distinct characteristic of the area is the presence of large warehouse spaces called waada where women gather to peel shrimps after the daily catch is unloaded at the fisheries.

A unique issue faced by the residents of Machar Colony concerns their extreme social marginalization, especially the ‘illegal’ Bengali and Burmese-Rohingya migrants who have long been denied National Identity Cards (NICs), even after living in the country for decades. This prevents them from accessing essential services, such as higher education, government jobs, and affects their ability to buy land legally. Even the Sui Southern Gas Company (SSGC) has refused to install gas connections for residents who do not possess valid IDs. Consequently, residents pay exorbitant amounts to third parties for illegal gas connections.

### 2.2.2 Federal Capital Quarters

The Martin and Clayton Quarters lie in District East, with a population of 2,907,467 (Census 2017) beyond Teen Hatti, straddling PECHS and the Garden East area. The Quarters are centrally placed in a part of Karachi where land is increasingly sought after by developers as ‘prime real estate’ (Map 2.11).

The most palpable difference between the Quarters and the other study sites, is that these are ‘planned settlements’, constructed in 1953 as part of Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra’s initiative to construct housing for government employees and migrant-refugees. Consequently, the neighborhood roads are wide and evenly spaced; sewage holes are covered and placed at even distances; nearly all houses are identical even though they fall in three different categories: 120 sq. yds, 200 sq. yds, and 400 sq. yds, and some houses have porches extended by a few feet onto public pavements. This variation in plot sizes is due to the different categories of plots allotted to residents based on the ‘grade’ or position of federal government employees. For instance, F type Quarters in Martin Quarters (Fig 2.1), contains 900 sq. ft. plots (100 sq. yds), which were larger and allotted to government employees of a higher grade than those living in Clayton Quarters in G type Quarters of 756 sq. ft. (84 sq. yds).

The Quarters land - 786 acres - was earmarked for the employees of the federal government who had opted to migrate from India and helped run the government of Pakistan. In the colonial context, the land had been leased in 1915 by the Bombay Provincial Government, and after Partition in 1947, the Federal Government transferred the land in 1953 to the Rent Control Department. In 1955, the Estate Office of the Public Work Department (PWD), took over the land’s administration. Even as far back as 1972, the Estate Office issued eviction notices to the Quarters’ residents who were approaching retirement. The eviction notices were served despite the Federal Government’s promise to provide the residents an alternative housing plan.
These promises are still considered sacrosanct by the residents.

The residents of Martin and Clayton Quarters are mostly white-collar workers, i.e., people who do not do manual labor, often at hourly or job-specific wages. Instead, they are employed by various private and public institutions with monthly salaries and other affiliated benefits (such as yearly leaves, EOBI numbers, pensions). An example is a key informant who has worked in Wi-Tribe as a software engineer and was recently laid-off when we met him in 2018.

A reason why so many people seem to have well-paying jobs in Martin and Clayton Quarters, is due to their educational backgrounds; most respondents had an education at least up to a bachelor’s level, and many have gone beyond to attain a masters, professional degrees like MBA, and even PhDs, hence their ability to work in knowledge intensive sectors.

The ethnic makeup of the residents is diverse: from Muhajirs, Sindhis, and Baloch to Pashtuns and Kashmiris. Although the majority appear to be Urdu-speaking or ‘Muhajir’, as evidenced by the local political landscape that seems to favor the MQM. Notably, eviction operations in Martin and Clayton Quarters were stopped by a leading MQM stalwart, Farooq Sattar who came to the scene (in Pakistan Quarters) and negotiated with political officials in the Federal Ministry of Housing and the Sindh government. A key reason why MQM officials might have intervened during the Quarters eviction operation but not in the Quaid-e-Azam colony, is due to the difference of scale. The Quarters area is incomparably larger than Quaid-e-Azam colony and houses at least half a million people compared to Quaid-e-Azam colony’s few thousands. As such, the political stakes for MQM are much higher for the Quarters area, necessitating a strong intervention.

But the MQM is not the only political party with a strong presence in Martin and Clayton Quarters. During field visits, we observed the slogans and flags of many different parties all over the streets, most notably PPP and PTI, the latter party even won in the 2018 elections from the area. These Quarters fall within the NA-245 constituency in Karachi’s District East. The sitting MNA of the constituency is Aamir Liaquat Hussain from PTI and the elected MPA of the area is Jamal Siddiqui also from PTI.

The Jail Quarters, Jahangir East, West Quarters and Patel Para altogether form the Quarters Mutasireen Committee (QMC) that convened soon after the Supreme Court Notice of 9th June 2017, which had labelled the residents qabza mafia (land mafia). However, the community representatives from the QMC trace the history of their neighborhoods to Partition. They claim the Quarters were originally just a collection of khaimas (tents) made up of muhajirs (refugees), many of whom were bureaucrats who had migrated in 1947 to bolster the newly founded nation-state with their selfless service.

2.2.3 Lyari Basti - Taiser Town Scheme 45

Lyari Basti or Taiser Town Scheme 45 is a resettlement colony located on the city’s rural-urban fringes in District West - population of 3,914,757 - near Gulshan-e-Maymar, Ahsanabad and Khuda ki Basti (Map 2.12). Falling under the ambit of the parastatal Malir Development Authority (MDA), Taiser Town, Scheme 45, has 96 sectors out of which 6 sectors comprise the resettlement colony ‘Lyari Basti’. It is by far the most populous of the three resettlement colonies, comprising approximately 19,300 houses compared to 5,500 houses in Hawksbay and 2,500 houses in Baldia (SPDC, 2012). People who resettled in Lyari Basti due the LEW’s construction, were given plots measuring 80 sq. yds and cash compensation of PKR 50,000 (USD 307). This amount was largely insufficient for the construction of a house, as we discuss in detail in Chapter 6.

Those people who were unable to afford the construction costs, ended up selling the plots 16 years ago at PKR 100,000-150,000 each (USD 615-923). To date, resettlement has only taken place in four of the designated sectors 35, 36, 50 and 51, while plotting in sectors 53 and 54 is still underway. The resettlement process began in 2004 and consisted mostly of people who were previously living along the upstream stretch of the Lyari River in locations such as Gulshan-e-Iqbal 13D,
Lyari Basti’s sectors vary widely in terms of sizes and number of blocks. For instance, Sector 35 comprises three blocks, 35A, 35B and 35C, of which 35C has a predominantly Christian population. Sector 35 is also the smallest area-wise and covers 97 acres of land. In contrast, Sector 36 is the most populous and contains the largest number of original allottees, given the availability of slightly better infrastructures, such as electricity, gas, and water. Sector 36 covers 252 acres of land and has the highest number of commercial businesses and markets. At the other extreme is Sector 51, the least developed in terms of infrastructure services, with no electricity, gas, or water. For this reason, several plots in Sector 51 have not been developed, and the owners have shifted to other sectors within Lyari Basti. We take up these details for a more expanded discussion about Lyari Basti’s morphology, land, and post-settlement dynamics in Chapter 6.

Some of Lyari Basti’s residents are employed in the nearby Ahsanabad Industrial Area, Gulshan-e-Maymar, New Karachi Industrial Area and in a garment factory near Shafiq Mor and Godhram. Most residents continue to travel to the city center for jobs, working as maids, cooks, drivers, and daily wage earners. The average distance to places of work from Lyari Basti to the city center, like Bohri Bazar, Saddar is at least 30 km by public buses that are generally in a poor state. Many women in Lyari Basti also work in the garment factory, as well as a fishery in Ayub Goth near Ahsanabad Industrial area. Several workplaces have private and secure pick up and drop facilities for the women, which also enables them to work night shifts. There are also a few public buses that run from Lyari Basti all the way to the fisheries in Kiamari.

Lyari Basti’s ethnic landscape is heterogeneous: Bengalis and Afghans are the majority; there are also Sindhis, Muhajir, Christians and Hindus. Before relocation, most people were living in ethnically homogeneous communities and during resettlement, the government tried to keep ethnic communities together as a single unit, with partial success. Lyari Basti lies within the current NA-262 with MNA Aftab Jahangir from the ruling PTI party, and the provincial assembly constituency for this area is PS - 122 with a PTI MPA. Previously, Lyari Basti was a constituency of the PPP, and in the 2018 elections, PTI won an overwhelming majority from the area. Under the local government system, this area lies in the KMC’s jurisdiction within Union Committee 38, and the chairman of the UC is MQM-backed Abrar Jahangir.

Most houses in Lyari Basti have the same construction material as our other research sites, for instance concrete blocks used for walls and roof material ranging from cement, tin, iron, asbestos sheet, and concrete tiles as well as reinforced cement concrete (RCC- which has steel in it) for roof slabs. However, a substantial number of houses also have complete RCC structures, i.e., both walls and roofs, which is the most stable form of permanent construction. This is visible through the presence of beams and columns located in the structures. Houses in Lyari Basti have better permanent finishes with tiles on the facades, paint finishes and other decorative elements. This can be attributed to the partial security of tenure that the residents in these sectors have in the form of official allotment papers.

### Table 2.4. Basic Information on Lyari Basti - Taiser Town, 2020.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood/Settlement</th>
<th>Location/District</th>
<th>Approximate Population</th>
<th>UC</th>
<th>UC Chairman Political Affiliation</th>
<th>Land Owning Agency</th>
<th>Electricity, water, gas, sewerage.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lyari Basti (Taiser Town Scheme 45)</td>
<td>District West</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>UC-38 Yousuf Goth</td>
<td>MQM</td>
<td>Partial (Sector 50, 51: no gas and water connection, electricity accessed informally)</td>
<td>Yes (Sector 35, 36)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Estimated population calculated from density figures as given in Chapter 2 Section 2.3.2 and Census 2017

The residents of Hasan Aulia Village (HAV) trace their settlement’s history to over 200 years ago. HAV is in District West near the Mewa Shah Cemetery, one of Karachi’s oldest and largest graveyards, and the Gutter Baghicha (Map 2.13). In 2009, the total population of HAV was 10,400 and the total number of houses before the first phase of evictions was approximately 1600 (URC, 2009). Lyari is one of Karachi’s oldest settlements that started as a fishermen’s enclave in the 18th century. The area expanded under British Colonial rule with the development of the Karachi port, and subsequently in the post-Partition phase, with ongoing, multiple waves of migration. Lyari’s population is predominantly Baloch but also includes other ethnic groups such as Sindhis, Punjabis, Pashuns, Bengalis, and Urdu-speakers (Kirman, 2018; Viqar, 2014). Residents claim the Baloch first came to this region to use the fresh river water and the fertile land for farming. Still others claim that HAV is named after a man who was a wealthy contractor and a resident of Malir. He sent labor to collect gravel or bajri from the Lyari river, and after several visits, was compelled to relocate to this region. HAV’s residents also claim their families have owned the land since the colonial era, and that it was the British who conferred them land rights. These claims are backed up with documents that confirm land ownership; evidence that has been used in courts to resist the LEW’s construction and related evictions.

According to our respondents, approximately 300-400 houses were fully or partially demolished in Block C, Salai Para in the second phase of evictions (2016-2017), and this included both leased and unleased houses. The structures occupied a total footprint of about 6 acres or 30,000 sq. yds. Before the second phase of evictions began, HAV comprised plot sizes that ranged from 80 sq. yds to over 400 sq. yds. The larger plots often housed multiple families around a courtyard setting: a large central open space that accommodated cattle and poultry, surrounded by rooms per family, and a shared kitchen. Most of the plots were multi-storied. Today, the remaining houses are mostly 80 sq. yds to 120 sq. yds, with very few left in the 200 sq. yds range. Even though a vast majority of houses are RCC construction, there are also a significant number of simple block masonry constructions. Some of the older houses situated within inner

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**2.2.4 Hasan Aulia Village**

Map 2.13. Hasan Auliya Village Study Site
The political landscape has also changed over the past few years. In the 2018 elections, the PPP lost from HAV as most votes went to the JI.

In the next section, we discuss the comparative densities of the surveyed areas by focusing mostly on the KCR informal settlements. These are high-density neighborhoods where household sizes often exceed the average 5 to 6 members as reported in the Census 2017. This has a bearing on understanding vulnerability at the neighborhood level, especially in terms of household needs for infrastructural access, services delivery, and economic redistribution.

2.3 Comparative Densities of Surveyed Settlements

In our work across the different study sites, we observed that population densities were often misrepresented in official discourse, particularly in the context of generalized calculations derived from the Census 2017. Density is an important consideration in relation to proximity to infrastructure services, such as water and transport, and to social well-being. It is also pertinent in the context of vulnerable communities confronting forced displacement, where there is a strong likelihood of far more people being displaced than officially imagined. This section provides a descriptive discussion on densities to highlight four key points relevant to our research on land displacement in Karachi’s central parts:

There are various ways of representing urban population densities. Densities can be scaled up or down spatially: represented as a national mean, as a provincial value, or a city-wide average. However, such macro-level density figures are mostly useful for broader policymaking. At the level of the social, micro-level densities are more meaningful than spatially aggregated ones. The highest resolution of urban population density is at the scale of the individual human body. This value is represented as the average available space per individual, and is significant for conceptualizing personal space, social distancing, and space-sharing practices such as shared living. A slightly lower but more practical resolution of density is the plot-level density value, which represents average available space per individual at the scale of the family or household unit as tied to a plot of land. This is significant for understanding everyday socio-spatial practices. Cultural norms, such as joint family living or intergenerational dependence, play a significant role in determining these density values.

The next (lower) resolution of density is at the level of the smallest administrative division of the city: whether it is a neighborhood, a municipal ward, a union council, or a census block. This value gives an average for an administrative area that clumps together multiple individual household units according to predefined criteria (land use, plot size, homogeneity, etc.). This value of density can be used to determine the corresponding needs for service delivery, infrastructure provision, and economic redistribution as required by households within a particular area. Examples include planning for provision of amenities, parks, and (mental) health services for urban populations.

Hence, resolutions of density keep getting lower and more generic as the covered population and area keeps increasing in spatial scale from the neighborhood level to the city level, and subsequently to the division and the province. In the following sections, we provide an overview of the various scales of urban density in Karachi, and then focus on the densities of the surveyed settlements. The density values are compared across the settlements, as well within the Districts of Karachi. The relationship of density to the visuality and materiality of the settlements is also considered. In Chapter 8, we will discuss official attempts at
planning for Karachi’s future densities through the emergent master planning and regulation at the city and provincial levels. This has a bearing on future land displacements under an increasingly centralized and speculative urban planning regime.

Table 2.6 provides an overview of the population densities across Sindh and Karachi. The overall density for Sindh is 339 people per sq. km; the density for the Karachi Division is 4,246 people per sq. km. This value appears low because the Karachi Division is spread over 3,780 sq. km, a significant proportion of which is ‘empty’ land comprising the Kirthar National Park and other uninhabited areas. The density values for the inner-city districts, such as District Central (48,336) and District East (17,625), are more indicative of the typical urban morphology that exists across these districts.

However, the built typologies, plot sizes, and land uses vary within each district. Therefore, it is more helpful to consider densities for morphologically and socio-economically homogeneous settlements within each district, as we have done for our surveyed sites. The following section explains how the densities for the various settlements were calculated.

### Table 2.6. Population Densities across Sindh and Karachi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Population (Census 2017)</th>
<th>Population Density ppl/sq. km</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sindh Province</td>
<td>47,893,244</td>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karachi Division</td>
<td>16,051,521</td>
<td>4,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Central (totally urban)</td>
<td>2,972,639</td>
<td>48,336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District West (urban and rural)</td>
<td>3,914,757</td>
<td>6212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District East (totally urban)</td>
<td>2,909,921</td>
<td>17,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District South (totally urban)</td>
<td>1,791,751</td>
<td>21,079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Malir (urban and rural)</td>
<td>2,008,901</td>
<td>762,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Korangi (totally urban)</td>
<td>2,457,019</td>
<td>25,918</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2.3.1 Calculating settlement densities from Census 2017 data

The densities for each individual settlement are calculated in successive steps. The first step is creating the settlement polygon on Google Earth. The polygon is prepared from consulting secondary data, and verification through field visits. The polygon shows the exact extents of the settlement and gives a value for its total area in acres and sq. km. The second step is creating a polygon for the Census Circle(s) that each settlement falls in. This is also done in Google Earth. PBS Census maps are consulted to create these polygons. This gives the area in acres and sq. km for each Circle. Map 2.14 shows the settlement polygons and Census Circles for Martin Quarters East and Clayton Quarters. Map 2.15 shows the settlements polygons and Census Circles for 5 Loop Line settlements.

Combining this spatial data with the Census 2017 population figures for each Circle, provides an initial value for the density of the Circle in which each settlement falls. This value is not necessarily the density value for the entire settlement, as the settlement can either occupy two or more Circles or only occupy part of one Circle. For example, as seen in Map 2.15, Moosa Colony occupies 7 Census Circles.

### 2.3.2 Accuracy of the density values

For all the KCR and Quarters areas, the densities calculated are accurate only at the level of the Census Circle. This means the density values depict the residential density within the entire Census Circle, as an aggregated value. Block-level densities, which capture more closely the actual density of each settlement, cannot be ascertained for these settlements. This is due to the unavailability of Block-level Census maps. For the settlements that completely occupy a Circle (such as Moosa Colony, Punjab Colony, and Machar Colony), the density figure is the most accurate. Where settlements span multiple Circles, manual adjustments are made to accommodate overlaps between the settlement and the Circle. This helps to generate a more accurate value for where Circle and settlement boundaries differ.

For the settlements highlighted in green in Table 2.7, the density figures are the most accurate. This is because the settlements fall completely within a particular Circle. The most accurate figure is for Clayton Quarters (Map 2.14). Although the settlement extends beyond that one Circle (4120505) used to calculate its density; the morphology is consistent across the settlement. Hence, the density value can be extrapolated for the entire settlement.

Another case to demonstrate this limitation of accuracy is Wahid Colony (Map 2.15). The density for Wahid Colony appears to be much lower than a typical informal settlement. However, the reason for this becomes clear when we see that Wahid Colony is part of a larger Census Circle, 4171804, which also contains larger plots that distort the density value.

This Circle also contains larger plots that distort the density value. Again, although block level population figures are available, maps are not. Therefore, it is not possible to calculate separately the density for only Wahid Colony. Nevertheless, given our familiarity with the area during fieldwork, it is expected that the density for this settlement will be like the densities of the other Loop Line settlements.
Table 2.7. Population Densities of Studied Settlements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlement</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Density (Calculated from Census Data)</th>
<th>Density (Calculated from Fieldwork)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LOOP LINE SETTLEMENTS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moosa Colony</td>
<td>District Central</td>
<td>129,800</td>
<td>214,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musa Goth</td>
<td>District Central</td>
<td>64,270</td>
<td>69,859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mujahid Colony</td>
<td>District Central</td>
<td>147,438</td>
<td>228,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab Colony</td>
<td>District Central</td>
<td>105,486</td>
<td>176,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wahid Colony</td>
<td>District Central</td>
<td>24,216</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machar Colony</td>
<td>District West</td>
<td>70,429</td>
<td>131,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAIN LINE SETTLEMENTS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghareebabad - PIDC</td>
<td>District South</td>
<td>18,765</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kashmir Mujahid Colony</td>
<td>District South</td>
<td>18,765</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Sindh Muslim Colony</td>
<td>District East</td>
<td>29,481</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umar Colony</td>
<td>District East</td>
<td>30,597</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEDERAL QUARTERS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Quarters East</td>
<td>District East</td>
<td>61,211</td>
<td>80,863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clayton Quarters</td>
<td>District East</td>
<td>108,436</td>
<td>162,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyari Basti – Taiser Town Scheme 45</td>
<td>District West</td>
<td>4,935</td>
<td>7,173</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ghareebabad PIDC and Kashmir Mujahid Colony. Keeping these points in mind, Table 2.7 provides a summary of the densities of each surveyed settlement as calculated from the Census 2017 data. The table also shows values calculated from fieldwork in each of the settlements. The methodology for these calculations is explained in the following section.

### 2.3.3 Calculating Household Densities from Fieldwork Data

Household Sizes are calculated from the Household Integrated Income and Consumption Survey (HIICS) 2015-2016 as published by the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (PBS). The value for mean HH size (Table 2.8) is compared to the value for mean HH size gathered through our fieldwork in these settlements. The term ‘household’ as defined by the Census was used to conduct the field surveys – i.e., number of kitchens in the house. Each kitchen denotes one HH, even though multiple married couples or generations might occupy the same house.

Table 2.8. Average Household Size by Province, Region and Quintiles based on Household Integrated Income and Consumption Survey (HIICS) 2015-16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region and Province</th>
<th>HH Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan URBAN AREAS</td>
<td>6.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindh Urban</td>
<td>5.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan RURAL AREAS</td>
<td>6.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindh Rural</td>
<td>6.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan OVERALL</td>
<td>6.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindh overall</td>
<td>6.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing these figures with our survey findings, we observed that even though 34 percent of the HH in the KCR settlements comprised between 5-7 family members, an equivalent number of households had 8-12 HH members (Fig 2.2). These figures are evidently higher than the Census, support the higher density values within these settlements, and make visible the misrepresentation in generalized HH data for urban Sindh, or even a single district of Karachi.

In the Federal Quarters, our survey findings on the household size were lower than the census average, with 36 percent of the surveyed households comprising 1-4 members, followed by 29 percent of the households with 5-7 members (Fig 2.3). This not only represents the smaller family sizes, but also the comparatively lower density of the neighborhood as calculated earlier in this section (See Table 2.3), when compared with the KCR informal settlements.

The values for densities calculated from fieldwork HH sizes, are in line with our observations on ground, the urban morphology documented, and the in-depth interviews conducted, which altogether provide insights into the living conditions of the residents of the KCR informal settlements. Some of these calculated density values are extremely high – in certain instances as high as 228,500 per sq. km as in the case of Mujahid Colony, which is close to Mumbai’s Dharavi at 277,000 per sq. km.

The impact of density is felt strongly in the KCR informal settlements when one moves towards the inner lanes. As we have iterated in Chapter 2, the only open space within these neighborhoods is near the buried tracks, which is used for commercial activities as well vehicular movement. As discussed earlier in this chapter, residents use the lanes as a social space and for parking vehicles. The tertiary lanes are less than 4 feet wide and are the only source of wind and light for the surrounding houses. This accounts for the poor ventilation within the inner confined spaces of the settlements, as well within the interior spaces of the houses connected to these lanes. Within these settlements, houses are constructed on 80 sq. yds plots or less, and rise to
The spatial morphology of these informal settlements provides a glimpse of the physical and demographic densities that shape everyday life within these neighborhoods. In doing so, we have endeavored to draw attention to the inadequate representation of such data in important Pakistan Government surveys, such as the Census 2017.

2.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have introduced the 16 study sites that were selected for our research and explained why these are important sites to study land displacement in millennial Karachi. We outlined the infrastructural, political, and land tenure profiles of the neighborhoods, and the histories. Finally, we introduced a brief discussion on density to highlight the variation across these informal settlements, discrepancies in Census 2017 data, on ground infrastructure situation and the connection between densities and vulnerabilities.
CHAPTER 3: Methodology, Sampling and Context

- 670 Semi-structured household surveys
- 30 Detailed in-depth interviews (IDIs) with selected residents, activists, state officials
- 5 Focus group discussions (FGDs)
- Participant observation
- NVivo analysis of qualitative data
- Geographic Information Systems (GIS) mapping and digitization of data
- Detailed secondary literature analysis
- Archival research
- Media discourse analysis,
- Community workshops (wellbeing and legal)
- Tracking court case hearings
3.1 Introduction

In this Chapter, we outline the main data collection methods, sources and tools used in the study. This was a multi-method research project, and each method was selected to address specific types of data relevant to the specific research questions. The data collection for the research project was based on several different methods:

1. 670 Semi-structured household surveys
2. 30 Detailed in-depth interviews (IDIs) with selected residents, activists, state officials
3. 5 Focus group discussions (FGDs)
4. Participant observation
5. NVivo analysis of qualitative data
6. Geographic Information Systems (GIS) mapping and digitization of data
7. Detailed secondary literature analysis
8. Archival research
9. Media discourse analysis,
10. Community workshops (wellbeing and legal)
11. Tracking court case hearings

The purpose of using so many different methods was triangulation. People’s lives, governance and human-ecology interactions are complex, but methodologies do not always reflect this complexity. This also helped to address the different types of data requirements necessary to the project proposed. Moreover, the ongoing context of land displacements in the selected sites - as explained in Chapter 2 - during the duration of the project, necessitated a reflexive approach as data collectors. The research was interposed with myriad unplanned, spontaneous meetings with community activists, residents, and civil society organizations, given the sudden or unannounced appearance of police, state officials and bulldozers to demolish houses, and evict families and informal businesses. In those moments, we were forced to reflect upon our own attempts to be ‘objective’ researchers as we became involved in helping organize protests to stave off evictions.

Triangulation offered greater reliability and validity of data. We constantly and explicitly focused on data production with and for the most vulnerable households within informal settlements because vulnerability within settlements is also relative. Therefore, we generalize our findings to make predictions and claims specific to our samples. In this regard, use of triangulation exercise has helped produce multi-method, and yet neighborhood specific data that is both disaggregated – data that has been divided into detailed subcategories- and is purposive. Typically, mono-method and aggregate data is likely to miss the purposive concerns of vulnerable populations. However, our triangulated data production, with quantitative and qualitative data for multiple neighborhoods, has made it possible to make comparative estimates with the other aggregate public data sources, to contextualize and emphasize the vulnerability of those who are affected and excluded the most.

In a separate section of this chapter, we reflect on the ethical challenges that arose in response to the KCR revival project, as activists’ and community organizations’ capacity to protest was continually destabilized and neutralized by intra-group tensions and state violence. In addition, we held weekly meetings to check on the progress of the research. During these weekly interactions, we constantly discussed how the data was being collected, what we were learning and how our positionalities in the study areas may have influenced the knowledge generation. The need for constant reflexivity and empathy was a key aspect of our methodological approach, as we dealt with sensitive issues regarding, for instance, how gender was enacted in the negotiations between residents, community representatives and state officials for compensation and resettlement plans.

3.2 Data Collection Methods, Sources, Tools and Analysis

3.2.1 Secondary Data Acquisition

The first stage of the methodological approach was to embark upon a review of the literature (academic, NGOs, media) that is available on land displacements and evictions in Pakistan and Karachi. The purpose was to get a handle on the previous work done and to get a sense of the type, locations, and frequency of evictions in Karachi over the past two decades. While the media had reported frequently on the intensity of evictions in the city, we wanted to understand how evictions were being reported in terms of the vocabulary and political tropes through which eviction actions and legal interventions were being justified in certain instances to elicit popular reactions. For past eviction events, we relied on archival data, stored as news clippings in libraries and information shared by the Karachi Municipal Corporation (KMC). The Urban Resource Center (URC) has extensive material on evictions from 1997 to 2005, although most of the data is ‘raw’ so it took time to organize and analyze. For data on evictions between 2006 to 2020, we relied on media reports as well as conversations with residents and activists, to get a firm idea about eviction incidents in this period, the number of structures demolished, land use type, the name of the institution that was responsible for the eviction.

Alongside this, we set out to generate two household survey questionnaires: the first was designed to capture details about the ongoing evictions in the Quarters and Karachi Circular Railway neighborhoods; the second addressed the views and concerns of respondents who were evicted from Lyari over a decade ago, and resettled in Taiser Town Scheme 45, at the city’s margins. We started with pre-survey visits to the field in several locations, to understand significant variables and help design the survey questionnaires before commencing fieldwork. This process was guided by residents and activists who generously shared their views with us. Our initial visits to the KCR informal settlements were facilitated by the URC that has already conducted extensive work in the KCR settlements over the last few years. The URC introduced us to key community representatives, such as Haji Khan Badshah, Sagheer Ahmed, and Moazzam Shah who represent communities across the main and the loop line settlements. With time, we developed inroads into the KCR informal settlements and forged trusting relationships with community members. Conversations with key representatives helped guide the household survey and enabled residents to become familiar with our presence. In Umar Colony 1 located along the main line, the elderly community leader - Haji Khan Badshah - had initially voiced his disapproval about our project and did not permit us to conduct a survey in his neighborhood. We respected his decision and moved to other neighborhoods that had fit our selection criteria. But as Haji Khan observed our interventions in the field, especially our role in helping raise community voices against evictions, he eventually changed his mind and invited us to include Umar Colony 1 in the household survey.

For the Quarters study sites, we approached Kaleem ul Haq Usmani - an active political representative from the area - who is affiliated with the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). Kaleem invited us to attend anti-eviction events held in Martin Quarters. By attending such events, we met other community activists from the area, and developed an understanding of the context surrounding residents’ tenure struggles in the Quarters, the political actors involved, state interventions, and the gendered dynamics given female residents have been active in organizing and participating in the events. Discussions with community activists such as Mohammad Rizwan and Shakeel, helped us to gain a nuanced understanding of their ongoing struggles considering the Supreme Court order, and eviction attempts in the Martin and Taiser Quarters. Based on our interactions with these key community representatives, we were able to conduct a pilot survey and identify residents for interviews.

Similarly, the pre-survey visits to Taiser Town enabled us to get a sense of the existing social hierarchies and provided an insight into the diversity of its residents. The visits included extensive conversations with different stakeholders, such as realtors and social workers. We made inroads into Taiser Town through representatives of a well-established real estate firm in Sector 36. Given their extensive knowledge about the area’s history, we learnt about Taiser Towns’ infrastructural deficits, the initial phase of resettlement and subsequent departure of many families, and the land tenure status. A realtor, Zahid, who was also active in the local community for setting up schools, introduced us to some of the residents. Initially, we were under the impression that Taiser Town contained only the Lyari Expressway affectees. But during the pre-survey visits, we learnt residents were renters and many had purchased plots as speculative investments. Thus, we revised the original questionnaire to represent Taiser Town’s tenure profile and resettlement story more accurately.
The pre-survey visits also helped narrow down the subsequent survey visits to those sectors that comprised only the LEW affectees: Sectors 35 and 36.

Toward the end of 2019, we made several visits to Hasan Aulia Village (HAV) in Lyari. The visits were critical for helping us decide whether to include this area as a case study in the broader land displacement story. We were interested in including those residents in Lyari whose un-leased homes were demolished but who did not receive plots and money as compensation. This category of ‘displaced’ are now scattered all over the city, in places like Malir, Naval Colony, as well as in Hasan Aulia, where they are renting accommodations (Map 7.2). Based on our discussions with community leaders, such as the UC Chairman Ali Raza, community activist Jan Muhammad, and City Councillor Fareeda Majeed, we designed basic interview protocols for HAV, specifically with regards to understanding the qualitative aspect of displacement. Doing so has given us a critical perspective about key events that took place more than a decade ago when Lyari Basti residents were evicted and relocated to Taiser Town. Even though we did not conduct extensive household surveys in HAV, the rich and nuanced qualitative data is sufficient for linking up with common themes across other neighborhoods surveyed.

3.2.3. Survey Construction

For quantitative exploration, the household questionnaire surveys were developed using a collaborative committee approach (Douglas and Craig, 2007), multiple pre-survey field visits, and observation to ensure that our questions reflected the socio-cultural context of the sample. During our pre-survey visits, and the administration of the survey, we developed systematic and proportionate quota sampling from each neighborhood. This systematic selection of houses to represent each area within neighborhoods leverages for avoiding researchers' bias and to avoid gate-keeperism. In addition to the relevant demographics (age, religion, caste/ethnicity, and household informatics), the survey was kept comprehensive to include multiple dimensions of the evictions and displacement process and lived experiences of the respondents. The key dimensions included questions about family members, health, and education within each household; work, income, and means of mobility/transport; housing, tenure, and land ownership; and the social and psychological outcomes and engagements due to evictions. The household surveys were thematically structured, and our respondents gave verbal consent for recording their data on survey forms. Furthermore, the two forms of surveys were developed to address the diversity of the different neighborhoods that were included in this research exploration. Before and during the surveys, all Research Associates were fully equipped with the ethics and confidentiality protocols through methodology and fieldwork workshops. During fieldwork, multi-method sampling strategies were employed to keep the samples from various neighborhoods representative and fitting with research goals. The most common sampling method was non-probability, and purposive sampling. In some instances, depending upon the needs for gender balance, quota sampling was also implemented, i.e., for acquiring gender balance, and of suitable age groups.

3.2.4. Pilot Surveys

We conducted 30 pilot surveys in the KCR informal settlements along the loop line in Wahid Colony and Mujahid Colony. This helped refine the household questionnaire survey, especially about issues such as tenure security. In addition, some scales were revised to help communicate the questions better to the respondents. The same survey questionnaire was used for the pilot in the Quarters study sites. Since the original KCR survey questionnaire was modified and a second one was prepared for Taiser Town, we conducted a pilot survey to ensure its validity. Numerous questions from the KCR questionnaire were no longer applicable in the Taiser Town case, for instance regarding threats of eviction. We conducted a pilot study of 35 households in Taiser Town Scheme 45, with results tabulated in a manner like the expected final field survey. This tabulation and initial analysis of data helped refine the household questionnaire. For instance, we realized that respondents under 30 years of age should not be included because the LEW project itself is about 15-20 years old (demolitions started 2004 onwards). Residents of Taiser Town currently younger than 30, would have been children at the time. Hence, they would not have been able to provide details concerning previous household income, previous occupation and commute patterns, and comparisons between indicators of current and past well-being such as utilities, community articulation, and land tenure. The reason to exclude under-30s was a significant change to the survey strategy.

Another important change was to include respondents who were renting accommodation in Taiser Town. Whereas we had done the pilot with the intention of including only those who had received plots and monetary compensation from the state, during the pilot survey, we realized that our a priori assumption of the compensation being a smooth and linear process was flawed. In fact, there were a significant number of people who had not received compensation but had still relocated to Taiser Town and were renting homes. We then decided to include renters in our Taiser Town survey: this also enabled us to understand the land subdivision dynamics in the study site, for instance when one plot was rented to two or more families who were sharing a kitchen. Details about such land ownership arrangements are presented in charts in discussions and analysis in Chapter 6.

3.2.5. Quantitative Surveys

A total of 670 questionnaires were completed. Initial analysis of the demographics yielding valuable insights into the study areas, is included as appendices for consideration. The questionnaires were also the main instrument through which information relevant to calculating neighborhood

### Table 3.1. Case Summary by Location

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Union Committee</th>
<th>UC-Chairman Party Affiliation</th>
<th>District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghareebabad-PIDC</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>UC-29 CIVIL LINE</td>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kashmir Mujahid Colony</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>UC-29 CIVIL LINE</td>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machar Colony</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>UC-42 MACHAR COLONY</td>
<td>PML-N</td>
<td>West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Quarters</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>UC-13 JAMSHED QUARTERS</td>
<td>MQM</td>
<td>East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moosa Colony</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>UC-35 MOOSA COLONY</td>
<td>MQM</td>
<td>Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mujahid Colony</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>UC-35 MOOSA COLONY</td>
<td>MQM</td>
<td>Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Sindh Muslim Colony</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>UC-08 PECHS</td>
<td>JI</td>
<td>East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab Colony</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>UC-36 FC AREA</td>
<td>MQM</td>
<td>Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umer Colony</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>UC-08 PECHS</td>
<td>JI</td>
<td>East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wahid Colony</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>UC-35 MOOSA COLONY</td>
<td>MQM</td>
<td>Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clayton Quarter</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>UC-13 JAMSHED QUARTERS</td>
<td>MQM</td>
<td>East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musa Goth</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>UC-35 MOOSA COLONY</td>
<td>MQM</td>
<td>Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyari Basti (Taiser Town Scheme 45)</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>UC-38 YOUSUF GOTH</td>
<td>MQM</td>
<td>West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>8 UCs</td>
<td></td>
<td>4 Districts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
densities was obtained, as discussed in Chapter 2. After the process of data cleaning through triangulation and validation, a total of 610 questionnaires were used for the statistical analysis. Details for both household surveys are provided in Annexure 2 for HS1 & HS2. The quantitative data analytics tool IBM-SPSS 23 was used for household data entry, coding, management, and analysis. This data was also later integrated into multiple results such as infographics, policy brief, and GIS maps. The breakdown of these cases by neighborhoods (and union councils) is given in Table 3.1.

3.2.6. Mapping and Digitization of Data

We used the Geographic Information System (GIS) to collect spatial data on the historical and current context of sites undergoing and under threat of eviction. This helped understand the frequency of evictions, the nature of land tenure in the study sites, and the changing geographical context. We integrated traditional participatory mapping methods directly with ArcGIS and Global Positioning System (GPS), and evaluated the potential applications of new digital technology. For instance, to identify the KCR settlements’ precise locations - several are not listed in Google Maps - we relied on the generous assistance of Rana Sadiq who is a field surveyor at the URC, and Mr Sagheer Ahmed Ansari, who is a community activist and the President of the Karachi Circular Railway Mutassreen Action Committee (KRCMAC) for District Central.

A key challenge was accessing union committee maps, census maps and related data from institutions such as the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics. We had to start from scratch to generate location-based data relevant to the project, such as calculating population densities in the study areas. For calculating densities, we utilized the 2017 Census data at the charge/circle level, combining it with maps of charge/circle boundaries acquired from the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) website. For individual sites, we calculated plot-level densities using the values from survey questionnaires for plot size, number of floors, and household size. This enabled us to focus on the estimated afteeces within different settlements along the KCR, and to understand the intensity of demolitions in temporal terms. We also used Google Earth historical imagery to get a sense of the temporal changes that have taken place in given neighborhoods over time. The maps are meant not only to support policy making but also to assist in stakeholder communication and participatory decision making. In using mapping tools, we take a cue from an older history of mapping as tools for participatory decision making, and for securing land tenure in Karachi. We note here the long-standing and exemplary work of the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) in documenting the built morphology and infrastructures in more than 800 goths or ‘villages’ of Karachi (OPP, 2012), and the history of using maps to enable land tenure for informal settlements (Rehman, 2004; Hasan, 2006). We also underscore the significance of mapping as key tools for mobilizing community action, as exemplified in the work of global organizations such as the Slum Dwellers International (SDI). The SDI uses different tools and strategies for community profiling and mapping of urban poor communities across the Global South. It does so by mobilizing residents who generate information about their own communities, through household surveys and mapping. The SDI’s objective is to shift development agendas toward more inclusive and sustainable outcomes (SDI, 2018).

We also used mapping as a tool to generate information on Karachi’s ‘eviction hotspots’, both commercial and residential, from 2018 to 2020. A key objective was not only to generate visual data on recording the evictions, but also to share the information on different social media platforms as well with communities and stakeholders. The hotspot maps mark specific areas of the city where different state agencies have carried out anti-encroachment drives (Map 3.1). The data for the hotspot maps was collected from media reports, field visits and the records of the KMC. The basic frame of the maps shows the areas where the maximum number of evictions have taken place. The maps also highlight residential areas where people have been served eviction notices since 2018.

Further mapping was done to quantify the number of families living under the threat of eviction, and those who have been evicted in the KCR informal settlements. Mapping helped to explore how these communities constructed their own sense of place and belonging within the community. These maps have become an indispensable tool in the legal battle over the residents’ right to stay. The data generated is being used by activist-lawyers such as Faisal Siddiqi, who leads the Rashid Razvi Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights (RRCCHR). The maps have become an important part of RRCCHR’s pro-bono petition filed with the Supreme Court of Pakistan. This petition is being led by civil society members such as Jibran Nasir, Arif Hasan, Noman Ahmad, Tasneem Ahmed Siddique, Keiser Bengali, and right-based organizations such as PILER, OPP and URC, that have organized to stop anti-poor evictions across Karachi.

3.2.7. Qualitative Data

The questionnaire surveys were supplemented with detailed in-depth interviews (IDIs), phenomenological interviews, Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), and participant observations over several months. We deployed some basic interview protocols for IDIs. The interviews aimed to capture the stories, opinions and experiences of residents and community activists. These interviews were conducted at a later stage in the research process, and with respondents who were willing to engage in extended conversations. The research team organized multiple visits to each neighborhood and engaged in several open-ended discussions with the respondents before the IDIs were initiated. This allowed respondents to develop comfort and trust with the researcher. A conscious effort was made to capture the voices of female respondents from the study sites. This was particularly difficult as women would often dismiss their participation by saying: “we don’t know about these things”. Thus, the IDIs and FGDs enabled us to explore gendered perceptions and experiences of tenure security, resettlement and compensation, social networks, infrastructure services, and especially views about the complex challenges of sustaining and building solidarity across neighborhoods facing evictions. During the IDIs, we were constantly reflexive of issues of power, especially as these cut across gendered relations, and the importance of positionality. This has yielded a rich and nuanced set of interview transcripts. Thirty (30) interviews were conducted across the study sites. The separate male and female FGDs were particularly helpful in terms of highlighting collective issues. These also provided respondents opportunities to challenge each other’s opinions or factual narratives.

The qualitative data derived from IDIs and FGDs
Chapter 3 - Methodology, Sampling and Context

Wellness community workshops were conducted to reach the most vulnerable and the least looped in society. The workshops were held at the Urban Resource Center (URC), our community-focused resource center, given. The workshops were held at the Urban Resource Center (URC), our community-focused resource center, Ghareebabad-Liaqatabad and the Ghareebabad-PIDC, where women from 120 households were present from nearby neighborhoods under the threat of eviction. The workshops were led by our legal expert - Rizvi. The objective was to help participants understand the legalities of the eviction orders and its implications, and to update them about the cases that helped the community. The workshops shared information about different types of land titles, the importance of legal documentation in land transactions, and the identification of contents of such documents. As we noted during our surveys and interviews, residents were often provided spurious documents upon purchase of land, and this was a huge hindrance in establishing title during a dispute in the court of law. Moreover, to help residents make informed decisions, the workshops focused on strategies to negotiate for compensation and resettlement for households and especially for women. The workshops also aimed to help women understand their constitutional rights as citizens of Pakistan, and to provide them a platform to ask questions and obtain clarifications regarding the impending evictions.

The legal workshops encouraged two-way communication to ensure the women understood information being shared and were able to obtain clarifications. Women actively participated in discussing hypothetical scenarios of negotiations and problem-solving group activities regarding legal documentation. The turnout was larger than expected, as according to the women, men at home discouraged them from asking questions or seeking information about land and legal matters. In addition to training the community leader for basic wellness tools, according to our follow-up estimates with the community leaders, we were able to provide follow up support to more than 120 households.

Previous studies in Pakistan have indicated that levels of chronic stress are significantly higher among women and girls, and they have higher needs for social support (Anwar et al., 2016; Anjum et al., 2019). Therefore, these workshops were deliberately focused on female participants, to reach the most vulnerable and the least looped in community dissemination, awareness raising, and production of knowledge; and ii) providing tools and motivation for stress and trauma management. We conducted multiple wellbeing workshops, and several follow-up counseling sessions were given. The workshops were held at the Urban Resource Center (URC), our community-focused partner organization. Some well-being workshops took place in a madrassa in Wahid Colony (KCR neighborhood).

Female participants from more than 150 households, across several neighborhoods, participated in the workshops and follow-up sessions. Workshops were implemented according to four key goals:

1. Introducing participants to the significance of understanding stress and anxiety, and their seminal role in predicting stress levels, distress related to displacements, and community well-being.
2. Providing a safe space for participants to talk about various sources of stress, distress, and communal support, especially amongst women.
3. To identify distress inducing and reducing events amongst participants.
4. To conduct mindful breathing exercise and stress release exercises.

A key advantage of using IPA is that it is in-depth and seeks to gather multi-dimensional themes in various forms of qualitative data. Another advantage of using IPA is that it accounted for and reflected on positionality and experiences of researchers, in addition to the participants in drawing codes and themes. This was a dynamic process that not only relied on the meanings of experiences, events, and states for the participants but also emphasized researchers’ experiences and socio-emotional states. The researchers’ experiences in the field and their constantly changing positionality, supports the use of IPA because this method of analysis acknowledges the interplay of personal (cognitive, linguistic, affective) and social, physical, and communal elements that come together to represent the field experiences of the participants.

3.2.8. Community Workshops: Wellbeing & Legal Engagement

Wellness community workshops were conducted to serve two additional and important purposes: i) to support mechanisms. For more details on the workshops see Annexure 1 for PW1 & PW2. With the same purpose of communal transmission and production of knowledge, we also conducted legal awareness workshops for women from the communities affected by the impending evictions due to KCR revival project. Our workshops were held at the Urban Resource Center-Liaquatabad and the Ghareebabad-PIDC, where women from 120 households were present from nearby neighborhoods under the threat of eviction. The workshops were led by our legal expert - Kanza Rizvi. The objective was to help participants understand the legalities of the eviction orders and its implications, and to update them about the cases that helped the community. The workshops shared information about different types of land titles, the importance of legal documentation in land transactions, and the identification of contents of such documents. As we noted during our surveys and interviews, residents were often provided spurious documents upon purchase of land, and this was a huge hindrance in establishing title during a dispute in the court of law. Moreover, to help residents make informed decisions, the workshops focused on strategies to negotiate for compensation and resettlement for households and especially for women. The workshops also aimed to help women understand their constitutional rights as citizens of Pakistan, and to provide them a platform to ask questions and obtain clarifications regarding the impending evictions.

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3.3 Role of the Researcher-Activist: Ethical Dilemmas & Community Activism

Several study sites, such as Martin Quarters, Clayton Quarters and various KCR informal settlements, received eviction notices during fieldwork. Due to our positionality as socially mobile researchers, our respondents and community representatives approached us frequently to relay information to the media and help organize protests. In those moments, we found ourselves facing an ethical dilemma: how to justify our presence in the field in moments of crisis when research participants are faced with circumstances that threaten to overturn their lives? After developing mutual trust with respondents, was it ethical for us to decline their request for help in facilitating resistance to the demolitions of their homes? What moral responsibility did we have as researchers trying to investigate questions of the right to shelter? If we did help our respondents, would we be appropriating experiences that were not ours? These were some ethical dilemmas our team faced in navigating a research field that was mired in a crisis. Such questions about ethical
dilemmas do not appear in formal academic ethics procedures or in ethical protocol forms; these are situations where there is no ‘right choice’ but only consistently shifting conditions (Chatterjee et al, 2019:193).

Reaching out to journalists and activists was relatively easy. As we reached out to our media and NGO contacts, we shared as much information as possible about the ongoing evictions. We also facilitated activists and journalists to visit the study areas so they could talk directly with the residents. Following this, more and more people became involved and eventually an anti-eviction advocacy group, Karachi Bachao Tehreek (Save Karachi Movement), was also invited by the research team. Together, researchers, activists, journalists, and lawyers across Karachi. It has been facilitating residents, especially across the KCR informal settlements, in their struggle for land/housing justice. The Karachi Bachao Tehreek has been successful in halting two state-led evictions.

As researchers, we tread carefully between mobilizing our social capital for the benefit of the research participants and being wary of appropriating their resistance. In the dynamics that unfolded before us, we witnessed uneven power distributions especially along gender lines. Women’s voices were repeatedly erased and undermined in the way meetings were run, responsibilities were allocated, and decisions were made. In some cases, information was intentionally kept from women by both male residents of the settlements, and representatives of other advocacy groups and NGOs that entered the settlements when evictions were imminent. In this situation, our voices were given more weight than those of the women of the settlement, and we tried to use our positionality to make space for women’s voices. This was done, for instance, by inviting women to critical neighborhood meetings organized by male leaders, to which the research team was invited, and where the women had been initially excluded. In addition to this, the research team developed strong relationships with some women, and was able to reassure them about the importance of their voices when they expressed a desire to participate in protests and press conferences.

However, there were many instances where the research team decided not to say anything because we did not want to impose our opinions and ideas on individuals who did not hold an economically or socially privileged position. But where we did intervene, albeit conscious of our own-class-privilege, we saw positive outcomes. For example, a 19-year-old female resident of Ghareebabad-PIDC, Ayesha, is now a housing activist. Whereas previously, she was routinely excluded from the meetings and protests, Ayesha has now taken up a leadership role in organizing anti-eviction campaigns in her neighborhood. Over time, we have also used our social capital to raise funds to arrange transport for residents who have wanted to participate in protests; we have also contributed to raising awareness about evictions across social media platforms. Additionally, we have initiated a series of dialogues at our university – IBA – where we invited researchers, activists, volunteers, and bureaucrats to talk to students on issues of land displacements. These dialogues were covered by news organizations and were pivotal in fostering a conversation about a critical issue amongst various stakeholders.

In our role as activists and researchers, we were also called upon to participate and contribute in ways that could ameliorate the living conditions of families who had been rendered homeless, for instance, in Quaid-e-Azam Colony and Ghareebabad-Liaquatabad (District East). In May 2019, Younus Baloch (Director URC) and Sagheer Ahmed (community activist), asked us to draft a proposal highlighting the material conditions of the homeless families living on the rubble of their homes and without sanitation facilities. We produced a proposal for constructing temporary, low-cost toilets for the families. This proposal was drafted after compiling findings from several site visits; manual counting of built structures demolished; and conversations with families who underscored their concerns about the lack of safety in women’s access to toilets. The community activists and the URC submitted the report (Annexure 3) to the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA). The NDMA has the mandate to coordinate with local authorities for proper planning of disaster mitigation activities, for instance identifying places and buildings at the district level, to use these as relief centers, and deciding for water supply and sanitation. However, we learnt the NDMA refused to take any action on the proposal for constructing emergency sanitation facilities in Quaid-e-Azam Colony and Ghareebabad-Liaquatabad. The NDMA asserted that before any intervention, the Sindh Government had to declare the placement a ‘disaster’; only then could the NDMA release funds to assist in the construction of toilets. The NDMA’s response reflects the way ‘disaster’ is understood in Pakistan’s broader policy discourse, whereby eviction/displacement outcomes are generally normalized as an inevitable part of the development process.

3.4 Limitations of Methodology

In Pakistan, data at the national level is primarily collected by the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (PBS), even though for many decisions, policies need to be made at the local level, e.g. on the ward level. Secondly, district- and union committee-level data is collected by Sindh Bureau of Statistics that falls under the Planning and Development Department (P&DD). However, such data is not accessible to the public. Data inaccessibility put constraints on our methodology: we could not access information at the local level, for instance on poverty, livelihoods, and ethnic breakdown at the ward level. During our research, extensive demolitions and evictions were taking place across Karachi, including in the neighborhoods where we were working. This produced a need to document the extent of the demolitions not only for our project, but also for city level discussions on resettlement and alternative housing. Even though the Supreme Court had directed the Karachi Commissioner’s office to submit a report on the status of demolitions conducted through the anti-encroachment drives, the city’s governance apparatus, in its public statements and reports, measured demolitions in “kilometers of land cleared” rather than accounting for structures that were demolished. Not only has this exempted the government from being held accountable for destroying homes, but also complicated the process of mapping evictions. In the absence of reliable data, we estimated the number of people evicted and structures demolished, we relied on print media reports along with multiple visits to the demolished sites. This enabled us to approximate the number of homes demolished.

Additionally, there is no data available about the number of jhuggis demolished across Karachi; no data about people without access to basic shelter, or those who sleep on footpaths or park benches (Ahmed, 2020). There is also scant data on populations resettled due to evictions; the few exceptions being those in the Lyari Expressway resettlement project, where the government conducted a survey on the number of persons displaced. Ultimately, it is largely through the efforts of civil society organizations, such as the URC, that some eviction data has been made available. The URC appears to be the only organization in Karachi that has recorded evictions, demolitions, and resettlements with accuracy, and we have relied mostly on their data to substantiate our mapping efforts. However, the URC data is documented up to 2005. For subsequent years, we have relied on archival research of English and Urdu daily newspapers.

Institutional Blockages: Security State, Bureaucrats

Another roadblock to our methodology was the Survey of Pakistan (SoP); a national mapping organization/agency that is responsible for surveying and mapping the requirements of the Armed Forces, as well as civilian organizations and departments. The SoP falls directly under the Ministry of Defence. The Surveyor General of Pakistan, who heads the SoP, is often a serving or retired General. The SoP deals with developments in the field of surveying and mapping, especially computer-aided cartography, the availability of satellite imagery and satellite-based Global Positioning System (GPS). In 2014, the Pakistan’s National Assembly passed a bill, “The Surveying and Mapping Act-2014”, to regulate geo-spatial data and nominated the SoP as Pakistan’s national surveying and mapping organization. The act mandates that all organizations involved in surveying and mapping must register with the SoP; failure to comply is punishable with one-year of imprisonment and a fine of up to one million rupees. The process to register is cumbersome and time-consuming, and rarely granted to individuals or educational institutions, even for research purposes. This impacted our research efforts as we were restricted from using tools such as drones for aerial mapping, 3D modelling, and photogrammetry of study sites with integration into advanced softwares like Pix4D.
Aside from the dearth of publicly available data, academic research in Pakistan faces another recurring problem in the form of institutional blockages enacted by an overzealous security state. While one form of this is through the formalization of the laws that inhibit certain forms of knowledge generating activities such as making maps, e.g., the SoP, some other ways are much more direct. On 11 April 2019, two of the team’s researchers were followed by plainclothes intelligence officers and briefly detained for around 4 hours in a military barracks while doing on-ground fieldwork near the KCR tracks off the Shahrah-e-Faisal road. The stated reason for this was ‘suspicious behavior’ near a military installation; the behavior being in possession of cameras and recording equipment, and the army installation being a completely unmarked stretch of wall at least a few kilometers away. In custody, the researchers were repeatedly threatened with physical abuse and warned of dire consequences if they were seen nearby again. Their devices were wiped, and they were finally allowed to leave. The Pakistan military has several such marked and unmarked facilities spread across the breadth of Karachi, and sometimes researchers might balk at undertaking detailed on-ground surveys of research in fear of stepping on the wrong toes.

Yet another institutional hurdle for our research was approaching state officials or bureaucrats to solicit their perspectives about development projects and displacements. An instance was when we contacted an engineering consultant who works on the KCR revival project. He refused to participate or lack of interest in responding to the survey questionnaire. Moreover, residents were anxious that our survey related to the government’s project for the KCR revival. Thus, they were often reluctant to engage with us. Some residents, for instance in Nazimabad/North Nazimabad, complained about previous survey teams who visited in the guise of researchers, but turned out to be government representatives. These kinds of anxieties and suspicions based on residents’ past experiences, created a charged atmosphere in the KCR informal settlements. This made it difficult for us to access the field on many occasions. We had to repeatedly assure residents about our institutional affiliation and the purpose of the surveys. Our presence in the field became particularly problematic when the demolition process was underway for clearing the path along the KCR settlements based on a Supreme Court order. This led to several informal settlements along the loop line, including our research sites Ghareebabad-Liaquatabad, Quaid-e-Azam Colony, Moosa Colony, Wahid Colony and Mujahid Colony, to be demolished. Others located along the main line including Ghareebabad-PIDC, Umar Colony 1, Kashmir Mujahid colony, remained under the looming threat of demolitions. During those moments, we had to halt the surveys and interviews. But the ongoing state violence had also heightened residents’ anxieties about impending evictions. This is exactly what happened in Martin Quarters, where we were present in the field a few days after a failed eviction operation that was to be conducted in the nearby Pakistan Quarters. The news of the presence of an “unknown survey team” spread across the neighborhood through a community led WhatsApp group that included all the residents of Martin Quarters. In no time, a crowd gathered around the team to prevent them from conducting surveys until credentials were verified. As such, we had to act judiciously to avoid such confrontations with anxious residents.

**Survey fatigue**

Perhaps the most critical issue in the limits to our methodology was the ‘survey fatigue’ that residents have experienced especially in the KCR neighborhoods, due to numerous surveys conducted over the past decade. This includes the JICA study conducted between 2009 and 2011, and subsequent surveys conducted for the census and K-Electric personnel. Our survey was yet another intrusion in the residents’ lives. Survey fatigue was evident in terms of the residents’ outright refusal to participate or lack of interest in responding to the survey questionnaires. Moreover, residents were anxious that our survey related to the government’s project for the KCR revival. Thus, they were often reluctant to engage with us. Some residents, for instance in Nazimabad/North Nazimabad, complained about previous survey teams who visited in the guise of researchers, but turned out to be government representatives. These kinds of anxieties and suspicions based on residents’ past experiences, created a charged atmosphere in the KCR informal settlements. This made it difficult for us to access the field on many occasions. We had to repeatedly assure residents about our institutional affiliation and the purpose of the surveys. Our presence in the field became particularly problematic when the demolition process was underway for clearing the path along the KCR settlements based on a Supreme Court order. This led to several informal settlements along the loop line, including our research sites Ghareebabad-Liaquatabad, Quaid-e-Azam Colony, Moosa Colony, Wahid Colony and Mujahid Colony, to be demolished. Others located along the main line including Ghareebabad-PIDC, Umar Colony 1, Kashmir Mujahid colony, remained under the looming threat of demolitions. During those moments, we had to halt the surveys and interviews. But the ongoing state violence had also heightened residents’ anxieties about impending evictions. This is exactly what happened in Martin Quarters, where we were present in the field a few days after a failed eviction operation that was to be conducted in the nearby Pakistan Quarters. The news of the presence of an “unknown survey team” spread across the neighborhood through a community led WhatsApp group that included all the residents of Martin Quarters. In no time, a crowd gathered around the team to prevent them from conducting surveys until credentials were verified. As such, we had to act judiciously to avoid such confrontations with anxious residents.

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**3.5 Conclusion**

In this chapter, our objective has been to outline the main data collection methods, sources and tools that were employed in the research project. We have also highlighted certain issues that put constraints on the fieldwork process, for instance limitations to the implementation of household surveys, the methodology and the ethical dilemmas of wearing the twin hats of researcher and activist. We have brought these issues to the forefront to underscore the importance of reflecting on methodology in a time of crises. To this we add a final point: the Covid-19 crisis that emerged in the last few months of our fieldwork. Even though we had completed substantial aspects of our fieldwork, the Covid-19 crisis disrupted daily life as we know it; our university closed; the last remaining interviews with state officials had to be cancelled; our ongoing engagements with informants and activists in Karachi’s rural areas were disrupted. But the disruptions have been particularly acute in the lives of our research participants, many of whom experienced enormous difficulties accessing food and incomes under lockdown. The daily struggle to survive during a pandemic brought to the forefront the inextricable connection between land, housing, and health. Covid-19 has shone a bright light on the myriad disparities in health, access to affordable shelter, stable incomes, and security of tenure for a vast majority of people living in Karachi. Even though the pandemic will recede, one thing is clear: without security of tenure, ordinary citizens cannot begin to imagine secure futures for themselves and for their children.
CHAPTER 4: Land, Law and Governance

The law is blind (قانون اندها ہے - ہے). If the poor get support from the government, they are lucky. Otherwise, no one listens to us. We are insects (رے مکوڑے کی کوڑے) to them, and they crush us whenever they want. (Female, 55 yrs., Ghareebabad-PIDC, District South, Karachi, 2019)

We can only order [demolitions]. Say the word and we’ll order them now only talk to us about demolitions. (Chief Justice Gulzar hearing a case on land encroachments, Karachi, 5th February 2020)
4.1 Introduction

In Pakistan, inequalities in land ownership have been routinely censured for causing poverty, inequality, and conflict, and since independence in 1947, the redistributive effects of land reforms have been limited (Gazdar, 2011). Fueled by growing land insecurity in both rural and urban contexts, the Pakistani postcolonial state had significant trouble defining its own ‘modes of articulation of power’ (Alavi, 1983:40), and relied heavily on colonial legacies to adjudicate on matters of land displacement, dispossession, and related conflicts. This was pervasive in urban Sindh where clashes over land resettlement between migrant refugees, or mohajirs, and ‘indigenous’ Sindhis came to a head in Karachi in the immediate decade after Partition (Ansari, 2005). With the onset of Pakistan’s era of populist politics in the 1970s under the rubric of roti, kapra aur makaan (food, clothing, and housing) popularized by the Pakistan People’s Party, and with the current protracted period of democratic governance since 2008, political mobilization through vote bank politics, political patronage, and public interest litigation, has triggered various marginalized communities and the urban poor to contest existing property rights in land. In urban Sindh, legal entitlements or tenure rights have been extended to informal settlements, and this has taken place under both military and civilian regimes. In Karachi, the enactment of the Sindh Gothabad Scheme 1987 and the Sindh Katchi Abadi Act (SKAA), 1987, exemplify a process that has emerged from contentious-driven over land rights and housing over several decades. Nevertheless, the issue of land rights and ownership continues to remain central in the intensifying struggles between the state and ordinary citizens to stay put in the city.

Over the past two decades, large-scale land displacements in Karachi have occurred mostly to make way for government-driven infrastructure development projects, such as the Lyari Expressway (LEW) and the Karachi Circular Railway (KCR), even though there are myriad instances of evictions due to increasing pressure from the Supreme Court to clear ‘encroachments’, as we will discuss in Section 4.3 of this chapter. Large-scale acquisitions of land have been criticized by civil society organizations for non-existent local consultation and compensation, and the negative impacts on local communities in terms of tenure insecurity, livelihoods, as well as nontransparent processes of negotiations for compensation. Additionally, these processes have been gender-biased, forcing women to confront the double burden of oppressive social and economic barriers.

In this chapter, we examine the laws, legal practices and discourses around land acquisition, displacement, and compensation as they take recourse in documents, legality, and violence. We refer not only to law’s inevitably violent imposition of state power (Blomley, 2003; Butler, 2012; Hussain, 2019), but also the constitutional provisions that seek to enforce fundamental rights of individuals and hold state governance accountable (Chatterjee, 2014). In Pakistan’s postcolonial transition, the law as a field of practice has been opened to individual citizens, groups, and organizations of civil society, who find various legal means, e.g., Public Interest Litigation (PIL), to defend their rights to land. Courts (Lower, High, Supreme) have become increasingly important sites where state and non-state actors battle over the regulation and appropriation of land and seek compensation. Yet, the space for contestation narrows considerably as one climbs the judicial ladder of each court, entering a non-negotiable and increasingly authoritarian legal terrain. As the senior lawyer for the KCR affectees reminded the authors of this report in a meeting on 8th February 2020:

“There’s also a finality attached to the Supreme Court. You can’t do anything. In [the city court and high court] you have the option of losing, but you have no option here. Even God cannot appeal here. We’re not asking [the affectees] to storm the court. Come one day, show your strength. Numbers are everything. When the judge’s car goes through the street in the morning, we need to show him that there are lots of people [standing here] who will be affected by this case.”

We also consider the ways in which discourses of development, deployed through ideals of ‘public purpose’ and ‘national importance’, have become the characteristic rhetoric of the Pakistani state, and are used to justify forced displacements. We show that for residents who have no official documents of ownership, their claims to land and the perception of security that comes with it, are often embedded in localized understandings of determinants, such as length of residency, voting lists, absence of punitive state action, access to public utilities/provision of services that materialize with time, and CNICs or national identification cards.

Research on ‘informal’ property rights in the urban Global South has shown that residents premise their sense of tenure security on factors other than property titles (De Souza, 1999; Garg, 1996; Gilbert, 2001; Van Gelder, 2010; Mahadevia, 2011). In certain cases, the start of the titling process, for instance through regularization, is sufficient to create a sense of tenure security, and may even result in an indeterminate delay in completing the process (Payne et al., 2009). This is certainly evident in Karachi in the case of informal settlements, as we discuss in Chapter 5, about the KCR neighborhoods, where most respondents have de facto tenure. For people whose property rights remain in limbo or in between a state of legality/illegality, the process of seeking pathways for redress and accountability is particularly onerous. Their claims and entitlements to land and housing are, often, easily discredited by the state. But even as they claim their rights to land, their formal and substantive citizenship rights are reconfigured (Holston, 2012) with ambiguous consequences. As we will show, for the people declared ‘illegal occupants’ and ‘encroachers’ on public land in the LEW, KCR and Quarters cases, the outcomes are highly uneven not only due to class dynamics, but also the historically determined pathways of access to land and patronage networks, which have positioned them as differentiated citizens demanding compensation from the state. This has a bearing on how the state addresses eligibility criteria for compensation and resettlement for people affected by land displacements: as an act of benevolence for some and a right of citizenship for others.

4.2 Land Acquisition, Leases and Fragmented Governance

The Constitution of Pakistan affords certain fundamental rights to every citizen including the provision of housing and protection of property. Article 38(d) states:

“The state shall provide basic necessities of life, such as food, clothing, housing, education and medical relief, for all such citizens, irrespective of sex, caste, creed or race, as are permanently or temporarily unable to earn their livelihood on account of infirmity, sickness or unemployment.”

Further, Article 24(1) of the Constitution states:

“...no person shall be deprived of his property save in accordance with law [and] no property shall be compulsorily acquired or taken possession of save for a public purpose and save by the authority of law which provides for compensation therefore and either fixes the amount of compensation or specifies the principles on and the way compensation is to be determined and given.”

However, these rights are not unfettered, and can be rescinded if the property in question becomes required for ‘public purposes’, in which case then, the Constitution grants the State the power of eminent domain over the contested land. Therein lies the rub: what is ‘public purpose’ and who is the ‘public’? When it comes to infrastructural development in Pakistan, the ‘public’ - whose interests, mobilities and aspirations are privileged
- generally comprises people who shape policy-making agendas, such as real estate developers, the military, and the urban middle and upper class. This question of what constitutes ‘public purpose’ also dovetails with the spirit of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (LAA), which has been ratified in Pakistan as a Federal Act and has seen ubiquitous usage. Even though the LAA outlines the land acquisition process and the compensation mechanism, it does not account for the on-ground realities of land ownership in urban Pakistan, such as recognition of non-titleholders of land as intended beneficiaries of compensation due to displacement, and patriarchal power that restricts women’s access to control over informal/formal land. In fact, in the absence of a clear-cut definition of public purpose, both the Constitution and the LAA create statutory rights of an exceptional character that may in a sense be taken to directly interfere with the ordinary right of volition of private owners regarding disposal of their property. This aspect of the LAA carries severe repercussions for working class, low-income and lower-middle income residents in Karachi, where their access to land is shaped by informality, and where ownership rights are generally incomplete. Moreover, under the LAA, compensation arrangements are only for the value of land, and do not account for the changes in social, cultural, economic, political, and environmental landscapes of the affected persons. Nor does the LAA address resettlement and rehabilitation needs. Resettlement plans, if developed, are arbitrary, politically driven and implemented on an ad-hoc basis by the state and private stakeholders. Further, the LAA does not account for gendered considerations - the absence of which puts women in a state of increased precarity with respect to access to basic amenities, as they simultaneously negotiate social barriers to property ownership, mobility, and employment. As we discuss in Chapter 5, property rights (formal/informal) are highly exclusionary to women.

The Supreme Court’s interpretation of ‘public purpose’ in the form of suo moto cases, is unique in the present context and we take this up in Section 4.3. The Pakistani courts have further widened the gap by creating a precedence in the continual interpretation of the expression ‘public purpose’ as synonymous with national interest. In the South Asian context, where the LAA has significant bearing, India has taken critical steps to amend the LAA by inserting a new clause in the Indian Land Acquisition Act of 2013. The amendments require prior consent of 80 percent of the affected families in case of acquisition by a private company, and 70 percent in the case of acquisition for public-private partnership projects to improve transparency and fairness in the process. But in Pakistan, the amendments to the LAA exist only on paper: The Resettlement Ordinance, 2001 and a subsequent National Resettlement Policy, 2002, have not been approved by the Federal Government. Even though this policy does not provide a firm definition for public purpose, it has closed most if not all the gaps in the LAA. In Sindh, the Land Acquisition (Sindh Amendment) Ordinance, 1984 was enacted to amend the LAA at the provincial level. The Ordinance fixes a timeline for the land acquisition process to reduce delays and compensate displaced persons. But in practice, there has been little progress in addressing the critical issue of compensation. Given the LAA has no provisions to cover any resettlement and rehabilitation requirements in cases of land displacement, this gap has been filled by ad hoc plans implemented by multilateral institutions such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank (WB). In various infrastructure and urban development projects (ADB, 2009, 2016, 2015), the ADB has developed the Land Acquisition and Resettlement Plan (LARP) based on its Safeguard Policy Statement, which aims to minimize involuntary resettlement. In such cases, the differences in the LAA and the ADB’s policy are reconciled to determine the LARP for the project. Similarly, in the World Bank projects (WB, 2017, 2019, 2020), its Involuntary Resettlement Operational Policy is deployed for preventing and mitigating ‘undue harm’ to the environment and people from involuntary resettlement. Even this policy is reconciled with the LAA to develop the Resettlement Plan Framework. Suffice to say, both the ADB and the WB projects’ ‘safeguard’ policies remain controversial. For instance, in the case of the Tarbela Dam project, which was displaced by its construction, of which one-third were declared ‘ineligible’ for compensation - which were mostly landless tenants, fishermen, artisans, cobblers, and some nomadic tribes - because they either owned no land or owned less than the required minimum holdings (0.2 ha irrigated or 0.8 ha non irrigated (Azhar, 2016). In the absence of binding laws and policies regarding resettlement and compensation, the Pakistani state has been able to downplay the adverse impacts of land displacement - seeing this as an inevitable companion of development in the ‘national interest’. Thus, appropriate compensation and resettlement policies are hardly ever planned, and the opinions and needs of affected communities are by and large ignored. This was certainly evident in the LEW megaproject case, which provides a particularly interesting vantage point to understand how the state’s land acquisition process rested on legality and violence, as well the shifting significance of documents. Before delving into the LEW case, we expand further on the issue of documents, as this is also pertinent to the KCR and Quarters cases.

### Bureaucracy, Documents and Power

Specific kinds of bureaucratic documents - leases, ownership certificates, offer letters - are the basis of negotiations between politicians, bureaucrats, and ordinary citizens for determining ownership of land and eligibility for compensation in land
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amenities and other services like maintenance of Estate Office, and the PWD facilitated them with The Quarters’ residents continued to pay rent to the employees. This was a unique agreement because PWD has been shaped in a post-Partition context, collecting revenue from Federal employees living in the KCR, and LEW cases, these bureaucratic entities ownership in Karachi. In the context of the KCR, Quar ters, and LEW cases, these bureaucratic entities have different and often conflicting jurisdictions over land. The departments rely on a plethora of official documents, a process that can be opaque, convoluted and riddled with loopholes, which create obstacles for the people who work and live under tenueous land tenure arrangements. This process is further complicated when different political parties, who have their own vested interests in ensuring the existence of informal settlements as reliable vote banks, intervene to prolong their longevity through patronage politics, for example by issuing residents new ‘eligibility certificates’. Such interventions might work temporarily but fail to provide long-term security.

The Estate Office is particularly noteworthy because it is tasked with maintaining records and collecting revenue from Federal employees living on government land. Thus, in the Quar ters case, the residents’ relationship with the Estate Office and PWD has been characterized by distrust, where an arrangement was made by the Federal Government to provide land and housing for federal employees. This was a unique agreement because in the aftermath of Pakistan’s creation, there was a dire need of skilled labor, especially in Karachi (the first capital), to run the affairs of the country. The Quar ters’ residents continued to pay rent to the Estate Office, and the PWD facilitated them with amenities and other services like maintenance of houses. But over the past few decades, the PWD’s maintenance services were halted and many residents stopped paying rents. A new generation of residents - many of whom are not federal employees - have claimed ownership of the plots and homes that their forefathers were given. This claim of ownership has been further facilitated by political parties, such as the MQM who have key constituencies in the Quar ters. An example of this played out in the case of Martin Quar ters, where in 2006, the process of obtaining ownership certificates from the Estate Office was expedited by Farooq Sattar, the face of the MQM party then, due to political exigency. Yet, when the court directed the government to clear all government land in 2018, these documents were not considered to possess any legal standing in the court because they were worded to only give the possibility of tenure at a point in the future, and not actual tenure itself. But for the residents, this certificate symbolized a promise of formal tenure. Today, the anxiety regarding possessing the ‘right’ documents has taken on a particularly urgent quality given the ever-growing threat of displacement.

Similarly, when we turn to the KCR case, the issue of documents looms large. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the residents living in the informal settlements claim their right to land based on different perceptions of the state and eligibility criteria. Some have SKAA leases but the vast majority, particularly those living on land contested with the railways, have incomplete or no documentation. Pertinent here are offer letters provided by the KUTC in 2009, after an extended survey spanning over three years was conducted by JICA across affected settlements. These letters promise PKR 50,000 in cash and an 80 sq. yds plot in a settlement named Jumma Goth, to all non-leased houses that would be demolished because of the revival of the railway track. However, in the current context when the KCR has been given high priority as a project of ‘national interest’, the residents reneged on the KUTC’s offer letter, because the state now has the legal standing, and opted to simply tear down houses along the Railways RoW without due process. When aggrieved residents went to the courts and presented their original offer letters, they were informed these were not legally binding, and their status changed once again from ‘Project Affected Persons’ to ‘encroachers’.

In the case of the LEW megaproject, we see that the ideal of constructing the expressway for the ‘national interest’ was made synonymous with ‘public purpose’. In 2002, when some residents filed petitions in the Sindh High Court (SHC) to contest the demolition of their homes, the state’s lawyer, in a counter affidavit, underscored that the LEW “...is a project of national interest and is being constructed for the benefit of the people of Karachi at large” (URC, 2003). Moreover, residents who were non-title holders such as those in the informal settlements along the Lyari Riverbed, thus found themselves in a double bind where violent governmental practices intersected with legal edifices in constructing them as ‘encroachers’ and ‘illegal occupants’. The LEW is a mega-infrastructure project that lay dormant for a decade but found renewed attention under the Pervez Musharraf (2001-2008) military regime, which perceived such projects as a sign of national progress (Anwar, 2015). The PKR 23 billion (USD $14.9 Million) LEW project was a joint venture of the Federal Government of Pakistan (GoP), the provincial Government of Sindh (GoS) and the City District Government Karachi (CDGK). The LEW’s construction led to the displacement of an estimated 77,000 families, many of whom were migrants who had lived for decades along the upstream and downstream banks of the Lyari River, stretching across four districts in Karachi. The Lyari River area was and remains a high-density zone, and as far back as the mid-1970s, it was described as a place where: “...every available foot of land has been built upon so that instead of streets and roads there are narrow and winding lanes which provide the only approach to the houses, and in some parts of the area the population density exceeds 2400 persons to the hectare.” (Dwyer, 1975:201-203).

The LEW’s land acquisition, displacement and resettlement process took nearly 16 years to complete - 2000 to 2016. This was largely because the project was ensnared in court cases, stay orders, affidavits and PILs filed by residents’ lawyers to stave off evictions, and to negotiate ‘fair’ compensation (Dawn, 2003). However, well before the LEW’s construction began, the project had already solicited extensive criticism from civil society organizations, urban planners, human rights advocates, and from international organizations such as the UN-HABITAT. Much of the criticism was directed against the state’s claim that the LEW would remove noise and air pollution; that it would protect the people living in the low-lying areas of the river from floodwaters; that it would resolve Karachi’s traffic problem. In letters to the Editor of the daily English national newspaper Dawn, NGOs such as the Urban Resource Center (URC) highlighted that far from resolving the city’s traffic problems, the LEW would instead trigger a social and environmental disaster. The URC called on the government agencies “[...] to hold a public discussion on the Lyari Expressway, followed by public hearings. Only after such a process should the Lyari Expressway be constructed or be shelved (Dawn, 1997).

An examination of court cases, civil society organizations’ project case studies and media archive, reveals the LEW’s land acquisition had in fact circumvented key steps. For instance, no socio-economic survey was conducted to assess the project’s risks and benefits, no environmental impact assessment (EIA) was undertaken: a violation of Section 12 of the Pakistan Environmental Protection Act 1997. Further, given the LAA has no provision for public consultation, the state took no steps to create pathways of inclusivity for residents to voice their concerns. Two years after the project started, the Action Committee for Civil Problems filed an appeal in the Sindh High Court for the Chief Justice to take suo moto notice of multiple irregularities, and circumvention of certain procedures laid out in the LAA: “The work on the project should have been started after the acquisition of land. Under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, seven steps need to be taken for acquisition of land. The Government should first notify the land within prescribed boundaries to be acquired. Objectives of requisitioning should be fixed, and resettlement plan approved. After these steps, the...
particularly noteworthy is aziz’s critical point: the case of angara goth and a area, liaquatabad.

after carrying out a valuation process, such as in residents who were in possession of what the state persons without a valid lease, consisted of PKR. the standard compensation package for affected persons whose properties - with valid leases - were not immediately impacted by the land acquisition. The properties were going to be acquired at a future date - perhaps several years later - but the residents had been compensated in advance. Aziz underscored such compensation schemes for valid leases quickly drew down the state’s funds, thus leaving hardly any money in reserve to compensate those who had no official documentation of land ownership.

Informal settlements, documents, and eligibility

The land acquisition process for the LEW’s Right of Way (RoW) and the physical survey of land and property along the Lyari Riverbank, fell under the ambit of the City District Government Karachi (CDGK). At the first stage, the National Highway Authority (NHA) provided the satellite imagery of the Lyari River area, to establish the LEW’s RoW. Based on the NHA’s data, the CDGK conducted reconnaissance surveys to estimate the number of homes and properties that fell within the LEW’s RoW. The CDGK’s Revenue Department claimed that of the 255 acres of land earmarked for acquisition, only 32 acres were leased, and the rest were encroached (Dawn, 2002). Large sections of the land included informal settlements such as Niazi Colony, Mianwali Colony, Rahmatia Colony, and Ilyas Goth, where an estimated 22,257 houses were demolished (Cheema, 2003). Most residents in these areas did not possess leases or official documents and were declared illegal occupants or encroachers. For ownership to be deemed valid, residents had to show a document issued by the requisite land-owning agency - such as the KMC, the KMC or the SKAA - all of whom claimed jurisdiction over the land in different temporal moments. A second stipulation required that ownership documents be to date and all related dues, such as mutation charges and land transfer fees, be fully paid. Nevertheless, some SKAA leases issued in the 1980s, were later declared ‘illegal’ by the provincial government, based on the SAC, that the city government did not possess the authority to award leases on land along the RoW of the Lyari River. This messiness of the leasing process was further perpetuated by constantly shifting responsibilities and mutating bureaucratic boundaries of the leasing authorities. The result was an almost un navigable system even for the residents who had valid documents. Those who had valid ownership documents, took to the courts to contest their rights to land and to seek ‘fair’ compensation.

At the same time, for the tens of thousands of residents who had been deemed ‘encroachers’, their claim to ownership was based on an accretion, over several decades, of different kinds of state provided documents such as ration cards, utility bills, CNICs, that altogether attested to their length of stay. Further, many of these residents who lived in the area on the Lyari Riverbed, had been given no prior indication of being removed, and for decades the state had simply looked the other way about their usage of the land. After the first wave of evictions from January to October 2000 that led to the destruction of 1000 residential homes and 2500 commercial units, residents across various neighborhoods mobilized to counter the state’s actions. Within the first six months of 2002, a wide coalition of social activists, community leaders and prominent local and international NGOs, such as the URC and the Asian Coalition of Housing Rights (ACHR), mobilized against the evictions and demanded the residents’ right to housing. Further, a major Constitution Petition was filed in 2003 (CP 2003) by political parties and civil society organizations (international agencies along with different local organizations wrote letters appealing to General Pervez Musharraf, to stop the evictions and demolitions along Lyari River. Even though court petitions were one form of resistance that different communities living along the Lyari River took up, a more popular method was on-ground mobilization against demolition crews. Hasan Auliya Village (HAV) emerged as a case of ‘successful resistance’ to demolitions. With their repeated acts of protest garnering city-wide and even international attention, HAV’s story was showcased in articles, magazines and even a documentary (Cabanis, Yafai and Johnson, 2010; Nazir, Saeed Ali, 2002; Fenn Sherry, 2006). Even though HAV became an important site of resistance against the LEW, there were significant fractures within the community, and these were often elided over, as we discuss in Chapter 7. Eventually, the letters combined with the on-ground protests exerted enough pressure on the state, forcing it to eventually agree on formulating a compensation package for the residents who were displaced in the informal settlements, and not just for those who possessed valid leases.

But for the residents of the informal settlements, the critical matter of eligibility pivoted not so much on legality but on the state’s subjective comprehension of its responsibility toward the displaced. Besides, determining these residents’ eligibility criteria was hardly straightforward. The method through which the CDGK had identified and counted residents as ‘affectees’, appears to have been politically driven. The cases of Ilyas Goth and Muhammadi Colony - to name a few - are illustrative. Both were informal settlements where residents had no documentation of ownership; but they had CNICs that the CDGK used for assessing eligibility. The spatial geography of these settlements was such that many residents’ homes fell outside the boundaries of the Lyari River RoW and the LEW RoW. In conversations with respondents from Lyari Basti - the resettlement colony for the LEW affectees - we learnt that during Mayor Mustafa Kamal’s tenure (2005 - 2010), the list of affectees from these informal settlements, was readjusted to include people who were not impacted by the project but were politically affiliated with the MQM. Allegedly, this caused many people to be deprived of compensation. Even though we cannot firmly establish the veracity of such claims, they, nevertheless, shed light on how the state approached the eligibility criteria - a process in which political exigencies may have carried weight.

It is noteworthy to consider how compensation was eventually settled for residents who had no official...
documents. In a key hearing at the SHC on 14th October 2003, the Advocate General Sindh (AGS), while presenting the provincial government’s proposition for the LEW compensation and resettlement package - PKR 50,000 and an 80 sq. yds plot - expressed that it was, “a gesture of goodwill and in order to provide better facilities of life [to people] who were residing in slum areas in subhuman conditions”. (SHC, 2003)

The AGS’ statement highlights some key dilemmas emanating not only from the LAA, but also the state’s subjective interpretation of responsibilities toward those residents who had no official documents:

1. The compensation casts these residents as recipients of charity rather than legitimate citizens claiming their rights and entitlements to land and housing. This resulted in a two-tier compensation scheme: one scheme for the residents without documents and another for residents who had official documents, with the former receiving considerably lower compensation.

2. Informal residents’ localized understandings of ownership were delegitimized. Shelter/housing was not perceived as an inviolable right. The state viewed this ‘gesture’ as a means of facilitating the afected, and not as an actual compensation offered in response to the displacement (SPDC, 2012).

These dilemmas raise an important question: even though the residents had raised their voices, demanded compensation, and forced the state to respond, even if in the form of a charitable gesture, what are the implications for substantive citizenship? We address this question in Section 4.5. In the following section, we turn to the issue of leased properties and the conflicts over land evaluations. We underscore not only the murkiness of the evaluation process at the state level, but the differentiated compensation outcomes even for those residents who possessed official documents of ownership.

### Land evaluations, leased properties, and contested compensations

Nowhere was the issue of ‘irregularity’ and non-transparency more apparent than in the land evaluations for leased properties to be acquired for the LEW’s construction. The protracted court cases bring to the forefront the differentiated nature of leasing arrangements, and the disparities in land values that directly impacted the compensation packages for the 39 settlements, where residents were able to show official documents of land ownership. Residents from these different settlements, such as Angara Goth and A-Area Liaqatabad, filed dozens of petitions in the Sindh High Court, to contest the land evaluation process. During the state’s land evaluation process, plots leased under the KDA, such as those in A-Area Liaqatabad, were evaluated to be worth twice as much as plots leased under SKAA, such as in Angara Goth, even though both were regularized settlements. These two cases stand out as definitive examples of the kinds of conflicts that arose over establishing the ‘market value’ of property and claims to ‘fair’ compensation for residents who had official documents of ownership. The difference in compensation amount is explained by the type of lease each settlement possessed: Angara Goth was leased through the SKAA, while A Area Liaqatabad was leased by the KMC. The petition order filed on July 7th, 2016 (Case Reference No. 1/2016), has two lists: one for A-Area Liaqatabad and the other for Angara Goth, which contain the names of lessee/occupants or afected of the LEW, and the corresponding compensation, based on the area of their properties to be acquired for the project and corresponding market values.

The petitioners rejected the compensation, claiming the state’s calculations were ‘unfair’ and in violation of the LAA. When the SHC carried out cross examinations of persons responsible for the determination of the land value, it found the evaluation had been carried out in an arbitrary manner: the assessment by the state’s evaluator was made based on informal inquiries rather than on what the LAA mandated, i.e., land valuation should be based on the last 3 to 5 years average registered land sales rates. Yet another evaluator when cross-examined in the court, admitted he had not considered the availability of facilities such as electricity, gas, water, schools, when estimating the value of land. Moreover, he was not aware about the increase in the prices of property in Liaqatabad. The SHC also called on property dealers who had been involved in the initial assessments. Some produced evidence showing the existing market value of the properties in A Area Liaqatabad, ranged from PKR 50,000 to PKR 60,000 per sq. yds, and they admitted these details were never accounted for in the valuation of the 49 properties in A Area Liaqatabad. In addition to the land valuation discrepancies, the court also learnt about the improper notices of land acquisition:

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“Notices U/S 9 of the Act were issued to the occupants through TCS and he has produced P.S. copies of TCS receipts with the notices, but the delivery receipts are not produced showing that actually the notices were served upon the objectors/defendants and even from perusal of notices and TCS receipts it appears that the address shown on them are neither complete nor proper therefore it can be said that the notices were not properly served upon the occupants of the properties in question.” (CR No. 1, 2016)
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Given the extensive discrepancies in the LAA’s application and the arbitrary nature of the land evaluation process, the Sindh High Court ordered a revaluation of the properties by its appointed commissioner. It also directed that compensation should be determined according to Section 23 of the LAA, which refers to certain factors mandatory for calculating compensation: market value of land, damages sustained by persons at the time of taking possession, and diminution of profits from the time of publication of notice until actual possession. After litigating for over a decade, the residents of settlements like Angara Goth and A-Area Liaqatabad, finally received a compensation package that not only included damages or consequences of acquisition, but an additional 15 percent on the market value of land (Table 4.1).

### Table 4.1. Compensation Packages for Angara Goth & A-Area Liaqatabad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlement Name</th>
<th>Type of Lease</th>
<th>Compensation before court intervention</th>
<th>Compensation after court intervention in accordance with LAA provisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angara Goth</td>
<td>SKAA Lease</td>
<td>For plot: Rs. 6,000 per sq. yd.</td>
<td>For plot: Rs. 24,000 per sq. yd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-Area Liaqatabad</td>
<td>KMC Lease</td>
<td>For plot: Rs. 13,000 per sq. yd.</td>
<td>For plot: Rs. 38,000 per sq. yd.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Case Reference No.1/2016)

Nevertheless, the final compensation package that was set in accordance with the LAA provisions, reflected the variance in the base value of land under the KMC and SKAA leases. As such, Mr X who lived in an 80 sq. yds plot in Angara Goth, received PKR 3.5 million under a SKAA lease, received PKR 3.5 million, whereas Mr Y living on the same sized plot in A-Area Liaqatabad with a KMC lease, received PKR 5.3 million. We remain mindful of the fact that these residents were able to seek accountability in the courts because they possessed ‘official documents’ that enabled them to obtain stay orders, and to subsequently delay the eviction process by almost 12 years. This compensation package also played an instrumental role in arbitrating the residents’ ability to reside within the city, as we discuss in detail in Section 7.3, Chapter 7, showing how persons displaced by the LEW project received highly differentiated compensation packages, and negotiated their future mobilities of livelihood and residence. During informal conversations with residents in Lyari Basti, we learnt that most people who had received the cash compensation under the LAA’s provisions, were able to purchase homes close to their original homes or as near as possible to the city center. But there were still some families who had to go farther out of the city-as much as 30 km-to purchase new land because they could not afford land prices in or near the city’s center.

Yet, the 30,000 families, whom the AGS had deemed
charitable cases, faced eviction as early as 2000, and received a mere pittance of PKR 50,000 and an 80 sq. yds allotment on the city’s rural-urban margins. It is evident that had levels of compensation been higher, and had negotiations been carried out in an inclusive manner, the long-term deleterious effects of resettlement on these families might have been curtailed, as we discuss in Chapter 6. Further, at the very bottom of the hierarchy, there were still tens of thousands of people who were never acknowledged as affectees of the LEW, or simply fell through the cracks in the compensation process, and as such never received anything.

Even this hard-won compensation package or charitable gesture was riddled with multiple issues; the compensation amount had not been updated to account for currency inflation, interest rate, and changing value of land in the years the project has been active. An inflation calculator based on the Consumer Price Index for Pakistan calculates the equivalent amount in 2016, when houses in neighborhoods such as Hasan Auliya Village were demolished, to be PKR 168,720, more than thrice the compensation amount from 2001 (WorldData, 2020). In 2020, the compensation should have been PKR 201,225, more than 4 times the original amount from 2001. The depreciation of the rupee (leading to increase in prices) during the last 19 years has been tremendous, a staggering 302.5 percent. This made it nearly impossible for the affectees to construct new houses and establish a lifestyle that could be on par with what they had in the pre-displacement phase. This is also partially the reason why the unleased affectees did not care for the monetary compensation, and instead insisted on acquiring a secure plot in their name, which is what they had been promised initially.

When our respondents in Lyari Basti were asked if they had received full compensation in the form of land and money, 91 percent reported having received both forms of compensation, while 9 percent received neither. This presents an overall successful picture on compensation distribution amongst the affectees. However, it does not mean the affectees viewed the compensation as satisfactory: only 33 percent of the respondents reported being satisfied with the compensation, and most of this satisfaction was based on receiving some form of tenure security for their children:

> “... I got a plot in 36 A, only one out of the 3 plots promised to my family. For the rest of the plots, we had to run around a lot. We had to pay bribes to a lot of people. We were promised the remaining two plots after paying these bribes. But the last bribe-receiver did not pass on the plots to us. We lost a lot of money in this process. If you conduct a survey here, you will find that 20 out of every 100 people are those who were allotted plots but did not receive them.” (Male, 60 yrs, LB, November 2019)

Respondents’ accounts suggest the process of documenting the affectees of the project was effective in the beginning, with surveys conducted by appointed teams from the LERP. As a result, there were fewer instances of irregularities in the allotment. However, the process was later mired in several issues, ranging from lack of transparency to fake cases:

> “But later when the middlemen got involved, the patwaris and the councilors, then to eat profits, they started doing their own things... taking out names of original allottees and replacing their names with those of their own people...Whatever these people call as China Cutting, from that only, whoever had the plots, those who had one room houses got one plot. But the ones who had so many rooms, 2-3 stories, they also got only one plot; so how does that make sense? You tell me?” (Female, 70 yrs, LB, November 2019)

> “Yes, CNIC is a big issue with Bengali community here. I’m not a CNIC holder and same with my mother-in-law. My father-in-law was a CNIC holder, but he has the old version. My husband is a CNIC holder…. his CNIC was made by making someone else his fake parents. Now his CNIC has expired, and we are facing the issue of renewal. They (NADRA office) are not making his CNIC because they want evidence about his parents’ and siblings’ identities. He doesn’t have any siblings; he is all alone. We got this house based on my father-in-law’s CNIC for the same reason.” (Female, 36yrs, LB, September 2019)

In the next stage, affectees had to visit the LERP office to verify whether their name was present in the list of allottees. This process of acquiring the file was particularly difficult for ethnic minorities such as the Bengali community who were not in possession of a NIC card. The allotment papers were handed over only to residents with NIC cards, and many Bengalis had to first go through the process of repeated visits to the NADRA office; attempts that were often futile. Our in-depth interviews with residents of Bengali ethnicity in Lyari Basti, revealed that during these visits, people were asked to present documents of their deceased parents, and failure to do so would delay or halt the process midway:

In some cases, only one member from several households living together would be successful in getting their ID card made, reflecting in the number of plots awarded to them, resulting in a compensation process that was ultimately uneven, opaque, and supremely arbitrary. This erratic and ad-hoc process of awarding compensation was rooted in the discursive construction, by the courts and other bureaucrats, of the affected citizens as ‘encroachers’ who gave up their constitutionally protected rights by unlawfully occupying state land, and hence became undeserving of a robust and transparent compensation scheme. On the contrary, an analysis of ongoing court cases, judicial reviews, and petitions around the ‘encroachments’ in KCR, Empress Market, and the Quarters and Empress Market cases, which we perform in the next section, highlights how the state continues to justify land displacement using these arguments. Pertinent in this discussion is how the Supreme Court, based on suo moto actions, has constructed its own ideal of ‘public interest’, which is aligned with a dominant discourse that underscores an emergent powerful worldview of different stakeholders around Karachi’s future.

### 4.3 Encroachments, Public Land & State Violence

From national English newspapers like Dawn, to local Urdu dailies Roznama Ummat, PILs, Supreme Court hearings and meetings with state officials, the ‘encroacher’ is represented as an undesirable category whose removal is akin to putting right the problem of corruption and inefficient government in Karachi. Moreover, the act of encroachment is perceived as bordering on criminality; a nuisance; the reason for urban congestion; a hindrance to revamping the city; and overall a ‘disorder’ that gets in the way of improving certain parts of the city. This was certainly evident in the 2018 eviction operation in the area known as Saddar, where longstanding informal markets were demolished. Saddar’s ‘uplift’ has been imagined for well over a decade; by removing the so-called Awami National Party-backed ‘land mafia’ and street vendors who had allegedly encroached on government land, and ultimately by making the markets and formerly congested streets pedestrian friendly (Hasan 2008), to boost tourism and shopping culture that caters increasingly to the desires of the middle class and elite (Ahmed, 2010). Interestingly, it is predominantly the Sindh provincial government - currently PPP backed - that controls and reproduces the discourse on encroachments; it does so by constituting task forces (designs strategy regarding evictions), committees (discusses resettlements), and executive orders (on spot order to fix the issue) that devise the eviction strategies.

These decision-making bodies are represented...
by various state officials and municipal agencies, ranging from the Commissioner Karachi, the KMC, the KDA, the SMTT, to the KUTC, the DMCs and the DIG. But the people impacted by the evictions are never included in the ‘high level committees’. Hence, in this dominant discourse, the ‘encroacher’ is generally absent or silenced. More specifically, ‘encroachment’ has become a unified label that represents not only informal workers, residents of income-poor settlements or katchi abadis but also certain formal settlements like the Federal Airways, whose presence on public land is deemed ‘unauthorized’. Equally important are the groups that are not considered encroachers by the state, such as large real-estate development companies like Bahria Town like formal businesses, who have an extensively documented history of circumventing similar legal requirements or zoning laws but are never censured or met with extreme force from the government.

There are essentially two pathways through which the rule of law is enforced against ‘encroachments’ on public property: (1) The Sindh Public Property (Removal of Encroachment) Act, 2010, a particularly draconian law that mandates only 3 days as notice period for evictions and for filing a review petition. It has also established special courts for ‘speedy’ adjudication of encroachment cases. However, this Act has not been referenced in the retrieval of public land for mega-infrastructure projects such as the KCR. Instead, the state has used the second pathway: (2) The Supreme Court’s suo moto actions or orders to remove encroachments that undermine the ‘public interest’. By taking this pathway, the Supreme Court unilaterally, and of its own volition, has ordered repossession of public land, thus stripping the affected persons’ rights to dispute the dispossession under the Act, 2010. In this process of ‘cleaning up’ the city through a strict enforcement of legality and violence, the Supreme Court has become a potent force in ordering the removal of unauthorized structures. Even though the removal of hawkers/street vendors, informal settlements, or other forms of ‘illegal’ housing, is not explicitly covered by the 2010 Act or in the Supreme Court’s orders, ultimately their removal is justified in the name of public and national interest.

From October 2018 to February 2020, multiple intense waves of anti-encroachment drives led to the demolition of approximately 1,605 residential units and the displacement of an estimated 3,200 families across Karachi - particularly in the KCR informal settlements - and the destruction of over 11,000 commercial structures within 20 major markets, which has resulted in the loss of an estimated 200,000 jobs. In millennial Karachi, residential and commercial evictions have taken place with court-sanctioned impunity. What has empowered the state, in this moment, to conduct such large-scale, violent, and speedy evictions without any recourse to accountability? Even though the local government system in Karachi has been conducting evictions against informal settlements and informal workers for decades, the current moment is one of unmatched intensity. The reasons for this are multi-faceted: they range from a dwindling of resistance against encroachment drives, a crippling of powerful local political parties such as the Awami National Party (ANP) and the MQM through supremely violent military-backed ‘clearance’ operations that started in 2013, and the Supreme Court’s proactive approach to matters regarding governance and planning. At the lower echelons of the state, municipal agencies and the provincial bureaucracy have justified the evictions under the rhetoric of completing a task that was ordered by the Supreme Court, and in doing so, removed any responsibility for the violence of the evictions.

We suggest these complex dynamics are also aligned with a new infrastructural and urban development regime, as outlined in Chapter 1, that represents an emerging pro-growth coalition of provincial, local, and federal governments, as well as real estate developers and multilateral international organizations such as the World Bank. This pro-growth coalition is reshaping Karachi’s urban development. Alongside this, is the advent of Chinese capital in mega-infrastructure projects that scale from the national to the local levels, and now include the KCR in its remit. We posit that with the inclusion of projects such as the KCR in the CPEC, there is an increasing dissolution of dissent within major political parties, bureaucratic institutions and the judiciary regarding the necessity or desirability of this mode of development. In fact, every project under the CPEC then becomes not only a project of ‘national importance’ but also dovetails with what is presented as being in the public’s interest.

Appeals to the Benevolent (Violent) State

The Supreme Court (SC) cases we discuss in this section, provide an especially interesting vantage point from which to explore how deeply the drama of land governance and displacement in Karachi is enmeshed in legality and violence. These are sites that function as a discursive battlefield where different state and non-state actors use the structure of the legal apparatus to instruct the ‘benevolent’ state or the higher authority, to institute measures that will regulate land. The PILs symbolize appeals to higher state officials - Supreme Court - who are seen not only as defenders of law but also those who can be called upon to discipline government officials for their ‘corruption’ and ‘incompetence’ in matters of land and urban governance. The turn to PILs in resolving matters of ‘land grabs’ and ‘encroachers’ in Karachi, can be traced to a significant moment in 2010 (See Figure 4.4 Timeline of Supreme Court Interventions in Karachi’s Land Governance), when Karachi’s ex-mayor Naimatullah Khan (2001-2005) filed a constitutional petition in the Supreme Court (SC) against the conversion of public land for residential and commercial purposes, and the encroachment by political parties representatives - such as the MQM - on amenity plots and public parks (Case Reference No.09/2010). This was a watershed moment in Pakistani jurisprudence because it invoked Articles 9 and 26 of the Constitution, tying issues of city governance with constitutional rights.

Since 2010, the Supreme Court has clubbed all cases - approximately 60 - related to encroachments on amenity plots, parks and playgrounds, railway land, footpath, public spaces, and drainage, with the earlier Case Reference No.09/2010, Naimatullah Khan vs. Federation. In a separate petition filed in 2011 by the Minister of State for Railways and Chairman of Implementation Committee Karachi Urban Transport Corporation (KUTC), the Supreme Court ordered the disposal of all cases in the civil courts within 2 months, especially pertaining to encroachments on railway land. In 2011, the Supreme Court took suo moto action against the encroachments on public land in Karachi, with respect to those cases registered and disposed under the 2010 Act and ordered the removal of

- Karachi’s ex mayor Naimatullah Khan files a petition in the Supreme Court against conversion of and encroachment on public land
- Supreme Court takes suo moto action against encroachments on public land in Karachi, and directs Provincial Board of Revenue to collect data on encroachments through satellite imagery
- Supreme Court orders disposal of all cases in the civil court pertaining to encroachments on railway land
- Supreme Court orders restoration of Karachi according to the ‘original’ master plan
- Supreme Court places a ban on the Master Plan Department of the SBCA and any other authority of the City Government and Government of Sindh

Figure 4.4. Timeline of Supreme Court Interventions in Karachi’s Land Governance 2010-2020 (Source: Case Reference No.09/2010 & others)
encroachments within a month. Moreover, through suo motu action, case No.16 of 2011, the Supreme Court directed the (Provincial) Board of Revenue to collect data on encroachments based on satellite imagery of the entire city, to determine how much public land was encroached upon.

The use of PILs as vehicles of urban development and restoration of ‘law and order’ re-emerged in 2018, when Chief Justice Saqib Nisar ordered the Mayor of Karachi, Waseem Akhtar, to remove commercial encroachments from the Empress Market and its surrounding areas, including the footpaths and public parks, with a report of compliance of court orders to be submitted within 3 weeks. Such authoritative orders by the Supreme Court bind local and provincial government officials to follow its instructions or face charges of contempt of court. This creates a range of unintended consequences such as narrowing the field for discussion, crippling possible criticism, and dispensing with the need of building consensus among multiple stakeholders. All these effects ultimately lead to a more violent landscape of governance, which we discuss in the ensuing sub-section.

This trend of adjudicating land encroachment cases through constitutional petitions and Supreme Court interventions, is further evident in a November 2018 meeting between the Chief Justice Gulzar Ahmed, and the provincial and local government authorities. During the meeting, the Chief Justice, citing Naimatullah’s 2010 case, ordered that open spaces, amenity plots, parks, and playgrounds, should remain for the same purpose that was delineated in the ‘original master plan of Karachi’ (Civil Petition No. A-R (k)/2018-SCK). He also extended the remit of this order to include railway land. He then directed the Divisional Superintendent (DS) Pakistan Railways, to demolish the illegal walls, and remove all encroachments from the Pakistan Railways’ lands and

The Chief Justice added a further caveat: if the Pakistan Railways was unable to retrieve the public land, then the task of removing encroachments would be handed to the Sindh Government that included the Mayor Karachi, Commissioner Karachi, Chief Minister Sindh, and Chief Secretary Sindh, who were then held accountable for the outcome. Including local government officials accountable in the ‘illegal’ occupation of public lands, the Supreme Court’s judicial reviews have bordered on a despotic exercise of power. For instance, in a petition in 2019 before the Supreme Court, Abdul Karim v Nasir Salim Baig and others (Court Reference No. 815-k/2016), Chief Justice Gulzar Ahmed placed a ban on the Master Plan Department of the SBCA, and on any other authority of the City Government or Government of Sindh, concerning the change of land use. The court also directed the Environmental Department and relevant Government Departments to ensure Karachi is restored in accordance with its ‘original’ Master Plan, with a progress report to be submitted to the court. The court further issued directives in respect of the functions of governmental departments by instructing the Additional Advocate General, Sindh to understand...

With each new hearing on land grabs and encroachments, the Supreme Court’s discursive and constitutional remit has expanded, bringing within its ambit an increased scale of interventions. Thus, what started off in 2010 as a PIL (Figure 4.4; pg. 95) regarding amenity plots, restricted to a specific piece of land, has scaled-up exponentially to include all sewerage drains, amenity plots, and clearance of government-owned land across the city, before finally subsuming even the drafting of the city’s master plan within its bounds.

The Supreme Court is seen as issuing orders and creating a state of emergency to impose a sense of order upon its subordinate, by means of violence rendered illegible, legal, and legitimate by its own sovereign word, which certain authors (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2016) have termed lawfare. Lawfare gives the Court the ability to cast informal settlements, along the KCR, the ‘illegal’ occupation - businesses and even formal settlements such as the Quarters, as illegal spatial forms. For the Supreme Court, the master plan constitutes a binding document; not a guideline for city development but a blueprint to be followed to its finest details. Hence, the multiple disjunction between the actual built form of the city and the master plan, as the City as legal violations that must be undone. Planned boundaries, as Gautam Bhan (2016) describes, create, and bind the city as a governable place, and spatialize governmental thought. The Master Plan categorizes the land use and ownership on their visual, literal, and two-dimensional allocations to reduce the complexity of the city and becomes the framework for the legal and illegal (Bhan, 2016).

However, in Karachi, the link between PILs and land displacement is somewhat particular and often couched within a wider narrative. For example, in the cases of Indian cities like Delhi and Bangalore, middle-class residents from formal settlements have been filing cases against slums using the rhetoric of aesthetics/sensibility, labelling them as ‘dirty’, or ‘health-hazards’, which are then transformed into an actual course of action in the form of eviction drives (Ghertner, 2011; Dupont, 2016; Baviskar, 2003; Bhan, 2019). In Karachi’s case, this phenomenon initially gained traction through the PIL petition filed in 2010 by Naimatullah, then Karachi’s mayor, who was a member of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), to recover public land usurped by the MQM, in a bid to bring ‘order’ to the city. In a hearing during February 2020, Chief Justice Gulzar lamented that Karachi has no semblance of a city rather it looks like a big chunk of slum”, signifying that the city had already failed critically, and now required the Supreme Court’s direct intervention to ensure the situation does not devolve to a state where safeguarding citizen’s constitutional rights becomes impossible. For the Supreme Court, these interventions are not only a matter of dispensing justice or enforcing the law, but a reaction to what is perceived as a more fundamental crisis of ‘law and order’. Also significant within this legal discourse, is the sense of urgency displayed in the orders of the Supreme Court. By allocating deadlines for the completion of given tasks, the Supreme Court strengthens the judicial accountability discourse against an inefficient bureaucracy, which has failed to maintain ‘law and order’. On each hearing of the Supreme Court, inquiries are made on progress reports to be submitted, and the overall project delays. Also reflected within these orders, is the aggression in the language of the Supreme Court: issuing warnings for opening cases of corruption against state officials, threats to remove them from their jobs, and initiating proceedings of contempt of court in cases of non-compliance of orders. The Minister for Local Government Sindh, Saeed Ghani was issued a contempt of court notice by the Supreme Court after he stated that he “…will prefer stepping down instead of razing homes in Karachi” (Tribune, 2019), where he expressed his refusal, as a representative of the government, to follow the Supreme Court’s orders. However, such declarations are performative statements by political representatives, to secure support for their party in their respective constituencies, as demolitions continued to take place on ground, and no concrete attempt was made by any political party to stop them.

We note that even though the framing of urban (dis)order as a crisis of law started with Naimatullah’s intervention in Karachi’s urban planning landscape in 2010, the precedent it sets continues to shape urban development processes in significant ways. In the context of the present political dispensation, there is a coalescing of economic interest and ideological approaches, which also need the ‘law and order’ to manifest to bring progress on ground.

Cost of Anti-Encroachment Drives in Millennial Karachi

What does it take to launch an anti-encroachment drive in Karachi? A sequence of events starting from the identification of ‘encroached upon’ land, a paper trail of notices to various government offices (law enforcement agencies like police and rangers via deputy commissioner), a mass mobilization of resources - ranging from bulldozers, to riot
police, to local district officials - an anti-eviction notice served to the settlement in question usually only a day in advance, and then a brutally quick operation that levels kilometers of land at a time, without any form of accounting, leaving behind rubble and displaced lives. Eviction drives are not cost-free endeavors even for the state: they require the mobilization of enormous resources, such as funds and personnel; processing through swathes of red tape; further resources to mollify or stop any opposition or protests; close coordination with a dozen different security agencies; and maintaining a positive media profile among the larger populace while doing all of this. Often, the lands that give the state the best return on its effort and resources, are those located near the city center and capable of generating immense profits.

In April 2019, during interviews with senior officials in the KMC head office, we discussed the ongoing commercial and residential anti-eviction drives that had turned Karachi into a veritable war zone. In response to our questions, a senior KMC official noted:

"The anti-eviction drives are assignments. Before each assignment, we first gauge the atmosphere in the targeted site; we study the entire area and discuss all possibilities. For instance, in the case of the Empress market, we visited the field and worked for six days with detailed discussions in our office and with the Commissioner Karachi’s office. We spent a night in Preedy house, you have the right to remove them. Most of these people only settled on railway land after 2003 when KCR’s revival was first announced, and they wanted to get some compensation money.”

Yet despite these perceived dangers, KMC officials were also adamant that eviction drives were an essential job that must be performed for the ‘well-being’ of ordinary citizens. In the case of the Empress Market, where more than 1,000 shops were demolished within two days, the KMC official justified their actions by claiming the ‘Empress Market was a hazard’, run by a mafia that made Karachi’s public ‘uncomfortable’. The officials further explained this discomfort was felt particularly by women who visited the markets but were sexually harassed by shopkeepers and younger men of questionable character who loitered around the area. During an open-ended interview, a KMC official finally capped off his explanation by recounting how, after they had completed a recent anti-eviction drive in the Burns Road Food Street, local families had thanked them for resolving similar ‘social issues’ of women being harassed, and the streets being dirty and unwelcoming.

This coding of “encroachers” as harbingers of social ills was not just specific to the Empress Market anti-eviction drive. Before the Supreme Court order for the removal of encroachments along the KCR track was issued, in September 2019, we interviewed the Karachi Urban Transport Corporation (KUTC) Project Director, who said of the people living on the railway’s contested land,

"When the protests are visibly intense at the site, we are the first ones to get out of there. Bhai, it’s important we save our own lives! The institution [KMC] won’t be affected. The rest is for the police and Rangers to handle.”

Another senior KMC official who has extensive experience managing anti-eviction drives in Karachi, added,

"We are interested in the removal of encroachments and securing the Right of Way for these projects... See in my opinion, if a wild dog comes and sits in front of your house, you have the right to remove him. Most of these people only settled on railway land after 2003 when KCR’s revival was first announced, and they wanted to get some compensation money.”

Yet despite the perceived dangers, KMC officials were also adamant that eviction drives were an essential job that must be performed for the ‘well-being’ of ordinary citizens. In the case of the Empress Market, where more than 1,000 shops were demolished within two days, the KMC official justified their actions by claiming the ‘Empress Market was a hazard’, run by a mafia that made Karachi’s public ‘uncomfortable’. The officials further explained this discomfort was felt particularly by women who visited the markets but were sexually harassed by shopkeepers and younger men of questionable character who loitered around the area. During an open-ended interview, a KMC official finally capped off his explanation by recounting how, after they had completed a recent anti-eviction drive in the Burns Road Food Street, local families had thanked them for resolving similar ‘social issues’ of women being harassed, and the streets being dirty and unwelcoming.

When we probed the Project Director about his opinion concerning the residents’ claims that they had lived along the KCR tracks for decades, he added,

"The anti-encroachment drives are assignments. Before each assignment, we first gauge the atmosphere in the targeted site; we study the entire area and discuss all possibilities. For instance, in the case of the Empress market, we visited the field and worked for six days with detailed discussions in our office and with the Commissioner Karachi’s office. We spent a night in Preedy house, you have the right to remove them. Most of these people only settled on railway land after 2003 when KCR’s revival was first announced, and they wanted to get some compensation money.”

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This coding of “encroachers” as harbingers of social
Colony – PIDC who were threatened by eviction due to the Karachi Circular Railway project - faced a similar experience when they instituted a case in 2017 for an injunction against eviction without proper compensation in the Civil Court, Karachi. This case faced inordinate delays primarily due to the absence of the Government of Sindh’s representation before the court as the opposing party, which resulted in a series of back-to-back adjournments of the case. The adjournment is also attributable to the court’s hesitance in pursuing matters pertaining to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) initiatives of the government and using the delaying tactics to circumvent its responsibility of issuing a firm decision on the matter. This case was disposed by the Civil Court pursuant to the orders of the Supreme Court, for disposal of all cases in the lower courts that were causing hindrances in the land acquisition process for the KCR project, severely limiting the lower court’s ability to effectively intervene in the matter.

Residents of the 28 informal settlements affected by the impending Karachi Circular Railway project, filed a petition in 2017 at the National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR), Karachi, demanding proper compensation against land to be acquired for the project. The NCHR was established as an impartial state body for the protection and promotion of human rights in Pakistan reporting directly to the Parliament of Pakistan. This quasi-judicial body took notice of the human rights violation due to the forced eviction and declared that affected persons do not fall within the ambit of the definition of “encroacher” and should not be removed without proper compensation. However, the NCHR appears to have no authoritative standing relative to the Supreme Court as its dissension did not impact the Supreme Court’s judgement on the matter. This is one of many instances where the courts have failed to independently adjudge the brutal impacts of developmental projects.

Accessibility to the Supreme Court for an ordinary citizen is only possible through civil society organizations, which is an additional barrier, and depends essentially on how vigorously the organization intends to pursue the matter. Even in the case of the KCR affectees, an intervenor application in the Supreme Court was only filed through prominent social activists such as Jibran Nasir and Faisal Siddiqui, after an extensive bout of mobilization involving Karachi’s civil society, the dynamic of which we examine in-depth in Chapter 5, Section 5.4. This application urged the courts to acknowledge certain rights had been violated by the eviction drives in Karachi, and it was the court’s duty to put a stop to all such activities. A veteran Supreme Court lawyer, engaged for this intervener petition, was frank about how the Supreme Court could be moved on this issue:

"Justice Gulzar Ahmed in my opinion is adamant on the revival of Karachi Circular Railway to show his legal authoritarianism, which was also evident from Justice Saqib Nisar’s efforts. The Supreme Court judges feel they do not have enough time. Hence, they issue orders and judgements based on their instincts without giving any rational thought to it."

However, once the petition was filed, the court took a strict stance on the revival of the defunct KCR and did not give weight to arguments that opposed its revival. On August 9th, 2019, Justice Gulzar Ahmed in a Supreme Court hearing at the Karachi Registry, ordered the Secretary of Railways to produce videos and presentations about the revival work done so far, and the measures to be taken in future, based on which he would visit the sites to review the work done. This led to Faisal Siddiqui forcibly changing his argument from the KCR being a non-viable project, to requesting the court for the constitution of a committee to decide on the resettlement and rehabilitation of the affected persons. In explaining this dramatic turn in the legal proceedings to a room full of activists and others who had signed the intervener petition, Faisal explained rather ominously his decision:

"...the court has made its decision [to revive the KCR] which leaves us with two choices: to choose between a worse outcome and an absolute disaster".

4.4 Conclusion

In this Chapter, we have shown how colonial legislation, a fragmented terrain of land regulation, and the constantly shifting symbolic value of documents, coalesce in different temporal moments in the state’s governance and acquisition of land for infrastructure and urban development projects in Karachi.

Some key takeaways from this Chapter include:

- Even though the colonial Land Acquisition Act 1894 outlines the land acquisition process and the compensation mechanism, it does not account for the on-ground realities of land ownership in urban Pakistan, such as recognition of de facto tenure rights as intended beneficiaries of compensation due to displacement.
- De-facto tenure rights for residents who have no official documents of land ownership, are often embedded in localized understandings of determinants, such as length of residency, voting lists, absence of punitive state action, access to public utilities, and CNICs or national identification cards. However, their claims and entitlements to land and housing, that are often easily discredited by the state, need to be taken into consideration and recognized for the security they provide.
- In the absence of binding laws and policies regarding resettlement and compensation, the Pakistani State has been able to downplay the adverse impacts of land displacement. Appropriate compensation and resettlement policies are hardly ever planned and the opinions and needs of affected communities are, by and large, ignored.
- The LEW case demonstrates not only an arbitrary and violent process of land acquisition, but also the selective application of the LAA in exercising the state’s power in its right to eminent domain.
- In the case of the megaprojects such as LEW and later the KCR that was brought under the ambit of CPEC, the ideal of infrastructural development for the ‘national interest’ has been made synonymous with ‘public purpose’. In effect, this creates a ground for the state to justify land displacement.
- The LEW case shows how differentiated compensation cast residents without formal documentation, as recipients of charity rather than legitimate citizens claiming their rights and entitlements to land and housing. This led to a two-tier compensation scheme: one scheme for the residents without documents and another for residents who had official documents, with the former receiving lower compensation.
- The Supreme Court’s discursive and constitutional remit has expanded considerably in the context of urban governance, bringing within its ambit an increased scale of interventions: from a single plot of land to the masterplan for the city.
- The power to appropriate land, demolish homes and livelihoods, has increasingly become separated from the state’s obligation to provide housing for the urban poor, working class, and lower-income residents.
- The definition or range of what constitutes legality is increasingly being narrowed through the Supreme Court’s suo moto actions that suggest the inversion of constitutionalism - an issue that must be challenged. In this process, the right to land, livelihood and shelter, and the right to move around and stay anywhere in the city, is being reinvented and supplanted by a singular version of legality to uphold ‘law and order’.

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For a few days there were rumors they will come to demolish; no one knew if or when they would come. We had been hearing such things for a long time. People didn’t pay much attention because they heard it every other day. It is like the story of the boy who cried wolf. And the day the bulldozers came, people just couldn’t believe it. (Male, 56 yrs., Ghareebabad-Liaquatabad, July 2019)
5.1 Introduction

When we started this project in June 2018, large-scale evictions in Karachi seemed to be at a temporary standstill. Even though there were several emerging land displacement dynamics in the context of millennial Karachi, as discussed in Chapter 1, it had already been 5 years since the last eviction drive. Thus, we started fieldwork in the KCR informal settlements with the goal of ascertaining how living under a prolonged threat of displacement has shaped people’s perceptions about their futures. Indeed, the KCR informal settlements have been under threat of displacement since 2012, and during the early phase of fieldwork, only some residents from these areas expressed acute fears regarding eviction. Yet, merely half a year into our research, we found the field changing with alarming rapidity; suddenly the threat of forced displacement was another eviction drive occurring simultaneously in Karachi that are the result of increased judicial interventions in urban/land governance and have led to a more overt distinction between ‘citizen’ and ‘encroacher’.

However, the emotional and material dislocations that ensue from the loss of land, home and livelihoods do not always end in defeat; these moments also generate various forms of resistance and contestations. As Judith Butler (2006:30) posits: “...to grieve, and to make grief itself into a resource for politics, is not to be resigned to inaction, but it may be understood as the slow process by which we develop a point of identification with suffering itself.” Thus, we also chart the complex, evolving and rich terrain of solidarities, protests, and grassroots activism that is gradually shaping resistance against displacements in Karachi. We place this process of resistance in shifting ‘affective atmospheres’ (Lancione, 2017) of hope, invigoration and expectation that can quickly dissolve into despair, distress and waiting (Ayero, 2012; Yiftachel, 2009). These atmospheric attunements also epitomize the extensive labors of ordinary men and women who come together in given moments, to forge connections in their common struggles to achieve the same goal. In Table 5.1, below, we present a timeline of displacements in Karachi from 2018 to 2020, which shows the unprecedented intensity of residential and commercial displacements that have unfolded within a compressed period.

We underscore the important point that land displacement does not have uniform impacts across gendered lines (Mehta, 2009; Tilley et al., 2019; Seppala, 2016; Chant & McIlwaine, 2015; Brickell, 2014; Doshi, 2013; Farha & Thompson, 2001). Through our interactions with people living under the threat of evictions, we found that women are impacted differently from men. Listening to both men and women talk about their experiences, apprehensions, and aspirations, deepened our understanding of the intimate relations between gender, land and the state. For women who live in poorly serviced, informal settlements, being faced with the threat of displacement means navigating the double burden of oppressive economic and patriarchal structures. Social barriers such as moral codes, restrictions over mobility, inaccessibility of public space and domestic responsibilities, are in effect exacerbated and reinforced by the threat of displacement, and the state’s failure to provide adequate resettlement plans. Moreover, in highlighting the gendered impacts, we show that businesses had been operating for years based on tenancy agreements with the KMC. Finally, there was another eviction drive occurring simultaneously in Pakistan Quarters, resulting in violent clashes between the police and residents.

In this Chapter, we use these three sites - KCR Settlements, Federal Quarters, and Karachi’s commercial markets - to chart the violent logic contained in and enacted through forced land displacement; a fragile performance of state power that also must grapple with the people and places upon whom violence is inflicted (Brickell, 2017; Roy, 2020; Bhan, 2009). Map 5.1 shows the demolitions conducted in the city in 2018-2020, as part of the violent anti-encroachment drive. Fundamentally, the violence embedded in bureaucratic-legal structures of land governance and the state’s shifting categorizations of ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’, make the urban poor casualties of evictions. This is evident in the recent wave of evictions in Karachi that are the result of increased judicial interventions in urban/land governance and have led to a more overt distinction between ‘citizen’ and ‘encroacher’.

Map 5.1. Commercial and Residential Demolitions in Karachi 2018-2020 (Sources: Express Newspaper (Urdu))

Table 5.1. A Brief Timeline of Recent Eviction Drives in Karachi (2018-2020) (Source: Karachi Urban Lab fieldwork)
Chapter 5 - Land Displacement as Process: KCR Settlements, Federal Quarters and Markets

The surveys were conducted before an anti-encroachment drive was initiated in the city for the removal of ‘illegal encroachments’ along the KCR track. Hence, the respondents expressed intense anxieties about the anticipated demolitions. We also conducted focus group discussions and over 21 open-ended, in-depth interviews with residents; extensive interviews with state officials in different government agencies; open-ended interviews with community activists; and legal and well-being workshops with women in the KCR settlements.

As we have previously mentioned in Chapter 2, these predominantly poor, low- to lower-income ethnically heterogeneous neighborhoods, comprise Pashtuns, Punjabis, Sindhis, Urdu-speaking, Hazara, Hindko, and Baloch amongst various other ethnic groups.

In what follows, Section 5.2 discusses the various forms of tenure arrangements embedded in diverse historical trajectories of urbanization, bureaucratic-legal structures, and politics of patronage, and ultimately leading to different outcomes in terms of people’s futures or right to stay. We also investigate how these tenure arrangements are operationalized through certain provincial and city-level institutions that are tasked with maintaining records and according (il)legitimacy in shifting temporal moments. Section 5.3 explores the forms of violence wrought by displacement, focusing specifically on its affective dimensions and detrimental effects on mobility, which is a key category tying in the spatial, temporal, and social aspects of displacement. Section 5.4 focuses on the varied forms of resistance and the attendant discourse regarding the state’s categorization of people as ‘illegals’, and its refutations by the residents in the KCR settlements and Federal Quarters. We discuss the different ways in which people resist, a process that is also differentiated along class, ethnic, gender and historical lines, and why some communities resist while others do not. Finally, in Section 5.5, we conclude by demonstrating how land displacement as a non-discrete phenomenon engenders conditions that inevitably lead to further cycles of increasing vulnerability (Ayvero & Swistun, 2009, 2007).

5.2 From Citizens to ‘Illegals’

In the Karachi context, a fragmented terrain of land governance (Hasan et al., 2015) combined with an arbitrary urban planning, and shifting terrains of political patronage, create layers of uncertainty for people whose access to land and housing remains insecure. People’s struggles to protect their homes and livelihoods, is in part also a struggle against the epistemic violence of being categorized ‘encroachers’ and ‘illegals’. The word ‘encroachment’ or ‘encroacher’ has become a unified label to represent different types of income-poor settlements, certain formal settlements where government employees reside, as well as spaces of informal livelihoods, such as Empress Market and Lighthouse. Such categorizations not only render invisible the complex historical relationships between residents and the state, but also justifies their removal in the name of public interest.

KCR Informal Settlements

In this section, we begin our discussion with the case of the KCR informal settlements where approximately 45,000 people face the threat of eviction (JICA, 2011), and approximately 6,500 have already been displaced. A key point we make is that for these people, the discursive shift from ‘project affected persons’ (PAPs) who were guaranteed compensation and resettlement in an earlier phase, to ‘encroacher’ or ‘illegal’ in the current context of infrastructural development, has become the linchpin of state violence. In a survey conducted by the JICA - one of the principal agencies in charge of the KCR project from 2009 to 2013, the residents living along the KCR’s RoW, had been declared ‘Project Affected Persons’ and given assurance of compensation and resettlement. This survey was conducted to officially account for the number of people who were going to be displaced and granted cash compensation of PKR 50,000 and 80 sq. yds plots in Jumma Goth located on the city’s outskirts. The compensation scheme was put in writing in the form of ‘offer letters’, adorned with official government stamps and signatures (see Annexure 4) that were provided to the 4,653 households identified in the list. However, the JICA’s withdrawal from the KCR project in 2016, led to a second wave of uncertainty for the residents who abruptly found themselves once again labelled ‘illegals’ or ‘encroachers’, a category that rendered them ineligible for compensation. When the KCR residents produced their offer letters in the National Council of Human Rights (NCHR), a semi-governmental body that arbitrates human rights cases before they are filed in the court, they were dismissed by officials from the KUTC and Pakistan Railways, as possessing no legal standing, thus rectifying their status as ‘illegal occupants’. Such events are representative not only of the fractured governance in place within the context of Karachi, but also the porous and ever-changing definitions of legality and illegality that residents of informal settlements are caught up in, and over which the state has considerable power.

The issue of land ownership remains central to the residents’ claims as PAPs who deserve resettlement and compensation. Yet, this claim is contested by the Pakistan Railways that has repeatedly questioned the justification under which these residents should be compensated. As a senior, male official from the KUTC highlighted,

“Those people who are being affected, they don’t have titles to land. This makes it difficult for them to justify land ownership or compensation. Especially when something isn’t in their name to begin with. The court is taking up these cases, but I say, on what basis are you fighting in the court?”

(September 2018)
Figure 5.3 provides a lens into the different tenure arrangements found in the KCR settlements, where an overwhelming proportion of residents have no access to secure tenure, despite having lived on the land for decades. It shows that only 5 percent of the respondents reported their land status as "regularized", which means the SKAA has given residents the right to acquire individual leases for their plots. Yet, a key part of this process involves acquiring a NOC (No Objection Certificate) by different institutions that might have a claim on the land in question, which in the case of the KCR settlements is the Pakistan Railways. Hence, the approximately 2 percent of our respondents who reported owning leases, were able to do so because their plots lay definitively outside of the Pakistan Railways' jurisdiction. However, the Pakistan Railways continuing refusal to provide a definitive RoW for the KCR project, has pushed hundreds of other households into a permanent state of uncertainty, and generated considerable anger and frustration.

Most respondents - 78 percent living on land within the Pakistan Railways' jurisdiction, and along the RoW- reported possessing kacha kaghaz (کچھ کاغذ) or stamp paper as evidence of land ownership. However, in the absence of regularization and/or a lease, stamp paper has no validity in establishing land ownership and can only document transactions. Thus, we categorize these residents as possessing de-facto tenure (Figure 5.3) based on their extended period-of-stay on the same plot of land. This process occurs over the course of many decades, and is necessarily facilitated by the state itself, for instance through the provision of utilities, inclusion of the settlement in the local voting list, and confirmation of people's addresses in official documents such as NICs and Domiciles. Yet, these residents' claims of ownership are now complicated by the fact that the public land they have been residing on, is being repossessed by the Pakistan Railways. As a 28-year-old woman from Machar Colony exclaimed,

“No one! We say it belongs to no one. When we were making these houses, no one came to stop us. When the colony expanded, even then no one came. Didn’t they know that an entire colony was growing over here? How could they have not known? It is only now that we are hearing that this land belongs to railways. We had never heard things like this before. If it was their place, how come they gave us gas and electricity? We are paying taxes for it! They should have said at the time the land belongs to them. For NIC, they ask for a gas bill, electricity bill, even the house number. That’s the basis on which we even get our NIC. How can they say this is their land?” (Machar Colony, March 2019)

Similarly, a 58-year-old male respondent from Kashmir Mujahid Colony construed his land ownership based on a plethora of documents amassed over his lifetime:

“A person lives in only one place his whole life. 40 years is no small amount of time. We have kept a record of everything. We have documents of our property rights; ration cards, domicile, children's birth certificates, educational certificates and our names registered in the voter lists. Our right to the land is solid. We have everything on record. We have maps of the water lines, the electricity lines, everything. When people agreed on something, a record was made of it. There’s a record of everything in the mohalla.” (March 2020)

Such claims to land ownership are also grounded in a politics of patronage, with statements from key political figures quoted by residents to further validate their claims. A statement of the former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto on one of her visits to Ghareebabad-PIDC in 1995 - to offer condolences on the death of a PPP party worker - is indicative of this. Ali Shah, a 30-year-old community lawyer from Ghareebabad-PIDC, narrated:

“Benazir was the acting Prime Minister at that time, and she visited to pay her condolences. We presented the situation to her and she called the DS Railway. She told him if the...”

The market for rent is expensive even though most properties have no recognized or formal tenure. This is largely due to the coveted location and short commute times to jobs and markets. As Figure 5.4 shows, the median range for rent is PKR 5,000 to PKR 7,500 per month for renting portions of a house, for instance two rooms on the upper floor of an 80 sq. yds plot. Keeping in mind the current minimum wage in Sindh is PKR 17,500 (The News, 2019), this suggests people in places like Ghareebabad-PIDC end up spending between 30 to 40 percent of their income just on rent. Moreover, even this minimum wage is often underpaid as most labor in Karachi earns an average of PKR 12,000 per month. In addition to the low minimum wages, survey findings also pointed to the high number of dependents per earning member in such households. Figure 5.5 shows 32 percent of the households have only one earning member, while 32 percent have up to 2 earning members.
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The glaring gender disparity in land ownership with an exclusively male privilege. Across the extended family unit, land ownership is to men. This is important because it shows that even ownership that are available to women as compared of the sheer entrenched disparity between forms of claim over the land. Our findings are illustrative of the sheer disparity between the range of categories available to men and women through which they can own land. Our male respondents reported 12 different kinds of legal arrangements around land ownership, with the most prominent owners being men themselves as fathers and husbands.

These findings also resonate with previous studies that argue that women’s lack of access to land is an outcome of fear of losing respect in the community, the complex mechanisms of dowry provision and other social pressures. Even though this is not specific to our case study, it is nevertheless relevant to mention that certain authors (Saba et al, 2010; Ahmad, et al., 2016) have found women were unwilling to pay the social price associated with claiming land, due to loss of respect from their relatives. The women did not believe land ownership bestowed social status. They were also conscious and accepting of the fact that dowry was considered enough and appropriate compensation in place of land ownership.

Such patriarchal notions are further reinforced because of the internalized norm that women bear no financial responsibility towards their family, so only men should be entitled to land ownership. Other reasons for lower land ownership among women are associated with the fact that most marriages happen on the basis of dowry. The women did not believe land ownership would be transferred to a male who was someone not even of the household, just to preserve patriarchal control of land. Thus, 8 percent land ownership claimed by women in our data, could be attributed to similar reasons: social norms and patriarchy.

These dynamics also resonate with what certain authors (Mehta, 2009) have pointed out for countries like India, where the wide-spread nature of male biases help perpetuate gender inequality in terms of unequal resource allocation and distribution and legitimize the silencing of women’s interests. Moreover, the biases within state institutions, structures and policies also help perpetuate the societal inequalities. These patriarchal norms are further entrenched by the development paradigm itself and related global pressures driving it. They further underscore that in the context of displacement, state policies and programmes fail to potentially remedy inherent gender biases found in the family and wider society, especially in the case of resettlement programmes. Instead, official programmes have mostly exacerbated gender inequalities within displaced communities. This is even more pertinent in a context where women’s rights, assets, and spheres of control often centre on informal institutional arrangements, which are rarely captured in policy or understood by policy makers, and risk being undermined during resettlement (Mehta, 2009).

Most importantly, the inequalities women face to social norms and patriarchy are further complicated by the intersections of race, class, ethnicity, and caste, and are linked with macro-economic factors such as fiscal policies that drive austerity.

Federal Quarters

A similar process of land displacement also took place in our second primary site: Federal Quarters. The tenure arrangements in this area are arguably more complex than the KCR settlements. The Quarters’ history is deeply connected with the Federal Government’s promise to provide housing for its employees in the post-Partition context. Thus, the residents of this area claim they are ‘original settlers’ who have lived in the Federal Quarters since 1953. The tenancy agreement between the residents and the Estate Office, was to last for their period of employment and in lieu of rent - a nominal 11.2 percent of monthly salaries was deducted by the state. Even though the original agreement stipulated the process would stop at most 6 months after an employee’s retirement, when most residents refused to move out of their houses, the Estate Office started collecting this amount from the employee’s pension. This informal arrangement lasted for decades. Wary of the informal nature of this arrangement and the possibility of its abrupt withdrawal, the residents of Federal Quarters have been engaged in extensive mobilizations since the 1990s. As discussed in Chapter 2, the residents have been aided in large part by the MQM party, which held significant political sway in the area because of its ethnic homogeneity of Muhajirs, in a bid to secure tenure on more formal terms. This is also reflected in our survey findings (Figure 5.7) with over 70 percent of the respondents being Urdu speaking.

These efforts appeared to have finally borne fruit in 2006 when the Federal Minister for Housing, Syed Sanaullah, who was also a member of the MQM party, ordered the Estate Office to provide ‘eligibility certificates’ as proof of ownership to each quarter resident (Annexure 4). Thus, the Federal Quarters residents, now feeling secure in their ownership of the land because of the official nature of this certificate adorned with stamps and signatures, consequently, began to heavily invest in the physical upgradation of their houses. The apex court in a hearing on May 10, 2018 (Ref: Human Rights Case no 20746/2018) took notice of the national shortage of government employee housing, under a case filed by a petitioner contesting the non-allocation of a house despite being a government employee.
As an outcome of this case, on July 31, 2018, the Supreme Court turned down pleas of the residents of Martin Quarters among others, stating that the eligibility certificates provided in 2006, held no actual legal basis. Thus, the current residents were declared 'encroachers' and the Court gave orders to the Estate for their eviction. As Figure 5.8 shows, 75 percent of the respondents reported their tenure status as 'non-regularized'. The 5 percent who reported possessing a 'Lease/Malkana-Haqooq', were respondents who perceived the eligibility certificates as conferring legitimacy of land ownership. Hence, we observe once again the contradictions in documenting practices that become particularly salient in the context of shifting dynamics of political patronage, and the violent imposition of state power through legality.

Figure 5.9. Current Rent Paid by Respondents in Federal Quarters

There is another category of people living in the Federal Quarter area; residents on rent, as shown in Figure 5.8. These are tenants living in houses that belong to former federal government employees who have moved to better locations in the city but continue to maintain their claim over the allotted house. These tenants, 15 percent according to the survey, did not have any family members who were working or had worked as government employees. As shown in Figure 5.9, there is a glaring difference in the rent prices for this area, largely due to the difference in plot sizes. Some houses have been extended in such a way that the small garden space of the kiyari (plantation) has been rent out, even though it measures barely 20 feet in width and spills into the street. The higher rents reported were by respondents living on plots sized between 80-120 sq. yds.

However, the majority – 46 percent of tenants - paid PKR 7,500 and upwards in rent for the sole purpose of living in a house in a coveted location in the city (Figure 5.9). Many tenants are Sindhi migrants who live in this area due to its proximity to their workplaces. Renters also reported that despite the uncertainty surrounding the future of the Federal Quarters, rents have continued to escalate. As a 50-years-old, female respondent, long-time resident of Martin Quarters explained:

“Rents right now are very high. These Sindhis and the Soomros, they are coming here for jobs, and their women also work in people’s homes. They wash dishes, cook food, and their men also sometimes work in the same house as drivers. So, most of the people who rent places in this area, are Sindhis. You will not believe me; they are even willing to give 50,000 rupees in advance rent.” (August 2019)

Although tenure arrangements are also heavily gendered in the Quarters area, compared to the KCR’s where only 8 percent of land ownership was associated with women, the percentage of ownership was much higher. As shown in Figure 5.10, 17 percent of the land ownership was associated with women in the Federal Quarters. This is primarily due to either the houses being registered in the name of female government employees or a greater number of widowed women who inherit the title after their husbands’ death.

These findings about gender disparity in land ownership vary a great deal in comparison to the KCR surveyed settlements. For instance, the proportion of land ownership among women is double in the case of Quarters (17 percent) compared to KCR (8 percent). The prevalence of gendered social norms and patriarchal notions of land ownership are evident in the case of Quarters as still 83 percent of the titles are maintained by men or male relatives, which serve to preserve patriarchal control of land. However, we speculate that gender disparity in land titles may intersect with education levels of the residents. Therefore, these relatively higher numbers of land ownership among women and female relatives can be associated with higher educational levels among Quarters’ residents.

Figure 5.10. Gender Distribution of Current Land Ownership in the Quarters.

The third major site in Karachi that has experienced an intense phase of demolitions and displacements since 2018, were approximately 20 formal and informal commercial markets spread across the city. Even though many of these markets were indeed informal, others - like the historical Empress Market and the Lighthouse Market - were operating based on tenure agreements with the Karachi Municipal Authority (KMC). This tenure arrangement existed in the form of ‘Occupancy Certificates’ secured by the tenants/shopkeepers who paid advance rent every six months to the KMC. Additionally, the rental payment was processed through challans or rent slips generated by public sector banks as evidence of a transaction. These historic markets pre-date the formation of Pakistan itself, and this tenure arrangement had been in place for decades. Yet, on 27th October 2018, the Supreme Court, in a bid to “restore Karachi to its former glory”, as discussed in Chapter 4, ordered the removal of all structures built on parks, footpaths, sewers, and public places, terming them ‘encroachments’.

Hence, these 20 markets were identified by the KMC as falling within the ambit of the Supreme Court's directive, and in the ensuing months, based on information collated from multiple sources, we estimate at least 11,000 shops were demolished across the breadth of Karachi (Image 5.1).

These were not just singular atomized shops, but essential parts of a larger economic system that enabled hawkers, small-scale entrepreneurs, and other informal workers to occupy and work in a primarily unregulated marketspace. These spaces enabled a substantial portion of the city’s urban poor to access larger markets, secure livelihoods and retain access to the city center. Their loss will be hard to recover from. As we underscored in Chapter 1, the informal economy generates around 72.6 percent of the jobs in Karachi, and this fluctuating legal status not only makes the informal workers vulnerable to evictions, but it also exacerbates the impacts on those who have been rendered the most vulnerable by Covid-19.

We have underscored in the previous chapters that the positions of the poor, working class, low-income and even lower-to-middle income residents in Karachi, have always been precarious in terms of access to land and housing. Informal settlements, jhuggies, slums and informal markets where the urban poor and lower-middle class residents find shelter, work, and build the city, are not perceived as invested with legality. As ‘encroachers’ on public land or property, people remain at the suffering of the state. In millennial Karachi, holding on to land and homes and accessing public space for labor, has become a vital struggle. A substantial majority of housing and markets that exist in Karachi, do so in an entirely informal manner. As we have pointed out earlier, urban informality is a process that is affected by multiple state and nonstate actors.
Within these shifting boundaries of the informal/formal, legal/illegal, as we show in the context of the KCR, the Federal Quarters and the markets, power also becomes dispersed across a range of non-state actors, such as politicians and ordinary citizens, who impose their preferred vision of formality/legality through complex negotiations with middlemen and the politics of patronage. The displacement that arises, engenders frustration and anxiety due to loss of land, home, and community, but also disruption of social networks and mobility that negatively impact people’s life strategies.

5.3 Disrupted Livelihoods and Mobilities

Displacement is a process because of its disruptive effect on people’s existing patterns of mobility, livelihood, and future aspirations. Land displacement is not a one-time event but a continuous phenomenon that stretches before and beyond the actual act of demolitions, the “...moment of being physically removed is just one in a long set of processes that constitute evictions... produces ways of life for those caught up in its processes” (Baker, 2020). In the context of our research sites, recurring rumors of potential displacement drives people away from their homes, how they gain access to amenities, their ability to rent out or sell their place of residence, and patterns of socio-political mobilization, all of which have had largely detrimental effects. Afterwards, following the act of demolition, residents are locked into a state of anxiety and uncertainty, with the loss of shelter, livelihood and ruptured social networks exacerbating their vulnerabilities and trapping many affectees into a downward spiral of social mobility.

Additionally, as we discussed in Chapter 1, unlike the right to housing, discussions about the right to work, and its direct associations with land, are hardly ever a part of the general discourse around displacements. We posit that these varied and extended forms of violence wrought by the threat of displacement, and the subsequently ensuing act itself, are a central factor in the degradation of the quality of life of these people.

**KCR Informal Settlements**

In the KCR informal settlements, respondents reported a diverse set of occupations (Figure 5.11) that can be grouped into three categories: formal work, informal or contractual work, and unpaid care work. There is also a fourth category, representing unemployed individuals. People with formal occupations (21 percent) had largely white-collar jobs that provided long-term security, above minimum wage pay and regular working hours. On the other hand, people with informal occupations, 44 percent of respondents, usually only worked sporadically when they found contractual jobs, were paid less than the minimum wage, and were often unable to save money or budget their monthly expenses. Women who reported being employed were mostly engaged as domestic workers in higher income residential neighborhoods, located near the settlements. Thus, women’s access to mobility and livelihood opportunities is closely tied to the location and proximity to place of work. Moreover, when asked about anxieties surrounding displacement, women usually underscored loss of employment because they feared not being able to leave their children, and more specifically daughters, at home if they moved somewhere else. Being displaced, then, means losing a sense of safety that specifically has to do with gender-based violence. Since adolescent and unmarried women are considered being at a higher risk of sexual violence, a threat to this sense of safety puts barriers in the way of older women, who are considered their ‘caretakers’ and their employment prospects. This is because women are usually expected to give up employment and stay at home when there is a perceived threat to the safety of their families.

The KCR settlements are the first choice of migrant bachelors or charas who come to the city for work, leaving their families behind in their respective villages. They choose these neighborhoods primarily due to the presence of other migrant residents, with whom they can share accommodations. This is also how they can afford the considerably higher rents: a single space dera is shared by 6-10 other male migrants, who then split the rent. However, we did not include these ‘bachelors’ in our surveys. Instead, we conducted unstructured interviews to engage with their experiences. With many people relying on informal means of livelihoods, the interlinkages between land and livelihood make evident how displacement not only deprives people of their access to land, but also their access to better sources of livelihood, which remain tied to the city center. This was also reported by the respondents in relation to the time to get to work from their place of residence, as shown in Figure 5.12.

An aspiring 30-year-old male lawyer who lives in Gharibabad-PIDC lamented,

> “We have our jobs; people work within 10-15 kms of the settlement. Will we have similar access elsewhere? From here the city...

Over 70 percent of the respondents reported spending between 0-30 minutes on commute, which is representative of their proximity and accessibility to work. Only 3 percent of the respondents spend between 91-120 minutes on commute, comprising those who worked closer to the Karachi Port area or the SITE industrial area. This also impacted their mode of transportation, and most residents or 32 percent (see Figure 5.13) - reported simply walking to their places of work, which helped them save money.
activities, residents have invested in the education of their children over the years. Nearly 30 percent of the respondents reported at least one family member who has acquired education at matriculation level; 18 percent reported members having intermediate education; and a cumulative 13 percent having BA/BCOM, professional or master's degree.

In the KCR settlements, residents have invested considerable capital and labor into the construction of their houses. Respondents underscored spending life savings on the improvements and extensions, which were carried out incrementally over decades. This was observed in all the KCR informal settlements whereby families construct a portion above the ground floor to accommodate a growing family, for instance when sons get married and have children. Figure 5.15 shows that the trend of vertical construction exists in these settlements but is generally limited to ground plus one storey construction.

Displacement threatens to uproot people from their transportation networks, access to education and other amenities by scattering them in distant locations on the city’s rural-urban margins. Under such circumstances, women’s mobility is curtailed the most. In Chapter 6, we discuss the mobility issue in greater detail regarding those people who were forced to settle in the city's rural-urban margins, because of the displacement caused by the construction of the Lyari Expressway.

In the main line settlements, 52 percent of the respondents reported only ground floor construction, while 43 percent reported ground plus one-storied construction. Those respondents who reported ground plus one, were generally loath to invest further in the material construction of their houses due to the looming uncertainty about their futures. These uncertainties had increased since the demolition drives started in 2018 in other parts of the city. Even though people were unsure if their neighborhoods would be targeted, they were no longer willing to invest money in upgrading homes. As a 42-year-old female resident of Mujahid Colony explained:

“We did not construct a floor upstairs because we don’t know what is going to happen. What if they come tomorrow and break everything? Our labor and money...”

The loop line tracks have been inoperative since the 1990s, and the settlements alongside it have been less visible to state authorities, such as the Pakistan Railways that has not maintained the tracks for decades. Hence, vertical expansion in these settlements has been more pronounced. Approximately 51 percent of the respondents reported living on plot sizes between 41-80 sq. yds, so given the space constraints, for many households there has been no choice but to expand vertically. Houses across both the main and loopline were predominantly constructed out of semi-permanent materials (Image 5.2), and only one percent of the houses were constructed entirely out of temporary materials such as wood, fabric, or bamboo. This is representative of the improvements made on homes and the capital invested (Macktoom, 2018).

Residents cited the proximity of the neighborhoods to various primary and higher educational institutions as the key reason for these higher figures:

“The convenience that is over here, we won’t have it anywhere else. That’s why I say this area is more valuable than Defence [DHA]. It’s VIP rather VIP plus [laughs]. College, Civil Hospital, Jinnah Hospital, Cantt Railway Station; everything is nearby. Even parents are at peace here because they know their children are always nearby-no one gets lost. No matter how far we wander, it is always easy to find our way back here.”

(Female, 19yrs, Ghareebabad-PIDC, April 2019)

Displacement threats to uproot people from their transportation networks, access to education and other amenities by scattering them in distant locations on the city’s rural-urban margins.
that legal ownership of land is the only way to attain long-term security and social mobility.

A 44-year-old male respondent from Ghareebabad-PIDC, emphasizing these locational advantages, demanded any possible relocation needed to be done within the vicinity of the existing settlements, saying, “Look at the vicinity for example, there is space ahead of this area, near the Jamshed Ahmed School; there is ample space everywhere for the railway to be constructed. Why don’t they give us an area in those spaces? Even if they give us only 80 sq. yds of land and a proper plan, we will make everything ourselves. They can give a plan and within six months, people will construct jhuggies for themselves. [The state’s] money and effort will also be saved.” (March 2020)

As previously mentioned, the surveys were conducted prior to an anti-encroachment drive initiated under the Supreme Court order. However, residents in the KCR informal settlements have been hearing about the KCR’s revival for the last decade. Practically everyone in the KCR settlements feels stressed and vulnerable about the possibility of demolitions. Nearly 93 percent residents before the actual act of physical violence would take place. Nearly 93 percent of the respondents reported stress, which shows low long-term security and social mobility.

The process of uncertainty related to the news of evictions that people heard through the media, community representatives and neighbors, even before the actual act of any demolitions, was a constant source of psychological stress. In November 2018, notices (Image 5.3) were put up around several neighborhoods along the KCR track, after a Supreme Court order was issued on the removal of ‘encroachments’.

Even though people disagreed on whether the notice included both residential and commercial structures, the stress associated with such news, and the lingering uncertainty, was something they had to live through in their everyday lives. As a 46-year-old female respondent narrated:

“People usually don’t even like telling others they live here, in Ghareebabad. People have negative psychological connotations with this word, Ghareebabad. I have a lot of rich relatives who hesitate to come here. They tell us to move somewhere else. We say that we will continue to live in a place that we can afford.”

The psychological violence of stress, the moment she heard that railway officials are coming to break the houses, she took all the furniture from the rooms at the front and stuffed it in the rooms at the back. Now, neither of the rooms can be used. There isn’t any space left to sit anymore. We told our mother so many times: three days have passed, let’s shift the furniture back to its original place, she simply refuses. She says, what if they come tomorrow to break it [the house]? The whole house has been turned upside down because of this.” (Ghareebabad-Liaquatabad, December 2018)

In experiencing such forms of verbal coercion by state representatives, people often felt discouraged from raising their voices against any action. Rumors of the impending evictions also affected the social bonds in place between people, as they discouraged each other from raising their voices in fear of any form of resistance that could make the situation worse. In addition to the stress, the respondents
reported several health-related vulnerabilities. Overall, 28 percent of the respondents informed that their households had at least one family member suffering from a health issue (Figure 5.18). Predominantly suffering from diabetes and heart problems, the respondents reported a rise in cases when news regarding demolitions was heard through the media or from neighbors.

This was particularly true for people suffering from blood pressure. Family members often hid information from those who had health conditions, to avoid the risk of aggravating their health. We witnessed one such incident during our field work: "My mother is ill. Often, I have to take her to Jinnah Hospital in the middle of the night. I can usually take a rickshaw and get her there immediately. Right now, we're in the middle of the city. How will I be able to rush my mother to the hospital if I am in a remote area? How will I adjust somewhere else?" (Female, 46 yrs, Ghareebabad-Liaquatabad, February 2020)

In Ghareebabad-PIDC in June 2019. When the demolitions started, a woman who suffered from both physical and mental health conditions, died after the demolition teams arrived in the area. Her husband reported her cause of death to be her deteriorated health upon witnessing the immediate threat to her house, which was about to be demolished right before her eyes. The woman left behind a child, and the encroachment drive was ultimately halted considering such events. Such instances show the psychological violence inflicted upon people facing the imminent threat of evictions even before the actual process of the physical violence ensues. Also, this prevalence of healthcare needs necessitates the presence of hospitals, and other healthcare facilities near the area where residents need to be taken in case of emergency. People living in places like Ghareebabad-PIDC, and Umar Colony, reported better access to public hospitals such as Jinnah Hospital and Civil Hospital located near these neighborhoods.

As we elaborate in Chapter 6, in Section 6.3, health services needs are barely considered in state-led resettlement schemes, as evident in Lyari Basti where even after 17 years, there is no public hospital in the vicinity, and residents are forced to cover long distances with commute times of between 60-120 minutes.

The Quarters’ central location is represented in findings on travel time, with 75 percent of the respondents reporting a daily commute of 0-30 minutes to work. This remains the most frequently cited reason for people’s insistence on not relocating from the area, even if they are provided a resettlement plan by the government. During conversations, people in the Quarters exhibited a strong resistance to relocation, which stands in contrast to what we observed in the KCR informal settlements. In the KCR informal settlements, even though location was a significant concern, people indicated willingness to accept a resettlement package that would relocate them, for instance to Jumma Goth as part of the

Federal Quarters

In contrast to the residents of the KCR informal settlements, people living in the Federal Quarters have utilized their social capital and livelihood security - which has existed for decades - to secure greater social mobility in the form of formal sector jobs, and they have invested in their children's education. All this has been put in danger given the Supreme Court orders for the Quarters’ residents removal. As our survey findings show, 43 percent of the respondents were employed in the formal sector: as government employees, children of retired employees who took over their parents’ jobs, and others who worked as employees in private companies (Figure 5.19). These forms of employment have not only provided them better financial security but are also representative of the greater social mobility people possess, and their classification as middle to lower-middle-class citizens. Those engaged in informal work account for 7 percent of the study sample, mainly comprising tenants or occupants who purchased their houses from the previous owners.
JICA proposal, a site that is considerably far from their present homes.

Another significant difference between the two study sites, was in terms of vehicular ownership and people’s mode of transport. In the Quarters, nearly 58 percent of the respondents owned motorbikes while 16 percent owned a car (Figure 5.20). Thus, the reliance on public modes of transportation was lower in the case of the Quarters.

Findings for educational attainment of the residents in the Quarters (figure 5.21) were observed to be much higher than the KCR settlements. With a cumulative 39 percent of the residents with a professional undergraduate or graduate degree, and over 31 percent with a BA/BCM/Diploma, these figures represent the ability of households in the Quarters to invest in the education of their children. Hence, residents who did not have to pay rent were able to invest in the social mobility of their children, enabling them access to better employment opportunities.

In the Quarters, people have made extensive investments to the overall improvement of their living conditions, private ownership of vehicles, in addition to physical improvements of their houses. A vast majority of the respondents reported doing so after being awarded the ‘eligibility certificates’ - highlighted in section 5.2. Thus, the allusion towards physical improvements of their houses date back to 1951, when the government provided houses to the federal employees. However, the houses were built only at ground floor level, and people gradually added floors over the years. Currently, 55 percent of the houses comprise a ground floor, and 35 percent have another storey above it (Figure 5.22).

In some cases, an additional floor was added and placed on rent to supplement household income. Most of the respondents acknowledged that under the agreement with the Estate Department, they do not have the right to place any portion of their allotted houses on rent. Many still justified it by pointing to their deteriorating financial conditions, therefore, residents who did not have to pay rent were able to invest in the social mobility of their children, enabling them access to better employment opportunities.

Figures for household expenditure point to their deteriorating financial conditions, hence, residents who did not have to pay rent were able to invest in the social mobility of their children, enabling them access to better employment opportunities.

Another significant factor is that the robustness of these informal businesses is very closely tied to their location and proximity to other larger markets or the city center (Sayeed, A. et al., 2016). In the case of Ghareebabad-Liaquatabad, for instance, some of the commercial activities observed, such as the place being used to store furniture or painting and selling steel cages to other local markets, were only made possible because of its location next to a large second-hand informal market – Gharibabad Furniture Market. Otherwise, the cost of transportation of these goods from a far-flung space would add extra time and overheads, which the businesses would not want to pay for when cheaper and simpler options are available nearby. When these larger markets are demolished, they also have a direct impact on the smaller businesses surrounding them, which are deprived of these informal means of livelihood (Hasan, 2016). Thus, an extensive number of families who were dependent on this network of large and small markets - such as Hindu women who sold spices on the street, now face uncertainty. As Hasan (2020) posits, many vendors are now in debt; many others continue to search for jobs and daily wage labor that are difficult to access.

Notably, most of the workers in the demolished commercial markets were residents of nearby settlements. This was beneficial because it allowed them to cut down on extraneous costs, such as transport and commuting time. This cost becomes a considerable factor for neighborhoods like Lyari Basti as discussed in Chapter 6, where people reported spending over PKR 4000 per month on transport, and nearly 120 mins daily for commuting. For a daily wage earner, these cumulative costs cut into a significant portion of his/her earnings, not to mention their time, which they would have been able to save by remaining employed within the neighborhood of their residence.

Yet, these significant costs and the centrality of markets as socio-economic drivers that enable thriving communities, is often disregarded not just by government officials and the courts, who often make informal commercial structures the first targets of any demolition drive, but also by popular anti-displacement mobilizations, which tend to focus on right to shelter but bypass this other form of dispossession in the pursuit of justice. Thus, we found hardly any reference by lawyers and even activists, to the markets because these were generally excluded from the anti-displacement coalition from the very outset. This legal, bureaucratic, and vernacular ‘gap’ regarding the right to work, is an issue to which we return in Chapter 8.

**Gender: Confronting Marginalization & Displacement**

As highlighted earlier, the gendered nature of land and property ownership has deeply
negative consequences for women in terms of their participation in matters related to land displacement, and resettlement. Being attentive to the differentiated impacts of land displacement brings to the forefront how the process is not a gender-neutral phenomenon (Brickell et al., 2017). Moreover, the importance of differentiation underscores Judith Butler’s (2006:20) key point on social vulnerability: “...loss and vulnerability seem to follow from our being socially constituted bodies, attached to others, at risk of losing those attachments, exposed to others, at risk of violence by virtue of that exposure.” With respect to women’s bodies, certain authors (Richardson et al., 2014) have shown that when women are forced to endure evictions, they experience overwhelming sadness, compulsive worry, and difficulty in sleeping and concentrating. As the primary carers of children and the family, women are more susceptible to suffering greater social, emotional, and economic hardships in the aftermath of land displacement (UNHCR, 2012). Female respondents’ voices presented in this section, show how increased pressures and vulnerabilities can manifest even when women are confronted with the threat of displacement. In fact, the threat of land displacement puts people in a sense of suspension “...that is the social prelude to displacement, relocation, and transience...”(Rao, 2007:246).

When speaking about what was at stake with the threat of displacement, female respondents highlighted losing the safety of ‘open doors’ in their neighborhoods, referring to themselves and their kin and friends, being able to walk in and out of each other’s homes throughout the day. In the context of Karachi, the public and private is by and large constituted as a male-domain, and access for men and women is conditional. The conditionalities often depend on the social and political context of the space/place in question. In many of Karachi’s low-income neighborhoods such as the KCR informal settlements, women from varied ethnic and class backgrounds recognized their presence in public space, through their associations and ties with various social, welfare and religious organizations (Viqar, 2018), as well as through their relationships with their communities. In Ghareebabad-PIDC, many residents are now the third generation of their forefathers who first migrated to Pakistan from India and settled on the railway land. The associational ties are strong, based on networks of familiarity built over many decades, and which enable certain gendered mobilities due to a sense of safety granted by these relationships. Talking about this sense of familiarity and safety, a 20-year-old female explained:

“In my neighborhood is unbeatable. I have lived here since I was a child. My parents also grew up here. This neighborhood is safe. No one stops us from going anywhere. Our parents trust this neighborhood, and they know that no one will kidnap us. We can go anywhere without any worry because we know that our elders are sitting outside, keeping a watch. People living in [posh] Defence-like areas have to install cameras for such security.” (Ghareebabad-PIDC, April 2019)

In this sense, the line between what is ‘public’ and ‘private’ becomes blurry. As Viqar (2018) posits, such a fluidity of home and the street can be found across different contexts, from Cairo to Mumbai, and even Karachi where a flexibility of thresholds presents an organic living space between the public and the private (Abu-Lughod 1987; Chopra, 2007).

In describing this characteristic of her neighborhood, a 50-year-old, female respondent compared her neighborhood to the ‘city’, implying that the latter exists outside the bounds of the ‘urban’:

“There’s a big difference between here and the rest of the city. There, people can’t even rest with the doors unlocked. We go out several times a day, with our doors open and we have nothing to worry about. If the electricity goes out, we sit outside. You would not be able to do this anywhere else in...”

In multiple focus group discussions, female respondents of the KCR settlements repeatedly pinpointed the loss of their sense of safety brought on by the threat of displacement. They explained that due to fears regarding the arbitrariness of evictions, they had to give up their livelihoods to stay at home. This is because cultural and religious norms dictate that women are guardians of their homes in the absence of their husbands:

“In this city. In those apartments and bungalows, you can’t even leave the doors unlocked for five minutes. We sleep with our doors unlocked. This is why we don’t want to leave this place. The peace of mind we have here, we can’t find anywhere else.” (Ghareebabad-PIDC, June 2019)

Women’s networks of familiarity enable them to feel secure from threats of sexual violence; something they feared losing if forced to move to new, unknown, and often peripheral areas of the city due to the lack of affordable housing in the city’s center. The most prominent concern brought up with regards to this was the perceived vulnerability of their daughters to sexual violence. As a female respondent noted: “Where will we go with our young, adolescent daughters?” (Female, 40 yrs, Ghareebabad-PIDC, June 2019). They expressed the way in which older women’s mobilities and employment prospects because they are considered their ‘caretakers’. However, none of the female respondents talked about the threat of domestic or sexual violence in the home. In conversations, the home and shelter were continually associated with gendered safety that the women feared losing due to displacement. Even though studies (Khan & Zaman 2011) have shown that violence against women in Pakistan, cuts across all socio-economic classes, in public space and public life, class plays a significant role in intensifying or mitigating the violence experienced by women. In conversations, women saw the biggest threat of violence from displacement, and it is likely the reason why they focused on this the most.

An important finding that became evident in the focus group discussions with female respondents, is how they negotiate access to external information in a broader context where there are restrictions on women being able to attend neighborhood or community meetings on evictions. For instance, formal spaces of resistance/negotiation are not considered the domain of women. Below we provide an excerpt from a write-up based on extensive conversations with women aged 35 and above. These conversations took place during a legal workshop that the Urban Resource Centre had helped to organize in Ghareebabad-PIDC, in April 2019:

“When asked how women learnt about the latest developments related to the KCR evictions, they said their primary source of information was the men of the house. The women added they sometimes hear updates from here and there, when they go out to get groceries. But the most effective way in which information travels..."
Despite traditional gender roles, our discussions and observations also indicated an unexpected affective variation in how men and women responded to threats of eviction. For instance, previous research in low stress situations indicates that men engage in active emotions whereas women express higher levels of passive affective states (Anjum & Godil, 2019). However, in our observations and discussions with participants, this assumption was challenged as soon as women became a part of the resistance process. Not only did they express active emotions such as anger but were also confrontational. This finding makes a crucial theoretical and empirical distinction between affective response to continually living under the threat of evictions and dealing with the actual crisis. In the former case, the stress and anxiety are ever present, and men and women deal with it differently based on the tools and resources they have access to. For instance, in the threat stage, women are not invited to meetings; they cannot be spectators when something is happening in the moment like bulldozers showing up without prior notice due to lack of access to information and public space or both. Therefore, men can and do gather, chant slogans, and get to externalize their anger, whereas women are absent, so their anger is invisible. Due to this lack of accessibilities, women’s stress and anxiety was also exacerbated by the fact that in many instances, they confronted barriers in terms of taking to the streets. Even though the possibility of physical and social losses was at the core of psychological violence, fear and anxiety experienced by most women, for many they were beyond stressed about their care taking roles. As indicated by previous studies (Furrukh et al., 2020; Farha & Thompson 2001) from Pakistan, Palestine, India and Nigeria, women are mostly the sole caretakers of children with special needs and losing their homes is more stressful for them. A 42-year-old female participant in a wellbeing workshop exclaimed:

“No one can imagine the nightmare I am living right now. If they destroy my home, I have nowhere to go. I have a son with special needs. All social support I have is in this neighborhood. My son can’t live more than a few days without...”

During the multiple wellbeing workshops held between November 2018 and March 2019 in the KCR informal settlements, women expressed high levels of stress and anxiety. The insecurity associated with living under an imminent threat of eviction, for example being served with an eviction notice, has a similar impact where some women reported having to take days off to ‘guard’ the house due to their role as caretakers. Long before the demolition drive targeting these settlements under the Supreme Court order, people had heard about the possible threat to their homes. At the time of the wellbeing workshops, women were deeply anxious, from the high levels of uncertainty for the future of their homes and their communities. During a workshop a 46-year-old female resident from a KCR informal settlement, shared her experience:

“From of our homes to the lanes and to beyond this neighborhood, it is women who keep our community going. Whenever there is panic about displacement, the women are affected first. Our men go outside; they meet other men; they talk to other men; they attend the protests; they can do all of this. But the point is the men can go out and show their anger. Now that our homes are at risk, we are highly anxious. So being women we suffer more. We are feeling stressed right now; we are more afraid, and our men are aware. But we support our men, if not on the streets then in other ways. We are willing to lie down on the rail tracks if our men ask us to; our children will do the same.” (March 2019)

Building on this, a 20-year-old female respondent from Gharreebad-PIDC explained that to find out information about the “outside” world, to learn the latest news about the state’s plans and the community’s anti-eviction strategy, the women often stand outside their homes and by doing so, they are witnessing, eavesdropping, hearing about whatever happens beyond their doorways - a space that is occupied in a purposeful way. Referring to her neighbor, the same respondent described how she regularly stands outside the doorways of her home to “keep an eye on the outside world for as long as she can.” Therefore, in the absence of a formal channel that provides women with information about a range of issues concerning their lives or the settlement in general, there is an alternate network of information in place that involves lurking in doorways - observing, eavesdropping, witnessing events as they happen, and then passing on the information further, or getting snippets of updates and information through their husbands, sons, fathers, brothers, and again passing it on and maybe even piecing it together. Nevertheless, there are still gaps in the information women possess; they are also not confident about what they know or do not know. Although, we found the female respondents were often accurate about the information they had learnt about the impending evictions.

On the eve of the new year, January 1st, 2019, after an unprecedented year of tumultuous state-led violence and upheavals, more than two dozen people were packed together in a small conference room of a legal firm, to discuss what could be done to prevent further demolitions and displacements. This was a group of activists, lawyers, academics, community leaders, and political actors who had been active since the start of demolitions in mid 2018, but now faced with the possibility of further evictions, felt an urgent need to coalesce their efforts behind a single united front. The meeting...
itself was called by the Rasheed Rizvi Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (RRCCHR), headed by the prominent Human Rights lawyer, Faisal Siddiqi, and was intended to culminate in a joint constitutional petition to the Supreme Court; a legal intervention that aimed to stop further demolitions. At this point, the atmosphere was charged and invigorated with possible directions this group could take, and a general atmosphere of camaraderie prevailed as Jibran Nasir, a key local activist, said to everyone in the room, “even more than the court, we need solidarity among ourselves”.

This meeting itself was an act in building solidarity and was particularly notable because it was the first time displaced people and those under threat of future displacement had gathered. These groups included affectees from the KCR settlements which were, at that time, facing an acute threat of eviction, including the head of the Mutasireen Committee Haji Khan Badshah and community lawyer Ali Shah; representatives from the Federal Quarters; shopkeepers from the recently demolished commercial markets including Empress Market and Lighthouse; as well residents from amenity plot settlements such as Shah Rassol Colony, which were also under threat due to an order for the removal of all houses built on amenity plots. Even though this last group has not yet been featured in our report, we do explain their circumstances briefly in Chapter 8. This meeting was also being attended by members of NGOs such as the Orangi Pilot Project and the Urban Resource Centre, organizations that would later become allies in the struggle for land and housing rights, differentiating themselves from the residents of the KCR settlements, but now felt its narrow focus on legal intervention and refusal to be more inclusive made it feeble.

Another major factor that limited the movement’s solidarity, were the vastly different socio-political backgrounds of the people gathered, including laborers, white-collar workers, long-time activists, politically inactive middle-class residents, all of whom had a sometimes-unbridgeable understanding of how to collectively move forward. This led to many people from the different neighborhoods, exceptionalizing themselves as being different “hamara masla hi aag he” - focusing inwards on their own cases, so their personal appeals would stand out to stop the evictions. For example, residents from the Federal Quarters insisted on calling themselves ‘legal tenants’, ‘up-standing Pakistani citizens’ and the oldest occupants of their area, differentiating themselves from the residents of the KCR settlements. At the same time, residents from the KCR settlements would point towards their brief status as ‘project affectees’ to argue they were also not encroachers or ‘illegal squatter settlements’, like the rest of the group. Hence, Faisal Siddiqi’s attempt to bypass the more contentious aspects of building a broad-based coalition for housing rights in the name of expediency, backfired by terminally fracturing the movement itself. This was a severe blow not just because it alienated several possible allies in the struggle for land and housing rights, but also because it narrowed the field of affective bodies this struggle could assemble. Hence, setting the stage for future bouts of inertia and passivity in mobilizing endeavors (Lancione, 2017).

Figure 5.23 shows the various actors and stakeholders

**Differentiated Citizenship, Differentiated Politics**

Much like the slums of Mumbai, informal settlements across Karachi are constituent of people with vastly differentiated political subjectivities (Doshi, 2013:01), born out of their class, ethnic, caste, socio-cultural, political, and historical contexts. So even though all the different groups initially present in the RRCCHR’s office on 1st January, might have been facing the same calamity of violent displacement without recompense at the hands of the state, their personal capacities of dealing with the problem varied widely. Further, from the outset, Faisal Siddiqi was also adamant that to attain any meaningful results, the group will have to remain focused and realize they could not, “… talk on behalf of the entire city of Karachi, we can only represent those who are present here.” (1st January 2019). Yet even these criteria appeared to fall somewhat short: in the very first meeting, Siddiqi told the amenity plot and Quarters residents that their issues could not be taken up with the court because the current Chief Justice was personally interested in reclaiming the Federal housing, which, “makes the case very difficult; the Supreme Court has no soft corners for the Quarters.” (1st January 2019). This move alienated not just these two groups, but also more radical political factions, like the Awami Workers Party (AWP), that earlier had been interested in being part of this movement, but now felt its narrow focus on legal intervention and refusal to be more inclusive made it feeble.

**Figure 5.23 Actors/Stakeholders Involved in Anti-Eviction Resistance**
involved in different forms of resistance at the study sites. What binds these sites are the Supreme Court orders as an outcome of a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) on removal of encroachments from public land. Even though the residents and community-based groups from the KCR settlements, Federal Quarters and Commercial Markets, attempted to be a part of the constitutional litigation filed by the KCRCHN, not all of them were able to seek redress from the courts under the PIL. Eventually the petition included only residents of the KCR settlements, with several different NGOs and activists as petitioners.

Amongst the different organizations that came together for the purpose of organizing and conducting protests, the Joint Action Committee (JAC) and Karachi Bachao Tehreek (KBT), who often disagreed on the same methods for resistance. The JAC is a collective representing Karachi’s civil society, comprising different NGOs, Human Rights Organizations and political parties who intermittently work as a group to take up social issues. The JAC’s key members include people from the URC (Urban Resource Center), the HRCP (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan), the NCHR (National Council of Human Rights), PILER (Pakistan Institute of Labour Education & Research), NTUF (National Trade Union Federation), and activists engaged in their individual capacities such as Anis Haroon from the NCHR and Naghma Sheikh.

In this landscape of diverse organizations that have taken up issues of land and housing rights, we have observed different modes of engagement in resistance campaigns, a process in which organizations such as JAC discourage a ‘confrontational’ form of resistance, instead focusing on ‘dialogue’, and ‘lobbying’ with powerful politicians and bureaucrats. We observed an example of this at a protest staged outside the Press Club in 2019: When an influential PPP politician and Education Minister Saeed Ghani - showed up for a photo-op, people started chanting “Give a house for a house, otherwise leave your seat”.

At this point, the NTUF’s (National Trade Union Federation) President angrily told the agitated residents from the KCR settlements to stay silent and listen. Even though the residents’ voices went silent, they continued to talk amongst themselves, saying “We are tired of these promises, this is all they do”. In contrast, the KBT (Karachi Bachao Tehreek), formed in January 2019, is a smaller collective of people representing the AWP, Aurat Haq and the Women Democratic Front (WDF), and activists, journalists and lawyers engaged in their individual capacities. An organization formed in 2018, one of Aurat Haq’s key demands is for an immediate stop to evictions across Karachi. This group also includes members of the Awami Workers Party (AWP), a leftist national political party formed in 2012, and set-up through a coalition of the Awami Party, Labour Party & Workers Party. The AWP, KBT and Aurat Haq conducted extensive mobilizing and organizing of men and women in various KCR settlements. At one point, these organizations worked with the JAC to organize anti-eviction strategies. However, due to an unbridgeable difference over their politics, especially on how to proceed further in the anti-eviction strategies, this fledgling alliance soon dissolved, as the KBT, AWT and AH formed their own coalition. The KBT’s approach was more radical, focusing on anti-systemic change, with anti-capitalist demands that held governmental and economic structures responsible for producing urban inequalities in the first place. In contrast, the JAC’s anti-eviction strategy was reformist, involving lobbying and negotiating with politicians and bureaucrats, an approach that was outrightly rejected by members of the KBT. These collectives, due to their contrasting anti-eviction strategies, are producing new resistant geographies, often remapping traditional boundaries (Brickell et al., 2017).

Hence, we understand resistance as a process: it is not just the actions that people under threat take on the day of displacement, but also comprises the constant discursive work and emotional labour required to build and sustain a broad-based consensus. In other words, successful resistance requires people under threat to forge a collective identity and ‘construct a world’ (Laclau, 2006), which universalizes their demands and identities a common adversary; in this case a state that is bent on violently dispossession large swaths of its populations. Subsequently, when this process does not take place, we find the capacity of these bodies as affective agents - capable of effectively influencing each other and their surroundings - remains unfulfilled, and they slip into an entirely different affective atmosphere that certain authors (Lancione, 2017:13) describe as ‘inertia’: a state where their “emotional resources and strength is chipped away … [due] to everyday bodily traumas.”

**Gendered & Informational Barriers**

A key detriment to successful social mobilization and resistance was the abject degree of women’s exclusion from this process. As discussed earlier, access to meetings on resisting evictions was considered as an exclusively male domain across the sites, an idea rooted in gender roles that consign men as political actors capable of claiming their rights and entitlements from the state, and women as caregivers, who need to stay indoors, refrain from mixing with men, and stay out of politics. Moreover, this disparity between gendered roles of resistance came up regularly in exchanges with male respondents who would often interrupt interviews with female respondents by loudly exclaiming, “Why are you asking her? She’s a woman, so she doesn’t know anything. She will become emotional” (یہ بات ہے کہ عورتوں کا کام ہے نہیں ہے۔  کہتے تھے کہ عورتوں کا کام ہے نہیں ہے)

This becomes a pernicious cycle where women’s perceived lack of rationality and information becomes a reason to exclude them from important processes of resistance. Women were, therefore, often excluded by men from the community and other stakeholders - such as NGOs (URC, JAC), CBOs (KCR Mutasirreen Committee), individual activists, politicians, and members of law enforcement agencies - who interacted almost exclusively with men.

Women’s domestic responsibilities of unpaid care-work is burdensome, and this leaves them with almost no time for mobilization work. This reveals how gendered dimensions of poverty and the associated domestic work in low-income, poorly serviced areas, adds to the unequal burden these women bear. Nevertheless, despite these pervasive socio-cultural barriers, a small number of women (eight out of the twenty-nine we interviewed) were less restrictive about their mobility in public, did actively participate in mobilization activities, often with the support of relatively new political organizations such as AWP, Karachi Bachao Tehreek and Aurat Haq. These organizations were more inclusive and radical in their demands for land and housing rights and based their activism on agitating for a revolutionary goal of socio-political transformation.

When women did participate in public forms of resistance, they faced moral policing from their community. In a focus group discussion in Ghareebabad-PIDC, where young women had been at the forefront of two sit-ins that were instrumental in halting the demolition of the settlement, several women highlighted the pressures they experienced within their community. When asked about their absence from one of the first protests held outside the Karachi Press Club, and organized by an alliance of (male) community leaders as well as different civil society organizations, a female respondent said: “They didn’t invite us to that protest. They told us it wasn’t for women; only for men”. (Female, 50 yrs, December 2019)

In the same group discussion, women also underscored their important role in incrementally building their homes, by saving and pooling money each month into saving committees. They noted how, despite this hard work, when it came to protesting and ‘protecting’ their homes, they were continually excluded by men:

“Women play the most important role. We save the money through monthly committees. The men bring in their salaries and put them in our hands. Now it depends on us whether we spend it in one day or spend it all. That money is for our children’s education, upgrading the house. (Female 45 yrs, Ghareebabad-PIDC, December 2019)
The mobilization of moral codes as a barrier to women's access to the masculinized domain of protests, sit-ins, and overall community mobilization, establishes their visible activism in public space as diverging from expected norms. If women from the committee decided to act on their own, they were perceived by the men as taking risks, and compromising their family's honor. Further, in deploying these moral codes against women, the men's and families' assumption is that women are passive beings who can be taken advantage of if they step beyond feminized domestic roles. This assumption serves to strip away women's agency because in establishing them as passive subjects unable to make informed decisions, the control over women's bodies and mobility by men and societal norms is justified. Young women routinely expressed their anger toward older male community leaders about being complicit in excluding them from community meetings. The young women highlighted the community leaders would present themselves as ‘inclusive’ in front of civil society activists, but never followed up in terms of ensuring their participation at the community level. Some young women pointed out it was imperative to protest, to be seen on the roads, and that by losing homes, they would eventually also lose the safety of the veil/purdah.

The entire house is run by the woman, but when it comes to protesting outside, or when it comes to speaking in public, they don't let us come forward.” (Female, 70 yrs, Ghareebabad-PIDC, December 2019)

Still, there were instances when women in the KCR informal settlements faced less restrictions from their families for participating in protests. Some of these women helped establish a female-led Ghareebabad-PIDC Female Committee that was involved in organizing anti-eviction campaigns. This group comprised housewives and older women who were not engaged in paid work, and younger educated women who were keen to mobilize the community. Most of them represented diverse ethnicities (Punjabi, Sindhi, Urdu-speaking) and low-income to lower-middle income households. Yet, as these women actively engaged in the campaigns, their families were criticized within the community for allowing them to be involved in the activities. A young college student/female activist from Ghareebabad-PIDC explained:

“There is a Punjabi man, he is one of our own. He has instigated everyone. He said to our family members that anything can happen if the girls go to the protests. How are you trusting them to go? He told us that we don't know how we [women] are being used. I responded that he wasn’t the one who made us members of the committee; it was all done by women, and our honor will be protected by God.” (Female, 21 yrs., December 2019)

A woman in her twenties expressed a sense of betrayal when women from her neighborhood were deterred by the men, from participating in protests as they might seem ‘too outgoing’:

“She was one point in time when all the women also backed out, and I felt very bad about it; the men had put so much pressure on them.”

“When the thing that ensures we are veiled is not there, how will we be veiled? How will we guard our purdah? Obviously, we will take to the streets, and we will not care if we have our dupattas on or not. When someone’s shelter is taken from them, they don’t care about anything. A house is constructed with so much difficulty. (Female, 45 yrs, Ghareebabad, December 2019).”

For these women, resistance took several forms, both visible and invisible, direct, and indirect. Even though the avenues of physical forms of resistance were constituted as masculine domains, this did not mean women were unaffected and indifferent. As the process of resistance against the state’s eviction order unfolded, both young and older women resisted barriers that kept them out of decisions regarding their rights. As meetings took place between male community leaders and residents, women spoke to each other in their homes, and tried to access information by loitering in the doorways of their houses. Women also emotionally supported each other, and externalized their anger and anguish brought on by these exclusions, through their friendships with each other:

“Whenever there are any worries or any news about the demolition of houses, we go to each other’s homes. Not only does that reduce the burden on our hearts, but we also become informed about what is happening.” (Female, 35 yrs, New Sindhi Muslim Colony, February 2019)
This participation turned the protest in the women’s favor as well as other similar protests where women were engaged as part of the sit-in, an example being at Ghareebabad-PIDC, where women were also seen at the forefront of on-ground protests. In this gendered experience of anti-eviction protests, some women ended up either taking a confrontational approach or were encouraged to do so by their community members for strategic reasons (Lamb et al., 2017). The following explanation by a female respondent highlights this point:

“The police were armed that day, so we knew they were going to spare the women but beat up the men.” (Female, 50 yrs, Ghareebabad-PIDC, December 2019)

Notably, certain scholars (Butler, 1998; Bordo, 2003) argue that women’s bodies are expected to appropriate the forms of dominance that oppress them, essentially normalizing the problematic male-centric gender ideologies. For instance, Bordo (2003) underscores that utilizing new spaces or the use of novel discourse to display female bodies, such as women protesting in the same public space where they usually do not have access, might allow for the experience of an otherwise impermeable masculine system of power. Through gestures, resistance, and public performance, the body can disrupt conventional constructions of the gendered body when required. In this context, public performance has the potential to transform women who otherwise are seen to belong to the private sphere.

Still, many women in informal settlements such as Machar Colony realized their marginality as poor women, and this consciousness did evoke their resistance. These women connected their actions with the acknowledgement of their ethnic identity as ‘Bengali women’ who are customarily confined to their homes:

“In us Bengalis, believe me, we don’t leave the house without the burqa and the naqab (veil). We stay in our iizzat (honor) because in our family, we don’t have permission; no permission to go and do jobs anywhere, or... ...leave the house. But still, we came out to save our homes. It’s not like anyone went out just like that... We came out only to save our homes.”

(Female, 56yrs, March 2019)

Did these women’s resistance, visibility, and the discursive ‘fights’ over it - change or shift any norms around their voice and agency in the wider and longer context? Time will tell because traditional gender norms tend to resume after protests are over. To this day, whenever consultative meetings take place between civil society organizations and residents regarding displacement, they remain highly gendered. Perhaps, an important shift is that several women in the KCR settlements will be able to assume the same kind of agency when the next demolition drive is announced, simply because a precedent was set in 2018/2019. So, networks have been put in place through which activists can directly reach out to female residents in the neighborhoods, rather than having to go through male residents.

On those occasions when women were positioned at the frontline of protests, this was done strategically to make visible their purposeful presence, particularly in sit-ins. This strategy was deployed not only by NGOs, but also by the male residents, as evident in the case of an eviction operation conducted in Machar Colony in January 2019. Once the encroachment team moved towards the area inhabited predominantly by Bengali and Burmese-Rohingya residents, a protest erupted, and an exchange of stones and tear gas ensued between the residents and police. Consequently, a sit-in was staged by the women who blocked the Maaripur Road, bringing the eviction operation to a halt:

“This is why the men put us women in front for all negotiations with the police. They know if they (the men) say anything or even argue, the police will lock them up. So, we women stayed at the front.”

(Female, 28 yrs, January 2019)

Certain authors (Farha & Thompson, 2001) underscore that in instances where women put themselves in the frontline at the time of eviction, they assume chances are that they are less likely to be beaten than the men. But in acting as a buffer between men and state authorities, women are left vulnerable to violence, especially when working men are often not present in the house at the time of evictions, which are carried out during the day. Under these circumstances, women are, to a large extent, left to their own devices to withstand the onslaught of evictions. Moreover, as Lamb et al. (2017) have shown through their research in rural Cambodia, when women lead protests in a context where state violence is imminent, it becomes more about resistance strategy than ‘women empowerment’, because traditional gender relations resume once protests are over. Besides, as discussed in Section 5.3, in Karachi, women’s ability to access and politically participate in public space is highly conditional. These conditionalities are incumbent upon intersections of gender, class, caste, and ethnicity of identities.
Notably, when women’s opinions and experiences are constantly devalued because of hierarchies of knowledge that privilege experiences gained from engaging in activities and inhabiting (public) spaces traditionally seen as male preserves - a lot of women also begin doubting and excluding themselves from partaking in the process of claiming their rights.

Experiences of On-ground Resistance

On-ground resistance against land displacement took on vastly different forms based on each location - the Markets, KCR settlements and Quarters areas with some actions being more successful than others. The KCR settlements, for example, are a group of ethnically heterogeneous and spatially dispersed neighborhoods spread across the city. The distance between the neighborhoods and the lack of shared ethnic markers, made it hard for the residents to forge a collective identity, and to organize and sustain a mass-based movement. Even though a URC supported WhatsApp group was formed in the KCR settlements - which consisted of primarily men - it was largely used for information sharing, for instance pictures of eviction notices, news clips, photos. In contrast, much of the mobilization in the Quarters took place through WhatsApp networks which included both men and women and was formed and regulated by the residents.

Another factor that prevented extensive cooperation, was the difference in people’s political allegiances across the settlements. These political networks and loyalties had been cultivated for decades, and had proved indispensable in securing access to basic amenities; for example, Ghareebabad-Liaquatabad and its community leaders were firmly aligned with the JI; in Ghareebabad-PIDC, residents had a long-standing relationship with the PPP; in Umar Colony, residents had had prominent ties with the PML-N. The fragmented nature of resistance as an outcome of these differing allegiances is nowhere more pronounced than in Karachi’s District Central, where settlements such as Wahid Colony, Mujahid Colony, Moosa Colony and Musa Goth are in proximity and were previously strongholds of the MQM. However, since the MQM’s power has diminished over the past few years, these settlements now belong to different political constituencies. As discussed in Chapter 2, the inability of the newly elected representatives to cultivate their presence on ground, has made it harder for the residents to build a broader political coalition, particularly in the event of eviction operations.

The friction that arose from the mutually antagonistic relationship between these national political parties, often bled into on-ground mobilization practices. Community leaders, who were also the representatives of these parties in their areas, would prioritize maintaining and leveraging their own political capital, over working in a feebly held together, single-issue group. Yet, even this political capital appears to have paid little dividends as both the old and even new emerging political entities - like the PTI - appear to hold a similar line on the legality of these settlements and their right to exist. In February 2020, at an All-Party Conference held at the Arts Council and attended by members of these different parties, a prominent leader from the PTI - Firdous Shamim Naqvi - made a revealing statement:

“We don’t want katchi abadis to be everywhere. No one is so innocent that they don’t know the difference between the price of a legal and...”

Subsequently, NGOs based outside of these settlements, such as the URC and JAC, ended up occupying a central role in enabling effective channels of communication, and coordinating joint resistance efforts, such as scheduling press conferences, organizing social gatherings, arranging inter- and intra-group meetings with other stakeholders, and so forth. This also included bearing costs for mobilization in the form of transport arrangements for participants, printing and distributing banners, loudspeakers and so forth. Yet, this added layer of top-down advocacy also sometimes alienated certain people in the affected communities, particularly those who remained distrustful of ‘outsiders’. This induced a significant inertia (Lancione, 2017) in the mobilization process, so much so that when
the actual eviction drive took place, residents from different neighborhoods could not be convinced to come to the aid of the area under threat. We contend these are some of the major gaps that resulted in a weakened or fragmented terrain of resistance, eventually leading to several KCR settlements - Quaid-e-Azam Colony, Ghareebabad- Liaquatabad, Wahid Colony, Mujahid Colony, Moosa Colony, and parts of Machar Colony - experiencing the brunt of displacement.

In comparison, residents of the Quarters area had several key advantages that allowed them to mobilize a more powerful, and self-sustaining resistance throughout the period they remained under threat of displacement. These advantages included a homogeneous population of Urdu speaking Muhajirs who were able to discursively tie their resistance efforts to a nationalist project of ‘having built the nation’. This discursive strategy was effective because of its inclusive message and wide appeal to all the residents of the Quarters area under threat of displacement.

Additionally, the spatially proximate and socially well connected dynamic of the Quarters neighborhoods, contributed to a deeper sense of socially well connected dynamic of the Quarters neighborhood, and parts of Machar Colony - experiencing the brunt of displacement.

Still, despite this show of unanimity, there was a prominent fissure in the Quarters area: the PTI had made in-roads through a group of residents who were conducting regular meetings with ABAD (Association of Builders and Developers), and with government officials from the Ministry of Housing, about the possibility of resolving the Quarters issue. In these meetings, the discussions focused on an alternative plan: to first demolish the entire neighborhood, construct 12-storey high-rise apartment buildings on its location, and then sell portions of those apartments to the displaced people through a subsidized mortgage scheme. This approach was shunned by most of the Quarters residents, who were adamant on not being displaced at all. This alternative plan failed to gain any significant momentum. We elaborate further on these plans and their possible repercussions in Chapter 8, Section 8.2, Planning Karachi’s Future Densities.

As such, when the actual anti-eviction operation started in the Quarters in October 2018, the residents were united and energized, and came out in strength to cause a stalemate against state authorities, which included a large and heavily armed police force, paramilitary rangers and six inspectors from the Federal Housing Department. Added to this, eminent community leaders were conducting regular meetings with the Federal Housing, about the possibility of resolving the Quarters issue. In these meetings, the discussions focused on an alternative plan: to first demolish the entire neighborhood, construct 12-storey high-rise apartment buildings on its location, and then sell portions of those apartments to the displaced people through a subsidized mortgage scheme. This approach was shunned by most of the Quarters residents, who were adamant on not being displaced at all. This alternative plan failed to gain any significant momentum. We elaborate further on these plans and their possible repercussions in Chapter 8, Section 8.2, Planning Karachi’s Future Densities.

In contrast, in the face of the impediments to on-ground resistance laid out at the start of this subsection, the KCR settlements fared significantly worse against the eviction drives where over 565 concrete structures were demolished, and more than 1,000 families were displaced across 6 neighborhoods. As mentioned earlier in Chapter 2, a major reason for this lacklustre showing was the almost terminal fracturing of the MQM due to the violent interventions by the Rangers in Karachi’s political landscape in 2016, which meant that many local community leaders were left to fend for themselves in the absence of embedded power structures to which they could turn for help. In fact, two of the demolished neighborhoods - Moosa and Punjab Colony (PS-127) - fell under the constituency of MQM’s Kanwar Naveed Jameel, who was conspicuously absent throughout the demolition of the neighborhoods he was elected from but showed up to resist in person when the Quarters were under threat. One possible reason for this selective display of solidarity might have been because there were no political dividends to be gained from supporting a small and relatively impoverished locality of a few thousand people, compared to the Quarters that housed over half a million middle-income families.

For the residents of these demolished KCR settlements and who continue to live on the rubble of their homes, no compensation or redress has been provided despite the Supreme Court’s order to resettle affected households within a year. Throughout this time, even though various articles and videos were being shared to highlight the conditions in which the displaced households were forced to live, the situation on-ground remained dismal, and residents felt the attempts at solidarity were superficial and unhelpful. Post-demolitions, the residents did try to improve their material conditions of living on rubble by appealing to the NDMA for the immediate construction of communal toilets, which were identified by the community...
As a caveat, there were two KCR settlements that were able to successfully resist demolitions: Machar Colony and Ghareebabad-PIDC. We have already mentioned how women’s participation in the protest at Machar Colony played a significant role in halting the process of demolitions, and this proved to be an important factor in Ghareebabad-PIDC too where residents, including women and children, staged daily sit-ins after notices were placed in the settlements by the Pakistan Railways. These residents were joined by members of Karachi Bachao Tehreek (KBT) and Joint Action Committee (JAC), who helped mobilize the residents prior to the sit-in, particularly focusing on the participation of women. Even though Rangers, police, and the demolition machinery did arrive at the settlement on multiple dates, a stalwart opposition by these groups that refused to budge, forced the government officials and the enforcement machinery to repeatedly postpone the operation. Eventually, they had to give up for the near future.

Hence, the landscape of resistance was quite different between the Quarters and the KCR settlements: the former displayed a more robust and united opposition compared to the latter, which led to differences in perception amongst residents about the outcomes of their mobilization. These observations are also reflected in our survey findings (Figure 5.24), where residents of the Quarters reported a higher perceived impact of community participation in resistance (34 percent) as compared to the KCR settlements (19 percent).

5.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, we used three sites - KCR Settlements, Federal Quarters, and Karachi’s commercial markets - to show how land displacement as a non-discrete phenomenon, generates conditions that lead to increased vulnerability. In doing so, we have also charted the state’s violent logic contained in and enacted through forced land displacement. We have discussed how recurring rumors of potential displacement drives, play a central role in determining many facets of residents’ lives: their approach towards the auto-construction of their homes, how they gain access to amenities, their ability to rent out or sell their place of residence, and patterns of socio-political mobilization, all of which are largely affected detrimentally. Following the act of land displacement, residents are locked into a state of uncertainty, with the loss of shelter, livelihoods, and ruptured social networks, altogether exacerbating their vulnerabilities, and trapping many into a downward spiral of social mobility. Most work and residential spaces as discussed in this Chapter, have been shaped by histories of Partition, urbanization and informality, a process affected by multiple state and nonstate actors. The emotional and material dislocations that ensue from the loss of land, home and livelihoods do not always end in defeat; these moments also generate various forms of resistance and contestations. Thus, we have also charted the complex and rich terrain of solidarities, protests, and grassroots activism that is shaping resistance against land displacements in Karachi. But there are certain contradictions that beset this emergent frontier of urban politics. Even though groups, such as the AWP, have revolutionary and socially transformative aspirations, the activities of residents and activists are more often narrowly focused on a more immediate set of objectives due to the threat of evictions in their neighborhoods. Thus, in contrast to the ‘right to the city’ movements in other parts of the Global South, the main thrust of activists’ and NGOs’ claims in Karachi is often a straightforward demand for regularization and stay orders, as opposed to long-term security and improved housing quality. Still, this can be understood as residents’ and activists’ way of prioritizing the urgent material interests of keeping land and housing intact and using wider movements instrumentally to gather support (Bayat, 2015). Residents’ collaborations with a network of old and new organizations that are both neighborhood- and city-based, can be understood as an anti-land displacement strategy.

We have also placed the complex process of resistance in shifting ‘affective atmospheres’ (Lancione, 2017) of hope, invigoration and expectation that can quickly dissolve into despair, distress and waiting (Auyero, 2012; Yiftachel, 2009). These atmospheric attunements epitomize the extensive labors of ordinary men and women who come together in given moments, to forge connections in their common struggles to achieve the same goal. Notably, we have foregrounded the voices/testimonies of ethnically and generationally diverse women from these study sites, to underscore how they must shoulder heavy burdens given traditional roles and pressures to ensure family well-being. As carers of family/home, women are more susceptible to suffering greater social, psychological, physical and health hardships both with the threat and in the aftermath of displacement.

Below, are some key takeaways from this Chapter:

- People’s de-facto tenure is mostly based on their extended period-of-stay on the same plot of land. This process not only occurs over the course of many decades, but is necessarily grounded in a politics of patronage, and facilitated by the state through the provision of utilities, inclusion
of the settlement in the local voting list, and confirmation of people's addresses in official documents such as NICs and domiciles.

- Land ownership rests mostly with males who possess ownership titles through different relationships and forms of documentation such as stamp papers, utility bills. Thus, seen as non-titleholders, women are often excluded from community meetings regarding information dissemination; from conversations about resettlement schemes; from community resistance; as well other decision-making processes at the neighborhood scale.

- With most people relying on informal means of livelihoods, interlinkages between land and livelihood make evident how displacement not only deprives people of their access to land, but also their access to better sources of livelihood, which remain tied to the city center.

- The location of the KCR settlements is important due to residents' access to healthcare and education. Thus, displacement threatens to uproot people from their transportation networks, access to education and other amenities by scattering them in distant locations on the city’s rural-urban margins.

- Women's anxieties about displacement center on loss of employment because they fear not being able to leave their children, and more specifically daughters, at home if they are forced to move somewhere else. Being displaced, then, means losing a sense of safety that specifically has to do with gender-based violence.

- Even when different groups face the same calamity of violent displacement without recompense at the hands of the state, their personal capacities of dealing with displacement as well their socio-political backgrounds, have a considerable impact on the outcome of their resistance.

- A key detriment to successful social mobilization and resistance is the abject degree of women’s exclusion from this process. However, even though the avenues of physical forms of resistance are constituted as masculine domains, this does not mean women are unaffected and indifferent. For instance, women in Machar Colony realized their marginality as poor women, and this did evoke resistance.

- Powerful political parties intervene and keep people in a ‘waiting’ loop that doesn't service their land rights in the long term.
CHAPTER 6: Afterlives of Displacement & Resettlement: Lyari Basti

“A few days ago, I visited the site of my old home. I was astonished to see a three-storey building where my shack had stood. I just stared and stared and thought to myself, what an idiot I was to come here [to Taiser Town].” (Male, 70 yrs, LB, November 2019)
6.1 Introduction

As discussed in previous chapters, large-scale land displacements in Karachi, especially those triggered by infrastructure and urban development projects, have been a prominent feature of the city’s planning regime for decades, with the KCR anti-encroachment drives being the latest iteration. However, the Lyari Expressway (LEW) megaproject is noteworthy because it also engendered an extended phase of resettlement, termed as ‘conveyance’ by the local and provincial governments. The resettlement plan aimed to house approximately 80,000 displaced people in newly built resettlement colonies; all of this in a bid to rectify poor urban planning, improve tenure security, and provide the displaced people with a ‘new beginning’. Yet, these efforts failed to consider that resettlement projects create new vulnerabilities among resettled populations, especially poor, low-income women. Studies on resettlement in different parts of the world have documented the socio-spatial and the socio-economic impacts of resettlement (Cao, Kwang and Xi, 2012; Warner et al., 2008; Cernea, 1997; Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau, 2006; Ghannam, 2002; Shami, 1994; Cernea and Guggenheim, 1993; Perlman, 1982). These studies show that resettlement projects not only create new economic insecurities exacerbated by the disappearance of old neighborhood relations and networks, but also rearrange displaced people’s links with the city.

However, few studies have considered the potentially far-reaching and long-term social and health related vulnerabilities (Rogers and Langa 2010), especially in relation to gender. Certain studies show that people living in urban informal settlements face a higher prevalence of psychological stress (Hossain et al., 2020). But those who live ‘afterlives’ as displaced persons in resettlement colonies, might face new socio-psychological and political experiences of resettlement, especially in relation to gender? In addressing this question, we highlight the limits of tenure security, and the new kinds of vulnerabilities created since the LEW displacedees were resettled almost two decades ago. The focus is on one resettlement colony: Lyari Basti (LB) in Taiser Town Scheme 45, where most of the displaced people, especially those who had no official documents of land ownership, were relocated. In the instance where a planned resettlement colony was promised as a ‘new beginning’ for those displaced by the LEW project, the current state of degraded infrastructures in LB, stands out as an exemplary failure of the state’s resettlement and planning policy, that never endeavored to accommodate the long-term needs of the resettled populations, especially regarding infrastructure maintenance and repair.

Taiser Town Scheme 45 is a long trip from the city center; it takes nearly 1.5 hours by car to reach LB. Even though the relocation has led to security of tenure and an overall improvement in the quality of housing, the process has become an immense struggle for people to access livelihoods and infrastructures. In the issue of compensation in land displacements, it is often assumed that tenure security is the most significant aspect of the resettlement process. However, this assumption fails to address the complexity of the problem, for instance the interlinkages and contradictions between locality, livelihoods and access to infrastructures and services. Our findings show that even in the presence of tenure security, there is no guarantee that life post-resettlement will lead to more secure livelihoods. For those displaced people who were forced to resettle in the new colonies in Karachi’s rural-urban margins, tenure security in the form of allotment papers, has not alleviated the increased financial insecurity brought on by the loss of livelihoods. When respondents were asked to compare the state of infrastructures between their current and previous places of residence (Figure 6.5), nearly 82 percent reported a decline in income prospects since they resettled in LB. Resettlement has not only increased people’s travel time and distance to work, but also reduced mobility and transportation options. This effect has been more pronounced for women who now find it more difficult to supplement household incomes or access public spaces and education facilities. Our findings underscore an important point put forward by several authors (Mehta, 2009; Ramanathan, 1996; Cernea 1997, 1998, 2000; McDowell 1997; Mathur and Marsden 1998) that land displacement and subsequent resettlement processes lead to a decline in the standard of living of displaced people, and also heighten impoverishment; this happens because the incomes and livelihoods of people collapse due to displacement. Even though both men and women experience disempowerment due to displacement and resettlement, women are often at the receiving end of the transitions visited upon communities, especially in relation to the domestic sphere and the market (Mehta, 2009).

As outlined in Chapter 4, the LEW project’s compensation process was messy and lacked transparency, resulting in an uneven terrain of outcomes for different groups of displaced people. An estimated thousands of people were never given a pitance, even after their homes were destroyed, as in the case of a neighborhood called Salai Para, in Hasan Auliya Village - we discuss in Chapter 7. Many were compensated insufficiently with smaller-sized plots than what they were owed, and the spatial-physical configurations of the resettlement colony varied considerably in terms of location, and access to infrastructures like electricity, gas, and water. Similarly, there are greater social and psychological vulnerabilities for those living at the city’s margins due to loss of social connections and health facilities. All of this has resulted in a vastly different quality of life for different sets of displaced people. Thus, we address the issue of tenure security and vulnerability in a more nuanced way by looking at land, and its relationship with housing, mobility, livelihoods, and infrastructures. All these relationships are inflected with issues of gender.

In what follows, Section 6.2 provides a brief overview of the material and social dynamics of life along the Lyari Riverbank, where most of the respondents had previously lived. This sets the context for understanding the land, housing, and livelihood conditions in the pre-resettlement phase. Section 6.3 presents the research findings based on the 162 household surveys as well open-ended discussions, in-depth Interviews and focus group discussions conducted in LB. Finally, Section 6.4 concludes by highlighting the importance of understanding resettlement as a process that gives rise to new insecurities and vulnerabilities in which working class, and low-income communities remain impoverished in terms of their health, well-being, and social mobility.
Our respondents had been living for several decades in different neighborhoods near the upper stream of the Lyari River, which passes through District East and District Central that are some of the most densely populated districts in Karachi. These neighborhoods included Gulshan 13-D, Dastagar, Azizabad, Liaquatabad, Federal B Area and Golimar, to name a few (Map 6.1).

The residential settlements along the Lyari River were largely Muslim. Post-displacement, as part of the LERP mechanism, various religious communities were resettled within religiously homogeneous sectors in LB. Thus, it appears that a degree of community articulation was maintained (See Figure 6.5) for these religious minorities during the resettlement process. Nevertheless, several religious minorities were excluded from the compensation process, for instance, Hindu and Sikh families who were living in jhuggis in Liaquatabad. Eventually, some of these families were resettled in Adam Goth, close to Gulshan-e-Maymar Scheme 33, an area located approximately 18 km from Liaquatabad. The resettlement was supported by the Ruth Pfau and Caritas Foundation that performs relief work for the poor in Karachi.9

The other settlements along the Lyari as well as a few Hindu families near Lasbela and percent Hindus residing mostly in Old Golimar, mostly in Azizabad, in the Federal B Area; and 6 respondents comprising Christians who lived and Hindu populations: with 18 percent of the communities were resettled in the Lyari Riverbank. Figure 6.2 provides a breakdown of the diverse ethnic composition - from Punjabis, Pashtuns, Bengalis, Siraikis and Sindhis to Marwaris, Hazara, and other ethnic groups, that had been forcibly displaced from the Lyari Riverbank.

Nearly all of them worked close to their places of residence. It can well be imagined that residents of the different neighborhoods along the Lyari Riverbank were reluctant to move elsewhere as they had become accustomed to living near the city's center. Respondents reported they were satisfied with transport mobility, livelihood opportunities, healthcare facilities, civic amenities, and other services there. A 79-year-old male respondent reflected on his earlier home in Mustafabad beside the Lyari River:

“In Mustafabad everything was close by. It was easy to visit Abbasi Shaheed Hospital or Jinnah Hospital; jobs and employment were also convenient. There were no issues regarding electricity, gas, and water. But from Lyari Basti, everything is so far away; mobility is difficult. But here we do have tenure security. Even then, everything was so convenient in Mustafabad.” (Male, 79 yrs, LB, January 2020)

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Map 6.2 shows that the workplaces were near the respondents’ former homes, with 89 percent reporting commute times between 0 to 30 minutes with many capable of commuting by foot. In fact, only 10 percent of the respondents reported commutes longer than 30 minutes, which they could still reach easily by an accessible network of buses, rickshaws, qingqi and bikes. This mobility contributed significantly to their ability to gain and retain livelihoods.

Even though informal housing in Karachi is often constructed using temporary materials - such as

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Map 6.2. Respondents’ Residences and Workplaces Pre-Displacement

bamboo, fabric, mats - people living along the Lyari Riverbank had invested in incremental improvements, made over several years, in the built structure of their houses. They had invested in construction through a combination of permanent and semi-permanent materials, such as cement concrete blocks and roofs made of metal/tin/asbestos/cement sheets. Living arrangements were based on a wide spectrum of plot sizes, ranging from 20 sq. yds to 160 sq. yds. Approximately 81 percent of the respondents reported their previous homes were built on plot sizes that averaged between 40 sq. yds to 120 sq. yds. Over time, people created horizontal divisions of their plots to accommodate different families living together. Even though families were sharing facilities such as a kitchen and a courtyard, they still had separate rooms arranged around those shared facilities. These socio-material arrangements changed dramatically after resettlement, especially for households that had previously lived on larger sized plots but due to a uniform compensation package, now had to adapt to 80 sq. yds plots, which was the case for approximately half of our respondents.

However, most of these households had no tenure security – 84 percent of the respondents in our LB survey, reported they were living on non-regularized land in their previous locations, an issue that was continuously reinforced by the media and state representation of these settlements as 'illegal land', as discussed in Chapter 4. This absence of tenure security was a source of stress in their lives, especially as the threat of eviction increased with extensive talk about the LEW’s construction reported in the media as early as 1987.

In the following section, we look at the aftermath of life after displacement and the dissatisfaction it has occasioned in Lyari Basti in terms of residents’ access to infrastructures, amenities, transportation, and employment. In doing so, we highlight not only the benefits accrued from tenure security, but also the new kinds of gendered insecurities and vulnerabilities wrought on by the resettlement process. We focus on the challenges that people are facing with degraded infrastructures, unstable livelihoods, inaccessibility to health infrastructures and secondary education, and lengthened commutes to the city center. Our findings underscore that in the case of the LEW project, planned resettlement has led to further impoverishment for poor and working-class communities.

Map 6.3. Trajectories of Movement to Temporary Locations after Displacement

6.3 Afterlives of Displacement

Nearly 58 percent of the respondents reported shifting from the Lyari Riverbank to LB within the first few months of receiving the compensation package. House construction began incrementally as the displacees lived on their semi-constructed plots. A significant number of respondents - 42 percent - rented living spaces in intermediate locations or stayed with relatives while their houses in LB were being constructed. Overall, 92 percent of those who had received compensation, arrived, and settled in their houses in LB within two years (Figure 6.4)

Figure 6.4. Percentage of Respondents resettled to Lyari Basti over time

Map 6.3 shows the trajectory of respondents’ movements after displacement, to locations where
they found temporary residence before finally settling in LB. Very few people were able to shift to LB immediately after receiving their allotment papers and the monetary compensation. As respondents reported, many were able to find immediate temporary accommodations near their previous places of residence, mostly on rent, or moved in with relatives. But a significant number of respondents were forced to move farther out.

People's decisions about where to stay, were determined by affordability of rents as well as proximity to their previous place of employment. Some people decided to move to areas that were close to LB, such as Khuda ki Basti and Surjani; some moved directly onto empty plots in LB, in a bid to save money on rent, and to construct a decent house on their newly allotted plots. Some of these intermediate locations were quite far from the respondents' previous homes along the Lyari Riverbank. For instance, from Golimar to Khuda ki Basti, the distance is 27 km. From these intermediate locations, the respondents searched for employment opportunities so they could ease their eventual transition to LB. They hoped the provision of services and amenities, such as electricity, gas, and water, at LB would be completed. The respondents underscored repeatedly that the compensation package of PKR 50,000 was not sufficient to construct a complete, livable house. Respondents explained the different kinds of costs involved, and difficulties faced to cover the resettlement expenses:

“When we got the plots and the compensation money, I called a contractor. I asked him how much he would charge for digging the foundation for the house, and he said 10,000 rupees. Then I took the rates for blocks, doors, and windows. But the overall cost was too much! So, I started digging the foundations myself. I spent many afternoons away from work, digging the foundations of the house with my own hands” (Male, 70 yrs, LB, November 2019)

Nearly 80 percent of the respondents shifted to LB within the first year and within two years, 92 percent of the relocation to LB was complete. Map 6.4 shows the length of stay that respondents reported at their intermediate locations. The circle sizes indicate the length of stay for each respondent. From this we can gauge that many families were able to cluster in the areas immediately surrounding their previous homes, and this went on for a duration of 7 to 12 months before they finally moved to LB. Those who had moved farther from their previous homes, spent a longer time adjusting and saving money, between a year to two years, before they could finally move to LB.

Approximately 97 percent of the respondents reported they have been living on their allotted plots in LB for at least 10 years. The remaining 3 percent represents people who acquired their allotted plots late or those who were living on rent before having sold their allotted plots. These figures also represent how resettlement led to different living situations with regards to basic infrastructure. Almost 56 percent of respondents who started living in LB between 2001-2005, settled there when the government had provided basic infrastructures and amenities. So, these 'early settlers' had access to newly built infrastructures, such as piped water, sanitation, and electricity. However, the state of infrastructures in LB has degraded considerably over the years, respondents who relocated to LB after 2010, have experienced acute infrastructural degradation and disconnect. Today, there are multiple and gendered vulnerabilities associated with disconnected infrastructures, an outcome that was never anticipated by the state in the planned resettlement.

Degraded Infrastructures

During the initial years of the resettlement in LB, residents experienced a generally well-maintained state of infrastructures. But over the past two decades, the quality of infrastructures has declined in LB. A 70-year-old male plumber who resides in Sector 36 - pointed out indignantly,

“They used to come here in their Pajeros to see what Musharraf had created, unlike any settlement in Karachi. But today, who is responsible for maintenance? Who takes care of the area? If at all, we are not even aware of these basic things. This settlement appears to be forsaken and orphaned. The offices are all empty. We are just common people.” (LB, January 2020)

When respondents were asked to compare the state of infrastructures between their current and previous
places of residence (Figure 6.5), nearly 82 percent reported a decline in income prospects since they resettled in LB. This was attributed to the longer commute to the city center, and the additional cost of transportation. Respondents also expressed discontent with physical mobility post-resettlement, as 76 percent complained about reduced access to public transport, but also limited options, with buses passing through the area already filled, forcing them to wait for hours at the stop for the next bus to arrive. Moreover, when they talked about WASH, electricity, health and education, an overwhelming number of respondents reported worsened conditions post-resettlement.

Approximately, 89 percent of the respondents expressed worsened conditions compared to their previous places of residence. The only variable that saw an improvement was access to land or tenure security, as already discussed in an earlier section. This is a crucial finding because it underscores a key point made by certain authors (Mehta, 2009) that resettlement officials fail to understand why displaced people cannot be content with compensation packages that focus only on housing and not livelihoods in general.

Nearly 59 percent of the respondents also reported their communities were changing, which was causing stress. They ascribed this change to people selling their plots or placing these on rent and moving out. Hence, neighborhoods that were ethnically or class-wise homogeneous in the early phase of resettlement, appear to have transformed into diverse settings. In rare cases in the field study, we observed entire lanes occupied by new residents, and only a handful of houses left where the original displacees continued to reside. During an open-ended interview, a 60-year-old male resident narrated his fears about ‘new’ neighbors:

“When we were living in Gulshan (pre-displacement), we lived as a community. Our fathers were born there, our children grew up there. We knew who was honest, hardworking, and respected in the community. But [in LB] we don’t even know our next door neighbours. Someone has come from Gulshan, someone has come from Golimar, someone from Lalukhet, now they are living near my house. I don’t know what kind of people they are, what is their background, what do they have in their houses [objectionable or illegal possessions], what are their occupations.” (LB, December 2019)

Nevertheless, the biggest worry for LB’s residents is the acute state of degraded infrastructures. Approximately 93 percent of the respondents reported worsened conditions especially for WASH in their areas; with almost all households relying on boring facilities or purchasing water through tankers at a cost of PKR 2,500 per tanker – an exorbitant amount for these households. As a male respondent - a plumber from Sector 36, underscored,

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“The Musharraf [government] gave us amenities before sending us here. But things gradually started getting worse. For example, the cleaning of streets stopped. Sewerage lines started getting choked, and there was no one to maintain them. Water started coming once a month, instead of once every week; from once a month it went to once in six months, then to a year, and now my street has not had water for 6 to 7 years.” (LB, November 2019)

Similar grievances were expressed regarding infrastructures such as electricity and gas. We frequently found residents sitting outside their houses in the daytime under the shade of a tree that had been planted by them at the outset of their relocation to LB. We repeatedly heard residents describe their neighborhood conditions in statements such as “the entire day electricity isn’t available; what kind of a life is this? We have gone back to the Stone Age, no electricity, no water.”

“When it came to issues of safety, the responses varied. Only 9 percent of the respondents expressed the security conditions had improved after resettlement; 42 percent said there was no change; and 49 percent noted things had gotten worse. Residents described increased incidence of crime, with some sectors in LB more prone compared to others. Residents also highlighted greater incidents of crime in houses located closer to the market area, whereas others attributed these activities to lack of street lighting at night. Although there were a few self-appointed neighborhood watchmen, women especially, were dissatisfied with the safety conditions, and expressed concerns about not finding police protection when reporting incidents such as theft and sexual assault. A female respondent underscored:

“We take care of our daughters. Someone broke into a house nearby and harassed a woman, but nothing happened even after they made a complaint with the police.” (Female, 45, LB, October 2019)

The same female respondent went on to add:

“My 7-year-old child got hit by a truck in a hit-and-run accident. There is no hospital or ambulance nearby and I was hysterical, but I had no hope. Since that day I’m constantly scared for him. You tell me, is there any accountability here? What if my kid had died? [starts crying]” (Female, 45 yrs, LB, October 2019)

In Karachi, infrastructural degradation and disconnect are pervasive even in the city’s center, as certain authors have shown (Anwar et al., 2016,
Karachi’s informal settlements especially suffer from acute infrastructural disconnects, for instance in solid waste management and water supply. Often, infrastructure access in these settlements is intertwined with a violent political economy (Anwar et al., 2020), that exacerbates women’s security and vulnerabilities. Further, access to infrastructures in informal settlements is often conditioned by a politics of patronage that defines the relationship between poor, marginalized communities, and the state. However, in this instance where a planned resettlement colony was promised as a ‘new beginning’ for those displaced by the LEW project, the current state of degraded infrastructures stands out as an exemplary failure of the state’s resettlement and planning policy, that never endeavored to accommodate the long-term needs of the resettled populations, especially regarding infrastructure maintenance and repair. Even though on several occasions’ residents in LB have spent their own money securing water and cleaning overflowing drains, this has added to their financial burden. The residents still perceive such tasks are the local government’s responsibility.

A key reason for the degradation of WASH is political: the LEW’s resettlement project was conceived and kick-started under the patronage of the JI-backed Mayor Niamatullah Khan (2001-2005), who provided the infrastructural facilities in the initial phase of the project. But after Khan’s tenure ended, subsequent governments, for instance the MQM-backed Mayor Mustafa Kamal’s (2005-2010), the PPP and now the PTI governments, appear to have increasingly withdrawn from their responsibilities of infrastructure provision, maintenance, and repair in the resettlement colony. In this changing political landscape, LB’s residents have struggled to find political patrons who can address the infrastructure failures, and this has led to a sense of disillusionment with governance and political action. This is even though residents in LB have voted in 2018 for parties such as the PTI that promised change. Such a disheartened attitude towards political assistance is reflected in the surveys, where respondents reported not engaging in memberships of different political, religious, or social organizations (Figure 6.6). Only 4 percent of the respondents self-reported such membership, which were mostly in religious organizations.

The reason for this appears to be in the lack of benefits of such memberships as perceived by the respondents. Approximately 94 percent of the respondents reported having received no help from any such organizations throughout their stay in LB. Surprisingly, those who did report some benefits were from minority communities who had received help in constructing religious buildings, or better representing themselves through an organization.

The resettlement process did, to some extent, maintain community articulation (where people from the same neighborhoods are resettled together) so that people living in the same neighborhood and in the same lane, were allotted plots in proximity when they moved to LB. This holds true for the Hindu and Christian communities that were previously living along the Lyari Riverbank, and now reside exclusively in the Sectors 36E and 35C, respectively (Map 6.5). Yet this planning failed to account for the possibility that minority communities might be stigmatized in the resettled area.

Many Christian respondents reported their community had experienced repeated conflicts with the Muslim Pakhtuns in the neighboring sector. The most severe of which, an argument about how Christian women dressed, led to a communal clash resulting in the death of a young Christian boy. Following the attacks, a wall was constructed between the two communities as a buffer to protect the Christians. Compared to the Christian community that reported a few incidents of targeted discrimination, the Hindu residents have reported more intense and frequent incidents of discrimination and violence. Conversations with the Hindu residents revealed that several incidents of discrimination directed at their children in the neighborhood schools, forced them to give up on their children’s schooling. During fieldwork, a Hindu male resident from 36E, explained thus:

“My child [gestures to 8-year-old son] went to school the other day and another kid – a Muslim – stabbed my son in the back with a pen. His teacher called us to take him home. [My child] was bleeding profusely and there was blood everywhere. To add further...”

These kinds of conflicts have compromised the broader socioeconomic mobility of the Hindu community. Where they were previously able to access education in government schools at their former places of residence, post-resettlement they have limited options for schooling, and greater safety concerns have forced them to make difficult choices for their future generations. According to some respondents, the weak law-enforcement infrastructure within the area further exacerbates this sense of insecurity as they complained that they could not rely on the police to provide any kind of safety. Unlike other parts of the city, where rangers and police vehicles are frequently found patrolling neighborhoods, this phenomenon is rarely observed in LB. The police response time on reported incidents was extremely slow according to the residents, and street crimes post sunset were a daily occurrence. This weak law enforcement was perceived to exist due to the peripheral location of the settlement, exacerbated by the lacking mobility and electricity infrastructure.

By 2018, LB residents had voted for parties such as the PTI that promised change. This disheartened attitude towards political assistance is reflected in the surveys, where respondents reported not engaging in memberships of different political, religious, or social organizations (Figure 6.6). Only 4 percent of the respondents self-reported such membership, which were mostly in religious organizations. The reason for this appears to be in the lack of benefits of such memberships as perceived by the respondents. Approximately 94 percent of the respondents reported having received no help from any such organizations throughout their stay in LB. Surprisingly, those who did report some benefits were from minority communities who had received help in constructing religious buildings, or better representing themselves through an organization.
In the realm of socio-economic mobility, respondents in Lyari Basti underscored the importance of education. Respondents had low levels of educational attainment, themselves, because when their families settled along the Lyari riverbank, they were poor, and children had to work as a result. Therefore, only 30 percent of the respondents were ever enrolled in school, and 25 percent had attained education up to a primary level. Only 1.5 percent of respondents had acquired any form of diploma, BA/BCOM or professional degree. Post-resettlement, they witnessed considerable improvement in primary educational opportunities, and several households have been able to invest in their children’s education. From Figure 6.7, we can glean that, now, over 80 percent of respondents’ households have at least one person who has attained education beyond primary level.

“...but there is no college in the area, so she can’t continue further education. I wanted to educate her more. But how could she travel? She is a single girl; that is why I had to halt her education.”

(LB, October 2019)

Educational advancement was a key promise that the LERP had made to the displacees when the resettlement plan was drafted. Ambitious promises were made, around developing universities in the area. However, most of the improvement in educational attainment is due to the presence of several primary and secondary schools through private sector initiatives. One such example is The Citizens Foundation (TCF), a nonprofit education organization that runs 4 schools in LB (See Map 6.6). Even though the local government had planned for 22 public schools in the resettlement colony, today only 12 such schools are functioning.

Respondents reported that the area of their life that improved the most after resettlement was tenure security. This sense of security has been established through the state’s provision of allotment papers to the households, with 88 percent of the respondents reporting ownership of the papers (Figure 6.8). The allotment papers included certain terms and conditions, for instance restrictions on the sale and transfer of property within the initial five-year period of resettlement; physical possession of the plot within 15 days; construction to begin within two months; limitations on combining plots or maintaining livestock inside or outside the house (SPDC, 2012). Thus far, we have discussed the education attainment levels of respondents and relevance to social mobility post-resettlement, albeit with contradictory outcomes for women and religious minorities. In the next section we expand this discussion to include the issue of tenure security and livelihoods. We pose the following question: what kinds of improvements have residents seen in their ‘afterlives’ with respect to land ownership, houses, property rights and especially in relation to gender?

**Tenure & Livelihoods**

Respondents reported that the area of their life that improved the most after resettlement was tenure security. This sense of security has been established through the state’s provision of allotment papers to the households, with 88 percent of the respondents reporting ownership of the papers (Figure 6.8). The allotment papers included certain terms and conditions, for instance restrictions on the sale and transfer of property within the initial five-year period of resettlement; physical possession of the plot within 15 days; construction to begin within two months; limitations on combining plots or maintaining livestock inside or outside the house (SPDC, 2012). Although, it is important to note that issuing allotment paper does not complete the land ownership process; the final leasing process of 99 years is still pending for LB’s residents. At the outset, the government had promised the resettled affectees a lease document within five years of resettlement. However, two decades later, this is yet to happen. Nevertheless, the respondents were emphatic that the allotment document does provide a sense of tenure security; they perceived it as an ‘official’ government document.

The possession of ‘official’ or ‘legal’ documents for their plots in LB, is in stark contrast to 84 percent of the respondents who reported living on ‘illegal’ land along the Lyari Riverbank. The small percentage of people who were renting homes in LB were also included in the field survey. These people were displaced but had not received compensation from the state, for instance due to malpractice, corruption, and family rivalry. Even though they could not secure allotments in their name, they still chose to rent houses in LB because their entire community and relatives had shifted to the resettlement colony. We also encountered people who had sold their allotted plots or had rented them while they lived within a different sector in LB. This was mainly due to the lack of amenities and infrastructure facilities. Such transactions took place frequently within the initial years of resettlement, despite the restrictions imposed by the clauses mentioned above:
The findings regarding tenure/land ownership, show that the allotment process was overwhelmingly gendered (Figure 6.9). Approximately 93 percent of the allotment papers were given in the name of male members of the family, with either the respondent, or in the case of females, their husbands having the title of the land. Nearly 22 percent of the legal title rested with the eldest member of the household, namely father or father-in-law. The rest included brothers, uncles, or in some cases the previous male owner’s name that was never removed from the allotment title.

This discussion points to Bina Agarwal’s (2002) important argument that when land transfers take place in resettlement schemes, land is usually allotted almost exclusively to males. This perpetuates existing male biases in ownership and increases the vulnerability of women. Thus, resettlement policies even an urban context, fail to adequately incorporate gender concerns. This also dovetails with another key point: policymakers and state officials often cling to the notion of the ‘household’ as ‘a unit of congruent interests’ (Agarwal, 1994:3) where resources are shared equitably by all its members; they assume that benefits directed to men will be transferred to all household members. Hence, there is a marked lack of recognition of the unequal nature of resource allocation within the household, especially around land rights, something that feminist scholars such as Bina Agarwal have demonstrated in her pathbreaking research on women’s land rights as a narrative in policy discourse. Certain authors (Mehta,2009) underscored tenure insecurity was pervasive in the pre-displacement era, still, the diverse plot sizes and possibility for vertical constructions had enabled families to accommodate different kinds of material arrangements. In several in-depth interviews, respondents frequently expressed their dissatisfaction regarding the compensation process, noting that it had been incomplete and disorganized; that it had left certain family members who shared living arrangements in previous homes. As a 70-year-old male respondent explained:

“I got a plot in Sector 36 A, only one out of the 3 plots promised to my family. For the rest of the plots, we had to run around a lot. We had to pay bribes to a lot of people, we were promised the remaining two plots after paying these bribes, but the last bribe-receiver did not pass on the plots to us. We lost a lot of money in this process.” (LB, November 2019)

Since resettlement to LB, 94 percent of the respondents reported living on 80 sq. yds plots (Figure 6.10). This has resulted in a larger number of family members per plot. Accordingly, residents have designed the layout of their houses such that shared spaces are arranged on the ground floor, with bedrooms built upstairs due to space limitations. Only 5 percent of the respondents reported living on larger plot sizes, and these are households that purchased neighboring plots to expand their living spaces. Hence, in this current moment of residential development in Karachi’s periphery, living spaces are increasingly constrained for the poor, working class population, who have been forced to move into smaller plots located at the periphery through ‘planned’ rehabilitation schemes. This stands in stark contrast to other real estate development in the form of gated communities catering to upper and upper-middle-class populations, designed on spacious plot sizes, and demonstrative of the new value regime centered around the transformation of rural land into urban real estate under the changing priorities of the state. (Anwar, 2018; Ali, 2019)
We grouped the materials used to construct the previous and current houses into three categories: ‘temporary materials’ comprising bamboo, mats, cloth, wood or other similar materials; ‘semi-permanent construction’ that comprised walls made of permanent materials like CC (cement concrete) block walls, and roofs made from temporary materials including tin/asbestos/cement sheets (-sheet) or CC tiled roofs. ‘Permanent material’ is defined as houses constructed out of CC block walls, concrete slab roofs and RCC (reinforced cement concrete) construction, which is the most stable material for constructing higher stories.

72-year-old female (formerly a domestic worker) respondent explained:

“Yes, there were certain facilities there, [previous place of residence-Dastagir] but then the houses were just shacks. Now when you see the houses of people living here, even the maids have tiles on their houses. They are still working as maids but now they have three storey houses! At times, these houses are even better looking than the houses where they work. They have tiles in their bathrooms! [Laughs]” (LB, November 2019)

Image 6.3. Exterior finishes on some houses in LB (Source: Karachi Urban Lab, 2019)

Image 6.4. Basic exterior finishes of houses in LB (Source: Karachi Urban Lab, 2019)


The survey findings show (Figure 6.12) that post-resettlement, people have relied less on temporary materials for construction, with increased use of permanent materials. Notably, 19 percent of the respondents reported using permanent materials for construction, such as RCC and concrete slabs. They have also invested in building finishes and decorations on their houses. Thus, some houses in LB comprised facades with tiles, detailed fenestrations, and painted exteriors (Image 6.3). This contrasts with the pre-displacement phase when houses were made of exposed brick and mortar.

Many women reported losing work opportunities that they previously had access to, for instance as domestic helpers. Even though some did eventually find work in LB in nearby factories that provide pick and drop service, most women felt they had limited opportunities for paid work due to safety, transport and other infrastructural issues that have constrained access or impinged on their time as elaborated in the previous section. The survey findings also show that the category ‘informal/contractual’ work has not changed significantly in the post-resettlement phase, with 51 percent of the respondents currently employed in this sector. This includes respondents who found informal employment near their current place of residence in LB, for instance jobs in the construction sector as the land in and around Taiser Town continues to develop. Some respondents reported they have created extensions to their houses in the form of small shops, which were either rented out or family members were managing as the only source of income. Respondents who were working as contractual laborers, masons, and drivers in the city center, described the difficulty commuting, and the burden of increased distance meant they were often late to work, or could not afford the increased transportation costs. Figure 6.14 shows the commute time to the city center from respondents’ current and previous places of residence. While previously, 89 percent of the respondents reported being able to commute to work within 30 minutes, this figure declined sharply to 41 percent in the post-resettlement scenario.

Figure 6.14. Respondents Commute Time from Current & Previous Places of Residence

Map 6.7 and 6.8 explain the spatial and livelihood implications for the increases in commute times. Map 6.7 shows a breakdown of current commute times by work location. Map 6.8 shows how commute distance (and consequently, time and cost) has grown substantially with the relocation to LB. In the previous places of residence along the Lyari River, the work commutes radiated from the residents’ centrally located houses to various work locations in nearby areas: Gulshan, Nazimabad, and F. B. Area. These trips were shorter in time and spread over a smaller distance. In the event of transport strikes, or to save commuting costs, people could arrange alternate modes of transport,
such as sharing a motorbike, or even walking an hour or so rather than taking a 15-minute bus. These small daily commuting strategies translated into substantial savings over a month. But living in LB affords no such opportunities.

Presently, those people who have found work within LB or in proximity, either walk or use motorbikes to commute. They can reach their workplace within 5 to 15 mins (see Map 6.7). Those who used to work
on daily wages near their previous houses (laborers, painters, plumbers), have found new work in the nearby settlements of Surjani, Khuda ki Basti, and New Karachi. Others, such as drivers, loaders, and shop owners still must travel to the city center. The drawback of working in LB is the lack of customers for specific services, lower earnings prospects due to the non-availability of specific goods needed to maintain and expand shops/services. Some respondents noted that they must travel periodically to the city center, for instance an electrician narrated:

“How can I earn here? In the city, I used to charge 50 to 100 rupees for repairing an appliance. Here, I can hardly ask for 20 rupees. Sometimes people can only afford 10 rupees. I cannot ask for more. I know they don’t earn much, and it is difficult for them even to give me 10 rupees. People have told me that they cannot pay me anything, but I still take their things, and if I get time during the day, I repair free of charge.” (Male, 36 yrs, LB, October 2019)

For people whose jobs are located at a distance from LB, their commute time averages between 60 to 90 minutes. These people often commute to work in the city center or in the industrial areas of Korangi and SITE. Typically, they leave their homes early in the morning and head south. Public transport is not easy to access; only two minibuses serve the main roads within LB, and people must walk or take a qingqi to the nearest stop to catch a bus for the city. In the evenings, the transport is even less frequent and often overloaded. Respondents narrated how they reached their houses late at night, and never got enough rest before they woke up again the next morning to catch an early bus to the city. They highlighted that the lack of rest added to their physical fatigue and mental frustration. For people who report to duty at 8 am, a travel time of 2 hours meant they had to leave their homes in LB at 6 am or woke up even earlier. Respondents reported that due to long commutes, both sleep time and family time were reduced.

The role of material conditions in shaping people’s experience of fear and safety in public space cannot be underestimated. Respondents explained that on their way back from work, it was always dark and with insufficient street lighting, they were more prone to mugging incidents. Fear brought on by poor street lighting especially resonated among women, who reported an increased sense of insecurity while using the streets after dark due to fears of sexual harassment. This fear was further compounded by the absence of law enforcement agencies in the area. These factors not only impacted women’s everyday relationship with public space but also acted as a barrier to their employment in paid work as well (Viqar, 2016; Anwar, Viqar and Mustafa, 2018; Padhke et al., 2011).

Ultimately, the economic decisions made by LB residents are the result of a constant negotiation between two factors: longer commute time/costs and the chance of earning a higher income. Their choices, however, are also constrained by the lack of overall employment opportunities in the city at large. As a respondent explained:

“How would one want to live in Taiser Town in the outskirts of Karachi where we have no facility? It is obvious that a poor person wants to earn money to feed the family, but why would he want to live in such an area where there is no transport facility to come to the...
they had also lost a sense of social safety perceived in their previous place. During in-depth interviews and focus group discussions, female respondents also expressed hopelessness about their lives and the lives of their children due to high levels of uncertainty, dissatisfaction, and stress.

“Nothing has happened for the past 70 years [implying since the creation of Pakistan], what is going to change now? A lot happens in the life of a person. Everything cannot be written down and recorded, nor can everything be read about. And not everything even stays in one’s memory.” (Female, 70 yrs, LB, November 2019)

Perceived distress and emotional experiences were also very diverse among our respondents. Even though some were hopeless and stressed about their lives, many also lived with regret that weighed heavily on their everyday lives.

“A few days ago, I visited the site of my old home. I was astonished to see a three-storey building where my shack had stood. I just stared at it. I was astonished. You know, my old home. I was astonished to see my old home. I was astonished to see my shack had stood. I just stared at it. I was astonished.” (Male, 70 yrs, LB, November 2019)

On some level, many respondents had also experienced prevalence of inter-ethnic stereotypes and perceived discrimination in the process of displacement, and even in the afterlives of displacement. These intergroup relations also became a hurdle in social integration and community formation in post-displacement settlement. It is visible from the lived experiences that women were more perceptive or at least vocal about sharing these experiences. Reflecting on the ‘backwardness’ of her Saraiki speaking neighbors in LB, a 70-year-old female, Bengali migrant who has lived in Karachi for the past 25 years, noted:

“They Saraiki fellows don’t know how to respect mothers and sisters, the women didn’t even know how to wear salwar kameez, they only wore gharraras back then. Do you understand? This is how they were. They didn’t even have the manners to sleep on a charpai, they would simply huddle on the floor around a fire in the sehn and the whole family would sleep on khaddar ki chatai on all sides of the fire in their mud house which wasn’t pakka at that time. They ate at the same place and slept at the same place in a line. No sense of privacy, ‘behaya भेहा’ (shameless).” (LB, November 2019)

Such comments also reveal the tensions between urban and rural customs/norms that can translate into ethnic divisions. The female respondent was generally proud of her urbane and civic sensibility, indicating her ‘good manners’ promoted by city life. In contrast, she saw the Saraiki people from rural Punjab as practically ‘heathen’. They connoted a certain ‘backwardness’ as rural folk who ‘huddled’ together on the floor and did not display appropriate manners when eating and sleeping.

Going beyond psycho-social vulnerabilities, our analysis also focused on health-related vulnerabilities in the afterlife of displacement. Survey data revealed that approximately half of the households living in LB had a family member with some form of healthcare needs. Out of a total of 80 respondents who reported having some health conditions, there was a higher proportion of female members -58 percent- as compared to 42 percent males. (Figure 6.17).

This is also representative in the kinds of diseases observed, as the majority (81 percent) reported cases of blood pressure were found in female respondents. The higher incidence of women experiencing physical and mental health issues can be attributed to the increase in their domestic burden as their families suffer through urban precarity. The failure of the state in providing basic amenities and adequate infrastructure impinges on women’s time and labor because it reinforces and heightens the existing domestic responsibilities that women must fulfill within a patriarchal society. Further, the care roles are highly gendered so the stress of tending to sick family members falls on females (Furrukh and Anjum, 2020; Kahlid and Anjum, 2019). Multiple female respondents reported spending more time cooking because they were forced to use firewood due to lack of availability of cooking gas. This led to an increase in breathing issues and cases of asthma among women due to smoke inhalation. Similarly, the uneven provision of water made it difficult for women to fulfil their cleaning responsibilities, leading them to feel distressed. During an in-depth interview, a 40-year-old female respondent explained:

“My kids can’t go to school because there is no clean water to wash their uniforms. We cannot offer namaz inside our house because sewage water is seeping through the walls. On top of that, we don’t have gas, so I have no choice but to cook food on firewood!” (LB, November 2019)

Thus, post-resettlement, we find that the burdens...
of infrastructures has not only created new gendered vulnerabilities but also contributed to people's perceptions of social and political marginalization.

6.4 Conclusion

The above discussion illustrates the challenges people must confront in the afterlives of land displacement when they are resettled on the rural-urban margins of cities like Karachi. Even though the state has given people in Lyari Basti (LB) tenure security in the form of allotments, the resettlement process has created new vulnerabilities and insecurities that are pervasive, especially for women. Tenure security and housing are an asset for the poor, but it does not equate to rehabilitation after resettlement, because it does not guarantee secure work in the resettlement colony, or improvements in the delivery of infrastructures and amenities. The assumption that tenure security and new houses inevitably have a positive impact on the health of residents, is not upheld in the case of LB: our findings show that in addition to individual level negative impacts on well-being, the post-displacement lives of LB's residents also reflect the loss of connectedness with the place and memories of their previous homes, good mobility, and availability of facilities. This brings up the question of what is 'adequate housing' in a context where infrastructures have become deeply degraded and disconnected within LB. The LEW resettlement case shows that as a process, resettlement projects often fail to see the longevity of new settlements, and the slow, gradual onset of infrastructural degradation. Moreover, post-resettlement, the burdens of women's domestic role, while traditional and patriarchal, are exacerbated in conditions of precarity. This is particularly pertinent in a context where the state is even more absent in providing security and infrastructure in both public and domestic realms. So, the processes of displacement and resettlement have intensified the imbalance of patriarchal power relations.

Heart problems, which are also the second most frequent healthcare need in LB, are particularly worrying since there are no major hospitals located within or near LB. This means patients must be taken to hospitals located far away – notably Baqai Hospital located at a commute of 60 minutes from LB, or the more affordable Ruth Pfau Civil Hospital/Innah Hospital located at the center of the city at a commute of over 2 hours. Thus, people have attributed the primary cause of various deaths in the area to be the delay in ambulance response time, with the loved ones of these residents passing away on the way to the hospital:

I have witnessed this pain because my mother got ill, and we were taking her to the hospital. But the hospital was so far away that she died on the way. This is not the story of me alone. Here you will find every other house has the same story, where people lost their loved ones before they could even reach the hospital.” (Male, 35 years, LB, November 2019)

Not only are there no public healthcare facilities in this area, but even the private facilities are not accessible for the poor. For instance, there are 8 small private clinics and 4 local private hospitals that serve the entire population - approximately 120,000 - of LB, as discussed in Chapter 2. However, these are too few, expensive and work with limited facilities. These findings present the abysmal condition of healthcare facilities in the area, and people continue to rely on the smaller private clinics located within the sectors. Another concern is the acute absence of public maternity facilities; issues that were addressed in the resettlement plan proposed 17 years ago to allocate land for a public hospital building. However, over the years, only the skeleton of the hospital building has been constructed on the site located in Sector 36-F and its completion is nowhere in sight. Many residents also reported that initially when they moved to LB, their neighbors and friends also moved with them, and this generated a perceived sense of stability in their new neighborhood in LB. However, over the years, many neighbors and friends sold their plots raising concerns for the community and social safety. Our respondents showed stress due to the fast-changing social lives and community in their neighborhoods, and with this, a sense of lower social and community safety and heightened sense of vulnerability.

Taken together, these findings indicate that due to the lived experience of being displaced, tenure security was highly important for the residents of LB. This, however, does not mean that their lives have become stress free or that relocation to a tenure-wise secure neighborhood has improved their wellbeing, or that they feel psychologically secure, as revealed in our field interviews. The biggest stressor of LB residents included lack of access to utilities, job prospects, health facilities, mobility/distance issues, and education. Overall, despite the perception that the land and housing in LB were secure, the psychological wellbeing of the residents was lower due to higher stress levels. The perception of lower wellbeing and higher stress levels was more pronounced among women compared to their male counterparts as women have higher social safety and health needs. These findings resonate with previous studies that demonstrate compromised wellbeing and high stress among Pakistani women due to compromised safety (Ahmad et al., 2018), and higher community support needs, and educational opportunities for their children (Furrukh et al., 2020).

An additional important factor that has had deleterious effects on the stress and general health of the LB residents, has been the state of degraded and disconnected infrastructures. This includes issues of safety regarding mobility as well as law and order; an absence of local primary healthcare facilities; environmental and health hazards due to open and unkept drains; severe power outages; and no garbage collection. Basically, the survey findings show a dramatic reduction in the delivery and quality of infrastructures in LB. This degraded state of infrastructures has not only created new gendered vulnerabilities but also contributed to people's perceptions of social and political marginalization.

- Violated expectations, psychological stress, and social vulnerabilities due to changing neighborhoods are leading to lower levels of well-being and high stress. Women are more stressed due to lower perceived safety and changing composition of LB.
- The locational disadvantage of being shunted to the city's rural-urban margins, means that for women safety concerns are heightened as travel to work or for education and work outside LB is considered risky due to limited and unaffordable transport and long commutes of 20 km or more.
- The degraded conditions of water, sanitation and solid-waste management have become a source of tremendous anxiety and frustration, with people feeling 'abandoned' by local government and political parties.
- Despite tenure security in the post-resettlement phase, people's aspirations for social mobility remain constrained by loss of livelihoods at the city's margins where they lack access to health and education infrastructures.
- For women, tenure security has been highly gendered, and land/property ownership remains in the hands of men. Such exclusion limits women's participation in issues related to land and tenure, and their futures.
CHAPTER 7:
Lives in Limbo:
Salai Para-Hasan
Auliya Village

“...The bridge turns like a serpent here and it came into our houses. They made this huge interchange. If it had not been constructed here, our houses could have been saved.” (Male, 43 yrs, HAV, November 2019).
7.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, we discussed the afterlives of some of the compensated 30,000 families who were displaced due to the Lyari Expressway (LEW) megaproject. But there were tens of thousands more displaced, who never received any form of compensation. Throughout this report, we have illustrated how people both grapple with displacement as an impending disaster, and how they live their afterlives in its devastating aftermath. Yet, this chapter is about those people whose lives are suspended in an entirely different liminal space, the space of waiting. We examine the case of the displaced residents of Hasan Auliya Village (HAV) Block C, or Salai Para as it is colloquially known, as they enter their fifth year in a protracted state of limbo. Salai Para’s displaced residents are representative of the tens of thousands who were left to fend for themselves or were scattered in different parts of Karachi and beyond, in the aftermath of the LEW’s construction. Despite HAV being cited, often, in Karachi’s activism circles as a successful case of compensation; for stability in livelihoods and in homes; for a sense of social safety and security in placemaking (Lombard, 2014; Burkner, 2006). Yet, their lived experiences have been one of facing a series of disruptions; of being ‘scattered’ across the city, constantly being threatened by the possibility of double displacement, and losing any hope due to lingering uncertainty. The spatial and socio-psychological impacts have led to personal distress and put immense strain on interpersonal and community relations. Displacement has shattered their past, scattered their present, and made their future uncertain. For many people, the spatial-temporal disruption has resulted in the loss of a sense of entitlement as urban citizens, which was previously tied to their status as centuries-old ‘original’ residents of Salai Para.

Of these former residents of Salai Para, some continue to live on the rubble of their partially demolished houses (Image 7.1); others have already moved to different parts of the city; and finally, some have exhausted their financial resources paying rent, and now simply wait for compensation. Their stories exemplify what it means to experience a protracted state of spatial and temporal disruption caused by the initial displacement, and their subsequent relegation to an irreconcilable situation of waiting.

In this chapter, we consider how people describe, experience, and challenge the spatial and temporal disruptions to which they have been subjected. We draw attention to the experiences of ‘waiting’: for compensation; for stability in livelihoods and in homes; for a sense of social safety and security in placemaking (Lombard, 2014; Burkner, 2006). Yet, their lived experiences have been one of facing a series of disruptions; of being ‘scattered’ across the city, constantly being threatened by the possibility of double displacement, and losing any hope due to lingering uncertainty. The spatial and socio-psychological impacts have led to personal distress and put immense strain on interpersonal and community relations. Displacement has shattered their past, scattered their present, and made their future uncertain. For many people, the spatial-temporal disruption has resulted in the loss of a sense of entitlement as urban citizens, which was previously tied to their status as centuries-old ‘original’ residents of Salai Para.

Of these former residents of Salai Para, some continue to live on the rubble of their partially demolished houses (Image 7.1); others have already moved to different parts of the city; and finally, some have exhausted their financial resources paying rent, and now simply wait for compensation. Their stories exemplify what it means to experience a protracted state of spatial and temporal disruption caused by the initial displacement, and their subsequent relegation to an irreconcilable situation of waiting.

In this chapter, we consider how people describe, experience, and challenge the spatial and temporal disruptions to which they have been subjected. We draw attention to the experiences of ‘waiting’: for compensation; for stability in livelihoods and in homes; for a sense of social safety and security in placemaking (Lombard, 2014; Burkner, 2006). Yet, their lived experiences have been one of facing a series of disruptions; of being ‘scattered’ across the city, constantly being threatened by the possibility of double displacement, and losing any hope due to lingering uncertainty. The spatial and socio-psychological impacts have led to personal distress and put immense strain on interpersonal and community relations. Displacement has shattered their past, scattered their present, and made their future uncertain. For many people, the spatial-temporal disruption has resulted in the loss of a sense of entitlement as urban citizens, which was previously tied to their status as centuries-old ‘original’ residents of Salai Para.
The different exigencies of waiting point to the nuances of uncertainty (Auyero and Swiston, 2009) that people have experienced in terms of their hopes, entitlements, and fears of waiting. Thus, time - *waqt* - is the most crucial factor in people's narratives and is deeply entangled with beliefs and lived experiences about displacement, aspirations, security, and urban futures. We extend the discussion on life experiences, microaggressions and traumas (Lewis et al., 2013) of forced eviction in spatial terms: the state of being 'scattered' and marginalized across Karachi is inscribed not only in space but also in people's consciousness. The analysis and discussions in this chapter are based on 13 open ended, in-depth interviews (IDIs), focus group discussions (FGDs), extensive phenomenological interviews with neighborhood activists, city councillors, and community lawyers, conducted over a period of 6 months. Even though the focus remained on individuals and families that continue to reside near Salai Para-HAV, the FGDs also captured the narratives of residents who were forced to move farther.

In what follows, Section 7.2 visually traces the spatial scattering of people displaced from Salai Para, across varying age and gender groups. In Section 7.3, we elaborate the ensuing temporal and spatial disruptions on people's lives. We draw attention to key metaphors that were commonly expressed in respondents' narratives that describe their anxieties of exclusion - feeling betrayed by the state; being left behind; and feeling out of place. Even though these metaphors emerged in the narratives of nearly all respondents, people still held diverse opinions in terms of their future aspirations and experiences. We tease out the contradictions in the circumstances of families that were forced to live together and pool resources, and those who were compelled to break-up their family units and live apart, and the burdens each of these choices carried. People's experiences of 'spatial-temporal' disruption denote futures that are permanently fixed in uncertainty. Feeling stuck in the middle of processes that are ambiguous and living in constant uncertainty, has caused many people to feel anger and frustration at the state. Finally, in all these metaphors we weave in various socio-psychological effects that impact the everyday lives of the respondents, including stress, hopelessness, and relationship strains. In Section 7.4, we conclude by bringing together the key points of this chapter.

### 7.2 Spatial Scatter and Ensuing Uncertainties

**“Some went to Sindh; some went to Hind.” (Male, 38 yrs, HAV, January 2020)**

The 2016 evictions essentially affected two categories of residents in HAV: the first were residents who had official documents of land ownership and received market-rate compensation under the LAA 1894 for their properties. They were able to purchase houses in relatively affluent parts of Karachi, such as in Naval Colony near Mouch Goth in Baldia, and in Malir. Some residents had planned when they initially learnt, back in 2006, about the interchange, and invested in land in Karachi's periphery, in Baloch-inhabited goths such as Samo Goth in Malir (Map 7.2). Thus, these families were able to shift immediately to the peripheral goths, where they have built large houses, like the goths, where they have built large houses, like the

**The rest of us are just circulating between rental houses, uncertain of where we will end up living a decent and stable life.” (HAV, December 2019)**

Map 7.2 displays the spatial scatter of the Salai Para, Block C, residents immediately after the 2016 demolitions. The dark green circle labelled H represents Salai Para-HAV. The red dots labelled S represent the Scatter: the new places of residence the displaced residents took up, either moving in with relatives or rental accommodation. Each S
The threat of eviction today is further complicated by the phase of Supreme Court-backed anti-encroachment crusades, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.

Starkly, S6 shows people who moved to Shanti Nagar, Dalnia, an informal settlement located 15 km from HAV. In Shanti Nagar, people found jobs as domestic helpers for the nearby elite residential areas of the KDA Officers’ Housing Society, Naval Housing Society, and Karsaz (W7). Some also found work in the nearby Gulshan area, taking up jobs as informal shop-owners and service providers (W6).

Still others had to move considerably farther away from Salai Para. For instance, S7 delineates people who moved to Samo Goth, along the Malir River, approximately 29 km from Salai Para, and S8 represents people who moved to Saleh Muhammad Goth, 31 km from Salai Para. Additionally, both these goths or villages are presently under threat of eviction due to the impending construction of yet another mega-infrastructure project: the Malir Expressway. Hence, the people who moved to these peripheral settlements, now face the risk of ‘double displacement’, that may result in losing the security of their new homes and land along the Malir River. This situation is compounded by people’s endless waiting for compensation for homes demolished in Salai Para in 2016. In a FGD, a respondent who now lives in Samo Goth asserted:

“Some of the mutasireen were so disappointed, they didn’t believe they would ever get compensated. They left their belongings here and moved out of the country. They went to Iran. They said, here [in Pakistan] there is only injustice, no one is there to listen to our troubles. We don’t want to live in such a place. Sometimes, they visit us; occasionally, they come and see the same things happening; no hope for any betterment; then they leave again. I really don’t understand when our country will progress.” (Male, 38 yrs, HAV, January 2020)

Several displaced residents had to look for new jobs in the nearby industrial areas (W5) in Samo Goth, and the story of one respondent is telling of the daily uncertainty experienced. After he moved to Samo Goth from Salai Para, the respondent was able to retain his government job at an office in Ranchore Lane (W3) in the city center, where he commutes daily by bus. The one-way commute from Samo Goth to Ranchore Lane takes over two hours. If he misses the evening bus to return home, which happens frequently, he must spend the night with a relative in HAV. Each morning, as he departs for work from Samo Goth, he wonders if he will return home that day or spend the night in HAV.

The ‘spatial scatter’ and the uncertainties that ensued after the 2016 demolitions in Salai Para, forced some people to relocate beyond Karachi. Some families had to leave the city permanently. One respondent explained that he relocated to Gwadar, Balochistan, because he could not find affordable rent in Karachi. He now works as a fisherman in Gwadar and returns periodically to visit relatives in HAV. Others returned to their ancestral lands in rural Sindh; and some even relocated to neighboring Iran:

“Of the mutasireen...” (Male, 38 yrs, HAV, January 2020)
farther out as they could not afford rents in the city center. Moreover, as the spatial scatter map illustrates, even those who headed to the peripheral settlements like Samo Goth to rebuild their lives, now find themselves facing another imminent threat of displacement due to new mega-infrastructure projects. Thus, displacement becomes an ongoing process and not a one-time event; a process in which people are being removed constantly from spaces earmarked for development, with little concern for their next destination. Amidst all this, the state of ‘permanent temporariness’ is further complicated by the “uncertainty and arbitrariness [that was].... dominated by persistent confusion and misunderstanding.” (Auyero, 2012:72). In the following section, we turn to a deeper discussion of people’s spatial and temporal anxieties and uncertainties produced by the experience of displacement and waiting.

7.3 Spatio-Temporal Disruptions

In this section, we explore certain metaphors commonly expressed in interviews with the former residents of Salai Para, and in doing so, draw attention to the experience of displacement, waiting and uncertainty. Certain scholars have underscored the importance of understanding the relationship between space and speech: why, when, and how people speak about their life experiences in given moments. Relying on Brickell (2013) and other scholars’ work (Ramakrishnan, 2014; Cresswell, 1997; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999), we take seriously the idea that metaphors provide structures for people to mentally confront their quotidian feelings of betrayal, despair, and unmet expectations from the state regarding compensation for loss of land and housing. As Ramakrishnan (2014:756) posits, people’s “usage of metaphors is not by any means devoid of a political consciousness of their local environment and conditions.” During interviews, people repeatedly articulated a particular socio-spatial logic of space and time produced by displacement. Notably, the spatial disruption was articulated not only in terms of geographical dislocation but also in terms of the everyday/quotidian experience of being confined to smaller spaces (chotay kamray).

We structure the respondents’ narratives in terms of three dominant metaphors that came up constantly in the interviews: hum peechay reh gaye (being left behind), kahin kay nahn rehay (feeling out of place), and hukumat ki wada khilafi (the state’s betrayal), that capture feelings of betrayal by the state; feelings of social immobility; feelings of frustration and the stalling of previously anticipated futures. While the psychological frustrations of those who are displaced have often been observed on social and infrastructural levels, the spatial-temporal effects on those who are left behind in uncertainty, are rarely explored. During open-ended, in-depth conversations, respondents talked about how their everyday lives were full of frustrations, and full of waiting for some normalcy, while they were left with heightened psychological uncertainties and lowered hopes. The key components of this waiting are stress and trauma of lost homes, loss of autonomy and a prolonged experience of uncertainty.

Left Behind

We start with the metaphor peechay reh gaye that our respondents used, to describe their present state of being ‘left behind’ in both a spatial and temporal sense. This metaphor does not evoke nostalgia as much as an immense sense of loss of a community, and a constant state of grieving; it is used to convey a moment of regression to a place where better opportunities and futures are perceived as increasingly unobtainable:

“With time, people progress, they move ahead in life. But here (instead) we have gone backwards with time. (Male, 38 yrs, HAV, February 2020)"

For the displaced residents of Salai Para, the loss of their land and houses in 2016, meant that the money was also affected and neighbors... Respondents explained that their financial immobility has profoundly impacted intergenerational mobility. For these people, many of whom have extremely precarious attachments to labour and housing markets, housing permanency was achieved over several generations. Their houses took literally decades in the making. Thus, temporal disruptions in the form of evictions are not just a straightforward regression that unravel decades of blood and sweat, but also spills violently across generations that are yet to come, imbuing their lives with a sense of immobility and stasis. When asked how the evictions have impacted their families, some respondents asserted:

“Not just me but my sister’s family was also affected and neighbors...”

These recollections reflect a questioning of the perversive logic of displacement that punishes people and enforces geographic departures from old networks and ways of living. For many respondents, the relocation to an area far from previous homes in Salai Para, also meant a vast disruption to their everyday pace of life, not only in terms of work but also their ability to maintain everyday social relations and an order of conviviality. There are lingering feelings of being left behind on social, temporal, and geographical levels, and they all emerge in the affective lives of our respondents. Socially speaking, they felt they were left behind in their communal and intimacy needs; in temporal terms they lost former times where they could live that time with their kin; and the spatial scattering of their loved ones has left behind a gap that cannot be filled through digital connectivity. Some of them were able to connect digitally but missed the in-
person connection with their relatives, a loss that was felt acutely on special occasions. A respondent asserted:

“It is not like before when we used to be connected daily. Some people have moved so far away, it is difficult to meet them even on special occasions. But we remain in touch through WhatsApp. Sometimes, when we recall our past, we get teary-eyed. How we used to live, how we were all together, now we are all scattered. Someone went to Hind; someone went to Sindh. Especially on occasions like Eid, we really miss our relatives. A lot of people come to my shop, we sit and talk, they share what is going on in their hearts; sometimes they weep a little. They feel so helpless; what they once were and what their condition is now.” (Male, 38 yrs, HAV, February 2020)

Hence, this sense of being left behind was not just predicated on the violent temporal-spatial ruptures experienced by the residents of Salai Para but was also based on a loss of community felt acutely by our respondents. The state’s bureaucratic-legal practices that valorized official documents as proof of land ownership, generated irremediable divisions within the community, eventually leading to a complete dissolution of a century’s old social fabric. Being left behind is thus perceived by residents not only in a material and spatial sense, but also as disruptions in their financial, intergenerational, and social mobility, a form of temporal and social suffering (Oldfield, 2013).

**Out of Place**

The second metaphor we selected is kahn ke nahi nahay or ‘out of place’, a phrase that respondents deployed frequently as they narrated their experiences of displacement and waiting. It is used as a diagnostic to convey a deep-seated sense of material and social vulnerability, as well what they confronted when they lost their homes and were forced to live on rubble or move into small spaces and rental accommodation. The first instance of literally feeling out of place, happened in that moment when the bulldozers arrived, and homes were demolished; male and female respondents explained they camped out on the rubble of their homes amidst their material belongings, and had no place to go. They deployed the metaphor of being ‘out of place’ to convey the disorder that ensued:

“Nowhere, we had nowhere to go. We spent a week sitting on the rubble, carrying out daily tasks with difficulty. We were living in the street near our destroyed houses, trying to salvage our belongings while we searched for better accommodation.” (Male, 58 yrs, HAV, January 2020)

“We spent our days on the rubble, near the demolished houses. All our belongings were piled here outside the demolished houses, how could we leave this area and go and live somewhere else? We had to take care of our belongings first.” (Female, 70 yrs, HAV, February 2020)

Loss of homes and sitting on the rubble had not only impacted the physical connection with the home that residents were attached to, but also disrupted familial intimacy and connectedness (Milligan, 2003). This loss of physical and emotional connection deeply impacted the perception and experience of being out of place due to their suddenly ‘broken past’, and the sense of loss of historical connections embedded in decades of intergenerational living and the psychological safety and comfort of their homes (Brickell, 2017). Not only was there a loss of people’s life stories and shared emotional experiences of their homes, but memories had turned into trauma. As reflected in an elderly female respondent’s account, it was not only the physical loss of home but also the loss of legitimacy and security they had about homes/property. In her interview, the constant reference to the colonial endorsement of her right to ownership, is a powerful invocation of legitimacy, and a history that she was entitled to keep intact; a history that goes back to pre-Partition time:

“This area is very old; almost 200-years-old. Hasan Auliya was there when the British government was ruling Karachi and they gave this area to us. In fact, you can see Mewa Shah Graveyard here, which is one of the oldest graveyards in Karachi. There are a few graves here that are 150 years old and belong to our relatives. (HAV, November 2019)

But the trauma of feeling out of place has also had a
visible impact on people’s wellbeing, especially on their stress levels. This was evident in respondents’ narratives about their own and their families’ health, especially elderly persons. As some respondents asserted:

“If the government had given us the promised compensation, we would never have shifted to an informal area like this one.” (Female, 50 yrs old, HAV, February 2020)

After moving to rented accommodation in nearby areas such as Tikonia, the spatial disruption became prominent in terms of people being forced to adjust to chotey kamrey or small rooms. From living in large houses built around spacious courtyards that accommodated multiple family units, people were now forced into smaller types of urban residences that are typical of Karachi’s housing landscape: single storey houses built on 80 sq. yds plots. Clearly distressed by the new spatial constrictions, a male respondent recounted:

“We were used to living in spacious rooms and courtyards but due to this demolition, we have been forced into tiny spaces. This has disrupted our lives. The rooms are so small that living is difficult, but we cannot do anything about it; we’re tolerating living like this.” (Male, 43 yrs, HAV, February 2020)

Notably, the Baloch families who were forced into smaller, rented accommodation in Tikonia, were seen by other Baloch who were not impacted by the demolitions, as bicharey or unlucky people. A 70-year-old Baloch female respondent reflected on the ‘bad luck’ that had afflicted some of her relatives who were forced to move into smaller, rented accommodation in Tikonia:

“The rooms are so small; it is an area of Muhajirs. These poor [Baloch] folk from our settlement are forced to live amongst them.” (HAV, March 2020)

In describing the smaller spaces and what is perceived as the inferior quality of their new environment, respondents highlighted that they were forced into new situations of financial insecurity and vulnerability. A 40-year-old male respondent explained how, after his family’s shared home was demolished, they - 13 people - had to shift into a rented house that could barely accommodate their needs. Even though the family put up with the constricted space, new financial conflicts emerged over the additional expense of sharing rent, an issue that had not existed in their previous homes. The respondent articulated his frustrations toward his siblings, and their unequal contributions to the family finances,

“If a father has 5 sons, then there will always be 2 or 3 who will be cunning (chalak). If their salary is 18k, they will say that they earn 15K and keep the money from the parents. If everyone were fair and honest then we wouldn’t be living in such a humiliating state today. Our whole life has been thrown off balance. We all used to live together in one house where we had three rooms, and while it wasn’t perfect it was still ours. We were happy.” (Male, 40 yrs, HAV, February 2020)

Some respondents deployed the metaphor ‘out of place’ to convey the vulnerability they felt when they moved to nearby informal settlements, where there was no tenure security. This led to the new uncertainty of double displacement. According to a female respondent who now lives in Tikonia, government officials had visited the area several times to evict them, but she had no other option:

“Personally, I suffered a lot. After this event, I became a heart patient. When my daughter and husband took me to the hospital, they said it was an angina attack. I cannot see properly because the heart bothering me.” (Female, 70 yrs old, HAV, March 2020)

In her mind, the sorrowful circumstances of the displaced relatives now forced to live in rented accommodation in a Muhajir neighborhood, elaborates the sense of a longstanding Baloch community’s loss of entitlement; they are perceived, after all, as the ‘original settlers’ or urban citizens of the HAV and by extension, Karachi. In the words of Haji Jan Mohammed, a senior Baloch activist from HAV: “We have seen Karachi built right in front of our eyes” (November 2019). In contrast, the Urdu-speaking Muhajirs, many of whom arrived as refugee-migrants after Partition and were later given plots by the state in places like Tikonia, are perceived as more entitled or favored by the state. Thus, displacement has caused a regression in material circumstances that is understood as a loss of entitlement; feeling out of place in the city that has always belonged to the Baloch. It also exemplifies a shattering of expectations wrapped up in a spatio-temporal disruption of urban citizenship.

**Hukumat ki Wada Khilafi**

The final metaphor we have selected, **hukumat ki wada khilafi** or ‘state’s betrayal’, provides yet another lens for understanding the range of experiences described by the respondents regarding displacement. Both spatial and temporal references underwrite this metaphor, particularly in terms of the state reneging on its promise to provide a new, permanent space - Rais Goth - for people to rebuild their lives and homes. The violent experience of demolition and loss of homes and the never-ending wait for compensation, was often narrated in conjunction with feeling betrayed by the state. During interviews, people expressed intense anger and frustration at state officials such as the Deputy Commissioner and the LERP office. They described the post-eviction process of accessing state officials as a traumatic experience of ill-treatment, neglect, delays, and manipulations of their urgent concerns. Moreover, the endless waiting in government offices was compounded by the frequent changing of officials appointed to oversee the residents’ cases. This meant people had to constantly reiterate their issues to the government officials during multiple cycles of visits, which kept them away from their work or domestic commitments for extended periods. This is perhaps a key reason why many respondents claimed they had given up hope of any compensation and felt exhausted with their pursuit of...
the bureaucratic machinery, which was understood as volatile, fragmented, constantly shifting, and, therefore, unreliable. This resonates with Akhil Gupta’s (2012) important point about the arbitrary and contingent nature of state practices in terms of its everyday functioning; practices that often result in the social and political exclusion of the poor. Some respondents deployed the metaphor to convey the ill-treatment and delays they experienced when approaching government officials in the LERP’s office:

“When I visit their [LERP] office, they ask me, why have you come? Why have I come! You are an officer in charge of my case, it is my right to enquire about my case at this office, and that is why I am coming again and again. You are not resolving my case. Sometimes you tell me it will take two months, sometimes you say one year, what is this? Five years have passed, we are still running around, but have managed to accomplish nothing.” 
(Male, 58 yrs old, HAV, December 2019)

Some respondents also expressed the possibility of how their lives might have turned out if the government had fulfilled its promise of compensation, and how they might have built upon the government had fulfilled its promise of how their lives might have turned out if

“We could have settled down in life. They [government] have set aside land for us in Rais Goth, but every few months they tell us a different story. Sometimes they say the allotted land has been encroached by goth dwellers; sometimes they tell us it has been cleared but there is remaining paperwork before it can be allotted. In the meantime, we have no place to go, we are forced to scrape out a living.”
(Male, 43 yrs, HAV, February 2020)

The spatio-temporal disruption became particularly prominent when respondents talked about the state’s delayed promise and the politics of the resettlement site - Rais Goth. Even though the 20 acres of land in the periphery has been earmarked as a resettlement colony for the displaced residents of Salai Para, respondents explained it had fallen prey to Karachi’s politics of encroachment:

“The local waderas of the surrounding goths occupied that area (set aside for our plots), then plotted and sold the land to various people. The government then got it cleared recently and demolished the encroachments. Now it is a large empty tract of land reserved for the HAV affectees, but it is not being passed into our hands.”
(Male, 58 yrs, February HAV)

This story resonates with similar dynamics that are reshaping many of Karachi’s peri-urban locations, especially the goths or villages that are being transformed into informal settlements or abadis. As goth lands are contested, illicit transient processes ensure numerous cycles of payment for goth elders, plotters, brokers, and ‘service’ providers of various kinds (Anwar 2018; Abdullah and Anwar, 2021). In the interim, the land in Rais Goth remains officially classified as vacant while displaced residents of Salai Para wait for it to be transferred in their names. Hence, waiting is protracted indefinitely as people experience a sense of powerlessness from being incapable of securing their promised plots.

While the respondents’ mistrust and suspicion of the state emerged throughout the open-ended conversations, some explained that with the passage of time, they were desperate enough to give up on the monetary part of the compensation. A 43-year-old male respondent who works in a factory lamented:

“When I visit their [LERP] office, they ask me, why have you come? Why have I come! You are an officer in charge of my case, it is my right to enquire about my case at this office, and that is why I am coming again and again. You are not resolving my case. Sometimes you tell me it will take two months, sometimes you say one year, what is this? Five years have passed, we are still running around, but have managed to accomplish nothing.” (HAV, January 2020)

For these people, the government officials are corrupt and do nothing to facilitate the promised resettlement, and instead contribute to the systemic violence people have experienced since the evictions. Yet, people continue to believe in the state’s ability to rectify the situation even if the compensation is only partial. The expectations from the state in terms of its responsibility to its citizens for providing shelter remain intact. Other respondents hoped that if not this government, then a future one would deliver on the promise - wada - of providing compensation:

“If not this government, we still have hope the next government will give to us what is in our right; that one day we will be compensated. After all, the government has promised us.” (Female, 70 year, HAV, February 2020)

In the respondents’ minds, the state’s project of resettlement to Rais Goth has been compromised by local officials and civil servants whose interactions were defined in terms of corrupt practices and negligence. These narratives about everyday interactions between the respondents and local officials give a “... concrete shape and form to what would otherwise be an abstraction (‘the state’)” (Gupta, 1995:375). But the state’s legitimacy remained unquestioned as evident in the respondents’ talk of a future regime delivering on the promise of resettlement. This expectation on part of Salai Para’s displaced residents for eventual compensation, is not based on hope or expected goodwill on the state’s part, but rather an acute understanding of the power dynamics embedded within this relationship. The state remains the only entity with enough power and resources to substantively ameliorate their current condition.

7.4 Conclusion

“We look at this young man here [points to him]; he became a heart patient. Look at this gentleman here. Look at the wrinkles on his face, running around trying to save his house, the tensions in his life. Look at this boy here [points to him]; he has become an addict, his life is destroyed. His [points to another person] mother became paralyzed with grief; his children are wasted. No job, no work, little children, a rented house. So much has happened here, someone became a thief, someone became a drug dealer, someone lies in bed struck by disease.
Chapter 7 - Lives in Limbo: Salai Para Hasan Auliya Village

My heart is filled with grief; I have so much more inside, I cannot even bring myself to say such things. How will I say it, to whom should I say it?" (Female, 56yrs, HAV, February 2020)

Demolitions, evictions, land displacements, and anti-encroachment drives have become a norm in Karachi. Yet for many people, displacement is not a brief process but a state of 'permanent temporariness' (Yiftachel, 2009). This chapter has explored the spatio-temporal disruptions that people experience due to land displacement, and the irreconcilable situation of waiting that they are relegated to by the state: waiting for compensation; waiting for stability in livelihoods and in homes; for better days; and for a sense of social safety and security in placemaking (Oldfield and Greyling, 2015). Residents' use of the metaphor 'left behind' underscores how they are forced to submit to living in "a time dictated by others, an alienated time." (Auyero and Swistun, 2009:129). The metaphors that people repeatedly expressed in the interviews, describe not only how their lives have been profoundly transformed in this state of prolonged waiting, but also draw out the contradictions in the state’s own claims of infrastructure projects, like the LEW, being instrumental in changing the landscape of tenure insecurity/informality in Karachi, as we have discussed in Chapter 4. The shattering of expectations that this promise of progress propelled, becomes wrapped up in people's spatial-temporal disruptions. The metaphors signal the broken trajectories of livelihoods, futures, and urban citizenship.

Returning to Oldfield and Greyling's (2015) work on waiting for land/homes, they underscore that waiting leads to more precarity in people's lives. But waiting also shapes people's encounters with the state. The specific metaphor of feeling betrayed by the state, signals growing disillusionment and mistrust of the state due to unkept promises. However, it also binds people to the state in an asymmetrical relationship of dependence for security of tenure and a future that may never come.
“How can they simply remove all our houses? It is not a matter of a single or a dozen houses; this is about thousands of houses! How can they make all of us homeless, just like that? All we have now is the consolation that if it happens, it happens to everyone, they won’t come by just to break my house.”
(March 2019)
8.1 Introduction

Throughout this report, we have endeavored to show how urban land is governed and appropriated in Karachi - Pakistan's largest metropolis - for infrastructural and urban development projects, through the processes of gentrification, cadastralization, and gendered dynamics that buttress land tenure arrangements. The position of the poor, working class, low-income and even lower-to-middle income residents in Karachi, has always been precarious in terms of accessing land and housing. Informal settlements, jhuggies, slums and informal markets where the urban poor find shelter and work, are not perceived as invested with legality, despite informal housing accommodating 62 percent of Karachi’s residents, and 72.6 percent of jobs in the city generated through the informal economy. In millennial Karachi, holding on to land and homes and accessing public space for labor, has become a vital struggle. Perpetually seen as ‘encroachers’ on public land or property, ordinary residents are, more than ever before, at the suffrage of the state.

It is our contention that what makes this present moment of land displacements and struggles particularly complex, is the interlocking of emergent neoliberal policies with colonial genealogies of managing and appropriating land, as well post-Partition legacies of housing crisis and land informalization that dovetail today with the emergence of the courts as key sites of urban planning and governance in a bid to restore law and order in the city. We also visualize a new wave of displacements (See Map 8.1) occurring in the context of ‘urban disasters’, particularly in the aftermath of urban flooding in August 2020, and the infrastructural breakdown that took place due to unprecedented rains.

Much of land and housing in Karachi exists in the interstices of ‘illegal’ and ‘informal’ practices, where tenure thus remains in constant limbo. Informality in Karachi is also deeply entangled with colonial genealogies of bureaucratic-legal land governance, with documents serving as a crucial means of establishing legibility, and it works as a strategic narrative to justify land displacement for development projects. However, with the constantly shifting and porous borders of legality/ illegality, the symbolic meaning of documents - eligibility certificates, leases, stamp papers, occupancy certificates - also keeps shifting. Within these shifting boundaries of the informal/formal, legal/illegal, as we have shown in the context of the KCR, the Federal Quarters and the markets, power also becomes dispersed across a range of non-state actors, such as politicians, community-based organizations, and ordinary citizens, who are often being driven by each other’s conflicting interests as much as by their own personal histories, that have been established over decades through the slow accumulation of the residents’ social and economic capital.

Further, the violence is not just physical, but also has an important epistemic dimension whereby settlements under threat are often reduced to caricatures, coded as ‘encroachments’, that then simultaneously represent and generate all the social ills of the city. This narrative completely disregards the on-ground reality of the neighborhoods, which are one of the determining factors in the lives of the residents, and are often being driven by each other’s conflicting interests as much as by their own personal histories, that have been established over decades through the slow accumulation of the residents’ social and economic capital.

The contestations and conflicts over land displacement in the multiple sites, demonstrate how the right to land as a form of right to citizenship, rights to work, and relevant post-Partition legacies of housing crisis and work, are especially regarding resettlement and compensation. In instances where ordinary citizens have demanded their right to land, housing and compensation in the aftermath of land displacements, the state has responded by first dismissing their claims of compensation as a given or ‘natural’ right, and then setting up arbitrary and highly exclusive frameworks of who is ‘eligible’ as a recipient of the state’s aid. This has unequivocal consequences for substantive citizenship as it erodes people’s claim to the right to land/property, and further, due to the arbitrary application of colonial land laws, creates differentiated forms of citizenship. Even in cases where the state did compensate affectees of displacement, it usually did so under the paradigm of granting ‘charity’, thus abrogating itself of any responsibility to be substantive in its assistance. Such highly inadequate forms of compensation set a negative precedent for others to leverage in future, for instance the KCR affectees, who understand similar compensation cannot cover even the basic costs of resettlement. In the absence of binding laws and policies regarding resettlement and compensation, appropriate policies are hardly ever planned and the opinions and needs of affected communities are, by and large, ignored. This demonstrates not only an arbitrary and violent process of land acquisition, but also a lack of appreciation of even the Land Acquisition Act 1894 in exercising the state’s power in its right to eminent domain.

In the past few years of unprecedented phase of land displacements in Karachi, the hardest hit have been the daily wage earners engaged in informal businesses. Judicial interventions have further narrowed access to redress for these informal livelihoods. Unlike the right to housing, discussions about the right to work are hardly ever associated with space, and there are no laws or policies that cover labor rights in the informal economy. The lack of legal status, and the ensuing legal gap, means that street vendors and hawkers are particularly vulnerable to evictions, as has been demonstrated by the 2018-2019 eviction drive around the removal of informal livelihoods, which deprived over 200,000 workers of their only source of income. Hence, understanding the layers of intersection between work, home, and land, is crucially important given that for the urban poor, working class, low-income residents, place-making hinges on the close relationship between housing and work. Decent Work, and the rights of informal and precarious workers, has been covered substantively under SDG 8, which calls for support to precarious workers and small to medium size enterprises, and prevention of violence and harassment towards them. However, as evidenced in this report, achieving SDG 8 may not be possible when people’s livelihoods are being dispossessed and displaced under the auspices of delivering development and restoring law and order. Even though civil society has been drawing attention to people’s right to livelihood in rural areas for over two decades, there has been very little attention to urban residents, and how urban planning regimes may be violating their basic rights to decent work. As this research shows, there is an urgent need for more elaboration and capacity building on how rights to land, housing and decent work overlap.

The lack of acknowledgment and understanding of the right to livelihood has emerged in conversations with government officials, an important example being a statement that was issued in May 2019 by the District Commissioner, Karachi Central. After the anti-encroachment drives were conducted in places like Ghareebabad-Liaquatabad, he stated: “We did not destroy the houses, we only destroyed commercial and soft structures.” These structures included communal spaces that men, women, and children had been living in for generations. The statement exemplifies the distinction persistently drawn between informal land, housing, and livelihoods by state officials, even though these are inescapably intertwined, and how the deployment of state machinery is justified in a series of brutal operations particularly against small-scale, informal commercial businesses, many of which are set up within informal neighborhoods.

Key Findings

Over the past two decades, mega-infrastructure projects, urban development and related anti-encroachment drives have resulted in the displacement of at least 400,000 people across Karachi; this figure is based on a conservative estimate of average 6 persons per household as reported in the Census 2017. However, we surmise a more realistic figure of 600,000 people displaced, given that most of the displacements were in the city’s high-density areas, where households often comprise between 8 to 10 persons. Notably, less than 33% of these forcibly displaced households have received any alternative form of resettlement site and/or cash compensation. Fundamentally, our findings show that land displacements arising from this complex process, have severe consequences for displaced populations; resulting in loss of land, home, livelihoods, community, and social networks; engendering a permanent state of anxiety and uncertainty; increasing physical, social, and environmental vulnerability; inflicting severe psychological trauma, and irrevocably damaging social and economic mobility. These effects are especially pernicious because displacement is a non-discrete phenomenon: a process that cannot be understood as a one-time event. Land displacement or evictions take place through different temporal contexts and generate complex, multiple effects of waiting, expectations, inertia, and defeat (Lancione, 2017), that are also often repeated, trapping people in cycles of increasing vulnerability. Thus, we consider the durations or times of displacement as an extended set of processes in which lives are made more precarious. We have underscored the issue of time - wait - that is of particular importance in people’s lives, for instance in matters of waiting for the state’s promise of compensation and resettlement in the case of people who were displaced from Salai Para, and in the KCR informal settlements.

Chapter 8 - Displacements Yet to Come
This report has also highlighted how the narratives on land governance are further complicated by the limited focus on physical loss of land and livelihoods, which excludes the socio-psychological impacts on individuals and communities. This report establishes that the experience of displacement and living through loss of home or livelihoods, has multidimensional impacts varying from physiological to psychological stress response, anxiety, fear of loss, and physical and emotional trauma. Community disruption and resulting loss of social support have prolonged and negative socio-emotional impacts on people in general, but for women these effects are further pronounced.

Advocacy over land rights, women must carefully weigh up the risks of backlash, which is a significant factor in discouraging their participation.

What will the future bring to the ordinary Karachi citizen in terms of land, livelihood, and housing security? In the following section, we speculate on this important question given the new infrastructure and urban development projects, as well land clearance and a centralized urban planning regime that are on the horizon, and the consequential displacement of tens of thousands more urban residents. We first take up this question in relation to density as it pertains to land and housing affordability, and real estate speculation in Karachi. Then we discuss displacements yet to come in the context of new megaprojects and urban planning interventions that include the construction of the Malir Expressway; the clearance of informal settlements from over 35,000 amenity plots; demolitions of buildings declared ‘dangerous’ due to structural instability; the impending Main Line 1 railway track that will connect with the KCR; and the construction of new luxury, high-rise apartments in the city center by developers like ABAD. We also visualize a new wave of displacements (See Map 8.1) that will occur in the context of ‘urban disasters’, particularly in the aftermath of urban flooding in August 2020, and the infrastructural breakdown that took place because of unprecedented rains. This has initiated a new resolve under the guise of clearing encroachments along drainage channels, with forceful action already underway against the informal residential ‘encroachments’ as compared to commercial encroachments on the same land.

As delineated in Map 8.1, the displacements yet to come are spread across the city’s central and peripheral areas and will be triggered by land acquisition for new mega-infrastructure projects, and by the cleaning of natural water channels or nullahs that have become clogged with sewage that has become a hazard for urban flooding. Approximately 80 informal settlements are located along the nullahs. In Table 8.1, we provide a rudimentary sense of the number of settlements that will be impacted by these plans/projects, in addition to anticipated displacements from other mega-infrastructure projects. It is imperative to underscore again that these are predominantly informal settlements.

Table 8.1. Number of Settlements Under Threat of Displacement due to Karachi Transformation Plan & Mega-Infrastructure Projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Projects</th>
<th>No. of Settlements under threat of displacement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Residential demolitions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malir Expressway</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearing and widening of Gujjar Nullah</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearing and widening of Orangi Nullah</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearing and widening of Manzoor Colony Nullah</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Line 1 (ML-1)</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amenity Plots</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Quarters</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Demolitions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Demolitions</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since March 2021, nearly all the settlements located along the Manzoor Colony Nullah have been evicted, with demolitions underway along the Gujjar and Orangi Nullahs. The evictions will result in the cumulative displacement of approximately 12,000 or more homes along the three nullahs (Hasan, 2021). With an estimated 8 persons per household, it is likely the demolitions will trigger the displacement of at least 96,000 people. The number could be higher because the informal settlements vary considerably in terms of plot size, number of floors and number of families per plot. This is further complicated by the variety of land tenure and tenancy arrangements, and the lack of data on the number of families per room/floor/plot.

8.2 Planning Karachi’s Future Densities

Informality in the provision of land and housing is a key characteristic of Karachi’s urban landscape because land/housing affordability has never been a key feature of the state’s planning agenda. In this section we briefly examine upcoming planning agendas that continue to overlook the on-ground realities of informality and density in Karachi- an issue that is likely to generate further displacements. In our brief discussion, we refer to the Karachi Strategic Development Plan 2020 (KSDP) and the Sindh Government’s recent master plan that is yet to be implemented, as well as the new Karachi Transformation plan- a USD $6.8 billion Federal and Provincial Governments’ scheme for Karachi’s infrastructure upgradation and designed to mitigate the risk of urban flooding. We anticipate such top-down interventions will lead to further land displacements, as discussed in the previous section.

1. Karachi Strategic Development Plan 2020 (KSDP)

The KSDP 2020 is the current masterplan for the city and was formulated in 2006-2007. It was officially notified by the City District Government Karachi (CDGK), with its core objective to transform Karachi into a ‘world-class’ metropolis. A key proposal in the KSDP was the development of high-rise apartment buildings that would surmount the challenge of housing shortages and improve living conditions. The proposal also included liberal provisions for...
the densification of existing core locations and encouraged high-density developments in and around the city center (ECIL, 2007:8). However, the CDGK has since been dissolved, and the KSDP's implementation was compromised due to political uncertainties. Even though the KSDP acknowledged ground realities such as "densities in the informal settlements continue to remain significantly higher compared to regular housing areas, while the quality and coverage of services remains inadequate" (ECIL, 2007:14), it did not generate any empirical data on the exact values of density in a representative sample of informal settlements, or on the consumption patterns of various services/utilities in informal settlements. This reinforces the argument we make in Chapter 3: without accurate density and infrastructure usage figures for informal settlements, it is difficult to calculate and plan for adequate service provision, especially considering that such high-density informal settlements constitute nearly 62 percent of Karachi's population.

Further, the KSDPs aim to achieve higher residential densities was markedly skewed in the direction of middle-income, and especially higher-middle-income apartment housing. However, this selective densification policy ignored the already existing high-density informal settlements where relatively lower and lower-middle-income groups reside. As we have shown in Chapter 2 of this report, densities in some of the city's informal neighborhoods are as high as 228,590. The KSDP proposed no recommendations to manage existing densities for such low-income settlements. It is not clear if the Sindhi Government's ongoing urban planning agenda will take seriously this important issue.

3. Sindh Master Planning Authority (SMPA)

We have examined the proceedings of the recent Sindh Master Planning Authority (SMPA), established in 2019. In doing so, we have relied on the minutes of SMPA meetings, and recommendations for developing Karachi's next master plan. As the KSDP 2020 duration has now ended, in January 2020, the government introduced a new master planning initiative with a Sub-Committee-IV formed for preparing recommendations for the strategic/master development plan for Karachi. The Sub-Committee has recommended an immediate task of 'Fixing the Old City', based on the following premise: 'The densification of population and activities through concentration of high-rise developments has already choked the old city and no further densification and land reuse plan be allowed in this area.' This recommendation focuses largely on the conservation of the old city as a 'historic district', with plans for its eventual gentrification. Notably, a key issue sidelined is the reason behind the existence of these high-rises: the buildings are occupied mostly by working class poor and low- to lower-middle-income households whose need for proximity to their places of work, has forced them to cluster in densely packed, vertical structures in the city's central areas.

Over the past year, the SMPA's flurry of activities in drafting a new master plan, is largely due to recent judicial interventions and more specifically, the Supreme Court's order for restoring 'law and order' in Karachi. This is particularly evident in Chief Justice Gulzar's nostalgic references to '...restore Karachi to its former glory', a vague statement that has steered the SMPA's plan to conserve and restore the city's historic district in line with the Chief Justice's recollections of the way Karachi 'looked' in the 1980s. Such planning efforts will, in fact, pave the way for more demolitions and displacements in the guise of 'Fixing the Old City'. Some of the key projects outlined in these plans, and others we have mentioned throughout this report, are centered around the construction of high-rise apartments for middle- and upper-middle-income residents. When put into effect, these plans will displace thousands of poor, working class, lower-income and lower-to-middle-income households, and lead to a substantially more expensive land/housing market, thus creating a powerful double-bind: depriving ordinary people access to land by the sheer unaffordability of the land and housing market.

4. Karachi Transformation Plan

In September 2020, in the aftermath of the devastating urban floods in Karachi, a 10-member Provincial Coordination & Implementation Committee (PCIC) was constituted with Sindh Chief Minister Syed Murad Ali Shah as its Chairman. The PCIC will oversee the implementation of a PKR 1.1 trillion (USD $6.8 billion) development package for Karachi - the 'Karachi Transformation Plan.' The key stakeholders in the PCIC include representatives of the Provincial Government: Chief Secretary, Secretary Local Govt, Secretary Transport Mass Transit Department, Chairman Planning and Development Department (P&D), Commissioner Karachi, Administrator Karachi. Notably, a key stakeholder is the Pakistan Army’s V Corps; Karachi, National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) and the Federal Government (See Annexure 4 for details of ToRs). The 'transformation' plan is centered around 6 issues deemed urgent by the Federal and Provincial authorities: provision of effective water supply schemes; sewerage treatment and disposal systems; solid waste management; the clearance/ removal of encroachments; road repairing schemes; and introducing a modern transportation system in the city. Even though the initial discussions about this plan signaled a strong inclination towards a transfer of administrative powers to the local level - from the provincial government to the city administrator or local government - instead, there appears to be a deepening centralization of such powers (Raza, 2020).

Notably, most of the projects - the Greater Karachi Water Supply Project (K-IV), Revival of Karachi Circular Railway (KCR), Green Line BRT, Rehabilitation of rivers, nullahs and storm water drains amongst others -- have been in the pipeline for over a decade. These have been brought under the umbrella of the Karachi Transformation Plan. In 2020, the PCIC announced in the leading English newspaper Dawn (2020) that thousands of households (predominantly low-income and informal) and commercial structures will be relocated to clear the city's main drainage channels. The Federal and Provincial Governments as well as the Pakistan Army, see this displacement as a necessary feature of 'disaster management' or to mitigate the risk of future urban flooding in Karachi (See Map 8.1, Table 8.1). Considering these mega-plans and interventions and with no talk of resettlement or compensation in sight, where will the future displacees go? Will they be shunted to the city’s margins-over 30 km away? Moreover, with land in the periphery increasingly being acquired for real estate development projects, will land even be available for resettlement purposes? These questions are particularly pertinent in the context of a city that has become a site of 'speculative strategy', leaving little room to see land as a site that is inextricably bound to social life.

8.3 City as a Site of Speculative Strategy

In talking about future land displacements, we have shown that in Karachi's informal neighborhoods, where average plot sizes are 80 sq. yds, the lack of available space often leads to the vertical expansion of homes on existing plots of land. There are multiple reasons for the vertical expansion, e.g., the need of greater storage space; increased number of members in the household; the need to supplement household incomes by building an additional floor to rent out. These dynamics create a doubling of density. Certain urban planners (Hasan, 2015) have written about increasing densification in the inner-city informal neighborhoods, where buildings as high as ground plus four stories have emerged. Hence, when planners and government officials talk about 'cleaning' inner-city historic areas, or demolishing 'stray' or 'unstable' buildings, they fail to take account of the sheer numbers of people who will be rendered homeless due to such 'cleaning drives', especially in the context of any viable plan for resettlement or compensation.

Certain scholars (Rao, 2007:245) have emphasized how manipulations of the physical form of the city, have become sites of speculative strategies with: "...development rules and regulations on the
one hand and people on the other.” It is within the juxtaposition of different forms of land tenure and housing, where lower income settlements are located adjacent to the middle, upper-middle-class houses where people find work, which creates the nodes for speculative densities of the built form. Such conceptualizations of the city see these spaces of informality as ‘inefficient and obsolete in their present condition’, necessitating the people living in them to be subjected to displacement, to make them more ‘efficient’. Thus, it is also the development of rules and regulations that become tools for executing the process of displacement. Further, in this emerging pattern of already high densities in the city center, is the creation of premium housing societies (Bahria, Defence, Naya Nazimabad) that continue to shift to the city’s periphery. These housing arrangements cater largely to middle and upper-middle-class residents and are often the outcome of collisions between the state and private developers. Such developments have triggered fresh rounds of displacements that impact indigenous people who have long-standing claims on land in the periphery (Anwar 2018; Daily Times, 2020).

Finally, we posit it is crucial to look at density not only in the physical sense, but as the nodes of intersections between the social and phenomenological experiences of the city (Rao, 2007). This social dimension of density is most prominent when the informal, dense settlements - where most of Karachi’s urban dwellers reside - are under threat of displacement. As people mobilize by coming together to safeguard their land and homes, it is not mere demographic density that matters but peoples’ social or relational densities that reinforce an understanding of their place in the city. As a 52-year-old male respondent from Sindh Muslim Colony, District East, said:

“...come by just to break my house.” (March 2019)

8.4 Recommendations and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

We make the following broad recommendations based on the findings of this report. These are critical steps in the context of the new infrastructure and urban development projects, as well as the urban flooding or disaster management plan that the Federal and Provincial Governments and the Pakistan military, have unveiled for Karachi in 2020. The recommendations are placed in the context of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) - a full explanation of the SDGs can be found in Annexure 9:

1. The existence of informal settlements or katchi abadis and jhuggies needs to be understood as an outcome of the failure of the state to plan for and provide affordable housing. This ‘failure’ is rooted in the history of urban planning and development after Pakistan’s independence in 1947. When the provision of affordable housing fell far short of on-ground realities in cities like Karachi that had experienced the brunt of post-Partition demographic shifts and attendant political-economic transformations (Daechsel, 2015; Ansari, 2011). At present, master planning and infrastructure and urban development projects are conceived in a manner that labels these forms of shelter as ‘illegal’ or ‘encroachments’. This ends up becoming a justification for land displacement. These actions work against SDG 11, which includes the targets: 11.1. ensure access for all to adequate, safe, and affordable housing and basic services and upgrade slums and, 11.3. enhance inclusive and sustainable urbanization and capacity for participatory, integrated, and sustainable human settlement planning and management in all countries.

2. Land displacements are often justified for infrastructure and urban development projects that are required in the ‘national’ or ‘public’ interest. However, the projects never clearly define the ‘public’ - after all Karachi comprises many publics. Hence, projects must be evaluated regarding which publics they will benefit, and which publics will bear the costs. This is critical because historically, the cost has been borne by marginalized groups and the urban poor who are never seriously considered into project impacts and costs. A key pathway to ensure this is through ‘eviction impact assessments’ that must be conducted prior to the finalization of any infrastructure or urban development project. The Housing and Land Rights Network (HLRN) has developed the Eviction Impact Assessment Tool (EvIA Tool), which seeks to determine the full consequences that persons, households and communities experience due to forced displacement. This tool can be used to quantify costs. It builds on the United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-based Evictions and Displacement, which states that “eviction impact assessments” should be conducted prior to the finalization and sanction of any project.

3. In the current phase of ongoing infrastructure and urban developments, it is likely more land displacements will ensue in Karachi. Even though there is no justification for further forced displacements, at the very least, all government bodies should be able to follow a minimum and clear-cut criterion for resettlement. Currently, local, and provincial as well as federal governments, follow no clear-cut protocols during evictions, leading to arbitrary practices, for instance giving residents little or no time to appeal or move, or with bulldozers and police appearing without notice, a process that triggers violent outcomes. This is further exacerbated by Supreme Court orders for anti-encroachment drives that have created a particularly violent atmosphere, and immense psychological trauma for residents. The UN Guidelines (HLRN 2018) can be used to develop a basic set of criteria for the different layers of government to follow in the Karachi context. Such guidelines should include impacts on jhuggies as well homeless communities, and on tenants (such as male bachelor-migrants, young families, widows, single working women) who can ill-afford their own house and are thereby compelled to rent rooms/dwellings. Land displacement would push such groups into greater vulnerability. Moreover, the practice of cut-off dates for the regularization of katchi abadis should be abolished because this has become a powerful tool through which the state keeps people in constant limbo for achieving tenure security.

4. An important aspect of developing a basic set of criteria must take into consideration the role of key federal legislation such as the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. This Act should be amended at the national and provincial levels to include (i) a strict definition that explains what constitutes as ‘public purpose’ with respect to the projects undertaken by the government. Some core requirements of what should constitute public purpose are equitable social and economic outcomes for all, and environmental sustainability; (ii) de facto tenure holders must be considered as project affected persons; (iii) compensation must include social impacts of the acquisition; and (iv) resettlement of the affected persons must be made part of the compensation, along with a grievance handling mechanism. This will entail a review and implementation of the draft framework for resettlement, namely the National Rehabilitation Policy, 2002 in case of acquisition of land. This connects with SDG 16 to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels. To promote the rule of law at the national level and to ensure equal access to justice for all, it is imperative to understand that the protection of homes is a basic human right and is directly related to people’s social and psychological health. The demolition of homes is a violation of basic human rights, but this is not considered as such by courts. Courts and legal frameworks should consider the occurrence of psychological...
violence and find pathways to mitigate negative impacts on communities.

5. In addition to bringing reforms in the current land legislation, there is an urgent need to make the existing framework inclusive of women and other genders. While SDG 5 concerns the adoption and strengthening of policies and enforceable legislation for the promotion of gender equality, this needs to be extended to include reforms in the current land legislation to make the existing framework inclusive of women. For instance, the LAA 1894 contains no reference to women/females/transgenders, and it uses the word ‘he’ in land related laws. This goes directly against Pakistan’s Constitution - which calls for all citizens to be equal under the law, and women’s full participation in all spheres of national life. Further, according to Pakistan’s fifth periodic report to the CEDAW Committee (Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women), in 2018, the Ministry of Human Rights declared that the state is “making efforts to foster the formalization of the agreements related to land that concerned women”. One example leveraged in the report was the Punjab Katchi Abadi Scheme, covering 110,000 households/plots where husband and wife have equal rights. However, these approaches need to be embedded in law, with guidance to policymakers and practitioners to ensure that recommendations and changes are cascaded through all spheres of land related legislation, and not in small-scale stand-alone projects. This would mean, as SDG 5.a.2 states, ensuring that laws and policies guarantee women equal rights to land ownership and control as well as women’s right to inheritance in the form of property, which as our findings reflect, are largely disproportionate in the current Pakistan context.

6. Resettlement and compensation should be approached through a strong commitment to gender inclusivity and recognition of the interlinkages between livelihoods, land, infrastructures and mobility. This has three key aspects: (1) securing the participation of women early in the process to ensure their social and psychological safety, and mobility as well as needs of children, elderly, and more vulnerable groups. Women are routinely left out of discussions of resettlement and paying attention to the differentiated impacts of displacement on women and men, is crucial for addressing the concerns of those who are most vulnerable. While SDG 11.2 concerns the provision of safe, affordable, accessible and sustainable transport systems particularly for those in vulnerable positions, our data suggests that the challenge of constrained mobility further acts as a barrier to educational, health and social participation of women and children in particular; (2) even though this recommendation has been repeated frequently, it is still imperative to ensure that resettlement in far off locations is carried out only if the city’s transport networks are well-connected and affordable; Land, housing, and mobility/transport are interconnected, and resettlement policies hardly account for people’s mobility needs. For instance, in the case of the Preedy Street displacement and resettlement, residents were relocated to Mehmoodabad that is well-connected with the city’s transport infrastructure; (3) It is not enough to consider tenure security, for instance in the form of allotments or housing units, and compensation such as cash, as a guarantee of long-term security for resettled communities. Even though allotments are an asset that has value for the urban poor, livelihoods too must be given consideration. This is even more imperative given that many households that face displacement, are engaged in informal work. In government plans for resettlement, authorities will need to carefully consider how people’s livelihoods can be made secure and maintained post-resettlement. With most people relying on informal means of livelihoods, recognition of the interlinkages between land and livelihood should be integral in future policy decisions, with laws and policies that cover labor rights in the informal economy.

7. There is an urgent need to review appropriate planning and governance mechanisms to investigate land available for resettlement. One way this can be addressed is through in-situ rehabilitation, through a nuanced understanding of all that it entails. As we have seen in the KCR neighborhoods, the close ties between spaces of work and living, and consequent cost saved on transport emerge as a key determinant for residents’ refusal to move from these neighborhoods. In-situ rehabilitation can be a viable solution, as suggested in SDG 11.1 through slum upgradation schemes, and one towards which residents are more accommodating. However, in circumstances where the in-situ rehabilitation is not a possibility, resettlement can be looked at through coordinated and transparent effort by the Provincial Board of Revenue and the 19 land owning agencies, who can identify, organize, and transfer ownership of potential lands for resettlement. A case in point is a 9.5 acres plot of land identified for resettlement by some residents of the KCR settlements. This land is located next to the Kala Pul Bridge, near several KCR neighborhoods. The CBOs and male and female activists in the KCR settlements, should be consulted prior to the drafting of a resettlement plan. However, such parcels of land can be considered as possible options only after contestation over the land ownership is resolved, which in this case was a conflict between Pakistan Railways and the military.

8. Given Karachi’s fragmented nature of land governance, all 19 land owning agencies, (Annexure 8) must come together to resolve the current murkiness and overlaps in land ownership. Resolving these conflicts is particularly important in the case of resettlement sites, for there have been past instances of double displacements as an outcome of changing nature/categorization of land, the displaces of the New Preedy Street Project were resettled at the Pul Bridge, near several KCR neighborhoods which was later slated for evictions due to its status as an amenity plot. This must also include developing effective and accountable institutions at all levels and conflict resolution mechanisms, as highlighted by SDG 16.6, for the present murkiness necessitates people affected by the violence of land displacement to approach civil society organizations and activists to be heard or considered.

9. Particular attention needs to be given to informal settlements on railway lands, along rivers and nullahs where residents face displacement without any plans for relocation. The Pakistan Railways, the KUTC, and Sindh Provincial Government should make a coordinated effort to initiate a dialogue, and finance solutions that are appropriate and acceptable to the residents. Public consultations with the residents and organizations, such as CBOs working in these settlements, should also be undertaken to find appropriate solutions. It is imperative that voices from the ground up are made a part of the broader discourse around resettlements and decision making. This is in accordance with SDG 11.3 which calls for inclusive, participatory, integrated, and sustainable human settlements: 11.3.2 concerning the proportion of cities with a direct participation structure of civil society in urban planning and management. However, we emphasize that this process not only calls for transparency and participation by civil society bodies, but such participation must include the voices of the community, with a particular focus on women, migrants, and other groups from income poor backgrounds, regardless of document ownership.

10. The Sindh Government and multilateral donor organizations such as the World Bank, should take substantive steps in allowing, accepting and supporting spaces of resistance and community mobilization. The idea of inclusive development/inclusive cities rides high on the international agenda and is exemplified in the SDGs, the World Bank, and the UN Habitat’s New Urban Agenda, especially the commitment to ‘leave no one behind’ in surmounting the challenges of economic, social and environmental dimensions. But in the context of cities like Karachi where established structures of power marginalize the involvement of the poor in the delivery of development, the idea of inclusivity does not translate into practice. Hence, communities that mount resistance campaigns against displacement should be supported for their self-organized initiatives and encouraged to challenge inequitable and harmful urban development and infrastructure projects. For low-income, poor communities to become fundamentally meaningful actors and contributors to building sustainable and inclusive cities, there needs to be an acknowledgement of their rights to challenge and seek redress without criminalization.
11. A critical aspect of delivering affordable housing is reforming land governance. This entails two issues: (1) better integration of land-use and infrastructure planning to provide a strategic framework for shelter delivery and resolving land conflicts; and (2) developing a secure, updated, and transparent land information system. A key component of this transparency will be data availability and its access for all concerned stakeholders, especially vulnerable communities. A discussion needs to be undertaken on how the processes for data availability can be streamlined effectively, given that the current avenues in the form of Right to Information Act (RTI) are long, cumbersome processes with limited success.

12. Given the adverse effects of mega-infrastructural projects as laid out in this report, there should be a larger questioning/challenging of the wisdom of such projects that limit the potential for sustainable and inclusive urban development. The sheer scale of investments in such projects is predicated on geopolitical shifts and profit-seeking agendas that have created very high stakes for the Pakistani state. The projects are also entangled with urban planning/development visions that are tied to the state’s agenda for gaining political legitimacy in a new, democratic phase of governance. The effects of these transformations are materializing on ground in violent ways by making poor, marginalized, vulnerable populations expendable.
Annexure 1 - Psychological and Legal Workshops

Objectives of Psychological Workshop
1. Give an introduction on the significance of understanding stress and its role in predicting mental health and wellbeing of women
2. Positive listening to the sources of stress among women
3. Identify distress inducing events among participants
4. Conduct mindful breathing and guided stress relieving exercise

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date and Duration</th>
<th>Number of Participants</th>
<th>Venue</th>
<th>Organizers</th>
<th>Major Theme of Workshop</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Psychological workshop 1</td>
<td>17-November-2018</td>
<td>Urban Resource Center</td>
<td>IBA and URC</td>
<td>1. Information and Awareness of Stress &amp; Anxiety.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From 3:00 pm to 5:00 pm</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Gender Effect of stress and anxiety.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50 Members</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Counselling on how to take stress and anxiety heads on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Affirmative listening and breathing exercise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological workshop 2</td>
<td>25-March-2019</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Information and Awareness of Stress &amp; Anxiety.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From 2:00 pm to 4:30 pm</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Gender Effect of stress and anxiety.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>70 Members</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Counselling on how to take stress and anxiety heads on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Affirmative listening and breathing exercise.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Objectives of Legal Workshop
1. Share information with participants about constitutionally protected fundamental rights concerning land;
2. Facilitate understanding of the impending evictions ordered by the Supreme Court;
3. Share information especially with women about the importance of land related legal documentation, and assist them to identify the same;
4. Share information with women about negotiation tactics in the case of community involvement in the government’s land appropriation process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date and Duration</th>
<th>Number of Participants</th>
<th>Venue</th>
<th>Organizers</th>
<th>Major Theme of Workshop</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal Workshop 1</td>
<td>15th December 2018</td>
<td>URC Office</td>
<td>IBA and URC</td>
<td>1. Information and awareness on right to land.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2018 - 2 hours</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Discussion about the Supreme Court’s eviction orders, and what they mean and the implications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>68 members</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Group activity to identify important components of legal land ownership documents;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Role play activity to negotiate compensation, and resettlement and rehabilitation plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Workshop 2</td>
<td>29th December 2018</td>
<td>Primary School, Ghareebabad - Liaqatabad</td>
<td>IBA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2018 - 2 hours</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35 members</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Workshop 3</td>
<td>13th February 2019</td>
<td>Ghareebabad - PIDC</td>
<td>IBA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2019 - 2 hours</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36 members</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Annexure 2 - Household (English/Urdu) Surveys

English Household Survey for KCR

Research associate: ________________________________
Date of Interview: ________________________________
Assigned participant code: _______________________
Assigned code number: ____________________________
Location Name: _________________________________

1. Age: ________________________________
2. Religion: [ ] Muslim [ ] Hindu [ ] Christian [ ] Other [ ]
3. Caste/ Ethnicity: ________________________________
4. Gender: [ ] Male [ ] Female [ ] Other [ ]
5. Marital Status: [ ] Married [ ] Unmarried [ ] Divorced [ ] Widow/Widower [ ]
6. Occupation: ________________________________
7. Time does it take to get to work (in minutes): ________________________________
8. Transportation: ________________________________
9. Number of Household Members:
   a. [ ] Male ______ b. [ ] Female ______ c. [ ] Child ______
10. Number of earning members in the household:
    a. [ ] Male ______ b. [ ] Female ______ c. [ ] Child ______
11. Does anyone in your family require special healthcare (physical or mental)?
    ______________________________________
12. Sources of Income: _____________________________________________________________
   ______________________________________
13. Income bracket: [ ] Low [ ] Lower middle [ ] middle [ ] upper middle [ ] upper [ ]
14. Monthly expense: ________________________________
15. Who has the title/ lease to this land? (or who pays the rent): ________________________________
16. a. Educational attainment of the most educated person in the household: ________________________________
    b. What is your educational attainment?
    Never enrolled in school [ ] Primary [ ] Elementary [ ] Matriculation/O-Levels [ ] Intermediate/A-Levels [ ] BA/B.Com/Diploma [ ] Professional Degree [ ]
    MA/ M.Phil [ ] Madrasah Education [ ]
17. a. Length of stay at this location: ________________________________
    b. Where did you live before moving here? ________________________________
    c. Reason for moving here: ________________________________
18. a. Previous land status: Regularize [ ] Non-regularized [ ]
    Lease/malkana-haqqoq [ ] Formal Contract [ ] Rent [ ] Paghri [ ] Other [ ]
    b. Rent amount ________/ NA.
    c. Plot size: ________________________________
    d. No. of floors: ________________________________
    e. No. of persons in the household ________________________________
f. Construction materials: _____________

19. How secure did you feel in your previous home?  

   b. Rent amount _____________ / NA.
   c. Plot size: ______________
   d. No. of floors: ______________
   e. No. of persons in the household __________
   f. Construction materials: _____________

21. a. How much did you pay to acquire this status/land? _________________________________
   b. How much do you think this land costs now? _______________________________________

22. How secure do you feel in your current home?  

23. How psychologically stressed do you feel in your current home?  

24. a. Are you a member of any formal or informal group/organization?  No [1] Yes [2]
   c. Have the groups and networks you are a member of benefitted you and/or your community (any help/support provided)?  No [1] Yes [2]:

   b. How did you find out about this threat?  _______________________________________


27. How have recent developments impacted you and your family?  

   b. How satisfied do you feel about the compensation?  

29. How would you rank the following facilities with regards to your living arrangements?  
   (a)Location (distance, commute, accessibility, income) ______
   (b)Cost of land and construction (possibility of extension) ______
   (c)Provision of basic amenities (electricity, gas, paved roads, WASH) ______
   (d)Tenure/Security ______


31. Do you think community participation/ involvement has an impact on the outcome?  
English Household Survey for Lyari Basti (LB)

Research associate: ____________________________
Date of Interview: ____________________________
Assigned code number: _______________________
Location Name: _______________________________

1. Age: _____
3. Caste/ Ethnicity: ____________________________
5. Marital Status
   a. Occupation now: ______________________________ Place: ______________________________
   b. Occupation before resettlement: ______________________________ Place: ______________________________
   c. Occupation following resettlement (within first five years): ______________________________ Place: ______________________________
7. Time it takes to get to work (minutes): a) now ____________ b) before RS ____________
8. Mode of Transportation: a) now ____________ b) before RS ____________
   a. Details: __________________________________________
10. Number of current Household Members: Total: ____ [Male]: ____ [Female]: ____ [Child]: ____
11. Number of previous Household Members: Total: ____ [Male]: ____ [Female]: ____ [Child]: ____
12. Number of earning members in the household:
   Now: [Male] ____ b. [Female] ____ c. [Child] ____
   Before: [Male] ____ b. [Female] ____ c. [Child] ____
13. Sources of Income: ____________________________________________________________
14. Monthly expenses: __________________________________________________
15. Does anyone in your family require special healthcare (physical or mental)? [1] No [2] Yes
16. Who has the title/ lease to this land? ____________________________
17. Educational attainment of the most educated person in the household:
18. What is your educational attainment?
19. Length of stay at this location (years): ____________________________
20. Where did you live before moving here? ____________________________ (Settlement Name)
   a. Plot size: ____________; No. of floors: ____________
   b. Construction materials: Wall: ____________ Roof: ____________
22. How secure did you feel in your previous home?
   a. Plot size: ____________; No. of floors: ____________
   b. Construction materials: Wall: ____________ Roof: ____________
24. How much have you invested on this land?
25. How much do you think your property/house costs now? ________________________________
26. How secure do you feel in your current home?
27. How psychologically stressed do you feel in your current home?
28. What are your biggest sources of stress? ____________________________________________
29. Are you a member of any formal or informal group/organization? No [1] Yes [2]
   b. Have any groups and networks benefitted you and/or your community (any help/support provided)? No [1] Yes [2]

   a. Which laws?

31. How has resettlement impacted you and your family?

32. Were you provided full compensation in the form of?

   Explanation:

34. How would you rank the following facilities with regards to your living arrangements?
   a. Location (distance, commute, accessibility, income)
   b. Provision of basic amenities (electricity, gas, paved roads, WASH)
   c. Tenure/Security

35. Did you personally participate in any community/social organization during the resettlement?
   Reason:

36. Do you think community participation/involvement had an impact on the outcome?

37. Are you/have you tried to move elsewhere?
   Reason:

38. Location of stay between eviction and resettlement period?
   Relatives [1]: ____________ Rent [2]: ____________ Other [3]: ____________
   Length of stay there (months): ____________
Annexures

English Household Survey for Lyari Basti (LB)

Research associate:
Date of Interview:
Assigned code number:
Location Name:

1. Age: _____

3. Caste/ Ethnicity:
5. Marital Status

   a. Occupation now: Place:
   b. Occupation before resettlement: Place:
   c. Occupation following resettlement (within first five years): Place

7. Time it takes to get to work (minutes): a) now ________ b) before RS ________

8. Mode of Transportation: a) now ______________ b) before RS ______________
   a. Details:

10. Number of current Household Members: Total: [Male]: [Female]: [Child]:
11. Number of previous Household Members: Total: [Male]: [Female]: [Child]:

12. Number of earning members in the household:
    Before: [Male] ______ [Female] ______ [Child] ______

13. Sources of Income:

14. Monthly expenses:

15. Does anyone in your family require special healthcare (physical or mental)? [1] No [2] Yes

16. Who has the title/ lease to this land?

17. Educational attainment of the most educated person in the household:

18. What is your educational attainment?

19. Length of stay at this location (years): ________________ (Settlement Name)
20. Where did you live before moving here? ________________
   Other [4]: ________________
   a. Plot size: ________________; No. of floors: __________;
   b. Construction materials: Wall: ___________ Roof: ______________

22. How secure did you feel in your previous home?

   a. Plot size: ________________; No. of floors: __________;
   b. Construction materials: Wall: ___________ Roof: ______________

24. How much have you invested on this land? ____________________________

25. How much do you think your property/house costs now? ____________________________

26. How secure do you feel in your current home?

27. How psychologically stressed do you feel in your current home?

28. What are your biggest sources of stress?

29. Are you a member of any formal or informal group/organization? No [1] Yes [2]

b. Have any groups and networks benefitted you and/or your community (any help/support provided)? No [1] Yes [2] Benefits: ____________________________________________


31. How has resettlement impacted you and your family?  


32. Were you provided full compensation in the form of  


Explanation: _____________________________________

34. How would you rank the following facilities with regards to your living arrangements?  

a. Location (distance, commute, accessibility, income)  

b. Provision of basic amenities (electricity, gas, paved roads, WASH)  

c. Tenure/Security  

35. Did you personally participate in any community/social organization during the resettlement?  


36. Do you think community participation/involvement had an impact on the outcome?  


37. Are you/have you tried to move elsewhere?  


38. Location of stay between eviction and resettlement period?  

Relatives [1]: ____________ Rent [2]: ____________ Other [3]: ____________

Length of stay there (months): ________________________
آیا مهم پا در چهار پای اول دنیا چیست؟

آیا مهم پا در چهار پای اول دنیا چیست؟

آیا مهم پا در چهار پای اول دنیا چیست؟

آیا مهم پا در چهار پای اول دنیا چیست؟

آیا مهم پا در چهار پای اول دنیا چیست؟

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آیا مهم پا در چهار پای اول دنیا چیست؟

آیا مهم پا در چهار پای اول دنیا چیست؟

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آیا مهم پا در چهار پای اول دنیا چیست؟

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آیا مهم پا در چهار پای اول دنیا چیست؟

آیا مهم پا در چهار پای اول دنیا چیست؟

آیا مهم پا در چهار پای اول دنیا چیست؟

آیا مهم پا در چهار پای اول دنیا چیست؟

آیا مهم پا در چهار پای اول دنیا چیست؟

آیا مهم پا در چهار پای اول دنیا چیست؟

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آیا مهم پا در چهار پای اول دنیا چیست؟

آیا مهم پا در چهار پای اول دنیا چیست؟

آیا مهم پا در چهار پای اول دنیا چیست؟

آیا مهم پا در چهار پای اول دنیا چیست؟

آیا مهم پا در چهار پای اول دنیا چیست؟

آیا مهم پا در چهار پای اول دنیا چیست؟

آیا مهم پا در چهار پای اول دنیا چیست؟

آیا مهم پا در چهار پای اول دنیا چیست؟

آیا مهم پا در چهار پای اول دنیا چیست؟

آیا مهم پا در چهار پای اول دنیا چیست؟

آیا مهم پا در چهار پای اول دنیا چیست؟

آیا مهم پا در چهار پای اول دنیا چیست؟

آیا مهم پا در چهار پای اول دنیا چیست؟
Survey Form for Market Demolitions/Evictions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Name:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Gender:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Father/Husband Name:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Caste/ Ethnicity:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. CNIC Number:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Phone Number:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. House Address:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Shop Address:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Market Name:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. District:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Nature of business:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Duration of business:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13a. Date of demolition:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13b. Material present in the shop at the time of demolition? If yes, value:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15a. Size of Shop:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15b. Number of shops (if more than one)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Number of people whose jobs are affected:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19b. Who has the title/lease of the shop? (if any):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19c. Amount of rent paid? (if any) 19d. Till when:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19e. To whom:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20b. If yes, how many days in advance:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21a. Did you take any legal action after receiving the notice? Yes [1]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21b. If yes, please mention details:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22a. Did you file a case in court/take legal action after demolition?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22b. If yes, please mention details:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23a. Do you have any alternative source of income? Yes [1] No [2]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
23b. If not, how are you meeting your expenses in the current conditions?

24b. If yes, what is its nature? -------------------------
Where? -----------------------------------------------

Additional Comments:

---------------------------------------------------

Name of Surveyor/Date ____________________________

Urdu Participation Consent Form
Annexure 3 - Karachi Urban Lab (KUL) Toilet Proposal for the KCR Displacees

As part of the demolition drive that took place in Gharibabad, Liaquatabad on 25 May 2019, over 333 houses have been demolished, including houses from the nearby Quaid-e-Azam Colony, as claimed by the residents. The families previously living in these houses continue to live amidst the rubble in a precarious state, with electricity, gas and other amenities cut-off, and residents left without access to basic toilet and sanitation facilities. A team of researchers from the Karachi Urban Lab visited the area on 16th June 2019 -- a month after the anti-encroachment drive, and observed the displaced residents continue to live in temporary shelters on or around the rubble of their houses, with makeshift toilets or utilizing remnants of previous toilets. The conditions were extremely unsanitary. Residents had placed chaadars (fabric) around the sanitary fixture for privacy, with the roof exposed. These make-shift arrangements not only place people at risk of disease but pose significant privacy concerns for the women, who have to relieve themselves under the constant fear of exposure. Images show the toilets are no longer functional, or fit for use by the displaced residents.

Numerous toilets have been buried under the rubble of the houses, no longer usable:

Fixtures unusable for toilet facilities after demolition:
Toilets cannot be used by women due to privacy concerns.

At present, only four toilets are functional in the two settlements. At times, residents use a charpai as a door, and often women stand guard while a female friend or relative uses the toilet. Below are some images of current conditions of two of the functional toilet facilities in the area.

Toilets with low height concrete walls or fabric walls used in present state by the residents.

In this present state, it is essential the government provide decent toilet facility to the displaced residents, until such time that a proper resettlement plan is initiated and executed, which according to the Supreme Court order, will take a year. This is a very long period of time in which it is impossible for the residents to continue living without basic and fundamental needs of a toilet. Temporary toilets should be constructed for the displaced residents: at least one toilet per 5 houses, with a W.C, wash basin and shower facility and an overhead water tank. This will ensure especially the privacy and safety of women’s access to toilets.

Below are marked locations of houses where one toilet facility can be constructed to cater to 5 households and to meet the immediate needs of those living in these demolished houses. A total 33 toilets are proposed at approximate intervals of 60 feet, which will be at a minimum distance of 30 feet from the track.

**Approximate Costing:**

- **Block Masonry work + plaster:** Rs. 26,000/- (256sqft x Rs100)
- **Stone Soling:** Rs. 4,000/-
- **Fixtures (W.C, Washbasin):** Rs. 2500/-
- **Overhead water tank:** Rs. 5000/-
- **Metal door:** Rs. 4000/-

**Total Construction Cost of one toilet:** Rs. 41,500/-
Annexure 4 - Notices for Evictions, Eligibility Certificates, Offer Letters, Rent Slips, Tenancy Paper

KCR PAPs Offer letters

Rent slips

Ownership Eligibility Certificate
Agreement of Tenancy

This agreement made at Karachi this 25th day of October 2005 between City District Government Karachi through its

Dr. D. I. Khan, M.D. C.T.

Mr. Muhammad Sher Ali, Secretary

Mr. Muhammad Nizamuddin, S.C.

and permanent resident of

M/s. Muhammad Nizamuddin, S.C.

and permanent resident of

Whereas the lessor is the exclusive owner of shops/offices/building No. C1 situated at Oriental Shopping Centre, Market Road, Karachi and desires to give the same on rent at Rs. 11,000/- per month for the purpose of commercial trade except that the goods

And whereas the aforesaid lessee has agreed to take the said shop/offices/building at the aforesaid rent of Rs. 11,000/- per month from the lessor.

Now therefore the parties agree to the following terms & conditions:

1. That the lessor shall be paid for a period of 11 months commencing from 1-2-2005 renewable with the consent of the lessor.

2. That the lessee shall make the payment of six months rent in advance to the lessor in question of the premises in question. In case of non-payment of rent, the lessor shall have the right to evict the lessee through its own agency and to secure possession of the premises in question. The lessee would of course be entitled to the refund of the amount of rent for the unexpired period if any.

3. That the lessor shall use the premises for the purpose of trade referred to above and for no other purpose.

4. That the lessor shall execute all agreements and contracts in respect of the premises in question.

5. That the lessee shall meet premia and deliver its vacant and peaceful possession to the lessor on the expiry of the lease period, failing which the lessee shall be deemed to be wrongfully occupied of the premises and the lessor shall have the right to evict the lessee through its own agency and to secure possession of the premises in question. The lessee would of course be entitled to the refund of the amount of rent for the unexpired period if any.

6. That the lessee shall be the lessees of the premises in question for payment of the rent on the specified dates and also to take possession of the premises in question in case payment of rent is made on or before the date mentioned above.

District Government

Annexures

Tenancy Papers
Quarters Eviction Notice from DC East Karachi

Eviction Notice from Karachi Port Trust

Eviction Notice for KCR informal settlements from Karachi Port Trust
Eviction Notice (Urdu) from Estate Department

PCIC TOR Notification for Provincial Coordination and Implementation Committee
Cancellation of leases in alignment of Nullahs

Annexures

Annexure 5- Maps

KCR Cross Section Map

Empress Market Before and After Demolition
Machar Colony Site Analysis

Machar Colony Infrastructure Profile 1
Machar Colony Infrastructure Profile 2

Women’s Daily work Routine in Machar Colony

*This chart depicts the daily routine of the majority of women living and working in Machar Colony.*
Daily Work Routine of Men in Machar Colony

Annexure 6-AutoCAD Maps of Study Sites’ Amenities Profiles
## Annexure 7- KCR & Quarters Timelines

### KCR timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>KCR starts for the first time from Drigh Road to Wazir Mansion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Railway is extended from Wazir Mansion to Karachi City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970’s</td>
<td>Operation begins for the circle section (30 km of single-track with double-track right of way) and the main line section (14 km of double track).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980’s</td>
<td>KCR operates 24 trains per day and the main line operates 80 trains per day, providing transportation to more than 6 million passengers per year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>KCR starts incurring major losses due to mismanagement and corruption; the vast majority of trains are discontinued with only a few running on the loopline.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>All KCR operations are discontinued.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Minister of Railways, Ghos Bakhsh Khan Mahar, states the revival of the KCR has been planned for which feasibility studies and tenders will be floated and awarded to the lowest bidder, adding that the KCR will be operated in the private sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>A report titled “Task Force on Revival of Karachi Circular Railway” is released by the Railway Ministry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz inaugurates the first phase of the KCR and claims the project will be revived in three phases “within a couple of years or so”. PKR 3.5 billion (US$33 million) is pledged to be spent on the complete renovation of the KCR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>A feasibility study on Revival of Karachi Circular Railway conducted by Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th May, 2008</td>
<td>The Karachi Urban Transport Corporation (KUTC), which is a Public Limited Company, is incorporated by the Securities Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2009</td>
<td>An EIA (Environmental Assessment Report) on the KCR is published by KUTC &amp; EMC (Environmental Management Consultants).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), which is funding the project, sponsors a final study prepared by Special Assistance for Project Formulation (SAPROF).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>JICA agrees to a PKR 260 billion (US$2.5 billion) loan to the KUTC, which will oversee the rebuilding and refurbishment of the KCR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2017</td>
<td>The Government of Pakistan approves a PKR. 27.9 billion (US$260 million) restoration package for the KCR.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Martin Quarters Timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947-48</td>
<td>Jamshed Quarters, Martin East, Martin West, and Jahangir Quarters are all constituted as part of Karachi’s Pakistan Quarters for the muhajirs arriving from India, many of whom are bureaucrats in the new government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>The central government’s Estate Office starts issuing notices to some residents that they need to vacate the houses soon as they are about to reach retirement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s-80s</td>
<td>During General Zia-ul-Haq’s military government, attempts are made to evict people but only a few houses are demolished.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>Nawaz Sharif’s government promises housing rights to people living in Pakistan Quarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>The Action Committee for Rehabilitation of Government Employees complains that the promises made by the previous government to grant ownership, have not been upheld and demands immediate action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>The minister for Housing &amp; Works, Iqbal Muhammad Ali, discloses the government will allot Quarters to its employees on an ownership basis and survey work is started.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Federal Housing Minister Iqbal Muhammad Ali distributes certificates of ownership among 394 residents of Pakistan Quarters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>The Ministry of Housing revokes its decision to grant ownership and orders residents to leave the land they have occupied.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th June, 2018</td>
<td>The Supreme Court, after an application from the Federal Housing and Works Ministry, orders the eviction of people ‘encroaching’ on residential houses in Pakistan Quarters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th October, 2018</td>
<td>Riot police and officers from the anti-encroachment cell, plan a raid to evict people living in Pakistan Quarters. This leads to 16 people seriously injured before the operation is called off.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Annexure 8 - Land Owning Agencies in Karachi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal Level</td>
<td>Defence Housing Authority (DHA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Karachi Port Trust (KPT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Six Cantonment Board</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Port Qasim</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government of Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pakistan Railways</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provincial Level</td>
<td>Government of Sindh</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kirthar National Park</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lyari Development Authority (LDA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Malir Development Authority (MDA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sindh Industrial Trading Estate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Level</td>
<td>KMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Housing Societies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Annexure - 9 - Addressing UN Sustainable Development Goals

### SDG #5: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SDG Target</th>
<th>SDG Indicator</th>
<th>Project Findings and Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.5-</td>
<td>5.5.1 Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments and local governments</td>
<td>Country profile of 2013 recommends Pakistan to increase legislative quotas to ensure women’s equal participation in political domain but there are serious lags in implementation of this recommendation. Females do not have equal opportunities for political leadership and economic participation due to lack of access to public spaces due to caretaking roles in their families, wide distance, and lack of transport. In order to enable women for equal opportunities, women are given leadership roles in decision making about their political and economic life which is only possible if they are provided safe public spaces, reliable and safe transport, and support in informal and home-based work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.5.2 Proportion of women in managerial positions</td>
<td>Our findings reflect that there is a miniscule proportion of women who have ownership of land or other forms of property or lease. Land is more than a natural resource or asset because it is a source of financial autonomy and empowerment. In its current form, Sindh’s legal framework land ownership is focused on patriarchal social norms and financial control mechanisms that can only serve enabled men. Land laws of Pakistan need reforms to make the system inclusive of women’s rights to inheritance and other forms of property.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.a-</td>
<td>5.a.2 Proportion of countries where the legal framework (including customary law) guarantees women’s equal rights to land ownership and/or control</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.c- Adopt and strengthen sound policies and enforceable legislation for the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls at all levels.

In addition to bringing reforms in the current land legislative, there is an urgent need to make the existing framework inclusive of women and other genders or at the very least it should appear gender neutral in its framing. For instance, law contains no reference to women/Females/Transgenders, and it uses the word ‘he’ in land related laws.

SDG #8: Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all.

8.3-Promote development-oriented policies that support productive activities, decent job creation, entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation, and encourage the formalization and growth of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises, including through access to financial services.

Evictions and displacement impact livelihood opportunities for informal businesses, which take away the possibility of any growth, and lead to loss of jobs and further impoverishment. Our findings reveal that not only is support for informal employment opportunities in Karachi non-existent, but the current anti encroachment drive against commercial and residential structures has rendered thousands jobless including home based informal workers who have no other source of income and are left most vulnerable.

SDG #11: Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable

11.1- Ensure access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services and upgrade slums.

In Karachi, the last katchi abadi was regularized in 2019 under SKAA, and since then, slum eradication under anti-encroachment drives has been given priority over slum upgradation.

In the aftermath of displacements, the resettlement sites usually lie on the periphery of the city, with an inadequate provision of infrastructural services and amenities including schools, hospitals, access to electricity, water, transport etc. Thus, the form of housing ultimately provided is neither ‘adequate’ nor ‘safe’ and further impoverishes the residents.

It is our recommendation that planners must look at the benefits of in-situ upgradation and resettlement as evictions and displacements become more rampant across the city.

11.2- Provide access to safe, affordable, accessible and sustainable transport systems for all, improving road safety, notably by expanding public transport, with special attention to the needs of those in vulnerable situations, women, children, persons with disabilities and older persons.

There is a clear suggestion in our data that lack of access to safe public transport is a barrier to educational, health, social, and economic participation of children (especially female children), and women. More importantly, our representative data sets from selected neighborhoods show that there is a substantial population of persons with special needs whose health and social lives are heavily impacted due to lack of inclusive and safe transport.

Therefore, we recommend that future planning and policies should be inclusive and must strive to bring reforms that accommodate vulnerable populations including women, transgenders, children, and most importantly persons with special needs.
11.3- Enhance inclusive and sustainable urbanization and capacity for participatory, integrated and sustainable human settlement planning and management in all countries.

11.3.2- Proportion of cities with a direct participation structure of civil society in urban planning and management that operate regularly and democratically.

Lacking transparency and participation at all stages of a development project excludes the voices of the community and undermines the impact of the project on the lives of the community members.

Gendered participation is particularly lacking as planning and policy implementation is focused around able-bodied male citizens, also excluding migrants, non-lease holding property owners and other groups from income-poor backgrounds.

11.b- Substantially increase the number of cities and human settlements adopting and implementing integrated policies and plans towards inclusion, resource efficiency, mitigation and adaptation to climate change, resilience to disasters, and develop and implement, in line with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, holistic disaster risk management at all levels.

11.b.1 Proportion of local governments that adopt and implement local disaster risk reduction strategies in line with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030

11.b.2 Number of countries with national and local disaster risk reduction strategies

‘Resilience to disasters’ as mentioned in SDG 11.2 relates specifically to climate induced disasters. Disasters need to be considered in far more nuanced ways and the criteria must be broadened to include other kinds of disasters with equally violent outcomes. With evictions increasing across the world to make way for different mega projects, urban renewal projects etc., displacements must be looked upon as disasters which lead to cycles of impoverishment and psychological stress; cascading and linking up to other forms of disasters.

SDG #16: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SDG Target</th>
<th>SDG Indicator</th>
<th>Project Findings and Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16.3 Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all</td>
<td>16.1.3 Proportion of population subjected to (a) physical and (b) psychological violence in the previous 12 months</td>
<td>- Protection of homes is a basic human right and it is directly related to social and psychological health of residents. - Demolitions are seen as a violation of basic human rights by the residents but are not considered as such by courts causing distress and perceived injustice - Courts and legal frameworks should consider occurrence of psychological violence and work with resident and activists to mitigate negative impacts on communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.6 Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels</td>
<td>16.3.1 Proportion of victims of violence in the previous 12 months who reported their victimization to competent authorities or other officially recognized conflict resolution mechanisms</td>
<td>The issue of accessing the superior courts has also been highlighted in this report. The accessibility requires that people affected by violence must approach civil society organizations and activists to be noticed, heard and to be considered a matter of importance. Otherwise the competent authorities due to low visibility of issues in the public or on media neglect issues of significance such as that of shelter as discussed in our report. For instance the Civil Appeal by residents of Ghareebabad Colony, PIDC was decided under Supreme Court’s order. Similarly, orders by NCHR highlighting violations of human rights were not considered by courts when making orders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.10</td>
<td>Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.10.2</td>
<td>Number of countries that adopt and implement constitutional, statutory and/or policy guarantees for public access to information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Right of Access to Information Act, 2017 has been implemented in Pakistan and adopted through the provincial legislatures however the weak implementation renders the law of no use. Issues such as non-availability of information, no response to submitted RTI requests and lack of support in this respect by the Information Commissioner render the enforcement of this law completely useless.

| 16.a | Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime. |
| 16.a.1 | Existence of independent national human rights institutions in compliance with the Paris Principles |

The Ministry of Human Rights has established various organizations for the protection of human rights in Pakistan, the issue of non-implementation of these organizations’ observations and recommendations remains unresolved.
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